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Preface: The study´s  objective and method 
 
The author is Seniore Lecturer and  Lawyer in Public and Private Law on Economics, 
European Integration Law  and International Law on Contracts, Berlin,Germany.  
 
The present study is the extended, deepened and actualized version of the lecture  
“ The European Union´s 21st  Century Design in International Security and 
Cooperation”  the author has held at the International University Bremen and at the 
Otto-von-Guericke University of  Magdeburg, Germany, in 2002 – 2004. 
  
The author owes his 35 years of experience in European Integration Politics and Law  to  
serving in the Comission of the European Community, in the German Foreign Office 
and  in  the German public administration where he participated in designing the 
German position on the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty establishing the European 
Union. 
 
 
It is this study´s method  to    apply  the lesson taken from the dynamically gradual 
stages in European integration history  to  the evaluation of current issues challenging 
the  European Union. 
 
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe failed-until now- entire ratification. 
It is still not clear how to overcome the present deadlock, whether 
 
 through political intervention by  establishing a new Treaty  text labelled 
“Constitution” and,  by doing so, again risking  misunderstandings  to invest a 
new order, a static order similar to the static nature of nation state´s 
Constitution,  or  
 
 through a short, concise Treaty merging  the existing Founding Treaties on 
European Union and European Community along the traditional line of the 
dynamic, gradual evolvement of the  European integration and cooperation. 
 
Whatever form of a text  will actually turn out, the enlarged European Union´s identity 
and legitimacy is the crucial issue: how to further develop  the Union´s  constitutional 
essentials – democracy, transparency and decisiveness- , essentials to be incorporated in 
a new Treaty text. 
 
The study´s method of applying the lesson taken from European integration history is 
exemplified in chapter IX also, applying the findings to the Union´s role played in the 
field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy focussing on the Union´s experience 
made in the years 2001-2003 after the September 11 attacks  and on the current crucial 
issue of international security and cooperation politics of how to overcome the deadlock 
in Iraq and the serious prospect of another deadlock in Afghanistan. 
 
This study undertakes to describe the dynamic nature of the stepwise, gradual 
development of the European integration through further improving the  constitutional 
quality essentials under the Founding Treaties. The European integration has owed its 
successes to the Monnet method of integration, gradually, dynamically developing the 
European Community and the European Union as an ever closer Union among the 
peoples of Europe,  but intentionally keeping open the exact final design of  the Union, 
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its “finalité”, and just  due to this openness facilitating the integration policy. The 
openness about the Union´s final design helped  to avoid the revitalization of, in some 
Member States, still existing misunderstandings concerning the nature of the European 
Union, still believing that any   federal or quasi federal nature of the European Union 
would be synonymous with “central state “ or would lead the Union to become a 
European  Superstate.  
 
The Monnet integration method, therefore,  also experienced its limits, facing a dilemma 
of how to continue  the successful integration process without giving a clear final design 
of the European Union. The more the EU enlarged with now twentyseven members, the 
more the doubts about the Union´s identity,namely its decisiveness, increased ,and thus 
the Union´s need of legitimacy increased requiring  broad democratic approval by the 
European citizens. The European cititens´ broad approval,however, requires the citizens 
to understand the nature of the European Union. This does not necessarily mean to 
present a final design of the Union to the citizens.  
 
Surely, a European  identity feeling would be difficult  to develop and  maintain if the 
citizens are facing a  integration method only. Establishing a constitution can be taken 
as political signal giving an European identity building political impulse. But 
establishing a Constitution  can also be taken as an act of political intervention, it can be 
misunderstood, in the view of the citizens,  as a final design of  the European Union. 
 
A final design of the European Union, if undertaken at the wrong time, may  risk to 
raise misunderstandings about the European Union´s legal and political nature.  The 
European identity is still being shaped, still having to  sharpen a common conviction of  
an European Union which is balancing liberal economic market policy and social 
responsibility and solidarity policy as well to cope with the globalization challenges. The 
European identity shaping is still ongoing, there does not yet exist a Europeanwide 
common conviction of the constituting common basic objectives and values concerning 
the basic correlation between  economic  liberties and social responsibilities and 
solidarity. Presenting  a legal document formally called “constitution”, may give the 
impression of  establishing a static nature of the European Union, thus confusing the 
dynamic nature of the European identity shaping  which is still “under construction” 
and  successful just due to the openness of the Union´s final design. And abandoning that 
traditional openness through establishing a Constitution for Europe may just contradict 
the Constitution´s intention and even blockade the European Union to further deepen 
and develop democracy, transparency and decisiveness.  
 
 
The study´s method of applying the lesson taken from European integration history  to  
current issues of European Union´s policy will be further exemplified by focussing on 
the Union´s role played in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy  in the 
years 2001-2003 after the September 11 attacks. After the European Union as 
organization had been bypassed by the EU´s Member States joining the wars in 
Afghanistan and in Iraq, it is the  current crucial issue of international security and 
cooperation politics of how to overcome the deadlock in Iraq and the serious prospect of 
another deadlock in Afghanistan through the European Union´s contributions to 
multilateral actions determined to help winning the peace in Afghanistan and Iraq 
focussing on civil reconstruction bejond merely military actions. 
 
---------------------- 
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Chapter   I 
 
A.   Introduction 
 
1. On 1 January  2007, the European Union took in two new Member States: Bulgaria and 
Rumania..  The European Union and its 27 Member States will face several most important 
challenges and decisions in the year 2007 and the years  ahead: 
 
- The issue of how to improve, if possible through overcoming the ratification deadlock 
of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe after ratification had failed in 
France and in the Netherlands,  the effectiveness, the decisiveness of the European 
Union´s policies and institutions within the enlarged European Union of the 
Twentyseven in order to effectively cope with the challenges of globalization and 
worldwide risks to international security: to be safe e.g. from international terrorism, 
religiously misguided fanaticisms, risks for  energy supply , risks for climate change; 
- Preparing further accessions of  new Member States, namely States from Southern-
Central Europe like Croatia: 
- The new design of  a Neighbourship Policy as the EU  has got and will get new 
neighbours in the course of new Memberships. 
 
 
After the EU´s enlargement of the Twentyseven, there is urgency acknowledged to implement 
institutional reforms in order to maintain the EU´s cohesion and capacity for decisive action. 
The central provisions of the  Treaty on the Constitution of the European Union were and still 
are meant to deepen the Union, to strengthen the decisiveness and effectiveness  as well as the 
democratic legitimacy of the enlarged EU. For, the political leaders in the EU and experts at 
EU affairs do basically agree that the existing Nice Treaty on European Union was and still is 
no sufficient legal and political framework to satisfy the requirements to help the European 
Union of  then 25 and now 27 or even more Member States to respond to future challenges in 
a world of permanent modernization and globalization .  
 
The EU, however, is in a severe crisis. The constitution must be ratified in  27  countries, 
some of which, including France and the Netherlands had held popular referenda: where 
exactly the constitution failed to get the acceptance through ratification according to the 
respective national constitutional procedures. On 29 May 2005 the French electorate had 
voted against ratification of the European Constitution. On 1 June 2005  Dutch voters also 
voted against ratifying the European Constitution. 
It is still an open question of how to overcome that deadlock. The constitution's passage  is 
still far from being guaranteed. The European Union´s Heads of State or Government  Spring 
Summit on 8-9 March 2007 has been focussing on a different issue: new reduction caps of 
CO2 emissions to combat global warming.The German EU presidency which is in charge 
during the first half of 2007 is reported to plan to present to the European Council meeting 
next 21-22 June 2007 a schedule for deciding how to resolve the deadlock, the final decision  
is planned under the presidency of Portugal or Slovenia, at a time, actually, between the 
French Presidential elections which are to take place in April/May 20007 elections and the 
elections to the European Parliament to be held in 2009.  
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The so-called “Berlin Declaration” planned for the special meeting of the Heads of State or 
Government on March 25, marking the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of  Rome, signed on 
March 25, 1957, is meant by the German Presidency to send out a positive message of unity 
but without giving any detailed information on how to overcome the deadlock constitutional 
issue. There is not a text of  draft of the Berlin Declaration yet at the time of publishing the 
present study. The German Presidency is reported to draft it after the Spring Summit on 8-9 
March., and it is  also reported, anyway, to suggest that the Berlin Declaration will boil down 
to the “lowest common denominator”. The Berlin Declaration will therefore have to wait  to 
be examined later in the course of further developments of the constitutional issue. 
 
In view of the continuing uncertainties about the Constitution, there is, therefore, much 
academic and political discussion on alternatives in case of definite failure of  the  Treaty on 
Constitution to get all ratifications completed and necessary for entering into force.  
 
The failure of the  Treaty on Constitution to get the approval in the French and Dutch 
plebiscites was held due, partly, to a lack of transparency the French and Dutch voters were 
missing in terms of how to  understand the EU´s Constitution.  The document of the  Treaty 
constitution is long and, to many, bafflingly complex, it actually emerged not as an exactly 
pretty document itself—it runs over 200 pages. And in addition to this technical aspect, an 
even more substantial feeling of scepticism is held responsible for the negative French and 
Dutch votings: a widespread feeling in the EU, that due to the present and future extent of the 
EU´s enlargement, the citizens in the European Union are uncertain about the Union´s  
identity and legitimacy.  
 
No doubt, the Draft Treaty on EU Constitution was the final result of  a long standing public 
debate on the emerging of a European Constitution. But the discussion about the future EU 
constitution was a discussion between eliterian Members of the Convent. In the view of the 
people within in the EU, the functional role of the EU´s Constitution still kept on being 
unclear:  Would  the EU Constitution be a genuine new political and legal instrument to create  
a EU  Superstate ? If so, critics of the EU´s Constitution saw  reason enough to fight against 
it.  
Or was and still is  the EU´s  Constitution no instrument to create a EU Superstate, and 
nothing else but  the written text as a better sum up of what already exists : a reviewed  
Founding Treaty on EU(Nice),already having constitutional quality, but lacking transparency 
and having difficulty in enhancing legitimacy, having difficulty in convincing the European  
people about the objectives, policies and powers  of the EU ?   
 
In view of the political timetable as set up by the Presidential elections in France in April,May  
2007, as well as by the elections to the European Parliament to be held in 2009, it is important 
in the first instance for  the German Presidency during the first half of the year 2007 to reach 
reliable consent for a plan to carry out the institutional reforms necessary for the enlarged EU: 
the deepening of the EU by strengthening its decision- making procedures as to the existing 
number of Member countries, and by improving its capacities  before any further new 
enlargements: the identity and the effectiveness issue of the European Union as the focal 
points the  Treaty establishing a Constitution for  Europe  was expected to contribute to 
improve the Union´s  democracy, transparency  and efficiency. 
 
The attempts at drawing up and establishing a Constitution for Europe is   not a new stage in 
the process of  fulfilling the idea of European integration. The future oriented dynamism of 
developing Europe´s identity should not make forget that  Europe´s identity shaping basic  
principles of liberty, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and equality, of 
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tolerance and of the rule of law had been developed in Europe´s past during the European 
Centuries of the enlightenment and fighting for civil rights and democracy, whereas the 
period of peace and consent for unity building in Europe is lasting  a relatively short period of 
time since the end of the Second World War, with fortunately only one exception of the war 
in southeast Europe, in the former Yugoslavia. The  process of European integration can, 
therefore, not be viewed as an isolated process caused exclusively by World War II.  
 in southeast Europe, in the former Yugoslavia.1 And the endeavors of establishing a 
Constitu-tion for Europe are another stage in the dynamic process of European integration to 
make the enlarged Union work  proving effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
As to the peoples´ needs of  effectiveness and efficiency in European integration, the 
European Union of twentyseven Memberstates is not functioning optimally. Politically, 
people within the European Union feel  disoriented about the objectives and the benefits of 
the European Union. This had turned out by the negative votes in the French and Dutch 
plesbiscites on the  Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (The European 
Constitution): 
 
 Reasons for the  rejection are believed to include fears about national sovereignty and 
national identity, the increasing amount of EU legislation, the pace of enlargement 
and the single currency. 
 
 The rejection of an EU Treaty by two founding members of the EU is unprecedented 
and has caused a crisis among EU leaders on how to proceed. 
 
 There has  been disagreement over whether the ratification process should continue or 
be suspended. 
 
 The Constitution  cannot  come into force unless all 27 Member States ratify it, but 
various scenarios for the future of the EU have been proposed. 
 
 It is possible that  some parts of the Constitution and other, more general reforms, may 
      be  implemented without the Constitution. 
 
 The European  Council, which will meet  in   June 2007, will consider how to 
      proceed. 
 
 
Further progress with European integration and cooperation requires improvements in order to 
restore public confidence in the EU. The currently pending blockade of the ratification 
procedure on the Draft Treaty on EU Constitution can be overcome if the European Union´s 
legitimacy and  identity crisis is resolved. Resolving the crisis requires  thorough response 
to the identity issue of the European Union:  
The  European citizen can identify himself with an European Union if, in his view, the real 
`state ` of the European Union reflects a Constitution that guarantees the citizens´ security, the 
protection of his fundamental rights and his economic and social healthy life and wealth if the  
 
1:  McCormick, John. (1999). Understanding the European Union. St. Martin’s Press. Ch 2.  
 
 
 
 
 23
 
 
following requirements are met: 
 
 legitimacy, democracy, respect for the rule of law and protection of fundamental rights 
 more transparency(openness)of the Union´s  powers and  
      decision-making including subsidiarity,  
 more decisiveness and efficiency of  the EU´s  external and internal political actions 
  a more dynamic common foreign and security policy. 
 
Notwithstanding the outcome of the pending  Treaty on the Constitution might be, measures 
have to be prepared aiming at incorporating  constitutional quality essentials of the EU 
in a concise document, not depending on whether this document will be called 
constitution or whether it will be a fusion of the existing Nice Treaties on European Union 
and European Community, but, at any rate, a document which has to be much more concise 
than the present text of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe as well as  the text of 
the Nice Treaty on European Union. Both texts are not accessible, not legible for the public :  
a fact which basically impedes the necessary public acceptance of any document which wants 
to be called and appreciated as identity shaping “Constitution”.  The  substance of this 
document should bring about: 
 
 greater transparency of the basic values and objectives of the EU 
 a better division of responsibilities between the EU and its Member States, and 
 an increase in the democratic legitimacy of an improved, more efficient decision-
making of the Union´s institutions´ legislator, the Council and the European 
Parliament. 
 
These elements of necessary improvements aiming at raising the EU´s level of political 
acceptance within the EU are focussing on ways in which what might be called the 
“constitutional quality” of the European Union can be improved, even if the formal 
instrument, the current  Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe , might under no 
circumstances enter into force, but the substance of which must “survive” for the sake of  the 
future of the peoples in Europe, and not primarily for the sake of the future of institutions 
in Europe. For, one should not forget that the founding Treaty on European Union  is a 
legal instrument  establishing with constitutional quality  
  
“… a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as 
possible to the citizen. “, Article 1 Treaty on European Union. 2 
it is a stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe and 
not a union among the states  or institutions in Europe.  If and how this could be managed, 
primarily through strengthening the identity and the acceptance  of the European Union in the 
view of the European citizens: that is the present crucial question of life for the European 
Union. 
 
 2  CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION,  Official 
Journal of the European Communities, December 24,2002,  C 325/5 ( 325/10), 
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For, as there is and will be even still greater diversity within the enlarged Union, getting 
people´s acceptance, there must be restored transparency about the basics of the EU, 
marking the EU´s identity, the basic orientation to help the European citizen to identify 
himself with the EU through establishing transparency about the basics of the European 
integration: 
 
 the basic emotions, desires and needs, the motives that were and are causing the 
European integration as stages in the process of an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe 
 the basic  values, objectives, principles and main instruments of the Euoropean 
Union  giving the citizen in Europe  the feeling: he is safe within the EU and 
thanks to the EU: as a living cooperative relationship between the mutually 
influencing and depending working   levels of the EU, the nation states and the 
regional and local levels, working together to cope effectively with   the people´s 
needs.  
The European Union´s enlargement has caused  the  discussion about deepening and/or 
widening the Union, and thus has caused the discussion about the Union´s identity which was 
and still is seen to be at stake if  the enlarged Union is left without strengthening its 
decisiveness for  internal action and for external action abroad and thus risking the Union´s 
cohesion. 
 Successfully examining the perspectives and the extent of  establishing a “Constitution” 
needs a realistic approach to the political and legal nature of the European Union , to the  
existing political and legal rules on the dynamic process of European integration. For,the 
endeavors of establishing a Constitution for Europe are another stage in the dynamic process 
of European integration to make the enlarged Union work. These endeavors are  reflecting 
continuity in  the traditionally proven dynamism of  European integration trying to respond to 
the functional needs of  effectiveness in the realization of the objectives and in the fulfilment 
of the Union´s tasks according to the basic legal principle of effectiveness as laid down in the 
already existing Treaty on European Union which includes even quite a number of basic legal 
principles  having constitutional quality ruling the European integration. 
As regards the establishing of a “Constitution” , for  understanding these endeavors as  a stage 
in the dynamic process of European integration, we turn, in the following chapter, to 
answering the question of “what is the European Union”? What are the dynamics of European 
integration as developed in history?  But, before starting chapter I , we find the twenty theses 
covering the findings of the chapters II – IX. 
B.  Twenty Theses on the State of the Union and the Union´s prospects 
 
20 Theses: 
 
1. Overcoming the present deadlock of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe  requires the method of applying the lesson taken from the process of  
dynamically gradual stages in European integration history to current 
challenges and to the prospects of further reforming the enlarged European Union. 
Reforming  the enlarged European Union means strengthening the Union´s 
constitutional quality essentials – democracy, transparency and decisiveness – through a 
short, concise Treaty merging the existing Founding Treaties on European Union and 
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European Community along the traditional line of   the dynamic, gradual development 
of the European  integration and cooperation.  A political intervention through 
establishing a Constitution contradicts the  intention  of the Constitution´s authors  to 
increase the Union´s legitimacy. A text labelled “constitution” risks misunderstanding 
that a  Constitution would establish a new  and namely static static order like a nation 
state´s constitution . 
 
 
2. The identity issue of the European Union:  key-opener to  the pending issue of  the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and to the constitutional quality essentials 
 
The enlargement of the European Union –now the Union of the Twentyseven-  had rightly 
once been conceived that enlargement b e f o r e  being implemented should be preceded by a 
fundamental reform of the way in which the EU institutions operate, being democratically 
accountable, transparent, with a view to both the efficiency and decisiveness of the Union in 
its various policy fields .  A  deepening of the European Union, not in the sense of adding new 
policy powers but of maintaining the Union´s capacity to act effectively, both inwardly and 
outwardly, close to the European citizen: that had been considered to be necessary, 
constituting   the common consent reached among the Union´s Member States after the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union had entered into force and when the Copenhagen 
summit of the Union´s Heads of State and Government had given  perspectives for Central 
and Eastern European Countries to accede  to the Union.  
 
The Member States, however, did not what they had promised:they did not deepen the 
European Union before enlargement, they were not ready to make the Union more efficient. 
The Member States had lost their basic   momentum: they did not take the chance given by 
the  IGC which had been supposed to make sufficient progress to achieve reforms of the 
decision-making namely in the Council of the European Union. 
Nor did the Amsterdam Treaty on European Union, nor did the Nice Treaty on European 
Union make comprehensive contributions to the needs of the Union´s democratic 
accountability, transparency and both decisiveness and efficiency. 
 
The Member States even failed  the entire ratification of the  Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe  and thus failed to  take the chance of  deepening the Union first by 
strengthening the Union´s democratic accountability and decisiveness before enlarging  when 
the Union became the Union of the Twentyfive on January 1st 2005. Now, the Union being a 
Union of the Twentyseven, since January 1st, 2007,  it is facing the challenge to rescue the 
essentials of the Treaty on Constitution.. And it is still not clear how and when the essentials 
of the Treaty on Constitution can be rescued, whether by a concise amendment to the Treaty 
on Constitution or by amendment to the existing Treaty on EU. Both options have a chance of 
being accepted by the public in the European Union if the text is  concise enough, avoiding 
being labelled “constitution” and if consisting of  constitutional quality essentials only, by 
drawing up: 
 
 the objectives of the Union (  raison d´Etre): anchor of stability for the peoples in 
the Union:  security, peace and wealth in Europe 
 safeguarding fundamental rights and the rule of law 
 basic tasks and instruments 
 guided by basic principles : democracy, transparency and efficiency 
 institutions, basic tasks 
 procedures subject to implementing European laws(regulations) 
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throughout a newly run procedure of  an Intergovernmental Conference. An 
Intergovernmental Conference will have to ensure a professional political approach 
accompanied by public debate close to the citizen in the Member States: 
to  present a new legal framework that reflects  the respect for democratic accountability and 
efficiency of a European Union which is close to the citizens: ratification procedures will be 
successful  if a European public will be encouraged  to accompany the discussions  of experts 
and to realize if and why the citizens of Europe can identify with the European Union. 
 
For, the key opener to solutions of the pending constitution issue is the identity issue of the 
European Union. The label “constitution”  is no primary issue. Approval of  any new text 
requires a picture of the Union which is clear and  acceptable  to millions of voters, a 
challenge which appears nearly impossible to respond to. 
Supposed the French and  Dutch votes on the same text that already failed ratification, a new 
text presented to the  European public and electorate, a successful, transparent and  concise 
text does  not necessarily have to show  the label “ Constitution”. A new text is to    be ratified 
by the entire number of the Union´s Member States. Ratification by all Member States will 
probably be  impossible if a Treaty´s text presents  hundreds of pages again  as the current 
Treaties on Constitution and on European Union and  European Community do. Hopeful 
prospects of ratification by all national electorates  may have a new text that  is  giving a clear 
picture of the Union´s identity. Clear identity shaping features  are only those which  can 
easily be recognized by the European public and not by experts only. The primary 
issue,therefore, is the identity issue, identity shaping essentials of the Union´s transparency, 
democracy and decisiveness.  
 
For, the  term  „ identity „ of the European Union is used here  as  a complex of special 
features that are marking and distinguishing the European Union as en entity from other 
institutions or collectivities of states and from the single Member State of the Union. Identity 
shaping features of the European Union may appear from a variety of different points of view: 
cultural ones, or political, geographic or legal ones. I am talking about the European Union´s 
identity shaping features from a legal point of view:  
the identity  o f   the European Union  is shaped  by the  EU´s   own, specific “merits” as they 
are attributed by the Founding Treaties establishing the European Union and the European 
Community: as  own organisation, endowed with own objectives, own institutions, own 
powers and an own,  autonomous legal order which is independent from the national legal 
orders of the Member States. 
 
These specific, identity shaping features of the European Union are  closely interconnected  
 with  the  c o n c e p t  of national identity and sovereignty . 
 
3.   The nation -state and the European Union are shaped by basic constituent elements : 
Constitutional law and sovereignty of the nation- state, as well Founding Treaties on 
European Union and European Community having constitutional quality. 
 
Constitutional law and sovereignty  are  basic features of the nation -state to legitimate the 
exercise of  legislative power and to  ensure  democratic accountability needed  for any 
exercise of  legislative power  also in post – Westphalian times  :  the European nation -states  
are  the  sovereign Contracting Parties of the Treaty on European Union. 
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National sovereignty is marked by a renewed emphasis on interdependence and on collective 
action, marking a  dialectical relationship between the actors and the system , between the 
nation-states and the EU institutional collectivity . 
 
Sovereignty still exists in modern times of globalization and nowadays `interdependence of  
states seeking to ensure their national interests within a network of a sort of co-existence 
between  
 
 a national core of  sovereignty and  
 a commonly shared and jointly implemented  sovereignty  implemented by all  the 
other  EU Member States or by a limited   number  of Member States. 
 
The objective, the functional role of the concept of sovereignty within the EU as  the 
concept of  a positively joint exercise of sovereignty  is  to reconcile  the dialectics of  
different aspects of  
sovereignty within the multi -level governance EU  structure of  separate, but not   
separable levels of   interdependencies between  national level and EU level , attempting  
at satisfying  the national sovereign´s interest in  
 
 good, namely effective governance on  national level and on Union level, and in 
 making democratic parliamentary control effective, accountable. 
          
4. Democratic accountability is understood here as the control of governance by a set of  
procedures,   the control of governance  which guarantees the participation of those who are   
governed by collectively binding decisions. Democratic accountability increases 
legitimacy. 
       
Legitimacy means a generalized degree of trust of the addressees of these decisions towards 
the  political system as it is,  in legal terms , shaped by the policies to implement the  Treaty 
on the Union, the Treaty on European  Union as the legal  incorporation of common values 
and common objectives, institutions and binding rules of  a constitutional  quality. 
 
As made evident by the French and Dutch refusal of ratification of the Draft establishing a 
Constitution  for Europe, electorates in Member States of the European Union tend to doubt 
about the European Union´s legitimacy.  
 
Independently  from the current Constitution Treaty´s ratification outcome:  
 
Legitimacy strengthening identity shaping  essentials have priority, the formal aspect, 
the legal frame  is less important.  
 
What counts for legitimacy through  acceptability of any text  is the   reasonable and  
legitimate objective  to maintain  and improve  what has been achieved by European 
integration until now by  strengthening: 
 
 democracy , transparency and decisiveness of the European Union 
 
European identity shaping needs legitimacy  of EU governance  through the legal and 
through the  living  constitution implemented on the basis of the current Founding Treaties 
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on European Union, open to public debate and convincing if meeting the requirements of  
exactly these constitutional  quality essentials.. 
 
 
5. The repercussions of European integration on national policymaking and the 
repercussions of national policymaking on European integration require clear and 
explicit constitutional law. National constitutional law has to lay the constitutional basics for 
a transfer of national core competencies to the European level. The objective of this transfer 
of national, mainly legislative powers is a joint exercise of powers creating an autonomous 
legal order  directly affecting the powers of the national  legislature , the Parliament . 
 
6. The Treaty on European Union ( consolidated version after the Nice Treaty on European 
Union )  concluded as a treaty under international law,  is the  European legal framework for 
further stages in the “ process  of creating an ever closer Union among the peoples of 
Europe”. 
The exact legal pattern and nature of the future European Union (the “finalité”) is kept 
open. 
 
 
7. Under the legal and the living  constitution of the European Union: the Treaties 
establishing the European Union and the European Community, the legal entity endowed 
with own institutions and own legislative powers  is the European Community.   The  
founding Treaty establishing the European Community – TEC -,the  first pillar under the 
common roof established by the Treaty establishing the European Union- TEU-,  is the legal 
framework to further develop the European  integration. Integration is the mode of 
cooperation between the Member States to achieve common objectives through 
implementing explicitly and impli citly attributed powers. 
 
8. The European Community-EC- has, gradually, evolved in a dynamic process, evolved 
from what many believed to be a purely intergovernmental international  organization 
governed by public international law into a quasi-federal, “sui generis “ entity with an 
autonomous legal order. 
 
The legal order of the EC is a body of rules which had not been created by one single stroke  
on the  basis of  one single constituting act  in the sense of a national constitution .The legal 
order of the EC has gradually developed from coordinating national policies to establishing 
common rules on the internal market and the common monetary policy and the single 
European currency. The EC´s legal order plays a dynamic functional role of promoting and 
safeguarding the dynamic political evolutive character of the European Community. 
 
It is that special dynamic evolutive  dimension as well as the different levels of density of the 
legal  order of  the EC which make the EC law substantially differ from the more static 
character of  national constitutions and legal systems of the E   
 
9.  The nature of the EC is marked by the nature  of the EC Treaty ´s  primary and  secondary 
law. The founding Treaty on EC, the primary EC law, has constitutional quality. The 
Treaty´s constitutional essentials as constitutional principles in EC law have been crafted out 
as case law by  the European Court of Justice. 
 
The case law crafted constitutional principles in the EC law: effectiveness of Community law,  
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direct effect,  primacy of EC law , principle of  effectiveness  Article 10  EC Treaty ,  
principle of subsidiarity , principle of attributed  powers ( the EC ´s powers are attributed by 
the Treaty , the EC has no state-like  „competence-competence“.  
 
10.  EC jurisdiction is further emanating from a joint  national sovereignty consent to the use, 
within the  Council, of implied Treaty powers , Article 308EC Treaty(exArticle 235) , which 
is limited to creating new competences filling Treaty gaps in order to implement   one of   the 
Treaty objectives but without creating new Treaty objectives. 
 
The growth of EC powers is based on the consensus among the Member States to do a broad 
reading of treaty-based delegations of powers (art. 133, art.94 harmonization of national laws 
directly impeding the establishing and functioning of the common market), find implied  
delegations in the text of the treaty (e.g.the ERTA case)and to use article 308 as an  elastic 
implied powers clause 
Individual member state discretion in the Council to expand or limit the scope of EC powers 
was officially narrowed with the reform of the Treaty of Rome by the Single European Act in 
1986 and the change of the Council Rules of Procedure(  m a j o r i t y   v o t i n g  ). 
  
11. Based on the dynamic and evolutive EC law the EC developed in a stepwise dynamic, 
 evolutive manner and thus shaping the exercise of national  sovereignty : 
 
 The nations of Europe remain and wish to preserve their independence.The old exlusiveness,  
 however, of the Nation  State and of its  old concept of external as well as internal sovereign- 
 ty is weakened, as a   sense of  a common destiny became  aware  of the realities of  common 
 problems ranging  across  national borders and which cannot find solutions by  national mea- 
 sures any more ( international competitiveness, environmental protection, global  warming, 
 cross-bordering international  crime, international terrorism ). 
 
 The European Union´s Member States develop European integration and cooperation in  
  the  present shape of the EC and of the Common Foreign and Security Policy  and  Home  
 Affairs  and  Justice Cooperation under the 2nd and 3rd pillar of the Treaty on European  
 Union. They share  their national sovereignties through decisions made within the Union´s  
  institutions and according to the Treaties´  provisions :  in  order   to keep their ability to   
  cope   with the new  tensions of  the social  and   political life in Europe: 
 
 In the EU sets  of interconnected social and economic problems  call for management by   
 actors operating in different policy-making contexts. Treating sovereign Member States  as   
 independently acting unified actors  vis a vis the EC  or within its institutions  would not  
 reflect the pluralism of modern states nor their way of   behaving   at EU/EC level. 
 
 The European Union has contributed to a re-definition of collective identity, to altering the  
 link between   sovereignty and territory and to a re-distribution of responsibility for public  
 policy across    different levels  of government,  thus shaping a dynamic multi-level  common  
 identity and sovereignty  sharing  : 
 'Multi-level system' identity indicates that the EU includes its member states in an interde- 
  pendent  encompassing system while, as the nature of the EC law demonstrates ,  at the same  
  time, national political,  economic  or legal systems  continue to exist. 
 
 
12.  The EC Treaty´s constitutional principle of  EC effectiveness   and national sovereignty 
are marking a dialectic interdependence between the Member State and the level of a 
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joint sovereignty  share pattern of the Community.  Diversity and unity are indicators of the 
dialectic interdependence between  national Member State level  and the level of jointly  
exercised sovereignty: the core identity shaping feature of  the EC. 
        
 
Sovereignty and the status of being  EC Member State  means basically  that the equal  
participation of   a l l   members  in the decision-making is an essential principle of the 
European Community. 
 
The principle of sovereignty of the Member State basically precludes any institutional 
development  which  would recognise the preeminence of some members .  This principle, 
however , does not exclude solutions  ( weighting of votes, extension of majority voting in the 
EU´s Council )  elaborated in view of  the  enlargement of the EU. .Reforms are meant  to  
ensure the effectiveness of the  acquis communautaire and the decisiveness of   the decision -
making procedures of the Council and of the Commission . 
 
Maintaining   the decisiveness of the EC institutional structures and maintaining the 
effectiveness of the EC within the enlarged Union of the Twentyseven  is of vital interest just 
for the sake of the modern understanding of national sovereignty to find solutions to political 
challenges: they can be met by common action only, namely in the field of  the EC´s  external 
role interconnected with the Union´s Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
 
13. Maintaining   the decisiveness and efficiency of decision-making of the EU institutions 
in the enlarged Union requires alternative, flexible forms of cooperation between the 
Union´s Member States within the Union´s Treaty institutional system without undermining 
the cohesion of the Union. As opting for divergent objectives increases the risk of thc gradual 
disintegration of the Union as a whole,variable geometry should preferably and primarily be  
avoided. Multiple-speed integration allowing the same  common objective for all Member 
States, but the  speed at which the common objective is  achieved individually by each 
Member State varies and covers the two new forms of  closer cooperation and enhanced 
cooperation also: 
 
 
 differentiated integration must be compatible with the objectives of the Treaty on 
European Union; 
 each Member State must be free to participate if it can and wants to meet the 
requirements for the fast track: 
 differentiated integration must not undermine the Community legal order or, in 
principle, impair the cohesion of the internal market; 
 Member States which elect to opt out must not be allowed to oppose the formation of 
a leading group which does meet the above-mentioned criteria. 
 
 
Differentiated integration and cooperation in an enlarged European Union is not a minor issue 
of institutional design for the EU but has to do with basic questions of large-scale politics 
which emerge due to a large variation in territorial and functional units  and a strong coupling 
of these units. On an even more abstract level, it has to do with the vital need of balan - 
cing national identity and collective identity  facing necessary unity as well as diversity 
of EU governance . 
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14.  Unanimity among still sovereign Member States of the European Union  in matters 
         of Foreign and Security Policy does not hamper the Union to be a  decisive external 
         actor 
 
The Member States´ obligation under the Constitution Treaty  to practice solidarity and 
consultation before taking single Member State action  is no innovation, it is a clarification of 
the current Treaty obligations. The obligation to  inform and consult one another within the 
Union´s Council b e f o r e undertaking single States´s  action should be incorporated in any 
new text in case of  the Constitution Treaty´s final entire failure of rafitification. 
 
The enlarged European Union is in need of being a decisive external actor to respond to 
modern challenges to international security and to safeguard interests common to  all Member 
States. The Union´s potential of being a decisive external actor depends on the legal basis 
created by the Treaty on European Union and on the political willingness of the Union´s 
Member States to cooperate within the Union´s  institutions. The Treaty on Euro-pean Union 
offers the legal provisions to make the Union an external actor. The political willingness of 
the Member States to cooperate within the Union´s institutions, however, is subject to  crucial 
tests of  the Union´s management of the Common Foreign and Security Policy  in the realities 
of the Union´s living  constitution:  
facing the crucial task of  balancing  national rights of nation state´s   sovereignty and  
collective interests and identity.  
 
Achieving  the decisiveness of  the enlarged European Union  in the field of Common  
Foreign and Security Policiy including Defence Policy under the legal constitution of the 
Treaty establishing the European Union and under the pending Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe is subject to provisions on unanimity voting in the Council of 
Ministers and in the European Council,on the one hand, and  subject to the Member States´ 
legal obligation to develop mutual political solidarity among Member States, on the other. 
 
The Treaty on Constitution confirms the principle established by the Treaties on EU 
that decisions having defence implications are kept off from majority voting. The legal 
situation remains unchanged: the sovereignty of the Member States is upheld by 
unanimous decision on matters with defence implications, which are matters of life and 
death and not subject to majority voting. 
 
This may hamper decisive action of the European Union as organisation. But, on the 
other hand, the Treaty on Constitution does not set  free the Member States from their 
obligation to develop “  mutual political  solidarity among Member States, the 
identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing  
degree of convergence of Member States' actions.”, Article 39 1st  paragraph, emanating 
from the constitutional principle of  effectiveness, Article 10 Treaty establishing the 
European Community, and confirmed by Article 3  2nd subparagraph  and Article 16 
Treaty on EU: 
“ The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole 
in the context of  its external relations, security, economic and development policies.” 
And: 
 
“Article 16:Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on 
any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that the 
Union's influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and 
convergent action.” 
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No innovation, introduced by the Treaty on Constitution – compared to the Treaties on 
European Union-, but a clarification is what the priniciple of solidarity  exactly  expects 
Member States to do before undertaking any action on the international scene:  to 
consult one another within the Union´s European Council and the Council of Ministers 
( Article 39 5th paragraph Treaty on Constitution). 
 
This clarification  meant to strengthen the Union´s decisiveness in the field of Common 
Foreign and Security Policy should  be secured and be incorporated in any new text or 
in the current Treaty on European Union, if  the efforts made to revive the pending 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe turn out to fail. The Union strongly needs 
legal backing by such precise Treaty provision on consultation within the Union´s institutions 
before Member States undertake single action on the international scene. The incorporation in 
a Treaty would enhance the Member States´ public awareness to obviously comply or not to 
comply with explicit Treaty  rules. That may help to further prevent similar acts of violating 
the  rules of  solidarity as proven  in the course of  coalition building before starting the wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, demonstrated by the case study on the  living constitution and the 
EU´s  external role in chapter IX of the present study. 
 
 
15. The  decisiveness of  the European Union´s   Common Foreign and Security Policy  
        faces  the expectation  gap between  the Union´s legal constitution and living con – 
        stitution 
 
The   clarification made by the (Constitution) Treaty´s explicit formula of the obligation to 
consult before acting is the result of  the  experience the European Union has made. Member 
States of the Union joined the two US led coalitions waging the wars on the Taliban and Al 
Qaida in Afghanistan and on the Iraq.  
According to the findings made in chapter IX of the present study, in both cases the Member 
States of the European Union participated  without informing and consulting one another  
within the Council  before taking action and  thus violating the binding explicit Article 16 
Treaty on EU ruling to inform and consult one another on such a matter of foreign and 
security policy “of general interest“ before undertaking action.  
 
16. Starting and waging the wars in Afhanistan and in Iraq without consulting within 
the Union´s Council before  undertaking action severely affected the Union´s interests to 
assert its values on the international scene: 
 
This is the European Union´s chance to contribute to influence  the further policy 
making in international security politics especially to influence 
  
 the strategies on winning the peace in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and , actually, to 
influence 
  any further  political decision-making on extending anti –terror actions to other  
potential war theatres , e.g. Iran. 
 
The European Union will have that chance if  the EU Member States considering  to join an 
international coalition use the EU´s  institutional framework of  enhanced cooperation in the 
field of  the Common Foreign and Security Cooperation including Defence Cooperation for 
common actions that are  not limited to military actions only: the whole range of EU´s  
instruments available for contributions to civil reconstruction. 
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For, what the European Union, bejond purely  military contributions and bejond technical  
and financial assistance to civil reconstruction,  can contribute   to international security is a 
poli-tical know-how of  high political and  practical value: after the experiences made in 
World  War II , the basic and well practiced idea of cooperation : to show countries like the 
shattered Iraq how to overcome the disastrous situation starting from zero, after having 
cleared who are the internal and external actors willing to cooperate for civil reconstruction: 
 
 by designing and  constructing  the cooperation of different nationalities  through  
 safeguarding the identities of   different nationalities and 
 establishing a Community, a federation by 
 
 pooling parts of  sovereignties and 
 
 jointly exercising them 
 to achieve common objectives  
 through common institutions and decisions 
 according to common rules  
 agreed upon on the  basis of  equality and solidarity. 
 
What the European Union can contribute- in terms of high political added value -is the 
experience that international security cannot  be achieved  a g a i n s t      each other ,  but 
through  cooperation only : 
 
The European Union developed  common political objectives  and instruments enabling  
the single Member Country to safeguard and promote its national interests within a 
Community of Member Countries that respect national identities within a  variety of  political 
, economic, social , diplomatic and military Policies that are implemented by interdependent 
and complementary  cooperation  of  Union level and Member States´ levels : 
practicing a combined system of integration and cooperation, thus balancing the needs of 
national sovereignty and common objectives that can better be achieved by the Community 
than by single nation state action, and with respect for democratic accountability. 
 
 
 
17.  The European Union is in a dilemma between EU efficiency and the constitutional 
law claiming  democracy  
 
The concept of a positively joint multi-level exercise of sovereignty - thus marking collective 
EU identity-  has a functional role to ensure the   efficient running of the EU . The concept of 
a positively joint multi- level exercise of sovereignty contributes to  reconciling the dialectics 
of  different aspects of sovereignty within the multi -level governance EU  structures   of  non   
separable   interdependencies between  national  level and EU level , reconciling  
                                     
- the national Sovereign´s interest to ensure, on EU level,  good, namely effective 
governance to meet the needs of the individuals through efficiently  running  
EU institutions which may  present a dilemma between EU efficiency  and 
gaps in  democratic control on EU level , 
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- whereas the national Sovereign´s interest may also seek to  ensure,on national 
level the  democratic accountability of  governance in EU matters  by making 
democratic parliamentary    control more effective on national level. 
  
From the post Westphalian modern concept of sovereignty and identity, asking for a full 
parliamentarization of  the EU – making the European Parliament the primary legislator under 
democratic control of a European electorate in direct elections to the European Parliament and 
giving the European Parliament the right to initiate EU legislation, the latter of which  the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe rightly avoids-   would appear to be unfeasible, 
at least premature : 
             
The reasons why a full parliamentarization of the EU would appear unfeasible, at least 
premature  are political and structural ones: National models of democracy developed in the 
national context cannot be simply transferred to the European Union, at least not by pure 
intervention through intergovernmental consent without considering the lack of  a cross-
bordering European public and of a common  European awareness. A political strategy of 
democratic intervention based on such a transfer would not necessarily lead to a more  
democratic  EU and would not lead to an increase in its legitimacy nor to an increase in its 
efficiency . 
 
The EU is aspiring to some new form of democratic system which carves up  legitimacy on its 
own, on the basis of a Constitution for the EU. A Constitution  in the way of a formal text 
called “constitution” would raise wrong ideas about the nature of the European Union, while 
the current Treaty on European Union contains a complex system of provisions on 
constitutional quality essentials without labelling  the Treaty on European Union “ 
Constitution”. 
             
Democracy and identity building cannot simply be installed by political intervention 
through an intergovernmental  act called “Constitution” for Europe: 
  
-Democracy and identity are linked to particular social preconditions which are only partially 
existent in  the EU  and which    cannot be created by political intervention .The  decision of 
the Heads of State or Government , July 2003, to adopt the Convention´s draft Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe had to be  submitted for approval by  national 
Parliaments or national referenda : this is meant by „ political intervention „. 
 
 Democracy requires the existence of  a  c o l l e c t i ve   i d e n t i t y  which does - not  yet -   
 exist on the level of the European Union´s institutions. 
              
But for the time being what counts is that the EU  has to work on established    notions of 
democratic legitimacy through showing  the national electorates why they can identify 
with the EU, making the EU  idea  more transparent, democratic and efficient in a 
concise text,recalling the common: 
 
 -  basic values all EU members are committed to , 
-   interest in shaping an „  ever closer Union among the peoples of  Europe” 
-   fundamental rights protected by the Union 
-    objectives,  competences, powers of the EU including the European Community 
 
contained in a basic document that might be called „ Constitution of the European Union „, 
but should not be called “Constitution”. It is preferable to merge the current Treaty establi- 
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shing the European Union, the Treaty establishing the European Community and  the Trea- 
ty establishing a Constitution for Europe in a single, concise document containing the 
constitutional quality essentials only, mentioned above,while detailed implementing 
provisions should be subject to subsequent implementing agreements. 
 
 
18.  The national gateway to democratic European Union Governance are the national  
  Constitutions of EU Member States  
 
The Member State´national constitutions  do more or less explicitly contain clauses which 
allow the national legislature to transfer national legislative powers to the European Union . 
Those national constitution clauses opening a transfer of national  powers have to be  in 
accordance with basic principles of national constitutional law, namely with the principle of 
democracy. 
Any transfer of national legislative powers  to the EC level  for a joint exercise  has to respect 
basic  principles of national  constitutional law.,namely  with the principle of democracy, 
 
 
The suprastatism established in the first pillar of the Union Treaty is provisional.  National 
sovereignties are delegated rather than surrendered. Such a delegation of sovereignties is acceptable,  
as long  as the criteria of  the Constitution are upheld ,  criteria ,as they once  were set up by the  1993 
verdict  (BVerfGE, 17, 155-213)  of the German Constitutional Court : 
 
The joint use of  competences transferred to the European Community ( the 1st pillar of the Treaty on 
EU, the pillar allowing EC legislation )  must be marginal in relation to the functioning  of the 
Member State democracy as a whole, and the uses to which these competences are put at the   
European level must be predictable. The delegation of national sovereignty must also be revocable;    
that is, the national authorities must retain the prerogative to re-assume the powers delegated if the 
criteria of marginality and predictability are not met.  
The German Constitutional Court deemed these three criteria to have been met, and so concluded that 
the  ratification of the Treaty was consistent with the demands for democratic accountability laid down   
in the Basic Law.   
Applying that  basic idea to a merger Treaty containing constitutional provisions meant 
to improve the European Union´s identity, namely its decisiveness, making the decision-
making of  the EU´s Council of a Union of the Twentyseven more transparent ,  more  
democratic and more efficient:  
it means that such a merger Treaty would not be a major shift of powers between  
national and Union level. The joint use of competences transferred to the EU/EC (the 1st 
pillar  ) would remain marginal in relation to the functioning of the Member States´ 
democracy as a whole, predictable and the delegation of national sovereignty remains 
revocable. A merger Treaty  would thus comply with the national constitutions´ general 
demands for democratic  accountability. 
 
 
 
 
19. The identity and legitimacy issue: Increasing the  European  Union´s democratic 
quality should accept the proposal made by the Treaty  establishing a Constitution: 
improving  the information of national Parliaments on planned European Community  
legislation. 
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Due to the Community´s  legal  effect on the national legislature and government, the EU/EC 
needs legitimacy within the Member States: public debates and political control if  and to 
what extent belonging to the Union is in the peoples´interest. The parliamentary character of 
the national EU governance  system,   in the    sense of  a decisive  say for political 
representatives who are directly legitimated, does  suffer . The national  ministers in the 
Council (and de facto often bureaucrats in the working groups) are the crucial decision-
makers  at the EU level, not a legislature that can be held accountable in general elections.  
The practice of  the EU/EC Council´s decision-making is not transparent enough to ensure 
democratic accountability. National governments regularly interact with the other 
governments in the EC Council of Ministers, they would  participate in package deals and in 
the relevant political give-and-take across issue areas – which is  in  practice outside effective  
control of other national actors , namely the national Parliament.  The national  ministers as 
well as their administrations will join the common   practice of showering EU related 
informations on the Members of  national Parliaments   hoping for their weakening by an 
overload of information . 
 
An effective democratic procedure  has to be established on a level which , in the realities of 
the EU, guarantees the participation of those who are the adressees of  EC legislation ( 
identity building  democratic participation ) : this is  to strengthen the  national  level of 
democratic accountability procedures through improved information of national   Parliaments 
on planned EC legislative acts before the Council adopts EC laws.  National Parliaments 
control their  own  Governments´ members voting in the Council. Improved democratic „ 
participation „of national  Parliaments is an identity shaping  element enhancing public 
awareness of EU matters in the Member States: The direct elected Members of the 
national Parliament can be held responsible by their voters  in EU matters. This makes a 
greater say for the Parliament , the still national Sovereign , in EU governance to be an 
imperative. 
 
 
An assessment of the effectiveness of the national Parliaments´ rights of control  in EU 
governance  matters shows that the legal control powers of the national  Parliament are   
hardly to be exercised in every day EU politics . 
 
Attempting to find effective compensation measures in practice in order to strengthen the  
democratic accountability of national Governments´ EU governance ,  as a consequence for  
constitutional   law policy making , this is an issue of  making effective  a greater say  of the 
national Parliament in  influencing and controlling the Government´s voting in the Council. 
An EU Treaty provision cannot  organize an effectively running and  cooperative  working 
relationship between national parliament and government which reconciles  
 
 the government´s needs  of  efficient representation of national interests on the   level 
of the EU institutions , and 
 the claims of the Constitution to seek to democratic accountability of EU governance. 
 
 
A  merger EU Treaty, however, can provide for improved communication ties between  EU 
Commission and Council to inform national Parliaments on planned legislative acts before the 
Council and the European Parliament decide. 
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20.  In sum,  an  European  i d e n t i t y  is substantially shaped  through transparent, 
democratic and efficient European governance. Sovereignty in the post Westphalian 
concept of the nation State´s identity   is  representing a compromise between  
 
 the independent pursuit of national interests and  
 their redifinition as  s h a r e d  interests  
 
to be pursued through common policies to be decided and implemented through 
integration and cooperation within the institutions of the European Union according to 
the provisions of  the legal “constitution” and – in the living constitution -with respect 
for  the  identity shaping   
 
 common values and basic principles, 
 respect for human dignity,fundamental rights and the rule of law, 
 common objectives to be achieved  
 through common policies  and institutions acting 
 with transparency, democracy and efficiency. 
 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Chapter II 
The European Union  under construction 
 
A.  Introduction:   
      The Nature of the EU – a “ sui  generis  actor” 
       according to the Founding Treaty on EU  and to its  dynamic  
       development 
 
Preliminary remark :  
In this study  the terms “EC” and “EU” are used in accordance with the explanation in Note 
on Post-Maastricht Terminology. 3 
  C.M.L.R. 4, 4-7(1994). Consequently, the terms EU and Union generally apply to the 
European political entity created by the Maastricht Treaty in the shape of the Nice Treaty on  
European Union, whereas the terms EC and Community generally refer to the legal entity or 
first pillar in the EU under the treaty on EU architecture. . 
 
 
 
The basic question about sovereignty in modern times of internationalization and European 
integration  is : what is exactly the meaning of   national sovereignty in times of globalization 
and nowadays´ `interdependence of all States: does national autonomy still exist ?  
 
The answer will be given by  looking at the nature of the EU law, For, there exists a mutually 
influencing correlation between national law and EU law,legitimated and limited by national 
law, as well as the exercising of attributed EU powers is marking the extent of national 
sovereignty. To clarify the correlation existing between the legal order of  the EU   and the 
national law, we need to know: 
 
What is the legal effect of  legal acts of the  EC on the Member State´s sovereignty ?  What is 
the EU and its  legal  order about ?   
  
Are there any needs  and, if so, any criteria for opening the national Constitution to the 
modern forms of multi-level  shared sovereignty within the EU ? 
        
 
The Founding Treaty on EU, called the primary EU law, and the secondary  law as 
created on the basis of primary law,compose the legal order of the EU. The primary law  
is a body of rules  which had not been created by one single stroke: its existence is not based 
on one single constituting act in the sense of  one constitutional form in the sense of a national 
constitution .We realize a specific, dynamic development of the primary  law  of  the EU.as 
well as  a dynamic development of the EU/EC´s secondary law.  
 
 
3: Common Market Law Review, C.M.L.R. 4, 4-7(1994). 
 
 
 39
It is the special, dynamic dimension of the EU´s legal order which makes the EU law 
substantially differ from the more static character of the national legal systems of the EU 
Member States including the  more static character of national constitutions :  
 
The  dynamic development  of the legal order of the EU is to be understood as being closely 
interconnected , correlated with the dynamic character of the development of the  EU as such, 
as legal entity,collectivity of the EU Member States. 
 
The legal nature of this collectivity of the EU Member States, i.e. its constitutional quality, 
depends on the spe- cific provisions of the Founding Treaty on EU. In order to understand  the 
legal nature of  the EU, its constitutional quality,we will  analyse    the nature of  the EU 
primary and secondary law ,on the basis of  Treaty provisions and  rulings of the 
Court(the European Court of Justice). We,first,   make a survey of the EU´s history,  the 
basic lines of the stepwise dynamic development of the EU integration, the dynamic 
evolutive development of its   institutional structures and its impact on the preservation 
of  national sovereignty. The outlining of the dynamic development of the EU  will help 
to better understand the dynamics of the EU law and the specifics of a  constitutional 
quality of the EU which is a specific stage in the process of creating an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe(Article 1 Treaty on European Union). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. The European Union´s dynamic development  
     creating  a   unique entity “sui generis 
 
I.  The European Union´s  basic motive to perform the dynamics of stages 
     in  a process of  creating an ever closer Union  
 
 
The European Union is the European nation states´ common answer to  challenges they 
had been facing together, they are facing and they will be facing: 
Sovereignty in the sense of the post-Westphalian nation State has been changed ,  
reshaped , adjusted to modern challenges to the nation State´s power :  
   
preventing wars in Europe, world-wide crisis prevention(Kongo), world-wide crisis-
management, Bosnia and Kosovo,globalisation and competitiveness , terrorists´attacks, war 
on Iraq, war in Afghanistan, global warming, safe energy supplies, proliferation of  nuclear 
weapons, Israel-Palestine conflict, famine,droughts,civil wars and poorness in Africa, flows of 
refugees, decline in birth-rates, maintaining economic growth and sustainable schemes of 
social security: these topics on the common agenda demonstrate that no single country can  
provide all the political, economic , social and military means necessary to prevent or manage 
crisis .  
   
Therefore , neither the nation State nor the Union are the solo player in the European 
structure.The European Union as the common shape of both the Nation state and their 
common actions of shared common exercise of sovereignty is the modern adequate respond to 
challenges which are beyond reach of individual and independent nation State influence .  
 40
   
 
Therefore, the collectivity of the EU´s Member States composing the EU has developed the 
dynamics of gradually building the EU : 
 
 
 
II.  Milestones of a stepwise dynamic development of the EC integration, 
      History and Institutions 
 
.  1.   Introduction: The dynamic, evolutive character of the European  
         Union as developed in the history of the European Union, creating a  
          unique entity “sui generis” 
 
The European Community   has evolved from what many believed to be a purely 
intergovernmental organization governed by public international law into a quasi-
federal entity with an autonomous legal order. 
 
The European Union, which came into being on November 1, 1993, was the result of decades 
of evolution, of a dynamic process of gradual advancing  - and the EU is certainly not the last 
word in European political and economic integration. lt can be understood only as part of a 
historical process which began during World War II and which is continuing, without drawing 
a final design of  itself if we look at Article 1 of the Treaty on European Union which is called  
“a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer Union among the peoples of 
Europe”,while leaving the final design, the “finalité” of the Union, open –for good reasons of 
political wisdom. 
 
The major theme in the following  history survey  is that the European Union has , in a 
dynamic stepwise approach, developed into a unique entity, which cannot be evaluated 
by conventional analysis., but which has to be evaluated on its own merits that are proved 
by the will and actions taken by the European States gradually  building the Union and 
expressing their will through negotiating, making joint agreements and signing Treaties 
creating the  common European law they are voluntarily submitted to. 
  
The main characteristic feature of the EU, starting with the  EC , from its beginning on ,  had 
been  and still is  its dynamic character ,  its dynamic evolutive character : 
 
As one decisive step had been reached, new tasks were undertaken, new stages in the process 
of creating an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe. So did,for example,  the  
Maastricht Treaty  set up the scenario of  the stepwise implementation of  creating one single 
European currency , the EURO  , in the course of the 1990´s .  
 
To understand the European Union´s nature , it is, due to specific characteristics ,  better to 
avoid all the familiar descriptions of national or international law . It is a common set of 
special features of the EC which has formed the very specific nature of the EC and 
which transcends a mere intergovernmental co-operation between the EC member 
States , and which may show an analogy  in a comparison with the features of  a federal 
State , but which is not a federal State . 
 
If, for example we hold the EU to the standard of a nation-state (even a decentralised one like 
Belgium, Canada, or the United States), we always will be disappointed. But if we recognize 
it as a unique and largely successful effort at democracy building by sovereign states without 
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historical precedent, we will realize , weaknesses and  whatever the EU does, however,it 
actually is done to advance  national security objectives  of the peoples of Europe and  
international security objectives of stability and peace.  
 
The  basic philosophy of the European Union as a  sui generis  entity is: The nations of 
Europe remain and wish to preserve their independence . The old exlusiveness , however , of 
the Nation  State and of its  old concept of external as well as internal sovereignty is 
weakened , while  a sense of  a common destiny was appearing being aware of the realities of 
common problems ranging  across  national borders and which cannot find solutions by 
national measures  any more . 
 
 The common spirit , so much hoped for by the founders of the European Communities , has 
not extinguished national egoism . The need , however , to co-operate for the common benefit 
of all has found recognition . 
 
  In the period of growing and far-reaching effects of the globalization limiting  the economic 
and political  effectiveness of  national  politics , it is due to the EC that against  strong 
temptations for protectionist practices and  national separatism,, the EC could  maintain the 
open market   and withstand disruptive tendencies , namely by strong EC competition law  
measures against distortions of  competition . 
 
It was and still is, however, not easy to understand the European Union´s natur : few 
Europeans fully understand it either.  
 
The European Union is one of the least understood, least recognized success stories in post-
World War II history.  
lt is a great experiment in building democracy and the free market,  an experiment carried out 
by former enemies who have gone to war three times in little over one hundred years. Bad 
news always tend to be “good” news to attract the public´s attention. The success story of the 
European Union is good news, if it works well, it is no topic on the top of the agenda of daily 
public interest, and it appears even to be taken for granted that its growing strength and 
maturity as a jointly working of a collectivity of 27 states with 493 million inhabitants are in 
the best interests of the peoples of Europe and international stability , of world peace and 
economic progress.  
 
There are no precedents for what is being done by the European Union :  
 lt is not a regional organization like the Organization of American States, nor a purely 
economic entity like the former General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Trade 
Organization-WTO-,nor an international organization like the United Nations. lt is not a 
customs union, nor is it a classical nation-state. lt is a sui generis supranational organization of 
nation states in which these states have pooled parts of national sovereignty for joint exercise 
of common powers in many areas, while retaining full sovereignty  in others. 
 
The EU evolved by fits and starts. lt has sped forward at times and, at other times, has seemed 
to stand motionless. But it has never gone backwards, never dismantled its institutions, never 
given up its  prerogatives. Contained within the greater Union, national enmities that have 
millenium-long histories have been laid to rest. 
 
The European Union is now an essential partner in securing political and economic interests : 
the interests of  liberty , democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,  the 
rule of law and the interests of the free market  in the post-Cold War world. 
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2. History of the European Union: from the Monnet-method to the European Union 
 
Many historic strands came together to create the European Union. Limiting the 
prospects for violent conflict dominated the thinking of Europe’s post-war elites. Today, a war 
waged in Western Europe is beyond imagination, the basic drive for European 
integration,however, is firmly held despite obstacles. Following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the European Union has undertaken to deepen integration by making the enlarged 
Union an anchor of stability to  work efficiently and to respond to modern worldwide 
challenges which are common to all Member States of the European Union. 
. 
The European integration  had earlier beginnings than World WarII.  During  19
th 
Century, the 
notion of European integration had  support from various thinkers, philosophers and leaders.4
 
After the devastation of World War I and with the  failed League of Nations, there was much 
pleading  for bringing the  peoples of  Europe together under a supranational structure.5
 
In 1929, France explicitly suggested “organizing Europe” towards an eventual system of 
Federal Union..6 France and Germany The French Foreign Minister,Aristide Briand,and the 
German Foreign Minister, Gustav Stresemann had made a joint effort  to define a plan for a 
European union.7
 
Unfortunately, this proposal  could not keep Europe from plunging into 
World War II. During World War II, the United Kingdom intensively argued in favor  of  a 
European union understanding it as the best course of action by which   the war could be 
brought to an end as well as Europe´s  decline 8
  
   
In 1939, when the  hostilities began, the 
United Kingdom had called for a supranational peace keeping force.9
 
 The United Kingdom 
tried to promote  the idea of establishing a full and “indissoluble union” with France.10 
Britain’s Prime Minister Winston Churchill made an ambiguous statement that “the mass of 
Europe, once united, once federalized or partly federalized, once continentally self-conscious, 
would constitute an organism beyond compare ... We see nothing but good and hope in a 
richer, freer, more contented European commonalty.” 11 
 
 In 1944, in London, the exiled governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands 
signed a treaty creating a customs union - Benelux - which they pledged to implement once 
their countries were restored. After the war, in 1946, it was in his famous speech, held at 
Zurich University, that Winston Churchill called  France and Germany to close cooperation 
in order to be the core of  developing the European unification .This call had a great echo 
leading, in 1948, to a Congress of Europe held in The Hague which issued a call for a 
European Parliament, economic and political union, a human rights charter, and a European  
4:
 
McCormick, John. (1999). Understanding the European Union. St. Martin’s Press. Ch 2. 
5: Young European Federalists. (2003, March 12). File 1: What Federalism Is. Retrieved  
     October 29, 2003, from http://www.jef-europe.net/federalism/archives/000928.html 
6: ibid.supra,note 5. 
7.:    ibid. 
8:     ibid. 
9.:    ibid. 
10:   ibid. 
11.:  ibid. 
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Court of Justice. The United States also made a major contribution to integration by 
announcing, in June 1947, the Marshall Plan, proposing assistance for the economic  revival 
of Europe,and by insisting that Marshall Plan aid be administered by a pan-European 
institution - which grew into the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation- OEEC-
,set up in April 1948. And, continuing that European momentum, the Council of Europe was 
set up under the Treaty of Strasbourg in May 1949. Uncompromising national Governments  
soon affected the operability of the Council of Europe.12
     
Efforts made to achieve European 
integration might have lost momentum, if the federalist movement had not continued to 
struggle with enthusiasm for the idea of European integration.13
 
Quite idealistic, at least at those times, appeared the Federalists´ approach to making 
proposals on methods to achieve European integration by drafting a comprehensive federal 
constitution and structure. For, France made additional proposals, pragmatic ones, by   
supporting a union of common markets:14 
 
This idea led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).  
On April 18, 1951, the treaty establishing the ECSC, initiated by a Franco-German agreement, 
was signed by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.15 
 
The EU claims as its own birthday,however, May 9, 1950, the day when the French Foreign 
Minister
 
Robert Schuman had announced that France and Germany would place their coal and 
steel production under an independent common high authority, and that other European 
countries could join them. According to the Schuman Declaration,  
 
“the pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of 
common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe... 
By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions will 
bind France, Germany, and other Member States, this proposal will lead to the realisation of 
the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation 
of peace."16. 
 
.  
The Schuman Declaration was the brain child of Jean Monnet, Schuman´s  counsellor, a  
visionary who was literally sketching out his political plan for post-war European 
reconciliation and integration during a German bombardment.  
 
The Monnet-method:Monnet‘s approach was and is called `functionalist`, but it 
was,actually, highly political. The ECSC, though it manifested itself as an instrument that had 
been given the functional role to rationalize and modernize the production of coal and steel 
among all Member States, had  firmly been  rooted in a political concept of integration. 17 
12: Federalists,  ibid.,supra,note 5. 
13: ibid. 
14: ibid. 
15: ibid. 
16: Ashgate, B. Lucarelli. (1999). The origins and evolution of the single market in Europe.  
      Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, p. 1. 
17:  Cohen, Elie. (2001). Monetary sovereignty, domestic policies, and intergovernmental  
       accords. In Anand Menon & Vincent Wright (Eds.), From the nation state to Europe?  
       New  York: Oxford University Press, Inc., p. 19. 
 
 
 44
 
 
For, Jean Monnet, the political visionary, believed that  European unification won´t  be 
created by one single stroke , but by , as he called it by „ the solidarity of the facts „ .What he  
meant by  “functionalist” is  that the  institutions of  his European Coal and Steel Community 
would gradually be applied to an increasing range of industrial sectors, and that political 
integration would naturally follow in a sort of  development automatically deriving from 
economic facts and leading to political unification. It is, therefore, right to say  that, from its 
very  beginning, the ECSC was the concept of  a long term project, to eventually lead to the 
ultimate goal of a federal-political union.18
 
 
The ECSC with the economic task of reviving the coal and steel industry had  faced the 
increasing significance of oil and nuclear power in the world economy.19
 
 
 It was, however, the political success of the ECSC that it   managed to establish the basic  
political   objective of  European  integration: cooperation of  Member States to achieve 
stability, security, peace, protection of  fundamental rights, economic and social wealth 
through the Monnet method of  integration by pooling and jointly exercising, through a 
supranational authority, parts of previously national sovereign powers within common 
institutions establishing a common legal order which is a new legal order in international law 
for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited 
fields.  
 
Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet  anticipated with anxiety the dangers of lacking in 
harmony that arise with the collision  of individual nation  State interests and the objectives  
of the collective.20  To remedy this, the founding Treaty establishing the  ECSC created an  
independent structure which had been limited by the attribution of specific powers :  
 
creating an autonomous, independent nature of the ECSC´s legal order, differently from other 
instruments under international law.  The ECSC´s   own, autonomous specific legal order  is 
characterized by an own independent organ and its respective competences and legislative 
powers . Furthermore , the Member States have , themselves , through a transfer of  parts of 
their own national sovereign rights to the Community renounced the exercise of  that part of 
their transferred  national sovereign rights, while, at the same time, conferring the power to 
exercise these respective rights upon the Community : The claim to be directly applicable 
throughout the Community without a legal act of transformation by a national Parliament  and 
to have supremacy over conflicting national law is  inherent to the autonomous character of 
the ECSC´s  common legal order .  
 
This objective and the Monnet method of European integration  as designed by and 
implemented on the basis of the Treaty establishing the ECSC are the  features of what 
had  constituted, for the first time in European history, the  unprecedented and unique 
supranational  European integration in a limited area of politics to serve common interests.21 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
18: Cohen, ibid.,supra,note 17. 
19: ibid. 
20: Fransen, Frederic J. (2001). Supranational politics of Jean Monnet: Ideas and origins of 
       the   European Community. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, p. 87.) 
21: Wiarda, Howard, J. (Ed.). (2001). European politics in the age of globalization. New 
       York West/Wadsworth Publishing, p.1) 
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And, thus,  beyond its primarily merely economic functional role in matters of steel and coal, 
but which were in previous times economic matters of most cherished interests of nation 
state´s sovereignty,  the ECSC had proved a political role by  successfully contributing as 
predecessor to establishing a new stage in the process of  creating the political design of an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe: the ECSC had successfully indicated the  
approach of the European Economic Community-EEC-. In 1957, the six ECSC Member 
States negotiated two new proposals known collectively as the Treaties of Rome.22
 
 
 
In so far, the ECSC  had , as  a forerunner, with its common policy and with the successfully 
operating trough the High Authority, the predecessor of the future Commission, been laying 
the political foundations for developing the European Union that exists today. It is, therefore, 
no surprise that with the 2001 expiration of the ECSC treaty, there emerged  greater efforts  
within EU Member States to establish a Constitution for Europe recalling  the roots of  the 
process of  European integration through developing  an European Union capable of  
responding to the common challenges .23   
 
The first one of the Treaties of Rome, the Treaty on European Economic Community ( EEC), 
constituted  the legal framework for the establishment of a customs union and a common 
internal market  to encourage the free movement of  goods, persons, services and capital.  
 
According to the  Treaty on EEC,  the EEC´s objective  was  
 
 “to promote throughout the community a harmonious development of economic activity, a 
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated increase in the 
standard of living, and closer relations between member states.”24 (24ibid.)  
 
The second treaty established  the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) which 
intended to set up  European cooperation to promote the scientific research and technological 
development and the civil use of nuclear energy. 
 
Milestones, since the six ECSC Member States had signed in 1957 the Treaties of Rome, 
included  a 1970 decision to begin European Political Cooperation;  the 1987 Single European 
Act which instituted the 1993 Internal Market and increased the use of majority voting; and 
the 1992 signing of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union confirmed the will of the EU 
Member States  to  
 
“continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” as it 
had been stipulated before by the Treaty on European Community (preamble of the 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Community,  25 
 
 
22: Wyatt, Derrick (Ed.) (2002). Rudden and Wyatt´sEU treaties and legislation. Cambridge:  
       Oxford University Press. 
23: Meny, Yves. (2001). National squares and European circle: The challenge of Adjustment. 
       In  Anand Menon &Vincent Wright, From the nation state to Europe. New York: Oxford  
       University Press, Inc., p. 29.) 
24:  Meny,ibid. 
25:  in Official Journal of the European Communities, December 24,2002, C 325/33(39). 
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So did the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties on European Union,1997 and 2000. 
 
In 2004, the Member States did a next decisive step of dynamically, gradually building 
European integration: alongside enlargement of the Union and alongside drafting and  
ratifying the European Constitution, 10 new Member States joined the European Union, 
followed by Bulgaria and Rumania, making the European Union  the “Europe of the 
Twentyseven”,  January 01,2007. 26 
 
The enlargement of the European Union is presenting an enormous challenge to the Union, as 
it continues to struggle  with the process of integration, trying to  deal with vital reforms to 
make the enlarged Union work, formulating a European Defence Identity, and combating 
transnational crime which are issues subject to the Union´s endeavors of drawing up and 
ratifying a Constitution for Europe.  
 
For, the citizens of the Member States view the results as inefficient, undemocratic, and in 
need of structural reform.27  The European Union has become the stability anchor  for 
securingpeace and prosperity in Europe for over half a century. But the legitimacy building 
acceptance of the European Union cannot count on this fact only in the view of European 
citizens. The .value of the Union´s  peace keeping contribution remains underappreciated. 
Strengthening the Union´s acceptability and closeness to the citizens in Europe appears to be  
the strongest movation for the drawing up and efforts to ratify the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. 
 
Investigating the European Union´s institutional and constitutional history, starting 
from the Treaties that shape the European Union, will help to understand the “state” of 
the Union. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
26: Europa. European governments online: European Union Member States. Retrieved  
      October 15, 2003,from http://europa.eu.int/abc/governments/index_en.htm#members 
27: Centre for European Reform. (2003, June 24). The CER guide to the draft EU constitution. 
      Briefing Notes. London: Author,pp. 1-6. Also available online at  
      http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/other/oth010603_4_en.pdf. 
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3. Survey on the milestones in the history of the European Union,dynamic stepwise 
development of European integration 
 
May 1945 
The end of the Second World War with victory for the Allies 
over Germany and Italy. 
 
June 1947 
The Marshall Plan was announced, proposing financial 
assistance for the economic revival of Europe. This was coordinated 
by the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC), set up in April 1948. 
 
March 1948 
North Atlantic Treaty signed between Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (the 
Brussels Treaty) on economic, cultural, and social 
cooperation and collective self-defence. The Berlin Blockade 
by the USSR started three months later. 
 
April 1949 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Treaty was signed in 
Washington, to include other European countries, the United 
States and Canada. 
 
May 1949 
The Council of Europe was set up under the Treaty of 
Strasbourg. 
 
May 1950 
Robert Schumann, the French Foreign Minister gave a speech 
inspired by Jean Monnet in which he spoke of pooling the iron 
and steel resources of France and Germany to establish the 
foundations of peace. It is worth looking at the career of Jean 
Monnet, an administrator with vision about Europe. 
 
April,18, 1951”Europe of the Six “ 
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was set up 
by the Treaty of Paris by ‘the Six’ (Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands). 
 
From the outset their objective extends beyond the creation of a  
common market for coal and steel. The Treaty establishing the  
 ECSC states that the six countries are resolved "to create, by  
establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and  
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deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts." 
 
  The ECSC takes up its work in 1952. 
 
 
 
May 1952 
The Six signed the European Defence Community (EDC) 
Treaty. 
 
 
July 1952 
The ECSC Treaty entered into force. Jean Monnet was the 
President of the High Authority established under the Treaty. 
Paul-Henri Spaak was the leader of the Common Assembly. 
 
June 1955 
The Foreign Ministers of the Six agreed to aim at economic 
integration of their countries at a meeting in Messina (Italy). 
Paul-Henry Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister, led an 
intergovernmental committee to draft a report (approved May 
1956). The Spaak Report proposed the creation of a common 
market with free circulation of people, goods, capital and 
services in open competition, as well as a European 
Community for Nuclear Energy. 
 
March 25,1957 
With the signing of the "Treaties of Rome" the six ECSC countries  
establish the European Economic Community (EEC) and the  
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).  
 
 
January 1, 1958 
The EEC and EURATOM take up their work . First President of the Commission: 
the German Walter Hallstein. 
The Treaty establishing the EEC  extends common policy to further sectors of the economy, 
e.g. to agriculture, law on competition, and foreign trade.  
The member countries decide to form a common market, i.e. an internal market, within twelve 
years. 
- Creation of a parliamentary assembly (official designation as of 1986:  
       "European Parliament"). 
 
 
May 1960 
The Stockholm Convention established the European FreeTrade Association (EFTA) 
 among Austria, Denmark, Norway,Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United  
Kingdom (‘the Seven’) 
 
December 1960 
The Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC)became the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
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July and August 1961 
Eire, Denmark and the United Kingdom applied formembership of the European 
Communities. Norway applied in April 1962 
 
 
January 1963 
General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, cast doubt on the United Kingdom’s 
application for membership of the EEC, leading to suspension of negotiations with all the 
applicant countries. 
 
July 1963 
An Association Agreement was signed between the Community and 17 African States in 
Yaoundé, Cameroon. TheYaoundé Convention entered into force in June 1964 and was 
renegotiated in 1969. It was superseded by the Lomé Convention in 1975. 
 
 
April 1965 
A Treaty (the Merger Treaty) merging the executives of the Communities (Commissions of 
the EEC and Euratom and theHigh Authority of the ECSC) was signed in Brussels. It entered 
into force on 1 July 1967. 
 
July 1965 
France broke off negotiations on financing the common agricultural policy. By recalling its 
Permanent Representative and refusing to take part in the Council Meetings, the French 
government under President de Gaulle precipitated the ‘empty chair crisis’, stalemating the 
implementation of Community policy. 
 
January 1966 
The ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ (retention of the unanimity requirement for very important 
national interests) was agreed, and France resumed its place in the Council. 
 
May 1967 
The United Kingdom re-applied to join the Community, followed later by the Republic of 
Ireland and Denmark and Norway. General de Gaulle (‘La France, c’est moi’) was still 
reluctant to accept British accession. 
 
July 1,1967 
The organs of the ECSC, EEC, and EURATOM are merged  in the "European Communities" 
("EC"). The Commission of the  European Communities takes up its work in Brussels.  
 
July,1, 1968 
Customs union entered into force ahead of schedule imports  and exports between  EC 
countries are duty-free. The Common Customs Tariff (or Common External Tariff) replaced 
national customs duties in trade with the rest of the world. 
 
December 1969 
The Hague Summit decided to adopt definitive (rather than transitional) arrangements for the 
financing of the  common agricultural policy, for the creation of Community‘own resources’ 
and to strengthen Parliament’s budgetary powers. 
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April 1970 
The Council decided on a gradual introduction of an ‘ownresources’ system whereby the 
Community would receive all customs duties on products imported from non-member 
countries, all levies on agricultural imports and resources derived from value-added tax. 
 
 
June 1970 
Negotiations with the four prospective Member States opened in Luxembourg. 
 
October 1970 
The Member States approved the Davignon Report on political co-operation. The objective 
was for Europe to speak with a single voice on all major international problems. 
 
March 1972 
Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom signed 
Treaties of accession to the European Communities. 
                     
 
March 21, 1972 
Establishment of the European Currency Snake, a first  step in the direction of monetary 
union.The currency ‘snake’ was set up in pursuance of the Council’s resolution to establish 
the first stage of economic and monetary union (EMU). The Six agreed to limit the margin 
of fluctuation between their currencies to 2.25%. 
 
May 1972 
A vast majority in a referendum in the Republic of Ireland voted in favour of accession to 
the EEC. 
 
September 1972 
A majority of the population in Norway voted against accession in their referendum. 
 
October 1972 
A referendum in Denmark was in favour of accession. The Norwegian Government 
decided not to proceed with accession.  
The United Kingdom proceeded to ratify the Accession Treaty without having first having 
held a referendum. 
 
January,1, 1973 “Europe of the Nine “ 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the European Communities. 
 
The Community Free Trade Agreement with Austria, 
Switzerland, Portugal and Sweden came into force. 
 
April 1974 
After a change of Government in the United Kingdom, theBritish Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs made a statement to the Council on their new policy on 
the Community. He called for major changes in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 
and ‘fairer methods of financing the Community budget’. 
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A Joint declaration on the state of the Community was submitted to the Council by the 
Presidents of the Council and of the Commission. They recognised the need for an 
improved decision-making process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 1974 
The Paris summit (the Community's Heads of State or of Government) decided to hold 
meetings three times a year as the ‘European Council’. They approved the holding of direct 
elections to the European Parliament, and agreed to set up the European Regional 
Development Fund. 
 
 
February 1975 
The EEC and the 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries(ACP) signed, in Lomé, Togo, a 
Convention (Lomé I) to replace the Yaoundé Convention. 
 
March 1975 
Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister,stated in the House of Commons that the UK 
Government would recommend the British people to vote in favour of the United Kingdom's 
continued membership of the Community in the forthcoming referendum on that issue. 
 
The European University Institute in Florence was officially established. 
 
April 1975 
British House of Commons voted infavour of the United Kingdom staying in the Community. 
 
June 1975 
The British referendum. 67.2% of voters were in favour of the United Kingdom’s 
remaining a member of the Community. 
 
Greece formally applied to join the European Communities. 
 
July 1975 
The European Council called for a report on direct universal suffrage for elections to the 
European Parliament. 
 
June 1976 
The Parliament discussed and voted on a motion of censure against the Commission 
concerning the manner in which the Parliament had been consulted on a specific matter. The 
motion, the first to be put to a vote, was defeated by 109 votes to 18, with 4 abstentions. 
 
July 1976 
The European Council meeting in Brussels agreed on the number and distribution of 
seats in the Parliament to be elected by direct universal suffrage in 1979. The Council 
designated Roy Jenkins (later Lord Jenkins of Hillhead) as President of the Commission. The 
new Commis-sion under his Presidency took office in January 1977. 
Formal opening of negotiations for the admission of Greece to the Community. 
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November 1976 
The Council decided that Member States would extend fishing limits to 200 miles off their 
North Sea and North Atlantic coasts from 1 January 1977, marking the beginnings of the 
common fisheries policy. 
 
March 1977 
Portugal formally applied for membership of the Communities. 
 
April 1977 
The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission signed a joint declaration 
on the respect of fundamental rights. 
 
July 1977 
Spain formally applied to join the European Communities. 
 
October 1977 
The Court of Auditors of the European Communities held its inaugural meeting. It replaced 
separate audit boards for the different communities. 
 
July 1978 
At a meeting of the European Council under the German Presidency held in Bremen, an 
agreement is reached on a common strategy to achieve a higher rate of economic growth 
in order to reduce unemployment, together with plan setting up a European Monetary 
System (EMS). 
 
October 1978 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom became signatories to the Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. 
 
December 1978 
The European Council established the European Monetary System based on a European 
currency unit (the ECU),entering into effect January 1,1979 
 
March 1979 
Jean Monnet died. 
 
April 1979 
The Commission adopted a memorandum on the accession of the European Communities to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
 
May 1979 
The acts relating to Greece's accession to the Communities are signed in Athens, Greece. 
 
June, 7/10,  1979 
The first elections to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage are held. 
 
September 1979 
The Community and its Member States sign a Council of Europe Convention on Conservation 
of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats. This is one of the earliest environmental 
initiatives of the Communities. 
 53
 
October 1980 
The second African, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP)-EEC Convention is signed in Lomé, 
Togo. (Lomé II) to replace the original fiveyear agreement (Lomé I). By this time there 
are 58 ACP states and the number steadily increases. 
 
 January,1, 1981” Europe of the TEN “ 
Greece became the tenth member of the European Communities. The first Greek MEPs 
were elected in October. 
 
February 1982 
In a consultative referendum, Greenland, which became a member of the European 
Community as part of Denmark,opted to withdraw from the Community. It is the only 
country to have done so, although as its citizens are citizens of Denmark they retain EC 
citizenship by virtue of that. It actually left in February 1985, although it remained as an 
associated country and territory (OCTS): see Part IV of the EC Treaty, Arts 182-188. Art 188 
deals specifically with Greenland. 
 
February 1984 
The draft Treaty on the establishment of the European Union (the Spinelli draft) 
was passed by the European Parliament by a large majority. 
 
June 1984 
The second universal suffrage direct elections to the European Parliament were held. 
 
December 1984 
The third ACP-EEC Convention was signed in Lomé by the 10 Member States of the 
Community and their 65 partners of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States. It came 
into force in May 1986. 
 
January 1985 
The first burgundy ‘European passports’ were issued in most of the Member States. 
Border controls had been becoming less significant in Continental European countries. 
 
The new Commission took office with Jacques Delors, a former French Finance 
Minister, as its President. 
 
June 1985 
Accession Treaties with Spain and Portugal signed. 
 
The Commission sent to the European Council a White Paper entitled Completing the 
Internal Market. The Council approved the White Paper. 
 
The Schengen Agreement on the elimination of border controls was signed by Belgium, 
Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in Schengen (Luxembourg). 
 
December 1985 
At a European Council held in Luxembourg, the Ten agreed to amend the Treaty 
of Rome and to revitalise the process of European integration by drawing up a 
Single European Act. 
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January,1, 1986 “ Europe of the Twelve “ 
Spain and Portugal joined the Communities. 
 
                     
 
February 1986 
The Single European Act modifying the Treaty of Rome is signed in 
Luxembourg and The Hague. This is designed to bring about the 
completion of the Internal Market by 1993. 
 
May 1986 
The European flag, adopted by Community institutions, was run up for the first time in 
front of the Berlaymont building (the former headquarters of the European Commission 
in Brusselsto the sounds of the European anthem. 
 
December 1986 
-A European Council held in London under the British Presidency examined the fight 
against terrorism, illegal immigration and drug trafficking.  
-In June, under the Dutch Presidency, the Parliament, the Council and the Commission had 
signed a Joint Declaration against Racism and Xenophobia. 
 
July 1987 
The Single European Act entered into force. 
 
 
October 1987 
The European Council adopted a decision establishing a Court of First Instance of the 
European Communities. 
 
April 1988 
The Delors Committee presented the report on economic and monetary union. 
The Parliament adopted the Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. 
 
November,9,  1989 
The Berlin Wall opened and the German Democratic Republic opened its 
borders. This signalled the end of Communist domination of Eastern 
Europe. 
 
December 1989 
The Heads of State or Government of 11 of the Member States adopted the Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers.The United Kingdom did not. 
 
The new (fourth) African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) – European Economic Community 
Convention between the Twelve and the 69 ACP countries was signed in Lomé, Togo. It 
entered into force in September 1991. 
An agreement on trade and commercial and economic cooperation between the Community 
and the Soviet Union was signed in Brussels. 
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April 1990 
A Special European Council held in Dublin agreed to a common approach 
on German unification and on Community relations with Central and 
Eastern European countries 
 
May 1990 
An Agreement establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) to provide financial support to Central and Eastern Europe countries was 
signed in Paris. 
 
June 1990 
The Schengen Agreement on the elimination of border checks was signed by the Benelux 
countries, France and Germany.Italy signed in November. 
 
The EEC and EFTA started formal negotiations for the creation of the European 
Economic Area (EEA). 
 
A European Council in Dublin confirmed the need to open two Intergovernmental Conferen-
ces, one on Economic and Monetary Union and the other on the aspects of Political 
Union, and to hold them in parallel. 
 
July 1990 
 The first stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) came into force 
(liberalisation of capital transactions, strengthening of economic policy coordination among 
the member states).  
. 
Cyprus and Malta formally applied to join the Communities. 
 
3 October 1990 
Germany was (re)unified. 
 
November 1990 
At the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Paris, 34 Heads of State 
or Government signed a Charter for a new Europe. 
 
December 1990 
The two Intergovernmental Conferences, on Economic and Monetary Union, and on 
Political Union, were launched at the European Council in Rome. 
 
April 1991 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development was inaugurated in London. 
 
July 1991 
Sweden formally applied to join the Communities, 
 
February, 07, 1992 
The Treaty on European Union was signed at Maastricht by the Foreign 
and Finance Ministers of the Member States. Cooperation in further policy areas 
was  agreed on e.g. foreign and security policy, development assistance,  justice and home 
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affairs, health, consumer protection, etc.. Economic and monetary union as well as political 
union are to be  realised by the year 1999. 
 
Three pillar Treaty architecture: 1st pillar: Treaty on European Community(EC),  
2nd pillar: Common Foreign and Security Policy,   3rd pillar: Cooperation in  fields of Justice 
and Home Affairs 
 
 
 
 
March 1992 
Finland formally applied to join the Communities. 
 
 
May 1992 
Switzerland formally applied to join the European Communities. 
 
June 1992 
In a referendum in Denmark, the people voted against the ratification of the 
Treaty on the European Union. 
 
In a referendum in Ireland the vote was in favour of the ratification of the 
Treaty on the European Union. 
 
September 1992 
In the French referendum on the Maastricht Treaty the people voted by a 
small majority in favour of ratification. 
 
November 1992 
Norway formally applied to join the European Communities. 
 
December 1992 
In a referendum in Switzerland, the people vote against the ratification of the Agreement 
establishing a European Economic Area. Switzerland had and continues to have a strong 
sense of neutrality as well as independence and seems content to continue this stance. 
 
January, 1, 1993 
Completion of the EC internal market (the EC is an  economic area in which the free 
movement of persons, goods, services and capital is guaranteed). 
  
May 1993 
In a second referendum, the Danish people vote in favour of the Treaty on Union. 
Perhaps slightly embarrassing for the Danish government was the fact that Denmark was 
President of the Council for the first six months of 1993. 
 
June 1993 
A European Council is held in Copenhagen, Denmark. The Council instructs the 
Commission to prepare a White Paper on long-term strategy to promote growth, competitive-
ness and employment; it confirms that accession of Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway is 
to be accomplished by 1995 and it assures associated countries of Central and Eastern 
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Europe that they will become full members as soon as they satisfy the requisite political 
and economic conditions. 
 
 
 
 
August 1993 
The United Kingdom ratified the Treaty on European Union (there was no referendum in the 
United Kingdom). Many other member States had ratified by then, mostly without holding a 
referendum. 
 
 
 
November, 1,  1993 
All ratification procedures having been accomplished, the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union came into force. 
 
December 1993 
The Council and the Commission reached agreement on a code of conduct governing public 
access to official documents. 
The Council concluded an agreement creating the European Economic Area. This came into 
force in January 1994. 
 
January,1, 1994 
The second phase of economic and monetary union came into effect. The member states  
 work to satisfy the criteria established for acceptance into EMU (price and monetary stability, 
interest rates, budget discipline). 
 
The European Monetary Institute (EMI) is established in Frankfurt am Main to make 
preparations for the establishment of the  European Central Bank. 
 
March 1994 
The Committee of the Regions, set up by the Treaty on the European Union, holds 
inaugural session. 
 
At an informal meeting of Foreign Ministers in Ioannina a compromise 
decision was adopted on rules for qualified majority decision-making in 
preparation for the enlargement of the European Union.. 
 
Hungary formally applied to join the European Union. 
 
April 1994 
Poland formally applied to join the European Union. 
 
June 1994 
A referendum is held in Austria, with the majority is in favour of accession to the 
European Union. 
 
July 1994 
Jacques Santer was chosen to succeed Jacques Delors as President of the Commission. 
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October 1994 
A referendum in Finland was in favour of accession to the European Union. 
 
November 1994 
The referendum in Sweden,  in favour of accession to the European Union. 
The Norwegian referendum rejected, for the second time, 
accession to the European Union. 
 
January,1,1995 “Europe of the Fifteen “ 
Austria, Finland and Sweden became members of the 
European Union. 
 
March,26, 1995 
 The Convention on the Application of the Schengen Agreement goes into effect in 
relations between the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Portugal.  
In 1995 Italy, Greece, Austria, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden acceded to the convention. It 
does not go into effect immediately for the three Scandinavian countries. Their full  
 participation, including the complete elimination of internal border checks is determined by 
the other parties to the convention on the basis of a unanimous decision after an assessment 
procedure.   Schengen cooperation agreements were concluded with the non-EU  members of 
the Nordic Passport Union (Norway and Iceland) in   1996. 
 
April 1995 
Liechtenstein ratifies its accession to the European Economic Area by referendum and in May 
is a participant in the EEA. 
 
May 1995 
The Commission adopts a Green Paper on the practical arrangements for the 
introduction of the single currency. 
 
June 1995 
Romania applied to join the European Union. 
Slovakia applied to join the European Union. 
 
July 1995 
The Member States signed the Europol Convention for police co-operation. 
 
October 1995 
Latvia formally applied to join the European Union. 
 
November 1995 
Estonia formally applied to join the European Union. 
 
December 1995 
Lithuania formally applied to join the European Union. 
 
1996/97 
An intergovernmental conference negotiates on   further amendments to the 
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Maastricht Treaty on European Union needed to make the enlarged EU 
work 
                    . 
 
 
                     
March 1996 
The Commission adopted a decision on urgent measures to be taken for protection against 
BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) by imposing a world-wide export ban on 
British beef and beef products. 
 
June 1996 
Slovenia formally applied to join the European Union. 
 
July 1997 
The Commission presented the “Agenda 2000 - for a stronger and wider Europe” and its 
opinions on the applications of 10 Central European countries. 
 
October,2,1997 
The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the European Union signed the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, amending the Maastricht Treaty on EU by provisions on further 
reforming  EU institutions such as closer  cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs 
and closer cooperation in Common Foreign and Security Policy. The rights of the European 
Parliament to take part in legislative decision-making are  expanded. But the Amsterdam 
Treaty on EU has unresolved “leftovers” as regards reforming the decision-making in the 
Council(the issue of weigthed votes to balance the sovereign equality of each Member 
State,one country/one vote and, in the interest of large countries, the proportionality of the 
population in the EU) 
 
 
March 1998 
The Commission recommended that 11 Member States should adopt the Euro on 1 January 1999. 
 
March,31,1998 
Beginning of accession negotiations with Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia and Cyprus. ("Luxembourg Group") 
 
 
May,2,1998: 
 The Heads of State and Government decide that European Monetary Union 
will begin on 1 January 1999 with 11 member countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,  Luxembourg, the Netherlands, , Portugal, and 
Spain). 
 
June 1998 
Establishment of the European Central Bank. 
 
January,1, 1999 
The third stage of European Monetary Union begins: introduction of the  Euro 
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as a means of payment in cashless transactions:Austria, Belgium, Finland,France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain adopted the Euro 
as their official currency. 
Later in the month, Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission, called for 
Parliament's confidence after serious allegations had been made about financial 
corruption in the Commission by certain of its members. 
 
 
                    
 
 
March 1999 
The collective resignation of the Commission members followed the report 
by the Committee of Independent Experts on the allegations regarding 
fraud, mismanagement and nepotism in the Commission. The French 
Commissioner Edith 
Cresson was seen as especially tainted. Romano Prodi was agreed as the new 
President of the Commission, some of the 
former members also returning. 
 
March,24/25,1999. 
At a Special European Council in Berlin the Member States approve the "Agenda 2000" 
package on the reform of EU internal policies. 
 
May ,1,1999 
The Amsterdam Treaty entered into force after ratification by all the 
Member States. 
The President of the European Court of Justice presented a number of proposals and ideas on 
the future of the jurisdictional system of the European Union. 
 
 
September 1999 
The European Parliament approved the new Commission. 
 
December 1999 
A European Council in Helsinki decided to open accession negotiations with Romania, 
Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Malta and to recognise Turkey as an 
applicant country. 
 It agreed to call an Intergovernmental Conference to revise the Treaties in 
February 2000 to resolve the “Amsterdam Treaty on EU leftovers” 
 
February,15, 2000: 
Beginning of accession negotiations with Bulgaria,  Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, 
Slovakia. ("Helsinki  Group")  
 
 
March 2000 
The Commission adopted a White Paper on its reform. 
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September 2000 
Denmark holds a referendum on the adoption of the Euro — 
with much publicised television debate on ‘Euro eller Kroner’. 
Denmark´s referendum  votes against the “Euro” 
 
 
 
 
 
December,7-10.2000: 
:At the Nice European Council the fifteen Heads of State and government agreed on 
the draft of a treaty spelling out the reforms needed to create the prerequisites for later 
enlargement. 
         
June,2001:                 
Ireland`s referendum votes against the Nice Treaty on European Union(54% 
voting against, 34% of the electorate participating) 
 
15 –16 December,15/16,2001: 
 At the  Laeken European Council the fifteen Heads of Statand Government agreed on  the 
European Convention to draft  on the Future of the European Union 
 
 January,1,2002 
 The “Euro “ is the  common and single European currency  replacing the 
national  currencies , except Sweden , Denmark,  United Kingdom 
 
February,28,2002: 
 The European Convention started work on drafting the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe 
 
October 2002: 
Ireland´s  referendum  votes for the Nice Treaty on European Union(63 % 
voting for,nearly 50% of the electorate participating) 
                  
July,10,2003:  
end of Convention´s work, reached consensus on a draft treaty establishing 
a   Constitution for  Europe. 
                                 
December 2003: 
 The draft was  submitted to an Intergovernmental Conference composed of  
 representatives of the governments of the present and future Member States. 
 
May,01,2004   “ Europe of the  Twentyfive “ 
Estonia,  Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Cyprus join the EU 
                      
18 June,18,2004: 
 The European Council Heads of State and Government reached final  agreement on   
 the text of   the Treaty establishing a  Constitution for Europe 
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October,29,2004: 
In Rome: the Heads of State and Government  signed  the  European Constitution, 
requiring the ratification by the entire number of Member States in order to enter into 
force 
 
November 2004: 
 Lithuania, the EU Member State ratifies the  European Constitution ,followed by: 
December 2004: 
Hungary ratifies the European Constitution 
 
 February 2005: 
Slovenia and Spain ratify the European Constitution, followed  by: 
 
 April 2005: 
Italy  and Greece  ratify 
 
May 2005: 
 Slovakia, Belgium, Austria and Germany ratify the European Constitution 
 
May,29,2005: 
France, by referendum, rejects ratification of the Constitution  
by 55% of the participating voters, 70% of  the entitled voters were participating 
   
June,01, 2005:  
the Netherlands , by referendum, rejects ratification by more than 61 % of the 
participating voters, 63% of the entitled voters were participating 
 
 
2007-   “ Europe of the Twentyseven” 
      
January,01,2007:  
Bulgaria and  Rumania join.  
 
January,01, 2007:    
Germany´s EU Presidency starts, expected to draw up a schedule for finding solutions 
to save the European Constitution. 
 
February 05/06, 2007: 
The European Union delegation, headed by the troika, is holding negotiations in Moscow on 
Russia´s participation in the European Energy Charta, on Middle East issues and on 
Iran´s nuclear policy. In Kiew holding talks on closer ties between the EU and Ukraine. 
The Troika composed of the German Foreign Minister (President of the Council), the 
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU,Solana, 
and, in Moscow, the Commissioner for Foreign Affaitrs,Mrs. Ferrero-Waldner. 
 
March, 08/09,2007: 
Summet of the European Council,Brussels, on the EU´s new commitments to reduce 
CO2 emissions to combat global warming.8/02/2002          2828 
The  
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III. The Treaties  shaping the European Union 
 
 
The outlining of the dynamic development of the EU as outlined above will help to better 
understand the dynamics of the EU law established on the basis of the Founding 
Treaties on European Union and on the Community(primary law) and the specifics of 
the Founding Treaties` constitutional quality  assigned to the European Union as a 
specific stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe(Article 1 Treaty on European Union). 
1. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, the Treaty of Rome 
Following the first years of successful operating the ECSC,  the European Heads of State and 
Governments of the ECSC six Member States made the next step in pooling parts of national 
powers  determined  to further liberalize the European  markets and to strengthen  trade and 
investment. Six countries – Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg – signed the Treaty of Rome on March 25, 1957.1958, founding the European 
Economic Community (EEC).  
 
The EEC´s   basic functional motivtion was clearly to reduce barriers to trade, through 
creating an internal market and a customs union.. Aiming at achieving  common political 
objectives beyond  technically sounding market and trade issues, the Treaty ,however, had 
attributed to the collectivity of Member States integrative powers to establish a common legal 
order limited by the objectives, tasks and competences as attributed by the Treaty.28  
 
Many political leaders at that time had therefore the common ambition of creating a united 
Europe.  Walter Hallstein, the first EEC Commission president, and author of the book “ Der 
unvollendete Bundesstaat” predicted: 
 
 “We are not integrating economies, we are integrating politics.”29  
 
The EEC had great success in the economic field. By the early 1960’s, most internal trade 
barriers in the EEC area were substantially reduced, and trade amongst members had 
multiplied several fold. Ahead of schedule, on July,01, 1968 the Customs union entered into 
force: imports  and exports between  EC countries are duty-free. The Common Customs Tariff 
(or Common External Tariff) replaced national customs duties in trade with the rest of the 
world.  “Its greatest single achievement was the accelerated elimination of tariffs and quotas 
and the application of a common schedule of external duties over a period of nine instead of 
twelve years.”30   Most internal trade barriers in the EEC area were substantially reduced, the 
leftovers of trade barriers were subject to the Internal Market that entered  into force on  
28:  Nugent, Neill. (1994). The Government and Politics of the European Union (3 rd ed.).  
       Durham:Duke University Press, p. 44. 
29 Wiarda, supra, note 21. 
30: Gillingham, John. (2003). European integration 1950-2003: Superstate or new market  
      economy? New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 53.)   
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January 01,1993, as scheduled by the Single European Act 1986. And  trade amongst 
members had multiplied several fold. The European Economic  Community,thus, constituted 
the world’s largest and most successful trading block. 
 
2. Single European Act (SEA) 
 
In February 1986,in Luxembourg and the Hague,  the six Heads of State and Government of 
the EEC  signed  the Single European Act (SEA).31(31: Wyatt, supra, note 20.) The Single 
European Act modifyed  the Treaty of Rome  to initiate  the completion of the Internal Market 
as a truly open market by 1993. The SEA  is the legal basis for  implementing 79 specific 
actions on  completing trade liberalization through the removal of  internal barriers,still 
existing between the EEC Member States, to the free movement of  people, goods, services, 
and capital.32 The SEA Treaty provisions set up binding rules for the EEC Member States to 
harmonize their product safety standards and consumer protection laws, reform customs and 
immigration controls, and eliminate excise taxes. The SEA replaced unanimity voting in the 
Council by establishing majority voting on Community legislation removing trade barriers, 
thus attempting to facilitate decision making in the Council. The SEA can be regarded as the 
forerunner of comprehensive endeavors undertaken by the Intergovernmental Conference held 
in 1996/97 to reform the institutions and the decision-making  to make the enlarged European 
Union work.The SEA can, therefore, be regarded as a significant stage in the EC integration 
process since the Treaty of Rome- another stage of many stages in the dynamic process of 
European integration. 
 
 
 
3. Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
 
The collapse of the Sovjet Union, the reunification of  Germany and the new democracies 
inCentral and Eastern Europe wishing to accede to Western organisations like the European 
Communty and NATO dramatically changed the strategic situation in Europe. Demonstrating 
Europe´s ambitious response to the challenges arising from the new strategic situation in 
Europe, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Ministers for Economic Affairs or Finance of 
the Member States signed the Treaty on European Union – TEU -in Maastricht on  February, 
07,1992. 33  
By the Mastricht TEU, the Member States   “  establish among themselves a European Union, 
hereinafter called ‘the Union’.  This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as 
possible to the citizen.” 34. The Treaty  three pillars architecture is  putting under one 
umbrella-structure  the “ European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of 
cooperation established by this Treaty”:  Cooperation  was  agreed on  a  Common Foreign 
 
31: Wyatt, supra, note 22. 
32:  ibid. 
33: TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION ( Official Journal of the European Communities, 92/C 191/01))  
34: Article A TEU 
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and Security Policy, the TEU´s 2nd pillar,  as well as Justice and Home Affairs, the Treaty´s 
3rd pillar. .. Economic and monetary union was to be  realised by the year 1999.The 
Maastricht TEU had, as one of its best achievements, the establishing of the Economic and 
Monetary Union.  
 
 
The TEU can be regarded as a starting point, as a bridging Treaty the major provisions of 
which were explicitly stipulating the expectation of future amendments through subsequent 
Intergovernmental Conferences. The TEU demonstrates the  pragmatism of the Member 
States seeking  to interconnect  the new stages of the process of  integration and cooperation 
made in principle with a binding schedule for  reconsidering and, if possible, resolving the 
“leftovers” and thus completing   the  Amsterdam Treaty on European Union,signed 1997,35 
and the Treaty  of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities .36 For, it is since the Maastricht TEU, that the EU is still  trying to 
better balance deepening and enlarging the Union: 
 
Namely since the 1996/1997 Intergovernmental  Conference, preparing the Amsterdam Treaty 
on EU, the EU was and ever since then  is preparing the reform of the institutions to improve 
the efficiency of the decision –making process within an enlarged EU. Reforming the 
institutions was  meant by the IGC as an essential step that should have to be taken ahead of 
enlargement to 25 members. The Amsterdam Treaty on EU , however, fell short of reforming 
the institutions: issues remained unresolved. The so-called “left-overs” of the Amsterdam 
Treaty on EU described what, in the view of the IGC preparing the Draft Amsterdam Treaty 
on EU, was necessary to agree upon institutional reforms to help the EU to find an efficient 
response to the common challenges which would be caused by enlargement. Institutional 
reforms were expected  to make the substantial contribution to the European Union´s 
transparency, democracy and decisiveness.  
 
Even the Nice Treaty (2001) on European Union  did fail to complete the Amsterdam 
“leftovers”.  
 
35:  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, in: Official Journal of the  
European Communities, December 24.2002, C 325/5. 
36: Official Journal of the European Communities, March 10,2001, (2001/C 80/01. 
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IV. Identity shaping essentials of the European Union, the structure of the European  
       Union, major successes, deficiencies and intricacies 
                             
The Treaty on European has established a unique ,unprecedented entity, collectivity of 
Member States in the history of cooperation between nation states pooling and jointly 
exercising  parts of their national sovereign powers and making law binding themselves 
without further acts of national legislation to make the common law directly applicable 
throughout the community. This European Union cannot be understood but by a 
thorough look at the intentions of the Member States which are declared by the 
provisions of the Treaty on European and by which the Member States have expressed 
the constitutional quality of their common  objectives, tasks, institutions and powers 
thus presenting the constitutional quality essentials or which can also be called the 
identity shaping essentials of the European Union. They are presenting what can be 
described as  the European Union´s own “merits”.They are the one to understand the 
nature of the European Union as a sui generis nature as designed by and developed on 
the basis of the founding Treaty on European Union attributing powers to the Union 
and limiting at the same time the range of objectives and powers of jointly exercising 
common rights which previously were individual nation states´sovereign rights. And this 
means that no comparison to any other entity working under international law appears 
to be appropriate to determine the European Union´s legal and political nature, but by 
the Union Treaty´s own “merits”only, its identity shaping essentials.   
 
1. Identity shaping essentials of the European Union 
 
The identitification of identity  shaping essentials of the EU needs identification  of the 
specifics  of  the EU´s constitutional quality  as attributed  by  the Founding Treaty on 
European Union and reflecting the dynamic construction of  the EU alongside the dynamic 
development of the EU. The identity shaping essentials of the EU´s construction are the 
following: 
 
1. the organization , created by the member States 
2. own objectives and basic principles  
3. own institutions to implement the Treaty objectives 
4. endowed with own tasks and powers as conferred upon by the 
Founding Treaties to realize the objectives,and with 
5. an autonomous legal order to rule the relations between the Union and its member  
states and their individuals 
 
 
 
 
In order to identify these identity shaping elements, we  look at  basic provisions of the 
Treaty on EU, starting with the provision on 
 
2.  The organization , created by the member States, the final design is not yet  defined, 
the “finalite´” of the EU is kept open 
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Reading the Article 1: 
“ 
AIM : Article 1 (ex Article A)  
By this Treaty, the HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES establish among themselves a  
EUROPEAN UNION, hereinafter called "the Union'.  
This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the  
peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as 
possible to the citizen.  
The Union shall be founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and  
forms of cooperation established by this Treaty. Its task shall be to organise, in a manner  
demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the Member States and between  
their peoples.37  
 
Article 1 shows that  the  exact legal pattern, the exact legal design  of the present EU as well 
as of the future EU does not  exist yet.. The  Treaty on EU is the legal framework for new 
stages “in the process of creating an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe”. The 
text does not state any  precise pattern of what might be  meant by “an ever closer Union 
among the peoples of Europe”. This formula is leaving behind any disputes on whether a final 
design of the Union should be a federal one, related to  a form of government in which a 
Union of States shall have to recognize a central authority while retaining certain own nation 
states´powers of government, or whether “federal” means to recognize a central authority of a 
sort of a central state without no nation states´powers left. The text of Article 1,however,  
until the soverign nation states might decide on a final design of the Union, for the time being, 
however, does state the dynamic mode of the EU´s approach: the EU is performing “a new 
stage in the process of creating an ever closer Union of the peoples”, and not yet a Union of 
States, but a Union of the peoples  of Europe  whatever final shape of government the Union 
might develop. 
 
 
 
 
 
3. The Treaty´s Objectives and major  successes  
 
3.1  General on the European Union  and European Community´s Treaty  objectives 
 
When the European Communities came into existence in 1957 on the basis of the Roman 
Treaties, it was the result of the political aim of developing cooperative ties between France 
and Germany setting as its objectives a close-knit European structure by a stepwise ever 
closer European integration hoping for the economies to develop as an automatic operation of 
self - motion towards a political unification of Europe ( Monnet  /  Schuman - approach). .  
 
 
37:TEU,consolidated version, of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European 
Communities ,Deember 24,2002, C 325/5(11). 
 
 
 68
 
The Community´s “task” , better said: the objective of the Community is, according to Article 
2 Treaty establishing the European Community-TEC-,38  
by establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union and by 
implementing common policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 4,  
 
to promote throughout the Community  
 
 a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities,  
 a high level of employment and of social protection,  
 equality  between men and women,  
 sustainable and non inflationary growth,  
 a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance,  
 a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment,  
 the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and  
 economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States. „ 
 
The TEC´s use of the term “task” in Article 2 is misleading to a wrong understanding of what 
the Member States meant by stipulating Article 2.  Their desired purpose, the objective,and 
not the “task”  was the achievement of the different goals called in detail in Article 2, by 
establishing a Common Market and an Economic and Monetary Union and by implementing 
policies, the Common Market e.g. not serving as an end in itself, not being the desired 
purpose, not being the  objective of  the Community, but the Common Market being a piece 
of work , a needed  instrument, a task in order to help to achieve what the TEC is wrongly 
calling “task”, but meaning “the objectives” as they are stipulated. It is,therefore, advisable , 
to read the term “task” as used in Article 2 TEC, but to actually understand this term as 
“objective” of the Community. 
 
Then , after the "Eurosclerosis " period of stagnation in Community integration politics , 
caused  by the national and Community budget constraints after the economic recession of the 
early  1970`s , the belief in an automatic course of economic integration towards political 
integration  fainted. So  that , after 10 years´ stagnation , the dynamic of European integration 
got an political impetus to accelerate the setting up of the Internal Market - abolishing 
barriers to the free circulation of goods,services  persons and capital flows -on the basis 
of the European Single Act on 1987 , initiated by the former President of the 
Commission, Jacques Delors, and his White Paper on creating the Internal Market . The 
European Single Act enhanced,  as well,   the stepwise creation of the Monetary Union 
on the basis of the 1992 Maastricht  Treaty on European Union :  
   
 
 
 
38: Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, Official 
Journal of the European Communities, December 24,2002, C 325/40,compare: Treaty of 
AMSTERDAM Amending The Treaty on European Union, The Treaties establishing The 
European Communities and related acts,:November 10,1997,Official Journal C 340). 
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The TEU´s  Objectives  : 
 
The Treaty on the Union`s  objectives are , according to Article 2     39 
“The Union shall set itself the following objectives:  
 
- to promote economic and social progress and a high level of employment and to achieve  
balanced and sustainable development, in particular through the creation of an area  
without internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion 
and through the establishment of economic and monetary union, ultimately including a  
single currency in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;  
 
- to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a 
common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence 
policy, which might lead to a common defence, in accordance with the provisions of Article 
17, 
 
- to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States 
through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union, 
 
- to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the 
free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to 
external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime, 
 
- to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build on it with a view to considering to 
what extent the policies and forms of cooperation introduced by this Treaty may need to be 
revised with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions of 
the Community.” 
 
While the last paragraph of Article 2 TEU stipulates one of the essential provisions 
constituting constitutional quality by stating that “The objectives of the Union shall be 
achieved as provided in this Treaty:”  This is the principle of attributed limited powers which 
are transferred by the Member States to the one and the only extent of  being explicitly and 
implied attributed and at the same time excluding any general comprehensive power of a 
nation state like self-generating competence-competence : 
 
“The objectives of the Union shall be achieved as provided in this Treaty and in 
accordance with the conditions and the timetable set out therein while respecting 
the principle of subsidiarity as defined in Article 5 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community.” 40  
 
39:  Official Journal of the European Communities,December 24.2002, C 325/10. 
40: Official Journal of the European Communities,December 24.2002, C 325/11. 
: 
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3.2 Integration and cooperation :  two different models to implement the objectives  
        of the Union´s  objectives  
 
 The Treaty establishing the ECSC  had,basically,introduced the supranational principle of 
integration through attributing and jointly exercising parts of national sovereign rights through 
a Special Council of Ministers 41   setting common binding rules,and through a supranational 
authority, the High Authority,the predecessor of the European Commission, 40) (40: Article 7  
of the Treaty establishing the ECSC) .)setting common binding rules. 
  
The institutional structure  of  the European integration has been adjusted since the beginning 
of the ECSC in 1951. In 1967, the merger   Treaty melted  the different institutions of the 
ECSC and of the Roman Treaty on EEC into one Commission, one Council of Ministers and 
one parliamentary Assembly and one Court of Justice acting for the three existing 
Communities: the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM.  
 
Article G of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union 42   amended  the 1957 Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community with a view to establishing the European 
Community: 
“  Article G 
The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community shall be amended in accordance with the provisions 
of this Article, in order to establish a European Community.  
A. Throughout the Treaty:  
 1)  The term ‘European Economic Community’ shall be replaced by the term ‘European Community’” 
The institutional structure  had become, through the Maastricht Treaty on EU, one frame 
covering  
 the integration method of Community policies to be implemented,on the basis of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community (the first pillar of the Treaty on the 
EU) through the European  Community, by a common set of instituional common 
rules and common las having uniform and direct applicability in the Member States 
and being endowed with the supremacy over national law, on the one hand, and 
 the  intergovernmental method of cooperation between the Member States 
operating outside the policy scope of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community: the objectives of the Union explicitly encompass political dimension 
for the first time , covering the issues of the TEU´s  second and third pillar , to be 
implemented by forms of - political , intergovernmental – cooperation, but inside 
the institutional framework of coordination within the Council acting as the joint 
meeting of the representatives of the Member States: 
  
41: Article 7 of the Treeaty establishing the ECSC. 
42 TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION. Official Journal of the European 
Communities,92/C191/01. 
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The Union is forming one frame,or one roof  of “a single institutional framework”,  by Article 
A last paragraph Maastricht Treaty on European Union, stating that the Union is based on 
 the European Communities  and spplemented by 
 the policies and forms of cooperation established by the Treaty on European Union: 
“The Union shall be founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of 
cooperation established by this Treaty. Its task shall be to organize, in a manner demonstrating consistency and 
solidarity, relations between the Member States and between their peoples.” 
The one frame of the institutional structure is called “ a single institutional framework” 
by Article C of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union , maintained by Article  3  
consolidated version of the Treaty on EU.43  
The functional role of the “single framework” is to cover the two different methods of 
cooperation between the Member States: the integration method and the 
intergovernmental method of cooperation. These methods are  referred to by the Articles A, 
B and C of the Maastricht TEU( Articles 1, 2 and 3 TEU consolidated version ): 
 Article B is setting the Union´s objectives as  
“to promote economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable, in particular 
through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the strengthening of 
economic and social cohesion and through the establishment of economic and monetary 
union, ultimately including a single currency in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty;” 
while at the same time setting the objectives subject to policies and forms of  cooperation 
outside the Community scope : 
“to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a 
common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence 
policy, which might in time lead to a common defence;”,and 
“to develop close cooperation on justice and home affairs;” 
Article B,maintained by Article 2 TEU consolidated version(2002)  is entrusting  these two 
methods of integration and intergovernmental policies and forms cooperation to perform 
under the common commitment: 
“  to maintain in full the ‘acquis communautaire’ and build on it with a view to considering, 
through the procedure referred to in Article N(2), to what extent the policies and forms of 
cooperation introduced by this Treaty may need to be revised with the aim of ensuring the 
effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions of the Community”. 
43: TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION. Official Journal of the European Communities 
(92/C 191/01, and Official Journal of the European Communities, December 24, 2002/C 325/5(C 
325/11/.   
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Consequently, in conformity with Article B, it is up to Article C ,maintained by Article 3 TEU 
consolidated version(2002) to bridge the two different methods of  integration and 
cooperation by setting  up one common roof, a single institutional framework endowed with 
the functional role to ensure consistency and continuity of the activities carried out to attain 
the Union´s objecives “while respecting and building upon” of what has already been 
achieved through the European Community´s method of integration:the “acquis 
communautaire”: 
“Article 3 (ex Article C) 
The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the 
continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and building upon the 
‘acquis communautaire’.  
The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its 
external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be 
responsible for ensuring such consistency. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in 
accordance with its respective powers. “ 
 
Article B and C of the Maastricht Treaty ,Articles 2 and 3  TEU consolidated version 
(2002),can,,therefore, be regarded as Treaty provisions that incorporate the Member States´ 
common intention to admit that there exists a tension  between the supranational” 
component of the European Union´s structure, which is the European Community,on 
the one hand,   and the intergovernmental method,on the other, to perform common 
European objectives.  
At the same time, these Treaty provisions incorporate the Member States´ common pragmatic 
intention to  “ensure effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions of the 
Community”  and,therefore, to make an effective use of the  tension existing between the two 
methods of coperation  for the common objectives´ sake to ensure the consistency and the 
continuity of the activities combining the two different  methods of  the Member 
States´cooperation to form a coherent whole :representing the two levelled system of 
interconnected separate but jointly acting levels of nation state responsibility and Union 
responsibility,thus ensuring the consistency and the strength arising from the forces of the 
dialectics emerging from the twolevelled system of the interacting national and supranational 
Union levels of performing common policies. 
 
Applying these two models of  implementing the EU´s objectives,today ,the EU has a 
number of functions of fundamentally political significance for European stability :  
   
   
Internally , the European Union serves to bind the European sovereign Member States 
together in offering a stable framework - composed of independently acting institutions 
on the basis of an autonomous legal order of the Community - for  
 
1) the EU member States to deepen the degree of integration which makes themselves 
dependable on each other  
- within a multi-level system of sharing interconnected sovereignty 
interdependencies between  
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-- the nation State level of exercising the States´ sovereign powers , on the one 
hand , and 
 
--the Community(=the 1st pillar of the Treaty architecture)  level share of jointly 
exercised powers, on the other . 
  
2) young democracies ( new Member States and applicant countries for accession to the 
EU ) to be assisted in developing and prospering . 
 
Externally, the European Union contributed and contributes to a profound stabilisation 
process in Europe , through its pulling power , its means and ressources - both the 
political and economic ones - in the form of the Europe Agreements , which incorporate 
extended association agreements with future members of the EU .  
   
   
The main challenge for the EU today is how to handle the delicate compromise of the 
consolidated (Nice,Amsterdam and Maastricht) Treaty on EU of being able to enlarge at 
the same time as continuing to integrate in depth - while striving with the impacts of 
globalisation challenges to the economic and technological competitiveness. 
 
The crucial question is whether the combined use of the two models of  integration and 
intergovernmental cooperation  will help to respond to the challenges the EU is facing by 
deepening and enlarging nearly at the same time –requiring reinforcing the decisiveness of the 
EU´s institutions´ decision-making within the Union of the Twentyseven, this issue will be 
deepened when discussing the  perspectives of  the essentials guiding the pending 
Constitution. 
  
 
4. EU Treaty architecture of the three pillars in detail 
   
   
The Treaty on the Union building the roof to cover the three pillars do support and reinforce 
each other in building a comprehensive multi-level interdependence framework for European 
integration and European cooperation implemented by the nation States and their commonly 
shared sovereignties as common players  in the European structure .  
 
There is,until now, no legal definition of the European Union –no wonder: the European 
Union still is on track to be established, step-by-step. 
 
It is, however ,  the EC, the first pillar under the common roof established by the Treaty on 
the European Union , which is  the existing  body with a clearly designed legal  personality 
and structure   to further develop the European integration on the legal basis of the EC Treaty,  
by  its explicitly attributed as well with its implied attributed powers which are transferred 
from the member States to the EC .   
 
The  legal basis, the scope of action  and the limits of the EC´s activities are clearyly 
discernible : 
 
The Treaty on the Union enlarges the scope of EC actions supporting and supplementing 
Member  States´ actions while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States ,e.g 
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in the field of  managing structural Funds of the EC, implementing the EC´s Regional 
Development Fund regulation is closely interconnected with the national powers of  funding 
the modernization of   economy related regional basic facilities,services and installations 
needed for regional communities, municipalities,  to be established and maintained in 
Member States. 
 
As to the newly attributed dimension of  enlarged scope of community action : Title VII - 
Economic and monetary policy,  economic policy is still a national competence , but subject 
to Community coordination , while  monetary policy is a central Community competence: 
  Economic policy: The Member States remain responsible for the conduct of their economic 
policies , Articles  4 and 98  Treaty on EC – TEC- (ex Article 102 lit. a Rome Treaty on EEC)  
44, but bound to coordinate,Art. 99 par. 3 EC Treaty. 
 
 
 
4.1 Monetary policy - central Community competence  
          
Title VII of the TEC establishes the European Monetary Union ,   attributing to the 
Community    the competence    for monetary policy , thus setting rules of a new centralised 
European competence which is , in legal terms , different from the Treaty provisions ruling 
the ´coordination of  the still nationally conducted economic policies . The European 
Community´s competence for monetary policy is ruling a core power which is one of the 
traditionally innermost parts of nation states´sovereign powers which are, through the 
revolutionary shift of power made by the Member States through the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union,it transferred to the Community level of jointly exercising the powers 
according to the decision-making rules and procedures as provided for by the TEC.  
 
Except the introduction of  TEU provisions on developing a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and on cooperation in Home and Justice Affairs, the transfer of power in 
the field of monetary policy is a genuinely revolutionary stage  in the process of the 
consistently dynamic development of European integration: 
 
According to Article 105 paragraph 1 TEC, the  primary objective of the European System 
of Central Bank  is 
“ to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the 
general economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of 
the Community as laid down in Article 2. The ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market 
economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance with the 
principles set out in Article 4. “  
 
 
 
 
44: Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community,in :Official 
Journal of the European Communities, December 24,2002, C 325/33(41,71),compare: 
Maastricht TEU,(97/C 340/03). 
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As to the  basic tasks  to be carried out through the ESCB, it is  since the third stage of the 
stepwise introduction of the single European currency , within which the Community  has  
assumed - for common exercise - the  national competences of the Member States  for :  
- the full range of the monetary policy of the Community ,  
- the  conduct of foreign exchange  operations ,  
- for  holding  and managing the official foreign reserves of the Member 
States and  
- promoting  the smooth operation of payment systems according to Article 
105 EC Treaty . Article 105 paragraph 2 TECC:. 
 
 
5.    Major successes of  the Community integration method: 
Peacemaking and peacekeeping procedures. 
 
 The Maastricht Treaty on EU that entered into force on November 1,1993,  as well as the 
succeeding versions of the Amsterdam and Nice  Treaty on EU,  can be called a magnificent  
achievement. But the Treaty on EU  was also a treaty that  proved very difficult to sell to the 
European publics in the  referenda which were held on it.  
 
Part of the problem is the Treaty´s  complexity, similar to the Constitution´s complexity. 
Within the EU Treaty´s  300-plus pages are articles on  such diverse subjects as human rights, 
parliamentary procedures, public health, and economic convergence. lt is also a compromise 
treaty which fully satisfied neither those who wanted stronger centralized EU institutions, nor 
those who wanted to turn more decision-making power back to the member states.  
 
But the Treaty on EU has proved to turn out more achievements than drawbacks.The most 
significant achievements within Maastricht,Amsterdam and Nice  Treaty  turned out to be :  
 
  
(1)Internal market  freedoms , benefits   from greater opportunities to market efficiently  
throughout Europe due to Common rules of law; 
(2)Common budget´s  redistributive role: stabilising cohesion within the EU, ,structural and 
cohesion funds: identity shaping role of  infrastructural projects financed by EU funds with 
increasing public notice of the EU´s  contribution; 
(3) Creating Europe of  the Regions: 
(4)Monetary Union, Euro,  
(5) Enlarging the EU  
(6) Imperatives of making the enlarged EU´s decision-making more efficient 
(7) Promoting democracy throughout Europe 
(8) Developing a common foreign and security policy 
(9) Developing the EU as an area  of freedom, security and justice,through 
 cooperation in justice and home affairs 
(10) Introduction of European Union citizenship 
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The Union´s identity shaping role of following major successes of the EU: 
 
a)Major success: completing the internal market 
 
There are many accomplishments that bear witness to the viability of the European Union. 
In 1985, after a period of economic stagnation and much soul-searching, the Community 
moved forward decisively to complete the single internal  market for goods and services 
originally envisioned in the Treaty of Rome.  
A bold constitutional measure, the Single European Act, made it easier to pass legislation 
through majority voting , paving the way for  tough new measures against  trade barriers 
among member states.  
 
The Single European Act was joined by the 1985 White Paper, which set out nearly three 
hundred measures necessary to remove by the end of 1992 all internal  barriers to the free 
flow of goods, people, capital  and services among the member states of the Community. 
 
The „1992„ internal market program is now nearly complete; 98 % of the measures originally 
outlined are in place; and member states have adopted more than 90% of the legislation 
needed to make these measures law throughout the European Union. 
 
 
While implementation delays mean that the program is less complete than it may appear, it is 
nevertheless a stunning accomplishment, overcoming decades of political tradition and local 
prejudice, to  open a large and rich market to all European economic actors. 
 
Companies, EU companies as well as companies from outside the EU  benefit   from greater 
opportunities to market efficiently throughout Europe.  
 
Early fears had vanished that the 1992 program would create a „Fortress Europe„ — open on 
the inside but closed to foreign trade. Apart from  specific areas such as audiovisual  services, 
the EU is clearly rnore open to trade today than it was fifteen years ago.  
 
b) The EU budget´s identity shaping role, assisting  regional infrastructure programs, 
stabilising cohesion within the EU 
 
Another notable aspect of EU viability is the member states‘ contribution of a significant 
and growing amount  of their own resources to a common budget. This budget had grown 
15 percent in real terms each year since 1960, and now stands over 100  billion Euro. 
 
By financing common programs, especially in the areas of agriculture, now under 40% of the 
EU´s budget, joint scientific research and technological development programs,4%, and 
foreign assistance (2 %)‚ the budget substitutes for member state expenditures; harmonises 
many member state programs; and redistributes resources from richer to poorer member 
states. 
 
This redistributive role of the budget helps reduce differences in per capita income in the 
member states, thereby promoting a key EU goal: „cohesion”  and helping to shape the 
EU´s identity  by raising the public´s attention to the EU´s contributions to modernizing 
programs in Member States. 
 
Indeed, almost a third of the budget is devoted to the Structural and Cohesion Funds, which 
finance infrastructure projects in regions where per capita income is less than 70 percent of 
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the community average, support areas affected by industrial decline, train the unemployed, 
and help develop rural areas.  
 
In part as a result of these programs, EU member states like  Ireland, Spain, and Portugal had 
increased their per capita income relative to that of the other member states since 1980. 
 
 
c) Creating the third level within the European Union: Europe of the Regions, the 
“Committee of the Regions” 
 
The Amsterdam Treaty on EU had established the “Committee of the Regions”, Article 198 
lit. a  Treaty establishing the European Community 45) a whole new level of  political 
representation and governance within the EU: that of the regions (Flandcrs, Scotland, 
Catalonia, Bavaria, and others),the “Europe of the Regions”. This new level had been created 
in addition to the existing two levels of the EU and of the Member States. It is consistent with 
the nature of the European Union  in which decisions should be taken “ as openly as possible 
and as closely possible to the citizen”,as stipulated in Article 1 of the Treaty on European 
Union: 
“This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the 
peoples of  Europe,in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as 
possible to the citizen.” 46  
 
And the Committee of the Regions is a new level of governance within the EU which is as 
well closely interconnected with the EU´s programmes of assistance given to regional 
infrastructure projects managed by national programs. These programmes work with close 
cooperation between the national,regional and EU levels, and they have the side effect of 
shaping the EU´s identity in the peoples´minds by making the people  aware of the EU´s 
helpful activities to support interregional cooperation for industrial and technological 
innovations to increase the regions capabilities of  improving their competitiveness and thus 
of contributing to overcome one of the basic problems of  tackling with unemployment within 
the European Union. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45:Article 198 lit.a ,in: Treaty  on European Union, Official Journal of the European 
Communities,July 29, 1992, C 191; Article 263 (ex Article 198 a )consolidated version of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community, December 24,2002, C 325/ 33   (138 ). 
46: consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, December 24,2002, C 325/10. 
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d)Achieving the single currency “Euro” 
 
The European Union had  taken a number of important steps to implement, by January 1, 
1999,  the ambitious goal of Economic and Monetary Union. As called for under the 
Maastricht Treaty on EU, stage II of Economic and Monetary Union began on January  1, 
1994, when the European Monetary Institute (EMI), the precursor of the European Central 
Bank, was established. The EMI had  to strengthen coordination of member-state monetary 
policies until monetary union was realized. 
The EMI  also prepared  the numerous practical steps that had to be taken to produce the 
common monetary policy and the single currency “Euro”.  
 
 
 
e) Enlarging  the EU to the “Europe of the  Twentyseven” 
 
Another clear sign of good health-  the Union has  almost continually been involved in the 
process of enlarging :  
 
Six countries signed the original Coal and Steel Community and EEC treaties: France, 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The United Kingdom-UK- was 
invited to participate in both, but declined. In 1961, the UK reversed its policy and announced 
its intention to join the Communities, but was then blocked by Charles dc Gaulle for eight 
years.  
In 1969, negotiations began-   with the UK, Ireland, Denmark and Norway The former three 
joined the Communities in 1972; the Norwegian public voted „no„ in a referendum.  
 
Greece applied in 1975 and joined in 1981, 
Spain and Portugal applied in 1977 and joined in 1986, “Europe of the Twelve”. 
  
Sweden , Finland and Austria joined on January 1 , 1995, "Europe of the Fifteen"  
 
Estonia,  Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Cyprus joined on May 01,2004,”Europe of the Twentyfive”, and  
 
Bulgaria and Rumania joined on January 01,2007,”Europe of the “Twentyseven”. 
 
f)Imperatives of  making decision-making more effective: 
 
Another success closely connected with the EU´s enlargement is the growing awareness 
of the imperatives of more efficient decision-making in the enlarged European Union 
 
In close connection with the EU´s enlargement, there is a broadly shared common feeling in 
the Member States and within the EU´s institutions that decision-making in the institutions of 
the enlarged EU has to be made more effective. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union  
left many issues of how to make an enlarged European Union work unresolved and com-
mitted the EU member states  to hold another conference- called Intergovernmental 
Conference - in 1996.The Amsterdam Treaty  as a „ bridging Treaty „ had left majority voting 
issues concerning voting in the Council of an enlarged EU still unresolved and committed the 
EU member states to hold the conference at Nice in December 2000 on institutional 
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adjustment .. There is broad consens throughout the EU that the Nice Treaty´s adjustments 
were not convincing, so that preparing a Constitution started. 
 
                 
 
g) Promoting democracy throughout Europe,but diluting forces of extreme nationalism 
at stake 
 
Bejond economic issues,  another great success of the EU is that it  has not only fostered 
democracy in its internal procedures. lt has strengthened democratic roots throughout 
Europe. 
 
Greece, Spain, and Portugal, which suffered dictatorships for varying periods in the years 
after World War II, had  been reinforced in their commitment to liberty by inclusion in the 
Union.  
 
One of the great success stories  of the post-war period is the growth of a flourishing, 
stable democratic order in Germany from the ashes of the Third Reich. In substantial 
part, this has been the story of Germany‘s integration into a larger community of like-minded 
countries, of the direction of its great energies and resources into the building of the common 
democratic and free market enterprise that thc EU represents. 
 
The EU has been effective in defusing tensions within its member states. By fostering 
cohesive action, it has diluted forces of extreme nationalism that could  threaten peace 
and stability and the old balance-of-power attitudes that were once the way  of 
European politics.The present days´crucial question  is, however, whether the European 
Union will keep up its strength for consistently and effectively diluting forces of extreme 
nationalism among the growing number of young generation if major parts of the young 
generation is  increasingly  left with deficiencies in education, left without hope and 
perspectives, left behind as the defeated in the worldwide combat of competitiveness. 
 
The role that the EU has played in fundamentally changing the historic relationship 
between France and Germany is another proud achievement. These two former enemies 
had fought three great wars in the past 120 years, twice involving the United States. Today 
their economies are inextricably bound together. A fourth war is inconceivable: Indeed, 
Franco-German cooperation is an essential link that binds the EU together. 
France and Germany stand for the European method of integration and cooperation, 
channelling and balancing divergent national interests until the emerging of  common 
positions called to be European. 
What made and makes the European method attractive to Member States as well as to 
non-Member States is the convincing model of the Union of States that do respect the 
sovereign rights of any Member  State no matter if big or small:  
 
there is no imperial domination  of any Member State,no conceivable majority of other 
Member States over minorities of Member States. Any convincing call for unanimous 
voting for the sake of vital natonal interest in a given case is,since the famous Luxembourg 
compromise in March 1966 to end the French policy of the “empty chair”,  being respected by 
the majority of Member States.  It was exactly that  European model of practising democracy 
and of the respect for the rule of law as  principles governing the conduct of their 
relations,that made and makes the EU  attractive to other democracies.  
It is the model of  integration and intergovernmental cooperation, the balancing of individual 
national positions and of the collectivity´s position in due respect for the national 
sovereignty,that made the EU attractive namely to formerly communist countries under the 
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dominating imperial power of the former Soviet Union. Recurring to claim national vital 
interests to obstruct a majority voting decision can,however, be a drawback for the Union´s 
decisiveness and effectiveness, on the other hand.The latter –negative- aspect of the still alive 
principle of nation state´s sovereignty and claim for equal treatment – one country,one vote- 
can be detrimental for the cohesion of the enlarged European Union. To prevent this negtive 
effect is one of the focal leftovers of the Intergovernmental Conference 1996/96 and of the 
Amsterdam and Nice TEU and subject to the endeavors to find a viable solution to ensure the 
enlarged Union ´s decisiveness and effectiveness in the course of the discussion about the 
Constitution´s  standstill. 
 
Of course, the  EU had not been alone in constructing throughout Western Europe successful 
barriers against communism and fascism:  
 
 NATO has been of immense irnportance as have been the Bretton Woods institutions. But the 
EU was and still is  an integral and increasingly significant factor in the lasting success story. 
More and more frequently the EU offered and continues to  offer  to non-member  states and 
to International Organizations a common address for decision-making on a broad range of 
issues of common interest for practical economic reasons – and, to a growing extent , for 
political , foreign policy and security reasons as well as for reasons of technical and financial 
cooperation with developing countries . 
 
The EU is , e.g., the United States´ largest trading and investment partner, bigger than Canada 
or Japan. The EU and the USA have   a broadly balanced and diversified trade relationship 
worth nearly $300 billion per year.  
The EU is the  biggest foreign investor in the USA  — over one half of all foreign investments 
by EU investors is in the United States and over forty percent of all U.S. investment abroad is 
in EU countries. This broad range of mutual interests is the fact oriented background for the 
political will to strengthen the EU-USA relationship for the sake of common strategic 
interests, as the German EU President,Chancellor Merkel, announced on January 03,2007, on 
the eve of her  visit to the US President Bush. 
 
 
6.   EU institutions under the Maastricht TEU and the TEU consolidated version(2002) 
 
The  institutions of the European Union  are, according to Article 5 of the consolidated 
version of the Treaty on European Union – TEU -: 
 
The European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission,  the 
Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors. 
 
In  addition, the  Treaty establishing the European Community, is stipulating the institutions: 
the Economic and Social Committee,Article 257 TEC, the Committee of the Regions, Article 
263 TEC and the European Investment Bank, Article 266 TEC. 47)   
 
47: Article 5 TEU (ex Article E Maastricht TEU)  Treaty on European Union,consolidated 
version,  Official Journal of the European Communities, December 24,2002, C 325/11; 
Article E Maastricht TEU, 92/C 191/01).; Articles 257 , 263 and 266 TEC,  C 325/33 ( 136, 
138, 139). 
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Identity shaping essentials of the EU are the institutions that are acting for the EU and 
legally binding the EU according to the principle of attributed but limited 
powers,attributed by the Treaty on EU ruling the objectives, tasks, institutions and legal 
instruments to implement the objectives and tasks of the EU through  the instruments of 
the secondary law.  
 
 
Related to institutions, the principle of attributed powers which are attributed , by the 
Founding Treaty on EU, to the European Union, and thus limited: 
 
« The objectives of the Union shall be achieved as provided in this Treaty and in 
accordance with the conditions and the timetable set out therein while respecting the 
principle of subsidiarity as defined in Article 5 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community.”, Article 2 Treaty on European Union 48   
And Article 5 of the Treaty establishing the European Community states : 
“Article 5 (ex Article 3b)  
“ The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty 
and of the objectives assigned to it therein.”, Article 5 (ex-Article 3 b) Treaty establishing the 
European Community. 49  
 
 And as far as powers are  attributed, by the Founding Treaty on EU, to the institutions 
acting for the Union, the principle of attributed powers is stipulated as follows: 
 
Article 5 (ex-Article E) Treaty on European Union: 
“Article5 (ex Article E)  
The European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Court of 
Auditor shall exercise their powers under the conditions and for the purposes provided for, on 
the one hand, by the provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Communities and of 
the subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying and supplementing them and, on the other hand, by 
the other provisions of this Treaty.”50 
 
48: consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Union, Official Journal of 
the European Communities, December 24,2002, C 325/11) 
 
49: Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community,in: Official 
Journal of the European Communities, December 24,2002, C 325/33 ( 41); compare 
Amsterdam Treaty consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European European 
Community, Official Journal of the European Communities, 1997, 97/C 340/03. 
50:Official Journal of the European Communities C 325/11. 
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“Each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this 
Treaty.”Article 7 (ex-Article 4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community,51)   
 
 
 
The EU´s  institutional structure and the power of the institutions: 
 
Looked at from a legal point of view the EU has three distinguishing characteristics: 
 
.-First, the content of the EU is a common internal political and legal order,  not just a 
treaty among states. The legal sources on which EU authority rests are not only  
 
 the founding treaties, the EU´s primary law, but also  
 the EU´s  secondary legislation created on the basis of the founding treaties and 
written and published with approximately over 100.000 pages of legislation, and 
  general legal principles, including human rights protection, developed by the 
European Court of Justice. 
 
 EU legislation applies to individuals and companies just as much as domestic legislation, in 
fact it takes priority over domestic legislation.  
 
• Second, the EU has highly developed instruments, institutions such as the Commission, 
which exercise autonomous rights and can undertake and enforce obligations on their own 
authority. And it initiates legislation which is negotiated and adopted by the Council 
throughout a legislation procedure of co-decision divided between the Council and the 
European Parliament. 
 
.No other organization, with the exception of sovereign states themselves, has this deep a 
structure. 
 
Because the EU goes so deep and does so much, so routinely, it is easy to take for granted just 
how effective it is. 
 
The impression one gets is that the EU is carrying on decision-making in almost the full range 
of areas in which one would expect any govemment to be engaged. More than half of the 
environmental legislation dealt with by  national  parliaments was  not national legislation, it 
was and is EU legislation created by the Member States within the institutions that are 
acting under the EU Treaty on the EU.  Maintaining the institutional structure is of vital 
interest for ensuring that the European Union´s further develops in security,stability 
and democratic accountability, supposed ,nevertheless, the Union´s identity shaping 
essentials will be strengthened: democracy , transparency and efficiency- 
 
 
51:Treaty establishing the European Commnity, Consolidated version of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, December 24,2002, C 325/33 ( 42 ); 
compare:consolidated version of the Treaty estblishing the European Community, Amsterdam 
Treaty on EU, 1997, 7/C 340/03. 
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Institutions, in detail 
 
The institutional structure of the European Union is  composed of  a number of major 
institutions. The consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union  
 
 
 
6.1 The Commission 
 
The  Commission, headquartered in Brussels, plays a central role  as the executive institution 
within the institutional structure of the European Union. 
The definitely  “supranational” component of the European Union´s  structure is the  Com-
mission, which is endowed with the powers 
 
 to initiate and to implement  the Council´s and the Parliament´s legislation   
 implement the  rules which the Council lays down, Article 202 TEC, 
 
 to make regulations and issue directives, take decisions, make recommendations or 
deliver opinions,Article 249 TEC, and  
 monitor the respect for the European Union´s law, Article  211 (ex-Article 155 ), 
Article 202  TEC, 52)  
  
The Commission´s supranational character is owed  to its explicitly and implied attributed 
powers to act and decide independently from any directives from individual Member 
States,Article  213 paragraph 2: 
 
“2. The Members of the Commission shall, in the general interest of the Community, be completely independent 
in the performance of their duties.  
In the performance of these duties, they shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or from any 
other body. They shall refrain from any action incompatible with their duties. Each Member State undertakes to 
respect this principle and not to seek to influence the Members of the Commission in the performance of their 
tasks.” 
 
The Commission´s supranational independent character is confirmed by Article 218  para - 
graph 1 TEC as well ,  stating that “ 1. The Council and the Commission shall consult  each 
other and shall settle by common accord their methods of cooperation. “ 
 
One of  the Commission´s basic characteristics which basically differs from other institutions 
of the EU , because  the Commission does not share it with other institutions,  is its chief  - 
power :  it alone has the  competence to  propose EU legislation, Articles 251 and 252 TEC. 
 
 The Commission also implements EU laws and monitors its implementation and enforces 
them: it ensures that the member states are carrying out their obligations, taking them before 
the Court of Justice when necessary, Article 226 TEC. 
 The Commission also manages the finances  of the European Union. 53)  
52: Official Journal of the European Communities, Decem-ber 24, 2002,  C 325/33 ( 119, 
117 ); compare:Amsterdam consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, 1997 (97/C 340/03) ;Wiarda, supra, note 21. 
53:ibid.,supra,note 21. 
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The Commission  consists of 2o  members,under the 2002 consolidated version of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community. Article 213 paragraph 1, subject to subsequent 
amendment  scheduled to enter into force on January 01, 2005, and subsequently,when the 
Union would consist of 27 Member States on January 01,2007, according to the provisions of 
the Protocol on the Enlargement of the European Union. 
 
 
The Members of the Commission are  appointed for a period of five years. Their term of 
office is  renewable, Article 214 paragraph 1 TEC. 
The governments of the Member States  nominate by common accord the person they in- 
tend to appoint as President of the Commission; the nomination is to be approved by the 
 European Parliament., Article  214  paragraph 2 TEC. 
The governments of the Member States nominate, by common accord with the nominee for 
President,  the other persons whom they intend to appoint as Members of the 
Commission, Article 214 paragraph 2 TEC. 
 
The President and the other Members of the Commission thus nominated are subject as a 
body to a vote of approval by the European Parliament. After approval by the European 
Parliament, the President and the other Members of the Commission are  appointed by 
common accord of the governments of the Member States.,Article 214 paragraph 2 TEC. 
 
The Commission  is an institution acting on the basis of collegiality and headed by  its 
President. 
 
“The Commission shall work under the political guidance of its President,  who shall decide 
on its internal organisation in order to ensure that it acts consistently, efficiently and on the 
basis of collegiality.”,Article 217 paragraph 1 TEC.  
 Article 217 TEC  had been amended by the Nice Treaty  on EU,strengthening the functional 
role of the President . 54)  
The responsibilities incumbent upon the Commission are  structured for assorted fields of 
policies(such as external relations, industries,enviromental protection, energy  competition 
policy, agriculture, trade)and allocated among its Members by its President. The President 
may reshuffle the allocation of those responsibilities during the Commission's term of office. 
The Members of the Commission shall carry out the duties devolved upon them by the 
President under his authority, Article 217 paragraph 2 TEC 
 
 
The  Commissioners are heading General Directorates, a bureaucracy of nearly 16.000 civil 
servants 55)  
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
54:Official Journal of the European Communities, March 10,2001, C 80/01 ( 21). 
 
55: Salmon, Trevor C. (1996). European Union structures and institutions and their powers. In 
Philippe Barbour (Ed.), The European Union handbook. Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers.  
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The Comissioners can be compared with a national Government´s members of the Cabinet, or 
with an American President‘s Cabinet Secretaries.   
 
As to the number of the Members of the Commission, under the consolidated version of the 
(2002) Treaty establishing the European Community,  
the Commission must include at least one national of each of the Member States, but may 
not include more than two Members having the nationality of the same State, Article 213 
paragraph 1 TEC. 
The issue of the number of the Members of the Commission had already been discussed  
in the light namely of the needs in an enlarged Community throughout the negotiation on the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union , finalizing the 
 
“ DECLARATION on the number of members of the Commission and of the European Parliament  
The Conference agrees that the Member States will examine the questions relating to the number of members of 
the Commission and the number of members of the European Parliament no later than at the end of 1992, with a 
view to reaching an agreement which will permit the establishment of the necessary legal basis for fixing the 
number of members of the European Parliament in good time for the 1994 elections. The decisions will be taken 
in the light, inter alia, of the need to establish the overall size of the European Parliament in an enlarged 
Community. “  56 
 
The largest countries: Germany, the United Kingdom, France,Italy and Spain nominated two 
Commissioners.until the Nice Treaty on EU entered into force. 57 
 
The European Commission was streamlined, with the larger Member States renouncing 
their right to two commissioners on 1 January 2005 in a Union of the Twentyfive, and 
with the introduction of a rotation system in a Union of the Twentyseven on 1 January 
2007: 
 
According to the “Protocol on the enlargement of the European Union “ ,annexed to the 
Treaty on European Union and to the Treaties establishing the European Communities, 
Article 4 provisions concerning the Commission, paragraph 1 states that on 1 January 2005, 
after the accession of ten new Member States on 1 May 2004, 
 
” The Commission shall include one national from each of the Member States”: which means 
25 Commissioners, one national from each of the 25 Member States. 
56: Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Communities, 1992, 
(92/C 191/01. 
57::Treaty of Nice, amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Commnities and certain related acts, Official Journal of the European 
Commnities,March 10,2001, C80/01. 
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And Article 4  second paragraph states that “When the Union consists of 27 Member 
States,..”, on 1 January 2007: 
 
“The number of Members of the Commission shall be less than the number of Member 
States.The Members of the Commission shall be chosen according to a rotation system 
based on the principle of equality,the implementing arrangements for which shall be adopted 
by the Council,acting unanimously. 
The number of Members of the Commission shall be set by the Council,acting 
unanimously.58)  
 
 In theory, the larger countries´advantage they enjoyed de lege lata ante the Nice Treaty 
to nominate two Commissioners, was not a matter of strengthened influential power of the 
respective Member State affecting the course of decisions within the Commission. For, each 
Commissioner must seriously renounce to depend on national interests and pledge to be 
committed to the interests of the Eurpoean Union as a whole, Article 213 paragraph 2 TEC. 
 
 The exercise of  these independent powers,however, is quite often facing conflicts when 
individual Commissioners are choosing sides when they appear to follow national wishes to 
oppose legislative initiatives  of the Commission destined  to strengthen e.g. environmental 
protection against alleged national interests representing the interests of  the industries 
concerned as recently, on February 07-08,2007, has been demonstrated when the 
Commission´s intention to launch Community legislation on reducing the CO2 emission 
caused by vehicles from 160 g/km down to 130 g/km was under discussion throughout the 
EU.  
 
The Commission negotiates for the Union in its areas of responsibilities, such as trade.  
The Member of the Commission, who is heading the Commission´s delegation in negotiations  
with third countries or with International Organizations , has to  consider and to  reflect the 
views of the EU member states. While negotiating, the representative of the Commission is at  
the same time trying to cobble together a common position among the 27  member states: -:no  
easy task. But it is nevertheless impressive and helpful that the third countries have one  
interlocutor with whom to deal, who speaks  for the European Union. Since the Treaties of  
Maastricht and Amsterdam,  the Commission is  representing the EU on an increasing  range  
of issues including such areas as the environment, transportation, and development  
cooperation.  
 
The Commission´s competence to  represent the EU in negotiations with third  states and  
organizations,however, has been  reduced following the Amsterdam Treaty: the Presidency of  
the Council represents the Union in matters coming within the Common Foreign and Security  
Policy- CFSP-. The Presidency has to express the position of the Union in international orga- 
Nisations and international conferences. The Presidency is assisted by  the Secretary-General 
of the  Council, Mr.Solana, exercising the function of the High Representative for the CFSP. 
The Commissioner responsible for the EU´s  external relations performed on the basis of the 
European Community objectives and tasks (the 1st pillar of the TEU) is to be fully assiciated 
 
 
58: following the Nice Treaty consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community,Official Journal of the European Communities, December 24,2002, C 325/ 33  
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in CFSP-related tasks, so that the Council, represented by the Secretary-General exercising  
the function of the High Commissioner for the CFSP are held thus to be  practicing a  
division of work ensuring the consistency between the integration and the cooperation 
matters of the EU´s external relations: 
 
As to the Council´s and the Commission´s joint responsibility for ensuring  consistency , 
Article 3 Treaty on EU states what is meant by  “ ensuring consistency” : 
 
“Article 3 
The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the 
consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives 
while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire . 
The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the 
context of its external relations,security,economic and development policies. 
The Council and the Commission  shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency and 
shall cooperate to this end.They shall ensure the implementation of these policies,each in 
accordance with its respective powers.” 59  
 
Article 18 of the Treaty on EU   stipulates:60  
 
“  
1.The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and 
security policy. 
2.The Presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of decisions taken under this 
title;in that capacity it shall in principle express the position of the Union in international 
organisations and international conferences. 
3.The Presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council who shall exercise 
the function of High Representative for the common foreign and security policy. 
4.The Commission shall be fully associated in the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2.The 
Presidency shall be assisted in those tasks if need be by the next Member State to hold the 
Presidency.” 
 
And Article 24 TEU, amended by the Treaty of Nice,  does provide the Council with the 
Commission´s assistance to open negotiations to conclude an agreement with one ore more 
States or international organisations. According to Article 27 TEU the Commission  
“  
shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security 
policy field.“ 
 
 
59: consolidated – after the – Nice Treaty on EU had been signed in 2001- version of the 
Treaty on EU, Official Journal of the European Communities, December 24,2002, C 325/5   
( 11). 
60 consolidated  version of the Treaty on EU, Official Journal of the European Communities, 
December 24,2002, C 325/5 ( 16 ). 
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And cooperative ties between the Council and the Commission are required for operating 
“enhanced cooperation “ under Article 27 a  TEU : calling upon the Member States operating 
enhanced cooperation on Common Foreign and Security Policy matters  to respect: 
 
“.. 
—the principles,objectives,general guidelines and consistency of the common foreign and 
security policy and the decisions taken within the framework of that policy, 
—the powers of the European Community,and 
—consistency between all the Union's policies and its external activities. “ 61  
 
 
The Commission plays other roles as well. lt effectively serves as the EU‘s antitrust authority 
. 
 lt has independent authority to provide funds in emergency situations both inside the EU and 
to third countries: for example, the Commission has sent emergency aid   to affected areas 
following recent warfares in Afghanistan and Africa. 
 
The Commission also proposed the Delors White Paper - a detailed program for dealing with 
Europe‘s recession and unemployment, although it was and is  up to the member states to 
implement the program.  
The Commission plays an equally important planning and coordinating role bejond economic 
issues ,eg. in health issues ; it released an outline for a coordinated EU international strategy 
towards AIDS.  
And as to the priority field of energy policy, the Commission released in March 2006 the 
Energy Green Paper for a European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy 
including tackling with climate change and commitment to coherent external energy 
importing policy.And one of the priority activitities of the Commission run at the present time 
is to convince Russia to ratify the European Energy Charta and to reassure the European 
Union that there are no further doubts about Russia´s commitment to  
ensure the secure gas and oil supplies destined to Member States of the European Union. 
 
 
 
6.2 The Council 
 
The prime decision-making body within the EU is the Council. 62   
 
The Council  consists of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, authorised 
to commit the government of that Member State, Article 203 TEC: 
 
 
 
61: Article 27 a  TEU, Official Journal of the European Communities, December 24,2002, C  
       325/20. 
62: Article 202 TEC, consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European  
       Community, Official Journal of the European Communities, December 24,2002, C  
       325/33 ( 117). 
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The Council is endowed with the task to ensure  that the objectives set out in the  Treaty 
establishing the European Community are  attained, Article 202 TEC. The Council, according  
to Article 202 TEC, 
 
 has to ensure  coordination of the general economic policies of the Member States; 
 has  power to take decisions; 
 confers on  the Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts, powers for the 
      implementation of the rules which the Council lays down.  
 
 
The Council  meets  when convened by its President on his own initiative or at the request of 
one of its members or of the Commission, Article 204 TEC.. 
 
It´s  sessions are held in  varying  compositions  of multiple committees of national ministers  
according to the specific agenda and item  under consideration.. 
The Council‘s legislative function is to jointly adopt European Community legislation  
and budget, together with the European Parliament, Article 249 TEC.   63  
 
As the Council is the Union´s institution destined to be the common forum where the  
Member State´s present national interests  to be discussed and  negotiated within and 
decided by this institution, it is exactly this  institution which is legitimated to let 
different national interests clash and to channel them through a common procedure of 
negotiating and finding consent.   64  
 
And that is,in the view of the method of integration, meant to be an  institutionalized 
procedure to automatically direct differing national interests along a channel of 
common procedural rules, a set of established methods for conducting common policies: 
being the forum to fight for national interests, but committed to the common objective to 
reach consent to any given item on the common agenda. 
Once, after consent has been reached by unanimous voting or qualified majority-voting, 
the result of the negotiations is the European Union Council´s decision and this final 
agreement can be called the “European” solution.  Attaching the label “European 
solution” to the final agreement the Member States have achieved reminds the fact that 
it the final agreement is  often enough the common denominator as the smallest one that 
appeared to be reachable in a given item on the Council´s agenda the discussion of 
which has reflected  diverging national positions on the issue. 
 
Achieving  a common denominator even though it might be regarded as the smallest 
possible one is not to be underestimated: In the course of the process of  negotiating it is 
the successful and stabilizing effect of the European way of confronting and channelling 
within the Council and according to common procedures of presenting and negotiating,  
different national views and interests and to attempt at finding  the common 
denominator to mark the common European position. It is this European way of  
 
63:  TEC, consolidated version, Official Journal of the European Communities, December  
        24,2002, C 325/33 ( 132 ). 
64:   ibid.supra.note 63. 
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common policy making which is an attractive basic  characteristic distinguishing 
attribute of the European Union setting example serving as a pattern of cooperation 
instead of hostile confrontation for stabilizing relations between States in other parts of 
the World. 
 
 
Each Member State in turn holds the office of  President for a term of six months rotating in a 
sequence as decided by the Council acting unanimously, Article 203 TEC. 
 
The Presidency is influential and enjoys not a merely formal status. The quality of and the 
extent to what  the Presidency is using its political steering function is demonstrated through 
influencing the Council´s agenda, and through coordinating the preparation and the exchange 
of national positions on issues in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
Justice and Home Affairs . It is up to each country in chair to use the Presidency as the chance 
for its own country as well as a chance for the European Union as a whole to act as the one 
visible and the one audible voice of the European Union in the field of international relations.  
This political  potential of the Presidency if  it is used inevitably increases competitive 
and cooperative communication between the Council and the Commission on matters of 
how to secure consisteny in conducting the Union´s comprehensive external relations, 
as  Article 27 TEU  states that  
 
“ 
 the Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common 
foreign and security policy field.“ 
 
 
 
And cooperative ties between the Council and the Commission are required for operating 
“enhanced cooperation “ under Article 27 a  TEU : calling upon the Member States operating 
enhanced cooperation on Common Foreign and Security Policy matters  to respect: 
 
“.. 
—the principles,objectives,general guidelines and consistency of the common foreign and 
security policy and the decisions taken within the framework of that policy, 
—the powers of the European Community,and 
—consistency between all the Union's policies and its external activities. “ 65  
 
The Council  meets more than at least twice a year. The importance of the sheer frequency 
that the Council meets should not be underestimated. The leading Council, the General 
Affairs Council - which is made up of member-state foreign ministers –has been  meeting in 
Brussels more than 10 times during November and December of last year alone. The Council 
members see each other literally more often than they sometimes see their  own government‘s 
ministers. 
  
 
65:Article  27 a  TEU, Official Journal of the European Commnities, December 24,2002, C 
325/20 
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Including the other Council policy areas -  -agriculture, fisheries, environmental, and others , 
the EU Council  met over 100 times in 2006. This has installed a  habit of cooperation that is 
pushing European integration forward. The govenments have becoming accustomed to 
instinctively dealing with problems at the EU level. 
 
 
The Council´s meetings are prepared by the Committee of Permanent Representatives of 
the Member States ( COREPER),Article 207 paragraph 1 TEC. 
The COREPER members as far as the Ambassadors  are meeting, are high ranking diplomats 
representing their national Ministries  for Foreign Affairs. The COREPER   is meeting  
regularly to discuss  the Commission´s legislative initiaves, proposals for new laws and 
policies, and to negotiate different positions held  between Member States. The COREPER is, 
basically, keeping off public awareness. The COREPER is despite or just because  of this 
special skill, one of the most powerful institutions working within the institutional structure of 
the European Union. For, once the COREPER has reached consent , this item is put on the 
Council´s agenda as an “ A-point”, which is signalling the Council´s members,the Ministers, 
that ,in the Council´s session, they can  easily  decide with speed and efficiency. 66  (66: see  
Lieshout, R. Elgar Edward. (1999). The struggle for the organization of Europe: The 
foundations of the European Union.) 
 
The Council is assisted by a General Secretariat, under the responsibility of a Secretary-
General, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, who shall be 
assisted by a Deputy Secretary-General responsible for the running of the General Secretariat. 
The Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General are appointed by the Council acting 
unanimously.Article 207 paragraph 2 TEC. 
 
Voted on proposals from the Commission, once adopted by the Council and published by the 
Official Journal of the European Community,  the EU legislation then takes effect. Unlike  
international organizations, the EU´s  big states‘ votes count for more than small states‘ votes 
-through a complex system of  
 
 straight majority vote on a limited number of issues,mainly matters concerning the 
removal of barriers to the Internal Market through harmonization of national laws 
 qualified majority voting, required for most other matters 
 unanimous voting required for sensitive, politically crucial  issues, reflecting national 
interests claimed as vital interests. 
 
 
66: see  Lieshout, R. Elgar Edward. (1999). The struggle for the organization of Europe: The  
      foundations of the European Union. 
 
 92
 
 
 
 
Before the European Union  enlarged from the Fifteen to the EU of  the Twentyfive on May 
01, 2004, the Council ´s  voting  procedures where the Council was required by a 
qualified majority,  the votes of its members were weigthed according to Article 205 2nd 
paragraph  TEC:      67) 
 
 Belgium 5 
Denmark 3 
Germany 10 
Greece 5 
Spain 8 
France 10 
Ireland 3 
Italy 10 
Luxembourg 2 
Netherlands 5 
Austria 4 
Portugal 5 
Finland 3 
Sweden 4 
United Kingdom 10. 
 
Before the “Twentyseven “ enlargement of the European Union and before the Nice 
Treaty on EU entered into force, for their adoption, acts of the Council  required at 
least: 
-62 votes in favour where the Treaty on European Community  required them to be adopted 
on a proposal from the Commission, 
-62 votes in favour, cast by at least 10 members, in other cases. 
 
Before the Nice Treaty on EU, each Member State had been assigned the number of votes as 
quoted above and roughly in proportion to the population of that Member State.  Out of the 
total of  the 87 votes were 62 votes required for voting on matters requiring “qualified 
majority voting” in the Council. The consequence of  “qualified majority voting” was that, 
unlike international organizations and unique, EU Member States could be outvoted on 
most types of legislation. This was the case just for larger countries: 
 
 qualified majority   voting  was meant to be a compromise in favor of larger 
Member States claiming that a weighting of votes should reflect their larger 
populations by a proportionally larger vote than the vote of smaller States. 
 Qualified majority voting,however, favored smaller states because at least one 
small Member State was required to vote joining a number of large States to reach the 
required 62 votes. Whereas a group of small States needed at least one large State to 
reach the required 62 votes. E.g., even if large Member States like France or Germany 
voted against a proposal from the Commission - say on qualifications for architects - 
they still were bound if the other Council members voted „yes„ 
 
 
67:Official Journal of the European Communities, December 24,2002, C 325/33 ( 118). 
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Article 205 TEC had been  amended,on 1 January 2005,in accordance with the “ Protocol 
on the enlargement of the European Union  “ 68According to the Protocol´s Article  3 
“Provisions concerning the weighting of votes in the Council “ the votes are weighted as 
follows: 
“‘.Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority,the votes of its members 
shall be weighted as follows: 
Belgium 12 
Denmark 7 
Germany 29 
Greece 12 
Spain 27 
France 29 
Ireland 7 
Italy 29 
Luxembourg 4 
Netherlands 13 
Austria 10 
Portugal 12 
Finland 7 
Sweden 10 
United Kingdom 29“ 
 
The  votes in the Council are weighted under  the Nice Treaty  on European Union, 
according to   the “20. Declaration on the enlargement of the European Union “, attached to 
the Nice Treaty on EU, corresponding to the following table “ for an elarged Union of 27 
Member States “ with the accession of Bulgaria and Rumania on January 01,2007 
 
“THE WEIGHTING OF VOTES IN THE COUNCIL 
Members of the Council/Weighted votes ( weighted vote before  Twentyseven enlargement ) 
Germany 29  (  10 ) 
United Kingdom 29 ( 10 ) 
France 29  (  10 ) 
Italy 29      (  10 ) 
Spain 27    (   8 ) 
Poland 27 
Romania 14 
Netherlands 13  ( 5 ) 
Greece 12         ( 5 ) 
Czech Republic 12 
Belgium 12        ( 5 ) 
Hungary 12 
Portugal 12       ( 5 ) 
Sweden 10        ( 4 ) 
Bulgaria 10 
Austria 10         ( 4 ) 
Slovakia 7 
Denmark 7        ( 3 ) 
Finland 7           ( 3 ) 
Ireland 7            ( 3 ) 
Lithuania 7 
68: Official Journal of the European Communities, December 24,2002, C 325/33 ( 163, 
164,165 . 
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Latvia 4 
Slovenia 4 
Estonia 4 
Cyprus 4 
Luxembourg 4    ( 2 ) 
Malta 3 
Total 345          
 
  
Acts of the Council, for their adoption under the Nice Treaty, require : 
 
“ 
Acts of the Council shall require for their adoption at least 258 votes in favour, cast by a majority of members, 
where this Treaty requires them to be adopted on a proposal from the Commission. In other cases, for their 
adoption acts of the Council shall require at least 258 votes in favour cast by at least two-thirds of the members. 
When a decision is to be adopted by the Council by a qualified majority, a member of the Council may 
request verification that the Member States constituting the qualified majority represent at least 62 % of 
the total population of the Union. If that condition is shown not to have been met, the decision in 
question shall not be adopted. “  69 
 
“Thresholds” had been set up according to the “Declaration on the qualified majority 
threshold and the number of votes for a blocking minority in an enlarged Union”: 
 
“Insofar as all the candidate countries listed in the Declaration on the enlargement of the 
European Union have not yet acceded to the Union when the new vote weightings take effect 
(1 January 2005), the threshold for a qualified majority will move, according to the pace of 
accessions, from a percentage below the current one to a maximum of 73,4 %. When all the 
candidate countries mentioned above  have acceded, the blocking minority, in a Union of 27, 
will be raised to 91 votes, and the qualified majority threshold resulting from the table given 
in the Declaration on enlargement of the European Union will be automatically adjusted 
accordingly.”  70   
Since  Maastricht, the Council had become even more important as the center for  decision-
making on the EU‘s Common Foreign and Security Policy and  Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters , Articles  11, 13, 14, 15, 23 on CFSP; Articles 29 and 34 
paragraph 2  on JCCM , Treaty on  European Union, 71   
 
When the EU sets policy on Somalia, on the Democratic Republic of Congo  or towards 
Israel-Palestine  or Iraq, it is now, since the accession of Bulgaria and Rumania (January 
01,2007) set by the twentyseven  foreign ministers, plus the Commission, in the Council.  
The Council  had also  taken  up  „third pillar„  issues such as coordination of immigration, 
refugee, and asylum policy; and the fight against terrorism, organised crime, and drug 
trafficking. 
69:Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties establishing the  
     European Communities and certain related acts,2001, Official Journal of the European 
     Communities, March 10, 2001, C 80/01 ( 80, 82,83). 
70:ibid. C 80/01 (  85 ). 
71:consolidated version,Official Journal of the European Communities, December 24,2002, C  
     325/13- 21; C  325/21- 24 ). 
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6.3 The European Parliament (EP)  
 
In addition to the Commission and the Council, the European Union has a Parliament.  
The European Parliament consists of  “representatives of the peoples of the States brought 
together in the Community” ,  
 “ The  number of Members of the European Parliament shall not exceed 732. “,Article 189 
TEC.71  
The Parliament is considered the Union‘s most democratic institution, because,at present, it is 
the only directly elected institution in the European Union: 
 
the representatives in the European Parliament of the peoples are  “ elected by direct universal 
suffrage.”,Article 190 paragraph 1 TEC 72  
The number  of representatives elected in each Member State is distributed among the 
Member States according to Article 190 2nd paragraph TEC, correspondingly to  their 
populations.73   
Belgium 25 
Denmark 16 
Germany 99 
Greece 25 
Spain 64 
France 87 
Ireland 15 
Italy 87 
Luxembourg 6 
Netherlands 31 
Austria 21 
Portugal 25 
Finland 16 
Sweden 22 
United Kingdom 87. 
In the event of amendments to this paragraph,the number of representatives elected in each 
Member  State must ensure appropriate representation of the peoples of the States brought 
together in the Community.” 
 
Article 190 2nd paragraph TEC had been  amended,on 1 January 2004,in accordance with the 
“Protocol on the enlargement of the European Union “: 
 
71:consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, Official Journal  
     of the European Communities, December 24,2002,C 325/33 (113). 
72: ibid., supra,note 71,C 325/33 (114). 
73:  Article 190 paragraph 2 TEC;Wiarda, supra, note 21. 
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The Protocol´s Article 2 “Provisions concerning the European Parliament” distributes the 
number of representatives elected in each Member State  as follows: 
 
“On 1 January 2004 and with effect from the start of the 2004 to 2009 term,in Article 
190(2)of the Treaty establishing the European Community and in Article 108(2)of the Treaty 
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,the first subparagraph shall be replaced 
by the following: 
‘The number of representatives elected in each Member State shall be as follows: 
Belgium 22 
Denmark 13 
Germany 99 
Greece 22 
Spain 50 
France 72 
Ireland 12 
Italy 72 
Luxembourg 6 
Netherlands 25 
Austria 17 
Portugal 22 
Finland 13 
Sweden 18 
United Kingdom 72 ’.  74  
 
The total number of representatives in the European Parliament for the 2004 to 2009 term is 
equal to the number of representatives specified in Article 190(2)of the  Treaty establishing 
the European Community plus the number of representatives of the new Member States 
resulting from the accession treaties signed by 1 January 2004 at the latest, Article 2 
“provisions concerning the European Parliament” of the “ Protocol on the enlargement of the 
European Union”, 75  
 
The distribution of the  number of representatives elected in each Member State for an 
enlarged Union of  27 Member States- with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania on 1 
January 2007, is -  under the Treaty establishing the European Community, consolidated 
version December 24.2002,following the Nice Treaty  on European Union, according to 
Article 190 second paragraph TEC and the “ Declaration on the enlargement of the 
European Union “, attached to the Nice Treaty on EU, 76 - as follows:  
 
 
 
74: ibid.,supra,note 71,C 325/33 ( 163). 
75: ibid.,C 325/33 ( 163). 
76: ibid,supra,note  69,  C 80/01 ( 80, 81 ), 
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EU of the Twentyseven: 
  
  
                                               Germany 99  unchanged 
                                                United Kingdom 72    ( 87 )  before Twentyseven enlargement 
                                                France               72   (  87 )  before Twentyseven enlargement 
                                                Italy                    50   (  87 ) 
                                                Spain                 50    ( 64 ) 
 
                                              Poland 50            accession 2004 
                                                  Romania 33 
                                                  Netherlands 25    (  31 ) before Twentyseven enlargement 
                                                  Greece 22            (  25  ) 
                                                  Belgium 22           (  25  ) 
                                                  Portugal 22           ( 25   ) 
                                                  Hungary 20     accession 2004 
                                                  Czech Republic 20    accession 2004           
                                                  Sweden  18          (  22  )  before Twentyseven enlargement 
                                                           
                                                  Bulgaria  17       acession  2007 
                                                  Austria    17       (  21  ) before  Twentysevene enlargement 
                                                  Slovakia   13     accession 2004 
                                                  Denmark 13      ( 16   )  before  Twentyseven enlargement 
                                                  Finland 13         ( 16   )  before  Twentyseven enlargement 
                                                  Ireland 12          ( 15   )  before Twentyseven enlargement 
                                                  Lithuania 12      accession  2004 
                                                  Latvia 8             accession  2004 
                                                  Slovenia 7         accession  2004 
                                                  Estonia  6          accession  2004 
                                                  Cyprus 6           accession  2004 
                                                  Luxembourg 6   unchanged 
                                                        Malta   5                                             
 
                                              Total   732 
 
 
The direct elections to the European Parliament are held without political parties at European 
level, though already (Maastricht Treaty ) ex-Article 138 a and (Amsterdam) Article 191 
of the consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community had  under- 
lined the importance of  political parties at European level which do not exist yet: 
  
“ 
Political parties at European level are important as a factor for integration within the Union. 
They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the 
citizens of the Union.” 77)  
 
Setting a signal towards organizing political parties at European level, the  Nice Treaty on 
European Union had added a second paragraph in  Article 191 TEC:  
 
77:Article 191  TEC  consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, Official Journal of the European Communities,1997, C 340/03. 
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“The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, shall lay 
down the regulations governing political parties at European level and in particular the rules 
regarding their funding.” 78  
 
Over the years the European Parliament´s prerogatives have increased steadily , most notably 
by the Single European Act of 1986 and by the Amsterdam Treaty: 
 
The European Parliament and the Council  jointly adopt European legislation and budget, 
Articles  249, 251 , 252 79) .  The Amsterdam Treaty on EU gave the European Parliament 
the right to a second reading of decisions taken by the Council of Ministers by a qualified 
majority on matters related to the single market, social policy, economic and social 
„cohesion,„ and the community‘s research program:Parliamentary amendments (or rejection) 
would have to stand unless modified by the Council of Ministers within three months of the 
second reading.  
In addition to the Parliament´s co-decision role in the European Community´s legislation, 
the European Parliament contributes an advisory and consultative role to the decision-
making of the Union´s Council and Commission. The Parliament  votes on the accession of 
new Member States and on the European Community´s agreements concluded with non-
Member countries. 
 
The  Parliament‘s powers,however, still are significantly less than those of the Commission 
and the Council. The Parliament cannot introduce or enact laws, nor can it raise revenue 
independently.  
 
The Parliament‘s role in deciding the Community budget was expanded in 1994  fall by an 
inter-institutional agreement giving the Parliament more control over non-agricultural 
spending and, for the first time, the right to suggest changes in agricultural spending as well.  
 
Although the Parliament does not have the right to initiate legislation, the Parliament´s 
political influence should not be underestimated. Its political weight in influencing public 
opinion in Europe much depends on the Parliament´s and its leading Members of Parliament 
authority acquired through professional contributions to the dialogue held between the 
institutions and held on public fora  for  discussions on European matters. For, since  the 
Maastricht Treaty the European Parliament  is able to confer more closely with the Council on 
legislation, it can amend new laws and  has a definitive veto.  
 
 
 
 
 
78: Article 191 2nd paragraph TEC, consolidated  version of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community,Official Journal of the European Comunities, December 24,2002, C 
325/33 ( 115 ). 
79: ibid,supra,note 78, C 325/33 ( 132, 133, 134 ). 
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Also since  Maastricht, the Parliament has gained the right to approve or disapprove the 
members of the Commission as a body:it has a limited function of supervising the 
Commission which may lead to the Commission´s resigning as a body: 
 
“  
Article 201 (ex Article 144)  
If a motion of censure on the activities of the Commission is tabled before it, the European Parliament shall not 
vote thereon until at least three days after the motion has been tabled and only by open vote.  
If the motion of censure is carried by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing a majority of the 
Members of the European Parliament, the Members of the Commission shall resign as a body. They shall 
continue to deal with current business until they are replaced in accordance with Article 214. In this case, the 
term of office of the Members of the Commission appointed to replace them shall expire on the date on which 
the term of office of the Members of the Commission obliged to resign as a body would have expired.” 
  
The European Parliament also appoints the European ombudsman toinspect operations. 80 
 
6.4. The European Council 
 
The Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the European Communities 
established the European Council in 1974, nearly twenty years before they  signed the 
Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union in 1992. The European Council was 
established “  to provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall 
define the general political guidelines thereof. “, Article D Maastricht Treaty on EU,81 
left unchanged by Article 4 Amsterdam Treaty and Nice Treaty on European Union 82 
 
The European Council is composed of the Heads of State or Government of the Member 
States and of the President of the Commission.83) (83: ibid.)They are assisted by the 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States and by a Member of the Commission. The 
European Council shall meet at least twice a year, under the chairmanship of the Head of 
State or of Government of the Member State which holds the Presidency of the Council.Itens 
are put on the Euroean Council´s agenda to define the Union´s long-term  strategic objectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
80:  Salmon, Trevor C. (1996). European Union structures and institutions and their powers. 
In Philippe Barbour (Ed.), The European Union handbook. Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers. 
81:Official Journal of the European Communities, July 29,1992, C 191. 
82: Official Journal of the European Communities, December 24,2002, C 325/5 ( 11); 
      Salmon,Trevor, (1996). ;ibid.,supra,note 80. 
83: ibid.,supra,note 82. 
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The European Council is basically an intergovernmental conference rather than a formal 
Union´s institution. It is, however, or just because of its outstanding political role of 
demonstrating the nation states´ sovereignty ruling the Founding Treaties, ruling the Union´s 
destiny, that the European Council is the supreme and most powerful “ institution”  in the 
European Union´s decision.making  system to ensure the political momentum whenever  
 
needed: expression of the Member States cooperative approach to stabilize the fruitful 
tensions between the integration method and the intergovernmental method of cooperation 
within the multilevelled system of the Union´s institutions and decision.making procedures 
and the nation state level of sovereign Member States. 
 
  
 
 
6.5  The Court of Justice 
 
The Court of Justice is  provided for by Articles 5 and 35 Treaty on EU-TEU_84 and by  
Article 220 Treaty on European Community- TEC-, including the Court of First Instance of 
the European Communities, as provided for by Article 47  of the Protocol on the Statute of 
the Court of Justice (2001) 85)  The European Union´s Court of Justice is not to be confused 
with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg . 
  
The Court of Justice is one of the lesser-known institutions  of the EU. But it plays a 
fundamentally important role and has  its own influence over the development of the EU: the 
Court has substantially contributed to deeepening the European Union through its basically 
constitutional rulings on the principle of effectiveness in Community law and ensuring the 
Member States comply with the Court´s decisions and not to undermine Community 
regulations and directives. 
 
Separate from all other European Union courts and national courts, it has no jurisdiction over 
the interpretation and application of national laws.  
The Court‘s role is to enforce the Founding Treaty on EU, the primary source of EU law. lt 
does this by ruling on disputes  between 
 
 the  institutions of the EU , Article 230 second paragraph:The Court of Justice has 
“jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State,the European Parliament,the 
Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence,infringement of an 
essential procedural requirement,infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law 
relating to its application,or misuse of powers.” 
 
84:consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Union, Official Journal of  
     the European Communities, December 24,2002, C 325/5 ( 11, 24 ) 
85: ibid,   C 325/33 ( 122 and 167 (177). 
 
 
 
 101
 
 Member States, Article 227  first paragraph TEC: “A Member State which considers 
that another Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty may 
bring the matter before the Court of Justice.” 
 the Commission  and Member States, Article 226 TEC : if the Commission considers 
that a Member State has failed  to fulfil an obligation under the TEC ,the Commission 
may bring the matter before the Court of Justice. And Article 228: If the Court of 
Justice finds that the Member State concerned has not complied with its judgment it 
may impose a lump sum or penalty payment on it. 
 Individuals, corporations and the EU, Article 230 4th  paragraph TEC:  “Any natural or 
legal person may,under the same conditions,institute proceedings against a decision  
      addressed to that person or against a decision which,although in the form of a  
      regulation or a decision addressed to another person,is of direct and individual concern  
     to the former.” 
 
 in addition, the member state courts are obliged to refer cases to the European Court 
when interpretation of EU  legislation is in question, by giving preliminary rulings on 
the validity and interpretation of framework decisions and decisions, on the 
interpretation of conventions established under the TEU and on the validity and 
interpretation of the measures implementing them, Article 35  first paragraph  TEU. 
 
 
The Court including the Court of First Instance of the Communities decide up to 300 cases 
each year‘ but the Court´s influence goes further than these because its decisions bind the 
member states in dealing with all similar cases. 
 
 
The development of EU law by the Court is a fascinating subject in itself. Just to give a 
flavor of what the Court has achieved over the years, 1 would mention three landmark 
decisions: 
 
 In 1963, in “van Gend  en Loos,„ the Court decided that EU legislation applies directly 
to individuals, not just to  the member states to carry out.  
 In 1964, in „Costa„ - a case brought by one Italian over a $2.80 electric bill,  the Court 
declared that, in case of conflict, EU law prevails over member state law.  
 And  in 1992, in „Francovich,„ the Court decided that member states are financially 
liable to individuals for their failure properly to enforce EU legislation: „Francovich„ 
will have tremendous impact on making sure that member states carry out their FU 
obligations. 
(More detailed see below under 6. ) 
The record of compliance by the member states with European Court decisions is extremely 
good :the few problems involve slowness rather than defiance.  
Even in cases in which the member state governments have strong disagreement with the 
Court‘s rulings, they yield to them, probably because they know that to undermine the Court‘s 
authority would threaten the EU‘s foundations. Does the Court dare to make controversial 
decisions? In 1991, a UK court, under instruction from the European Court in Luxembourg in 
dealing with a case involving Spanish fishermen, issued an injunction against an act of 
Parliament - for the first time  in British history.  
 
A more intensive discussion  of the  nature and  development of EU law will follow under: 
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V. Deficiencies : the situation after the signing of the Nice Treaty                                      
1. Introduction: The enlargement issue and the European Union´s deficiencies in   
       democracy, transparency and decisiveness in the Union´s political and institutional      
       structure  
 
The deficiencies  that exist in the political structure of the European Union are obvious. 
The Article 1 TEU, since Maastricht, Amsterdam and the Nice TEU continuously describes 
the Treaty on EU to be a new stage in the process of  creating an ‘ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe’. And political leaders never forget solemnly to declare their  commitments 
to the  European integration. The European Union,however, does not enjoy  popular support  
at an all time high level. Within the European Union, among countless individuals, among 
experts and political leaders, there is much critical comment on the EU as politically distant 
from the citizen, not functioning efficiently, politically and administratively.86. 
 
The future of the European Union is the vital issue of the common future of the citizens 
in the European Union. Opinion polls consistently show that the  Union citizens are severely 
concerned about employment,  maintaining peace and security in Europe, and fighting 
organized crime and drug trafficking.87  
 
The common future of the citizens in a safe and wealthy  EU requires  a political  
decision-making system ensuring a balance between the two opposed levels of integration and 
intergovernmental cooperation, a balance  which allows to channel diverging national 
interests for the emerging of transparent, democratic and efficient political decision-decision 
making. But it does not exist. 
88)  
 
The European Union´s policy-making and decision-making is a process which is open to more 
than one interpretation and does internally  display a lack of consistency. An EC regulation or 
directive is initiated by the Commission, the European Parliament may want amendments, and 
the Council has the final say, the Council approves or disapproves. And  as far as law-making 
under the EC Treaty(the 1st pillar under the roof of the TEU)  is concerned, the European 
Council  is an institution set outside the institutional structure and decision-making 
procedures as ruled by the EC Treaty.   The European Council may choose to disregard  the 
EC-level institutions and enact policies which may  completely  expose  this EC process to 
danger.  
 
Sudden crisis often cast a shadow over the EU´s institutions agenda which is full of 
unresolved items.89  The Member States´ representatives are lost in arguing in attempts to 
bargain package –deals during Council sessions  in the pursuit of victories the representatives 
at Cabinet Minister level may present to the TV´s in their home countries.90)  
 
 
86: Calleo, David P. (2001). Rethinking Europe’s Future. Princeton: Princeton University  
       Press. 
87: Grabbe, Heather. Policy brief: Preparing the EU for 2004. London: Centre for European  
      Reform. 
88:  Nectoux, Francois. (1996). The politics of European integration after Maastricht. In  
      Philippe Barbour (Ed.), The EuropeanUnion handbook. Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers. 
89: ibid. 
90: ibid. 
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Employment, social security , maintaining peace and security in Europe, and fighting 
organized crime and drug trafficking  are issues causing much political distress for Heads of 
State or Government who often are reluctant to go beyond statements of mere commonplace. 
 
Most items put on the Council´s agenda require quite an amount of  political, institutional and 
financial inputs in fields of policies that does not arouse most people´s interest. 
. 91)  
 
New policies do not meet with  general acceptance of new policies.   The  main political 
institutions have not established a framework for smoothly and efficiently running 
relationships amongst themselves. 92  
Continuously held discussions about the European Union´s  “democratic deficits”  are  
weakening the Union´s legitimacy, as the  European Parliament is the only directly elected 
institution in the Union,but it is not a genuine legislative body; and the Council is the 
legislator, but this institution is not held responsible in direct elections to the Council, as its 
Members, national Governments´ members are directly elected and responsible to their 
national electorate. 93)   Within the Union´s institutions  transparent debates are lacking. 
National Governments being subject to the regular checks and balances in matters of national 
policies debated and decided in the national institutions of their home country. But as far as 
European matters are debated and decided within the European Union´s institutions,  regular 
checks and balances sdo not exist at Union level. 94)  
European Community regulations and /or directives are regularly used to be invoked by 
national  governments to triumph over or to reject proposals put to a vote by the  
parliamentary opposition at home, which does not strengthen the Union´s legitimacy. 94) (94: 
ibid.) 
 
The Union´s Common Foreign and Security  Policy is conducted without a clear and decisive  
 institutional framework to develop foreign policy objectives, or to declare a common interest 
and to decide on a common position and common action as  coherent response to common 
challenges. 95)  
 
There is no proper proportion to the respective numbers of the Member States´population 
regarding the voting  strength in the Council. As the Presidency of the Council is rotating in a 
six months´ turn, the emphasis given to specifics put on the Cuncil´s agenda differs  
 every six months as a new Presidency shows the ambition to advance political issues that 
often enough cannot be resolved within a period of six months´ time. 96  
 
  The  Presidency being currently in office, however, uses a new procedure destined to ensure 
stability and continuity in planning and implementing the Council´s  
 
 
91: Nectoux, Francois. (1996). The politics of European integration after Maastricht. In  
       Philippe Barbour (Ed.), The European Union handbook. Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers. 
92: Nectoux, supra, note 91. 
93: Calleo,ibid.,supra note 86.  
      Press. 
94:ibid.,supra,note 86. 
95: Calleo, supra, note 86. 
96: Nectoux, supra, note 91) 
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agenda: the current Presidency is used to meet with  the outgoing Presidency, as well as with 
the incoming Presidency: the “Troika “. So did the current President of the Council “General 
Affairs”, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Walter Steinmeier, when he negotiated in 
Moscow and Kiew heading the European Union´s  Troika delegation. 
 
In general practice, the “Troika”has not yet fully achieved  stabilizing the Council agenda nor 
strenghtening the Union´s diplomacy´s  effectiveness. 
 
The European Union´s political leaders have been aware of these deficiencies. As noted 
above, they had addressed the deficiencies early after the Maastricht Treaty on EU entered 
into force, opening the preparations for holding the Intergovernmental Conference 1996/97 
destined to find solutions to amend the TEU in order to make the enlarged Union work. 
As  noted above, the Amsterdam Treaty on EU had leftovers, it left unresolved  
 mainly issues of how to improve the efficiency of the Council´s decision-making. 97  
 
The Nice Treaty on EU  had achieved some impovements, but, in the end, is suffering from 
deficiencies, too 98: 
 
The European Commission was,as noted above, streamlined, with the larger Member States 
renouncing their right to two commissioners on 1 January 2005 in a Union of the Twentyfive, 
and with the introduction of a rotation system in a Union of the Twentyseven on 1 January 
2007.  99 
 
The Nice Treaty , as noted above, also  redistributed the number of representatives elected in 
each Member State for the European Parliament and re-weighted the votes in the Council  
 to provide for a more proportionate distribution, Articles 2 and 3 of the “Protocol on the 
enlargement of the European Union”. 100 
 
The votes of the larger Member States in the Council, however, in a traditional compromise,  
 tripled while those of smaller members doubled. 
 
The Nice Treaty also  extended qualified majority voting (QMV), and it also raised the 
threshold for passage. 101  
 
97: Calleo, supra, note 86. 
98:Official Journal of the European Commnities,March 10,2001, C80/01. 
99:following the Nice Treaty consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European  
      Community,Official Journal of the European Communities, December 24,2002, C 325/ 33  
      (163, 165, 166 ). 
100: Treaty of Nice, “Declaration on the enlargement of the European Union”, Official  
       Journal of the European Cmmnities, March 10,2001, C 80/80 (81,82);consolidated  
       version of the Treaty establishing the Europen Coummunity- TEC-,Official Journal of the 
       European Community, December 24,2002, C 325/ 33 ( 163, 164,165 ). 
101: ibid.,supra note 100. 
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The  qualified majority threshold referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 
205(2)of the Treaty establishing the European Community, expressed in votes  does not 
exceed the threshold resulting from the table in the Declaration on the enlargement of the   
European Union,included in the Final Act of the Conference which adopted the Treaty of 
Nice. 102 
 
Qualified majority votes face  a triple hurdle:  
Since 1 January 2005, qualified majority votes had to  represent 73.4% of weighted vote, two 
thirds majority among member states, as well majority that collectively represents 62 percent 
of the total of the EU population.  Since 1 January 2007, the blocking minority in a Union of 
27, is raised to 91 votes, and the qualified majority threshold resulting from the table given in 
the Declaration on enargement of the European Union was automatically adjusted 
accordingly.103  
 
These reform efforts done by the Nice Treaty on EU  soon were facing doubts whether the 
achievements of the reforms would be sufficient to respond to a new range of challenges: 
In December 2002, the European Union invited ten new countries to accede to the Union. The 
accession took effect on 1 May 2004.104  
 
The Member States when signing the Mastricht Treaty on EU, and conducting the 
Intergovernmental Conference 1996/97 to amend the Maastricht Treaty in the light of the 
future enalargement, had already foreseen the challenges following the Union´s future 
enlargement. But they remained  without result concerning the challenge to improve the 
decision-making in the Council of an enlarged Union with ten new Members of an Union of 
the Twentyfive and, with theaccession of Romania and Bulgaria to a Union of the 
Twentyseven. Without improvements even of what the Nice Treaty on EU had achieved, 
the EU would  become more difficult to govern because it would be larger and more diverse. 
 
 
 
 
102:Article  3 “ Provisions concerning the weigthing of votes in the Council “ of the Protocol 
on the enlargement of the European Union”, attached to the consoilidated version of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community, Official Journal of the European Communities, 
December 24,2002, C 325/33  ( 163, 164,165 ); and the Nice Treaty on EU, Declaration on 
the qualified majority threshold and the number of votes for a blocking minority in an 
enlarged Union, Offcial Journal of the European Communities, March 10,2001, C 80/01 
( 85 ) 
103: ibid. 
104: The list included: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta,  
         Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Romania and Bukgaria joined the EU on 1  
         January 2007. 
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Twelve more potential vetoes could bring the Council to a political halt. The Union could also 
risk breaking into fragments, its institutions and policy-making becoming more distant from 
the citizens and voters in the Member States. And the peoples of the Union would find it even 
more difficult to identify with the European Union: an enlarged European Union with 
deficiencies in democratic accountability and efficient decision-making would raise severe 
doubts about the EU´s identity and about the future of the Union´s citizens who want a Union 
to be open, transparent enough, and democratic and efficient enough to ensure the  
Therefore, as to any further enlargement, even if basically desirable, the European Parliament 
was firmly against any further enlargement unless the European  Union has deepened, 
equipped itself with the means of keeping stable pace with further enlargement. 
 
2.  The issue of enlargement 
 
 
The further enlargement of the European Union to include countries with no doubt being part 
of Europe, in Southern-Central (former Yugoslavia) and Eastern Europe (Ukraine),as well as 
including other countries meeting the requirements was decisive for the EU´s geostrategic 
interests. It was and still is decisive for  the EU´s interests of  security, political stability and 
economic development within the EU and all over Europe. It is important that not only should 
prospective Member States fulfill  the necessary requirements as established by the 
Copenhagen summit in 1993, but the EU itself needed and needs to improve  its own 
capacities to enlarge. Such  an appeal, as made by the December 2006 summit of the 
EU´s heads of State and Government,was not launched for the first time: 
 
Until  the enlargement from 15 to 25 countries that took place on May 1st 2004, the EU’s 
legal shape had been determined by a series of treaties which turned out to pave a long way of 
reforms and to be long-winded and illegible to common people within the EU: 
 
 
3. The issue of reforms: the EU attempting to improve identity and decisiveness 
 
3.1 amendment procedures  laid down in the Treaties   
 
Amendment procedures are laid down in the Treaties themselves. The ECSC  Treaty 105  
 differs from the EC Treaty.106 and the Euratom Treaty 107 in that  it provides for a 
simplified procedure for amending certain provisions, whereas the other two treaties only 
make provision for decisions taken by unanimity to be ratified by all the national parlia- 
ments. 
 
 
105: http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc29.htm 
106:  http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc05.htm 
107:  http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc05.htm 
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3.2 The question of extensive reform of the Treaties, which was much discussed   in the  
1950s (European Defence Community, ad hoc parliamentary assembly to  prepare the ground 
for a European Political Community) and at the beginning of the 1960s (Fouchet and Cattani  
plans), was put on hold to some extent for the rest of the 1960s and 1970s, during which 
period the complex provisions of the Treaties were implemented.  
 
From 1970 onward, the Member States acting within the Treaty´s objectives,but the Treaty 
lacking the necessary powers, had no need for reforming the Treaty, as far as the Member 
States used Article 235 (now Article 308) of the Treaty establishing  the European Economic 
Community – TEC - to act, through the Council, unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, to “ take the appropriate 
measures” if action by the Community should prove necessary to attain,in the course of the 
operation of the common market,one of the objectives of the Community,and this Treaty had 
not provided the necessary powers, Article 308 TEC   108. The range of the 
Communities´operation thus could be widened, within the Treaty´s objectives, but, and this 
was the sort of  needed flexibility, without a need for amendments of the Treaty, e.g. for 
matters of regional policy, monetary policy etc.) 109    and some purely intergovernmental 
procedures (1970 Davignon reports  110 and  Carrington report of 13 October 1981 on 
European political cooperation, and  “institutionalisation” of the European Council in 1974) to 
bring about a significant reform of the content of the European venture, without appreciably 
reforming the Treaties.  
Despite the considerable emphasis on deepening the Community,cf.  1971 Vedel report  on 
the decision-making procedure regarding enlarging the law-making powers of the European 
Parliament  111 and  and 1975 Tindemans report   112  , the approach to reform only changed 
in 1984. 
 
 
3.3  Until the 1980s, the Member States had made very little use of the provisions for re  - 
forming the Treaties. Essentially, there had only been the 1967 Merger Treaty   113   and the 
two budget treaties  of the 1970s. 114  
______________________________ 
108: : Official Journal of the European Communities, December 24,2002, C 325/33  
           ( 153 ). 
109:   The October 1972 European Council was particularly significant in this respect (at the  
           time such  meetings were still referred to as summits, as the new title was only  
           attributed in 1974) (Bull. of the EC ,10-1972. 
110:    Bulletin of the EC,11-1970. 
111:    Supplement 4/72 – Bulletin of the EC.  
112:    Supplement 1/76 – Bulletin EC. 
113:     Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European  
          Communities, Official Journal of the European Communities, July 13, 1967,L 152 and  
          http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc112.htm. 
114: Treaty amending certain budgetary provisions of the Treaties establishing the European  
          Communities and of the Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission  
          of the European Communities, OJ L 2, January,02, 1971, and  Treaty amending certain  
          financial provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Economic Communities 
          and of the Treaty establishing a single Council of the European Communities, Official  
          Journal of the European Communities, L 359, December 31,1977. 
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Both the accession treaties and the Act concerning the election of the representatives of the 
Assembly by direct universal suffrage:both involved significant institutional adjustments. 115  
 
3.4  European Parliament´s approval of the  “Draft Treaty on European Union”, 
       February 14, 1984 
 
In  response to the “eurocrisis”, the European Parliament, elected by universal suffrage for  
the first time, approved the “Draft Treaty on European Union” on   February 14, 1984. 116  
In June 1985, the Member States decided by a majority at the Milan European Council to 
convene the Intergovernmental Conference which culminated in the Single European 
Act. 
 
 
3.5  The Single European Act, signed in Luxembourg on 17 February 17, 1986,  and The  
Hague on February 28, 1986 by Italy, Belgium and Denmark, was an initiative of the Euro- 
pean Parliament and was prepared by a Committee of representatives of the Heads of State or 
Government, chaired by Irish senator James Dooge. 117   
 
It was based on the European Commission’s strategy of making the single market 
provided for by the Treaties a reality, laying down: 
 
 a precise timetable and  
 improving relevant decision-making procedures by 
 increasing the use of qualified majority voting and  
 strengthening the democratic control of the European Parliament (introduction of the 
legislative cooperation procedure between the European Parliament and the Council).  
 
The word “single” comes from the fact that, for the first time, Community matters such as the 
creation of a single market and European political cooperation (Article 30), were specifically 
dealt with in a single treaty.  
 
The Single Act also refers to future reforms, notably in Article 30  and Article 20 on  
economic and monetary union. Five years later, these two points would provide the 
impetus for the Intergovernmental Conference to prepare the  Treaty of Maastricht. 
 
 
 
115: OJ L 278, October 08, 1976,  and  http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc117.htm. 
116: Spinelli plan; Resolution on the draft Treaty on European Union, OJ C 77, March  19,  
         1984,  p. 53, Celex No 51983IP1200.    
117: OJ L 169, June 29, 1987,  and http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc113.htm. 
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3.6  The second phase of the reform process, the Treaty of Maastricht, initiated in the mid 
eighties and signed on  February 07. 1992 at Maastricht, represented an important  commit- 
ment by Member States to continue with the process of European integration after the end of 
the cold war. It  focussed  on two main areas:  118  
 
 the monetary question, on  which preparatory work was carried out by the Delors 
Committee, which opened the way for the introduction of the single currency, the 
setting up of a European Central Bank and a European System of Central Banks and 
rules and procedures for drawing up joint economic policies; this allowed  the Union 
to complete the process begun at the start of the 1960s, after the convertibility of the 
dollar was suspended, which included the legislation for the European Monetary 
System in 1978 and Article 20 of the 1986 Single European Act. Economic and 
monetary union marks the completion of the single market, but it also has a much 
greater significance in political terms.119   
 
 the reform of institutions and powers. This relates to traditional Community 
powers, common foreign and security policy (the new name for European  political 
coopera- 
tion )  and justice and home affairs. These three areas are the new “pillars” of the 
system; there are different decision-making procedures and instruments for 
implementing each of them: 
 -- The first is based on the “Community system “ and the  
 -- other two on the “Intergovernmental system”.  
 
It should be remembered that the Treaty of Maastricht introduced the concept of 
European citizenship 120)   and, , at institutional level, legislative codecision 
between the Council and the European Parliament , and Parliament’s vote of 
approval of the European Commission. Article N 2 of the Treaty, the article on  
codecision (189b) and the articles on common foreign and security policy refer to 
future reform. 
 
3.7 After a long preparation period by the “Reflection Group”, the Intergovernmental 
Conference was convened in Turin on March 29,1996, to  prepare the basics  for the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on 2 October 1997,  121)  
 
 The Amsterdam Treaty establishing the European Union, amending the Maastricht Treaty 
establishing the European Union, contains provisions on 
 
 fundamental rights  , 122)   and  
  as a response to the concerns of citizens provisions regarding non-discrimination, 
equality between men and women, the environment, health, social policy, the disabled,  
      religious organisations, voluntary work and, specifically, employment.123)  
 
 
118:  http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc112.htm. 
119: About the euro: http://europa.eu.int/euro/html/home5.html?lang=5. 
120:  http://europa.eu.int/abc/cit3_en.htm.. 
121: http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/amst/en/index.htm. 
122: http://europa.eu.int/abc/cit1_en.htm. 
123::http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg05/empl&esf/index_en.htm. 
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 fundamental as regards the common foreign and security policy and, 
in particular, defence (Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union; this part of  
the Treaty contains all the general questions and those which are not included 
in the amended Community Treaties). 
 
 vital to the building of an area of freedom, security and justice,124   
         encompassing cooperation on civil   matters, immigration and asylum under the  
      Comunity pillar, and criminal justice and police cooperation under the third pillar,  
       which  has, in fact, been strengthened   greatly by comparison with the provisions of  
       thhe Treaty of Maastricht. Consequently,  
       it was possible, though with derogations for some Member States, to incorporate the  
       Schengen  Agreement in the Treaty,opening the gateway  to expanding freedom of  
       movement and even making it applicable to all Union residents.  125   
 
 
3.8. The Amsterdam and  Nice Treaty unsatisfactory on the institutional front 
 
Despite substantial improvements as regards the decision-making process and the 
legitimacy of the European Commission (approval of the President of the Commission by 
the European Parliament); specifically, the Member States were dissatisfied with 
the steps taken to adapt the Treaty for the next wave of enlargement (countries 
of central and eastern Europe and some Mediterranean countries). This was why, after the 
“night of Amsterdam” on 17/18 June 1997, a Protocol on the institutions was adopted 
which deferred the questions of  
 
 the composition of  the Commission and 
  weighting of votes in the Council to the next Conference. 
 
This Protocol contained two new provisions: the first regarding  the changes  required to reach 
twenty members, while the second provided for radical reform in the case of a greater number 
of accessions (however, the speed at which enlargement procedures were moving had made 
this distinction somewhat superfluous).Three Member States (Italy, France and Belgium ) 
 made a declaration requesting that the question of extension of majority voting in the Council  
should also be considered in the light of the impending enlargements. 
 
On the basis of the Protocol and of this declaration, the Cologne European Council, convened 
shortly after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1 May 1999), started the process 
of convening the Intergovernmental Conference which began its work on 14 February 2000 in 
Brussels to prepare the Nice Treaty on European Union. 
 
Even the Nice Treaty on European Union  did fail to sufficiently complete the 
Amsterdam “leftovers”. 
 
 
124: http://europa.eu.int/pol/justice/index_en.htm 
125:  http:// europa.eu.int/citizens/ 
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4.   Conclusion 
 
This survey on reforming the Treaties shows that it is since the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union 1992,that the EU is intensifying  trying to better balance deepening and 
enlarging the Union. Namely since the 1996/1997 Intergovernmental  Conference – IGC 
1996/97-, preparing the Amsterdam Treaty on EU, the EU was and ever since then  is 
preparing the reform of the institutions to improve the efficiency of the decision –making 
process within an enlarged EU. Reforming the institutions was  meant by national delegations 
at the IGC pleading for a priority to be clearly given to deepening the EU first before 
further enlargement.  
The Amsterdam Treaty on EU,however, fell short of reforming the institutions: issues 
remained unresolved.The so-called “left-overs” of the Amsterdam Treaty on EU described 
what, in the view of the IGC preparing the Draft Amsterdam Treaty on EU, was necessary to 
agree upon institutional reforms to help the EU to find an efficient response to the common 
challenges which would be caused by enlargement. Institutional reforms were expected  to 
make the substantial contribution to the European Union´s transparency, democracy 
and decisiveness.  
 
Approval of reforms on decision-making in the Council failed  due to the  dividing line 
between diverging interests of those member countries  preferring enlargement even if 
further deepening of European  integration came under risk.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI. Activities to establish a Constitution for Europe to overcome the Union´s mess of  
       tensions between deepening and enlarging the Union 
 
 
1.The  Laeken Declaration 
 
In  view of the Union´s deficiencies even under the Nice Treaty on EU, the Heads of State or 
Government of the EU´s European Council , therefore, had decided on their summit held in  
Laeken,  on 14 and 15 December 2001, the so called  “ Laeken Declaration on the Future of 
Europe”, to hold an Intergovernmental Conference in 2004. The Intergovernmental 
Conference should   resolve the problems of democratic and transparent accountability and 
inefficient decision-making in the EU´s institutions.To prepare the Intergovernmental 
Conference, they decided to convene the European Convention on the Future of Europe 
to undertake a comprehensive overhaul of the EU´s policymaking institutions. According to 
the Declaration of Laeken, the Convention´s mission was to draw up a single document, a 
Treaty establishing a Contitution for Europe, that should both be simpler for the average 
citizen to understand  and make the EU more effective, focussing on three  subjects : 
 
 112
 how to bring citizens closer to the European design and European Institutions; 
  how to organise politics and the European political area in an enlarged Union; and  
 how to develop the Union into a stabilising factor and a model in the new world 
order.. 126  
 
The  Laeken Declaration addressed the role of national parliaments in the EU, the drafting of 
a Charter of Fundamental Rights, the division of competencies between the Union and 
Member States, the composition of the  Commission, the rotating Council presidency, and the 
external relations of the Union. 127   
.  
In detail, the Laeken declaration set the following guide-lines for the Convent´s design of 
the future European Union: 
 
- to propose a better division of Union and Member State competencies 
 
- to recommend a merger of the Treaties and the attribution of legal personality to the Union; 
 
- to establish a simplification of the Union's instruments of action; 
 
- to propose measures to increase the democracy, transparency and efficiency of the 
European Union, by 
 developing the contribution  of national Parliaments to the legitimacy of the European 
design,  
 simplifying the decision-making processes, and by  
 making the functioning of the European Institutions more transparent and 
comprehensible; 
- to establish the necessary measures to improve the structure and enhance the role of each of 
the Union's three institutions, taking account, in particular, of the consequences of 
enlargement. 
The Laeken declaration also asked whether the simplification and reorganisation of the 
Treaties should not pave the way for the adoption of a constitutional text.  
 
126: The Laeken Declaration. (2001, December 15). Retrieved October 7, 2003, from 
http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/offtext/doc151201_en.htm;  as to to the Convention´s mission 
and focal three subjects, see the preface of the draft  Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
Official Journal of the European Union, July 18,2003, C 169/01 ( 07 ) 
127:ibid.,supra, note 126.. 
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2. The drawing up of a draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe by the 
Convention for the future of Europe 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The task of the drawing up of a draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was 
entrusted to a Convention in which 105 representatives of national parliaments, the European 
Parliament, the national Governments from both current and candidate Member States and the 
Commission openly discussed the future of the Union. 128  The Convention, chaired by the 
former French President Valéry Giscard d`Estaing, startet in March 2002. 129 
 
The basic objectives of  the Convention were to make the European Union´s institutions  
 more  democratic as well as more transparent and efficient (in  anticipation of enlargement).  
The Laeken Declaration had given  the Convention a virtually open mandate. Without 
delays, the Convention reached the drawing up of  reforms of the institutional framework of 
the European  Union , carefully aware of the needs to balance  opposing concerns and 
interests  among the larger and smaller countries, richer and poorer countries and  among the 
Union´s  institutions. 
. 
The European Convention's proceedings ultimately led to the text of  a draft Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, which achieved a broad consensus at the plenary 
session on 13 June 2003. The text  had been  presented on 20 June 2003 to the European 
Council meeting in Thessaloniki, and  on  18 July 2003 submitted to the President of the 
European Council in Rome on behalf of the European Convention, in the hope that it would 
constitute the foundation of a future Treaty establishing the European Constitution: 130  
 
2.2  The draft Constitution 
 
The resulting Draft Constitution is separated into four parts.  
 
 Part I on  fundamental  legal principles.  
 Part II : the Charter of Fundamental Rights for EU citizens.  
 Part III : the Policies and functioning of the Union , expanding Community policies 
to   areas of  criminal law, taxation, and social policy, as well as Common Foreign and 
Security Polcy  
 Part IV: terms for ratification of the Draft. 
 
 
128: Grabbe, Heather. Policy brief: Preparing the EU for 2004. London: Centre for European  
         Reform. 
129:ibid.;supra,note 128. 
130:  “ Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe ,Adopted by consensus by the  
        European Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003 submitted to the President of the  
        European Council in Rome-— 18 July 2003 —, Offcial Journal of the European  
       Communities,2003/C169/01;   
       http://european-convention.eu.int/doc_register.asp?lang=EN&Content=DOC. 
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 The three parts cover details embedded in   reflective context. A  lengthy preamble is praising  
the history and values of Europe, Europe´s  cultural, religious and humanist traditions. The 
draft then draws up   the definitions and objectives of the Union: its “ aim is to promote peace, 
its values and the well-being of its peoples.” And it “ shall offer its citizens an area of free-
dom, security and justice without internal frontiers, and a single market where competition is 
free and undistorted.” 
 
2.2 1   Definition and objectives of the Union, membership 
 
The draft  clearyl declares  that membership in the Union shall remain open to all European 
States:  
 
“ 
DEFINITION AND OBJECTIVES OF THE UNION 
 
Article 1 
Establishment of the Union 
1. Reflecting the will of the citizens and States of Europe to  build a common future, this 
Constitution establishes the 
European Union, on which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives they 
have in common. The Union shall coordinate the policies by which the Member States aim to 
achieve these objectives, and shall exercise in the Community  way the competences they 
confer on it. 
2. The Union shall be open to all European States which respect its values and are committed 
to promoting them 
together. 
 
 
Article 3 
The Union's objectives 
1. The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples. 
. 
2. The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal 
frontiers, and a single market where competition is free and undistorted.” 
 
The draft states  that the Union is founded upon the values of respect for human dignity, 
liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. These liberal 
values, prominently confirmed in the draft Treaty, constitute the innermost part, the 
essentials of the modern European identity: Article 2 of the draft Treaty. 131 
 
 
 
131: Ibid., supra note 130, Offcial Journal of the European Communities,2003/ C 169/01(08). 
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2.2 2  A  single legal personality  and  the  conduct of a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy including a Common Security and Defence Poliy 
 
The draft Treaty´s proposals thus  cover  a wide range of  provisions  on objectives, legal 
status, policies, institutions, competences, law-making power and actions. According to the 
draft the  European Union would gain a single legal personality rather than its current 
political entity covering the only one entity, the European Community, having the legal status 
of a legal personality, as well as the two entities of intergovernmental cooperation nature: the 
second and the third pillar under the Treaty architecture of the current Treaty on European 
Union. 132  
 
Attributing a single legal personality to the European Union would  significantly  change 
the decisiveness of the EU implementing a comprehensive Common Foreign and Security 
Policy enclosing energy policy and foreign and security  policy, development policy and 
foreign and security policy as well as trade relations and foreign and security policy of the 
EU. A single legal personality would allow  the EU to negotiate and ratify international 
treaties independent of its Members and, theoretically, to take a seat at the United Nations´ 
Security Council. 133  
 
As to the idea of taking a seat at the United Nations – to exclude the United  Kingdom and/or 
France at the UN Security Council ?, however, such an  exclusive power of the EU would 
going much ahead of  current realities that require a systemf cooperation between the EU  
Member States that includes exclusive competences of the EU,e.g. trade relations, and mixed 
competences shared between EU level of  the EU´s institutions  and the national level of 
national Governments, as well as exclusive national powers, thus forming a multilevelled 
system of  interconnected forms of conducting a comprehensive Union foreign and security 
policy the basic characteristic if which is its cooperative nature. 
 
 
No doubt,the compehensive approach of the draft Treaty would constitute a coherent system 
by  replacing  the three-pillar  structure set-up by the Maastricht Treaty on EU and thus, by 
interconnecting the different pillars and their different institutional decision-making 
procedures, the draft Treaty would streamline, would improve the efficiency of the  
EU´s policy-making and decision-making. 134   
  
According to Article  39 and  Article  III-195  of the draft Treaty the European Union  shall 
conduct a common foreign and security policy. 135  
 
 
132:  Centre for European Reform. (2003, June 24). The CER guide to the draft EU  
          constitution. Briefing Notes. London: Author, pp. 1-6. Also available online at  
          http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/other/oth010603_4_en.pdf. 
133:   ibid, supra note 132. 
134:   The European Union’s Constitution: Tidying Up or Tyranny? (2003, May 31). The 
          Economist.  
135 Official Journal of the European Communities, July 18,2003, C 169/01  ( 17, 66 ). 
 
 
 
 
 116
 
 
The common foreign and security policy shall be put into  effect by the Union Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and by the Member States, using national and Union resources., Article 39 
4th paragraph and Article III-197. The  Union´s  Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the  
field of common foreign and security policy, who shall chair the Council of Ministers for  
Foreign Affairs, shall contribute to  the preparation of the common foreign and security policy 
and shall ensure implementation of the European decisions adopted by the European Council 
and the Council of Ministers, 136 He would implement the common foreign and security 
policy provisions of the Treaty in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union´s  
external action, in the common interest and in line with the Member States´ policies as 
defined by  the European Council´s guidelines definining and implementing  a common 
foreign and security policy, in view of the Member States´ commitment to  “support the 
common foreign and  security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and 
mutual solidarity.”137 
 
According to Article 40 and Article III-210, the Union shall implement  the common 
security and defence policy that shall be an integral part of  the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy,  
 
Article 40 : 
 
“1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign 
and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on assets 
civil and military. The Union may use them on missions  outside the Union for peace-keeping, 
conflict prevention and  strengthening international security in accordance with the principles 
of the United Nations Charter. The performance of  these tasks shall be undertaken using 
capabilities provided by  the Member Sta tes.” 138   
The draft Treaty would also create, within the Union´s common defence policy, an  
European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency, under  the authority 
of the Council of Ministers, with the task  to help to coordinate the improving of the  
Member States´ military  capabilities, defence technology research and arms  procure- 
ment procedures: 
 
“ 
  identify the Member States' military   capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability 
commitments given by the Member States;  
 promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods; 
 propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in  terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of 
the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes; 
  support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of 
technical  solutions meeting future operational needs; 
  contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial 
and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military 
expenditure.”,139  
 
 
136:Article III-197 1st paragraph of the draft Treaty, Official Journal of the European 
Commnities, July 18,2003, C 169/01 ( 66 ). 
137:draft Treaty, Article III-195 1st and 2nd paragraph , Official Journal of the European 
Commnities, July 18,2003, C 169/01 ( 66 ). 
138:   C  169/18 
139:Article III- 212 , ibid. C 169/69. 
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2.2 3   Distributing exlusive and shared competences between the European Union and  
           the  Member States 
 
 
The draft  Treaty tries to set up clear principles of  distributing the competences  between 
the European Union´s institutions and the Member States by the principles of: 
 
 “confering exclusive  competences “ on the Union 
 “ confering on the Union competences shared with the Member States 
 the Union´s competence to promote  and coordinate the Member States´economic 
and employment policies 
 the Union´s competence to define and implement a common foreign and security 
policy including defence policy 
 the Union´s competence to support, coordinate or supplement Member States´ actions, 
Article  11  140  
 
“1. When the Constitution confers on the Union exclusive competence in a specific area, only 
the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do 
so themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of acts adopted 
by the Union”,Article 11 1st paragraph  and Article 12 141 
“ 
 
The Draft Constitution does not assign any new exclusive competences to the EU; it 
simply codifies current policy practices.: 
 
 competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market, and in the 
following areas: 
  monetary policy, for the Member States which have adopted the euro, 
  common commercial policy, 
 customs union, 
 the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries 
policy. 
the conclusion of an international agreement (implied powers ) when its conclusion is 
provided for in a legislative act of the Union, is necessary to enable it to exercise its 
internal competence, or affects an internal Union act. 142   
 
 
The Union´s areas of shared competence  apply in areas:  
 
 internal market 
 area of freedom, security and justice 
 agriculture and fisheries, 
 transport and trans-European networks 
 energy 
140: ibid, C 169/10. 
141: ibid, C 169/10. 
      142: Crossick, Stanley. (2003, June). The Europe We Need. Brussels: The European  
               Policy.Centre. 
 
 
 118
 
 
 
 social policy 
 economic, social and territorial cohesion 
 environment 
 consumer protection 
 public health 
 scientific research and technological development, R&D,space exploration 
 development cooperation and humanitarian aid. 
  
The Union´s  areas of supporting, coordinating or complementary  action  are, 
at European level: 
 
 industry, 
  protection and improvement of human health, 
 education, vocational training, youth and sport, 
 culture, 
 civil protection. 
 
Legally binding acts adopted by the Union on the basis of the provisions specific to these 
areas in Part III may not entail harmonisation of Member States' laws or regulations.,Article 
17   143    
 
 
2.2 4   Creating one institutional framework for the Union´s institutions 
 
As  to  the Union´s  institutions and the institutional framework, the draft Treaty maintains 
the major EU institutions. According to Article 18, the Union's Institutions  shall be served, 
however, by a single institutional frame-work to 
 advance the objectives of the Union, 
 promote the values of the Union, 
 serve the interests of the Union, its citizens and its Member States,and 
  ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of the policies and actions which 
it undertakes in pursuit of its objectives. 
This institutional framework comprises: 
 
The European Parliament, 
The European Council, 
The Council of Ministers, 
The European Commission, 
The Court of Justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
143:ibid, supra,notes  136,137,. C 169/11. 
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2.2 5    Principle of attributed, limited powers; transparency of decision-making 
 
As to the principle of attributed powers, Article 18 paragraph 3 of the draft Treaty  
expresses in similar  words as does Article 5 of the Treaty on EU  that “ each institution shall 
act within the limits of  powers conferred on it in the Constitution.”,  
144   
 
Emphasis is  given to  increased transparency of the proceedings of the  institutions : 
“ 
Article 49 
Transparency of the proceedings of Union Institutions 
1. In order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the 
Union Institutions, bodies and   agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible.” 
 
“Article III-305 
1. The Institutions, bodies and agencies of the Union shall recognise the importance of 
transparency in their work and shall, in application of Article I-49, lay down in their rules of  
procedure the specific provisions for public access to documents. 
The Court of Justice and the European Central Bank  shall be subject to the provisions 
of Article I-49(3) when  exercising their administrative tasks. “ , 145  ) 
 
 
 
2.2 6   The European Parliament  
 
 
The draft is strengthening the European Parliament`s shared legislative role with the 
Council of  Ministers, by assigning an  equal position:  “ The European Parliament shall, 
jointly with the Council of  Ministers, enact  legislation, and exercise the budgetary function, 
as well as functions of political control and consultation as laid down in the  Constitution.”, 
Article 19 1st paragraph. 146   
European laws and European framework laws shall be adopted on the basis of proposals 
from the Commission, jointly by the  European Parliament and the Council of Ministers 
under the ordinary legislative procedure as set out in Article III-302: The two Institutions 
have the task of reaching agreement, within the Conciliation Committee, on a joint text, by a 
qualified majority of the members of the Council of Ministers or their representatives and by a 
majority of the members representing the European Parliament, after they could not  reach 
agreement on an act in policy areas that are subject to majority voting in the Council. 147  
 
 
The European Parliament  would elect the President of the European Commission upon 
proposal by the European Council . Article 19 1st paragraph , 2nd sentence ; Article  
26  1st paragraph.148   
 
144:  consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union,Official Journal of the European  
         Communities, December 24,2002, C 325/5 ( 11 ); draft Constitution Treaty , C 169/12.) 
145:   ibid., C 169/ 01(85 ). 
146:   bid., C 169/01 ( 12 ). 
147:   ibid., C 169/01 (84). 
148: ibid., C 169/01 (  12,14 ). 
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2.2 7  The Council of Ministers 
 
The draft maintains the Council of Ministers´ co-decision legislative role shared with the 
European Parliament, Article 22  1st paragraph .149  
 
 
The  Legislative and General Affairs Council shall ensure consistency in the work of the 
Council of Ministers. “ When it acts in its legislative function, the Council of Ministers shall 
consider and, jointly with the European Parliament, enact European laws and European 
framework laws, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. “, Article 23 
paragraph 1 . 150  
 
To achieve more coherent policy-making of the Council of Ministers, the draft is extending  
the Presidency´s term of  equal rotation among the Member States  from six months to at least 
a year, Article 23 4th paragraph.151     
 
 
2.2 8   The Commission 
 
 
The draft maintains the traditional role of the Commission being the motor of European 
integration and namely having the exclusive right to initiate the making of European 
Laws: 
 
 “promote the general European interest and take appropriate initiatives to that end. It 
shall  ensure the application of the Constitution, and steps taken by the Institutions 
under the Constitution.”  
 
 “2. Except where  the Constitution provides otherwise, Union legislative acts can be 
adopted only on the basis of a Commis-sion proposal. Other acts are adopted on the 
basis of a Commission proposal where the Constitution so provides.”, Article 25 1st 
and 2nd  paragraph. 152   
 The exception made for the Commission´s role  of initiative  is provided for  the 
European Council to ensure consistency in the political work of the Council of 
Ministers: 
 
“ The European Council can adopt, on its own initiative and by unanimity, after a period of 
consideration of at least six months, a decision allowing for the adoption of such European 
laws or framework laws according to the ordinary legislative procedure. The European 
Council shall act after consulting the European Parliament and informing the national 
Parliaments.  “, Article  24 4th paragraph . 153   . 
 
 
149:: ibid.,C 169 /01 ( 13 ). 
150:  ibid.,C 169/01  ( 13 ). 
151:  ibid., C 169/01  (13 ). 
152:  ibid., C 169/01 ( 13 ).   
153:  ibid., C 169/01  (13 ). 
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In addition to the Commission´s role to initiate the Union´s law-making,  the draft 
maintains the Commission´s executive and bureaucratic funtions. The Commission 
shall: 
 
 oversee the application of Union law under the control of the Court of 
Justice; 
 execute the budget and  
 manage programmes, 
  exercise coordinating, executive and management functions, 
 ensure the Union's  external representation, wth the exception of  
the  common foreign and security policy, and other cases provided for in the 
Constitution; 
 initiate the Union's annual and  multiannual programming with a view to 
achieving interinstitutional agreements. Article 25 1st paragraph.        154   
 
The President of the Commission would be elected by the European Parliament´s  majority 
vote on a candidate nominated by the European Council,deciding by majority vote. The 
President-elect  would then  select the thirteen European Commissioners,from a list put 
forward by each Member State determined by a system of rotation, “ for their competence, 
European commitment, and guaranteed independence.”The President and the persons so 
nominated for membership of the College, including the future Union Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, as well as the persons nominated as non-voting Commissioners, shall be submitted 
collectively to a vote of approval by the European Parliament. The Commission's term of 
office shall be five years. “,  Article 26 1st and 2nd paragraph. 155  
 
2.2 9  Conclusion          
Thus, the future Constitution was supposed, in the view of the Convention on  the Future of 
Europe, to be drafted  along the lines as set up by the EU´s summit meeting´s Laeken 
Declaration . The Convention´s  consensus was the result of long negotiations and  hard to 
accomplished compromises. The draft text had received opposing and welcoming response 
from the European public, from the citizens at large, from European experts and European 
politicians. While some appreciated  the Constitution to be an ambituous, if not the biggest 
leap forward for the European Union since the Treaties of Rome on the European Economic 
Community – EEC- and on the European Atomic Community-Euratom-., others judged the 
faults of the draft not to be concise enough, using more words than necessary, and to be too 
ostentatious. 156  
Others critizised the draft as having fallen too far from the Convention´s mission to make the 
European Union more demcratic and transparent. 157   
By the text´s evidence, fact is that the text´s  strucuture and contents of the draft are born by 
the existing treaties establishing the European Union and establishing the European  
 
 
154: ibid. ,C 169/01 ( 13 ). 
155: ibid., C 169/01 ( 14 ). 
156: Niskanen, William. Comparing the U.S. and EU Constitutions. Washington, DC: The  
        Cato Institute. Also available online at  http://www.cato.org/dailys/08-14-03.html 
157: Centre for European Reform. (2003, June 24). The CER guide to the draft EU constitu-  
         tion. Briefing Notes. London: Author, pp. 1-6. Also available online at    
         http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/other/oth010603_4_en.pdf. 
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Community. Much of the complexity of institutional structures and decision-making rules of 
the European Union is maintained unchanged .158  
 
The draft is thus giving the impression that, in the minds of citizens, the draft appears to be 
too illegible to be called “Constitution” as a brief document containing provisions on basic 
obejectives, tasks, fundamental rights, institutions and legislative powers while incorporating 
every other provisions necessary to rule implementing policies and procedures in a secondary 
law of the European Union. The draft is, actually, not an approach to harmonize the two 
different methods of cooperation between the Member States, integration and intergovern- 
mental cooperation, but to deepen the tensions existing between the two methods. For, the text 
of the draft is giving the impression the European Union is going to develop into a federal-
state like entity, distinguishable from the Member States, and thus forgetting that the current 
system of the Union is the multilevelled system of interconnected levels of the nation state 
(the still sovereign Member States) and the level of the jointly operating collectivity of the 
Member States acting within the common institutional structures. To make these two levels 
functioning well and efficiently, it is not sufficient to appeal to the Member States´ 
commitment to a common solidarity ( Articles 3 paragraph 3, 15, 39 paragraph 5, Article 42, 
Articles III-158, III- 169, III- 193, III- 195, III-201, III-231,implementation of the soldarity 
clause). What counts are legally binding and enforceable rules of procedure to imbed the 
Member States´ cooperative discipline operating within the Union´s s legislative instritutions. 
 
 
3. The Intergovernmental Conference debating the draft Treaty establishing a  
     Constitution for Europe 
 
 
The draft Constitution had been  discussed by the representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States at the Intergovernmental Conference – IGC -  , that began in October  2003. 
At the Brussels summit (12-13 December 2003), Heads of State or Government did not reach 
an agreement on the final text of the Constitution, as finalising the constitution failed 
dramatically over the distribution of voting power between the Member States. The March 
2004 election that changed Spain's government  however broke the deadlock. With Irish help, 
constitutional talks revived in March 2004 and were  completed by the European Council on  
17 June 2004. 
 
 
The  final agreement on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe – Treaty on 
Constitution-  had largely endorsed the Convention’s basic proposals of the draft.  
 Beyond a large number of editorial modifications, the substantial changes were focussing 
on   the  much disputed  issue of qualified majority voting on legislation by the Council  
of the EU. 
 
 
4. The  Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
 
The  Treaty on Constitution  , as agreed upon by the European Council in June 2004, 
is a treaty concluded between the Member States under the rules of international law.  It 
would enter into force when the entire number of the Member States has ratified the treaty. 
 
 
158: ibid.,supra note 156. 
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Two referenda failed: in France and in the Netherlands in 2005. 
Any modification of the Constitution´s text at a later stage would require the unanimous 
agreement of the Member States and, in principle, ratification by all again. For some 
modifications, however – for example with regard to the extension of the scope of qualified 
majority voting – a unanimous decision by the European Council might  suffice 
 
The  Treaty on Constitution  , as agreed upon by the European Council in June 2004, is a quite 
long document, it runs over 200 pages, and, it is to many judgements still bafflingly complex. 
159  
 
The essential  elements of the reforms stipulated by the Treaty on  Constitution are as 
follow: 
 
4.1  The Union would  have a single foundation, the Constitution and simplification of 
the European construction:one single institutional framework 
 
Europe has been built in stages and is based on different Treaties that have been 
concluded over time. This is why the European construction is difficult to understand today. 
From now on, there would be only one European Union replacing the present “European 
Communities” and the “European Union”; the three “pillars” will be merged, even 
though special procedures in the fields of foreign policy, security and defence are maintained;  
the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” would replace the EU and EC Treaties, as 
well as all the treaties amending and supplementing them, by creating one single institutional 
framnework. 
 
 
The integration of the Charter for Fundamental Rights into the text, the  acknowledge-
ment of the Union’s values and objectives as well as the principles underlying the relationship 
between the Union and its Member States, might allow  to call this basic text “Constitution”. 
It also contains a clearer presentation of the distribution of competences and a simplified set 
of legal instruments and procedures. In future, European laws would be known as laws. 
 
In legal terms, however, the Constitution remains a treaty concluded between the Member 
States under the rules of international law.  it would enter into force when only all Member 
States have ratified it, which implied referenda  in some Member States.  
And  any modification of the Constitution at a later stage would require the unanimous 
agreement of the Member States and, in principle, ratification by all. For some modifications, 
however – for example with regard to the extension of the scope of qualified majority voting 
– a unanimous decision by the European Council would  suffice.  
 
 
159:: A consolidated version of the treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, see: 
          http://europa.eu.int/constitution.. 
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4.2  Commission ,recognition of its different missions, its: 
 
 near monopoly of legislative initiative,  
 executive function and  
  function of representing the Union externally, except in the field of common foreign 
and security policy.  
  interinstitutional programming is assigned to the Commission’s initiative.  
 
4.3  Institutional framework: Parliament and Council 
 The Treaty extends  the scope of the co-decision procedure, which, significantly, will 
henceforth be called the legislative procedure (95% of European laws will be adopted 
jointly by the Parliament and the Council). 
 
4.4  Main institutional innovations within the Council 
 
 the creation of the  post of Union Minister of Foreign Affairs, who will be responsible 
for the representation of the Union on the international scene. This function will merge 
the present tasks of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy with those of the Commissioner for external relations. The Minister of Foreign 
Affairs will thus be mandated by the Council for common foreign and security policy, 
while being a full member of the Commission and as such in charge of the 
Commission’s responsibilities in the field of external relations as well as of the 
coordination of the other aspects of the Union’s external action;  
 in addition, he will chair the External Relations Council.  
 
4. 5   The European Council 
 
 the Treaty establishes the European Council as an institution, distinct from the 
 Council. The European Council will be chaired by a President, with limited powers, 
appointed for a period of two and a half years. 
 
 
4.6     Composition of the institutions 
 
 the IGC finally had decided to raise the maximum number of seats in the European 
Parliament to 750. These seats will be allocated to the Member States according to 
the principle of “degressive proportionality”, with a minimum of six and a maximum 
of ninety-six seats. The precise number of seats attributed to each Member State will 
be decided before the European elections in 2009. 
 Commission: The IGC decided to maintain the current composition of the 
Commission – one Commissioner per Member State – until 2014. From then on, the 
Commission will comprise a number of Commissioners corresponding to two thirds of 
the number of Member States. The members of the Commission will be chosen 
according to a system based on equal rotation among the Member States, which had 
been already decided by the Nice Treaty. 
 
4.7  Qualified majority for decision-making in the Council: Strengthening the Union´s 
decisiveness by striking the balance between sovereign equality of each Member State and the 
democratic legitimacy by proportionate weigthing the votes: 
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 The definition of qualified majority for decision-making in the Council: the most 
difficult question the IGC had to deal with: 
    .  
       The Convention wanted the Council to  decide on the basis of the double  
        majority of   the Member States and of the people, which constitutes an  
        expression of the Union’s  double legitimacy.  
 
       The IGC nonetheless decided to raise the thresholds:  
        instead of the  majority of Member States representing 60% of the population, the  
        IGC decided that a qualified majority will require the support of 55% of the  
        Member States representing 65% of the population. This definition is  
        accompanied by two further elements: 
 First, in order to avoid the situation  where, in an extreme case, only three (large) 
Member States would be able to block a Council decision due to an increase in the 
population threshold, a blocking minority needs to comprise at least four Member 
States.  
 Moreover, a number of Council members representing at least three-quarters of a 
blocking minority, whether at the level of Member States or the level of population, 
can demand that a vote is postponed and that discussions continue for a reasonable 
time in order to reach a broader basis of consensus within the Council: 
 
 
 Article I-25 of the Treaty: 
 “ 
Definition of qualified majority within the European Council and the Council” 
1. A qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55% of the members of the Council, 
comprising at least fifteen of them and representing Member States comprising at least 65% 
of the population of the Union.“ 
 
Whereas the  Convention´s text of Article 24, paragraph 1 of the draft constitution, proposed 
on qualified majority decisions in the Council of Ministers : 
“1. When the European Council or the Council of Ministers takes decisions by qualified 
majority, such a majority shall consist of the majority of Member States, representing at least 
three fifths of the population of the Union.”. 
 
 
 
4.8 The Union’s newly acquired single legal personality : 
  
 it  also is meant to enable the Union to play a more visible role in world affairs. 
 
4.9 Achievements in the area of freedom, security and justice, and in the field of 
common foreign and security policy 
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 The  Community method of qualified voting will  apply to  nearly all the areas of 
criminal justice and police cooperation.The Constitution retains or introduces some 
special features in these areas, namely in the area of judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters  d in the area of police  cooperation. 
 Common foreign and security policy: the  distinction between common foreign and 
security policy and the other aspects of EU external action still determines the 
respective roles of the institutions and the procedures that apply. Unanimity is retained  
in the field of  common foreign and security policy. 
 Strenghtening the ways for  the Member States to cooperate more closely in the field 
of defence is meant to reinforce  the credibility of the Union’s foreign policy. 
 
 
4.10 Economic, taxation, social policies: 
 
 Further extension  of the scope of qualified majority and a near generalisation of the 
codecision procedure.  
 
Unanimity is retained in the field of taxation and, partially, in the field of social policy. 
“Passerelles” allow a unanimous decision that henceforth qualified majority will apply in a 
given area. 
 
4.11   Increased democracy and transparency  ? The Constitution´s provisions are aiming  
          at more democratic, transparent and controllable EU institutions that are closer to the  
          citizen.  
 
 Citizens´ right to invite the Commission to submit an appropriate proposal to the 
legislator, if they manage to collect one million signatures in a significant number of 
Member States.  
 proceedings of the Council, when exercising its legislative function, are to be open to 
the public.  
 The role of the European Parliament has been strengthened.  
 National parliaments are to be informed about all new initiatives from the 
Commission and, if one third of them consider that a proposal does not comply with 
the principle of subsidiarity, the Commission must review its proposal.  
 New provisions on participatory democracy and good governance have acquired 
constitutional status.  
 The Charter will guarantee better protection of fundamental rights. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion: 
 
5.1 The situation after the failing French and Dutch votes on ratification 
Throughout the Treaty, there is a tension between making the EU work better and 
maintaining different national positions claimed as vital or basic ones  and consequently 
maintaining national vetoes in sensitive areas.  
It was no surprise that several points of disagreement made reaching the final text of the 
Treaty   on Constitution difficult: 
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For, the  aims of the EU’s different members for the constitution varied widely.The British 
Prime Minister had been trying to sell the idea to his Eurosceptic voters  that the Draft Treaty 
on Constitution was merely a consolidation of existing treaties. Many British voters,however, 
thought  that any “constitution” implied a nascent European super state,a federal state, 
“federal” as interpreted in the British special tradition that “federal” meant “central unity 
state”, and were  dead-set against this. Other EU leaders, e.g. the French President Mr Chirac 
and Germany’s Chancellor Herr  Schröder, not only wanted a single, clear document—they 
wanted to make the EU more relevant by using a EU Constitution the vehicle for achieving 
this goal, namely by expanding  the existing majority-voting powers of the EU to  matters 
which until then still were subject to nation states´veto rights of   unanimous voting covering 
matters like foreign and security policy as  well as judicial and police cooperation. 
Still unchanged until today, some EU laws could and still can be passed with a “qualified 
majority vote” (QMV). The current QMV system is complex and gives smaller countries 
power disproportionate to their populations so that bigger countries have a bigger say. But in 
other, particularly sensitive areas, all members must agree. But the Treaty Constitution wants 
to  replace it with a specal “double majority, according to Article I-25 of the Treaty. 
The  Treaty on Constitution  allows for the eventual extension of QMV to corporate taxation, 
some aspect of criminal justice and foreign policy. The British Prime Minister,Blair,  insisted 
on keeping Britain’s national veto in these areas.  
As to a miscellany of other crucial  issues that had been finalised by the Treaty, the  British 
Prime Minister was also concerned that the proposed Charter of Fundamental Rights attached 
to the constitution would introduce rigidity into Britain’s flexible labour market by bolstering 
the right to strike. 
Poland and Italy wanted a reference to God or Europe’s Christian heritage in the text, which 
France and others opposed. The bigger countries wanted to slim down the commission so that 
not every country would always be represented, but the small ones were resisting. The Dutch 
Government wanted to strengthen the commission’s powers to enforce the stability and 
growth pact, which sets limits on the budget deficits that member countries of the euro can 
run. France and Germany, both egregious breakers of the pact, were opposed. 
 
If, in view of the fact that ratifiacation already failed in France and in the Netherlands,  
ratification by the entire number of theMember States is not reachable, it appears to be 
too readily understood to put the blame on the Heads of State or Government having endorsed 
the very long and complex document of the   Constitution.  .  
 
What in fact appears  causing great concern , however, is  that the Heads of State or 
Government in the course of drawing up the draft  failed to realize the issue of  identity 
of the European Union, the issue of transparency, democratic accountability and 
efficiency all of which they failed to make clear to the public in the EU how to 
understand the EU: 
what kind of  identity of the EU is meant by the instrument “constitution of the EU” and 
by its main substantial features?  
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They failed to leave no doubts about the functional role of a EU Constitution whether to 
construct a EU “Superstate” or to make  the EU better work after further enlargements 
and to guarantee people´s future  in the world of globalization and modernization.  
 
5.2 How  to leave the impasse ? Leaving the impasse through focussing on identity 
shaping essentials  
                ` transparency, democracy, decisiveness ` not necessarily presented  
                 in a Treaty labelled “ Constitution 
   
At the present state of the procedure, it appears unclear how to achieve the necessary 
unanimous consent by all EU members to the Treaty on EU ‘Constitution.  
 
If ratification by the entire number of the Member States fails, it appears unrealistic to 
submit a new, modified  text of the Treaty constitution to the plesbiscite again: the French and  
Dutch voters who denied the Treaty in 2005 might well feel to be messed around. And in 
addition to this, it appears unrealistic as well to hope that the Treaty constitution as a 
whole package  might easily be renegotiated and be successfully submitted to ratification 
procedures in the Member States: the national electorates and Parliaments that already 
had voted for the draft Constitution might well doubt about the seriousness and  
legitimacy of the ratification procedures.  
 
In this situation there is much academic discussion in the EU on how to leave the 
impasse. By finding a pragmatic way of balancing the legal requirements for ratifying 
any basic modifications of the Treaty on Constitution or of the existing Founding 
Treaties on EU and EC on the one hand, and the requirements of legitimacy with 
respect for the democratic acceptability of the constitutional reforms, whether the 
reforms are part of a text called “Constitution” or whether they are part of the existing 
Founding Treaty of the EU and EC: the reforms have necessarily to be part of what I 
am calling the constitutional quality of the European Union. 
 
And the issue of  the acceptability and legitimacy of the Treaty on Constitution 
is, essentially, the issue of the identity of the European Union: 
 
The essential features shaping the European Union´s identity should be 
incorporated in a text 
 
 which might be called “constitution” or 
 which might be a modified text of the existing founding Treaties on EU and EC  
reflecting the essentials of the constitutional quality of the European Union.  
 
The essential features shaping the European Union´s identity should be incorporated in 
a concise text the citizens of the European Union might easily understand and accept. 
The text  should contain the stipulation on giving the response to the questions: 
 
 what is the European Union ? 
 why  is the European Union a “joint venture” in the best interest of the citizens? 
 what are the European Union´s basic values and objectives to secure the interests 
of the citizens 
 what are the Èuropean citizens´ fundamental rights protected by the European 
Union? 
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 what are the European Union´s main institutions to act to protect the citinzens´ 
rghts and interests` 
 what are the European Union´s main policy areas to protect the citizens´ 
interests? 
 what is the basic line of distributing the competences between the European 
Union and the Member  States? 
 what are the European Union´s  main legal powers and instruments to design, to 
decide and to implement common policies? 
 All implementing provisions are to be incorporated in the European Union´s 
secondary law, complementary to the primary constitutional law as incorporated 
by a treaty on Constitution or by a modified founding treaty on EU and EC. 
 
 
 
Whether the form of a concise text containing the Union´s essential identity  features  
has to be a formal text called “constitution” or has to modify the existing Founding 
Treaties on EU/EC appears to be rather a matter of  political psychology than a matter 
of legal stringency as will be explained in the following chapter: 
 
 
 
 
Chapter III 
The identity issue and the formal text called “Constitution” 
 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
 
Before  the Laeken Declaration had been launched, a constitutional law debate had discussed 
the  question whether the nature of  the EU as a supranational entity  might allow to create an 
EU Constitution  or, if , in view of  the already existing Founding  Treaties on  EU shaping 
the constitutional quality of the EU in its present shape , there might be any further need for 
setting up a comprehensive codification  in the sense of a written  text to be called 
Constitution. 
 
The Heads of State and Government of the EU had actually decided to create a formal 
text called "constitution" meant to get the Union closer to the citizens by better shaping 
the Union´s identity shaping essentials in terms of democracy, transparency and 
decisiveness. 
 
After the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe had failed ratification in France 
and in the Netherlands, the constitutional law debate about the adequate form of 
presenting the constitutional quality to the European public started again.  
  
For,the Treaty has to be ratified by the entire number of the Member States. Taking 
into account the fact that the Treaty ratification has already failed to get ratification in 
France and in the Netherlands, it is not imaginable that the already rejected  text of the  
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europea might be submitted again in France and 
in the Netherlands, for this would undermine the voters self-respect. And it is not 
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imaginable to submit a modified text to the voters in France and the Netherlands, for 
this would not meet the requirements that a text has to be ratified by the entire number 
of the Member States, while the great number of the Member States has already ratified 
the initial version of the text. 
  
Therefore, one option appears to be imaginable: 
 
 a totally different text, a merger text of a modified Treaty on European Union 
might be submitted to all Member States to get the necessary final unanimimous 
vote by the entire Member States, and , in this case, 
 the totally new  text has to contain essentials that prove an identity oriented 
solution helping  to avoid a  „coalition of the willing“ represented by those 
Member Countries which have already voted in favour of  the Constitution and 
which-as “ Kern - Europa”  might feel to be challenged to opt for enhanced 
multiple-speed integration. Such a turn of  events would increase the risk of a 
gradual disintegration of the Union as a whole. 
 
 
 
For, drawing up a totally different text which is not called “constitution” but which 
contains the essential constitutional elements in the tradition of the Founding Treaties  
would, rather in terms of political psychology than in terms of legal stringency,   facili-
tate acceptance throughout all Member States: 
 
In political theory, a text called  "constitution" might have an identity shaping and 
reinforcing effect for the Union´s democratic accountability and legitimacy in the 
people´s public perception of the EU.  The contrary effect,however, proved reality: 
 
Viewing at the voting in France and in the Netherlands, it basically appears doubtful if a 
formal text called "constitution" can successfully  be used making reference to 
traditional instruments known from nation states´ traditional patterns and easily being 
subject to misunderstandings by broad masses in the European public believing that a 
“Constitution” for Europe might be the signal for starting the project of creating a 
European Super State which,in fact, is not the finalité of the current project 
  
There is, therefore,  reason for a deeper discussion of   the nature of an instrument 
called "constitution" for the EU, its functional role in the policy-making of the Eropean 
Union , compared to the nation state constitution  and its functional role in the nation 
state´s policy-making, and the need to establish, for the EU,   a formal text called “ 
constitution”.   
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B. Basics of nation states Constitutions and mutual interdependencies     
between the  national constitutional systems of the EU Member States and 
the existing political and legal order of the EU 
 
 
I.       The  comparative approach to the  basics of national constitutional laws.:  
          the functional role of nation states´ constitutions and the functional role  
          of the EU´s legal and political order 
 
As the European Union´s political and legal order is not imaginable without the political 
and legal systems of the sovereign nation states which have founded the European 
Union, we want to use a comparative approach to the basics of national constitutional 
laws. For, the objective of that comparative approach is  to find out the functional role 
of the  nation state´s constitution and compare it to the functional role of the European 
Union´s existing political and legal essentials. The comparative approach might facilitate 
the understanding of the  form and contents that an instrument called “constitution” for  
Europe may necessarily require in order to fulfill the legitimate  expectations of  the 
European electorate who wants to know in the coming elections to the European 
Parliament in 2009 what kind of European Union is calling for the  polls. 
 
The nation state constitution traditionally is the written document describing the more 
static than flexible  basic legal  system of a nation state which describes the basic laws 
and principles that rule the functions and limits of legislative, executive and jurisdiction 
powers within a nation state: 
The assessment will be based on the mutual interdependencies between  the  national 
constitutional systems of the EU Member States, which  represent static systems, and   the 
existing political and legal order of the EU which is characterized by  a tradition of a dynamic  
development since the beginning of the historical process of  European integration, which 
influences the development of the traditional nation state concept of a national constitution. 
 
The modern concept of  Postwestphalian-Nation State Constitution  is that nation state 
constitutional policy and law will remain  the principal source of the  legal systems of the 
Member States of the EU, even nowadays in times of globalisation and   European 
integration. The nation state legal system, however, is subject to dynamic changes in view of 
the dynamic process of European integration. 
 
An analysis and assessment of the European Union´s constituional quality essentials will, 
therefore , have to take into account the  national  constitutional laws, in view of the mutually 
influencing national and EU levels of constitutional law. The national constitutional law is 
marking the constitutional range and limits set to any transfer of national sovereign  rights to 
EU level for a joint  exercise of   legislative, executive and judiciary powers (pooling of 
powers ), thus deciding upon the future development of the EU. 
At the same time , the process of European integration  has a remarkable repercussion  on the 
national constitutional, legal and political order. 
In the beginning of the process of European integration , the emerging European law on 
European institutions, on their functional role and on their powers, had been created on the 
basis of national traditions and  concepts, even creating the European Community as an entity 
sui generis, not  comparable with any other existing international or national entity. 
And on the other hand, during a second phase of the historical process of European 
integration, the  Founding Treaties on European Union-TEU- and on European 
Community-TEC- as EU  primary law, and the established law of the European 
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Community as secondary law which is based on the  TEC representing the first pillar 
under the TEU architecture, are presenting a comprehensive system of a constitutional 
quality by and in itself, on its own “merits” by own objectives, tasks, institutions, 
powers, representing a sui generis system of jointly pooled parts of  national sovereign 
powers which are jointly exercised by attributed,limted powers, limited by the founding 
Treaties..  
This comprehensive system  of the EU´s constitutional quality shaped by primary and 
secondary EU/EC law: this European Union law has begun to reflect legal and political  
repercussions on  the national constitutional systems of the Member States. Thus, it is 
comprehensible to realize, as Schwarze has rightly described it at the beginning of the rising 
debate on a EU constitution, as the emerging of an institutional multilevel system of 
mutually influencing EU and Member States national levels  as well as  a process of 
mutual adaptations of national and EU constitutional orders.           160)  
 
This is why  the President of the European Court of Justice, Gil  Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias 
had called  these interdependencies between the EU constitutional order and the national 
constitutional orders as the “ emerging of  a European legal order “, covering  the 
interplay between national constitutions and  basic rules of the European Union law. 
It is in view of evaluating interdependencies between the EU constitutional order and the 
national constitutional orders, that the criteria I use to assess the essentials of the Treaty on 
EU Constitution are based on an comparative approach to the  basics of national 
constitutional laws. The comparative approach is covering four  main groups of  points of 
discussion for finding out what the constitutional quality of   the EU might consist of  as 
common  essentials  qualifying  for the legitimate identity: 
 
II.    Notion of nation state constitution and the functional role of main national  
        constitutional systems of the EU Member States 
 
1. Germany 
The doctrine in German constitutional law as well as the rulings of the German 
„Bundesverfassungsgericht“,the German Federal Constitutional Law Court do not present a 
comprehensive and distinctly defined notion “constitution”. 161   Consent exists,however, as 
to basic guiding principles of the „Constitution“: „Constitution“ is the basic legal order, 
ranging first in hierarchy among all sources of national law,and thus guaranteeing the unity of 
national law. The “constitution” is a written text set up by the “pouvoir constituant” along  
established procedures and which contains  legally binding guiding principles on 
 
 human rights,  
 basic rights of freedom of all citizens 
 organizing and functions of the legislative, executive and jurisdiction.          162) 
 
160: Schwarze, Jürgen: “ Die Entstehung einer europäischen Verfassungsordnung “,  Jürgen   
        Schwarze (2000), Nomos Baden-Baden,   pp. 205-286 ( 221-245).) 
161: Badura, P., P.Badura,Artikel Verfassung ,in:Ev.Staatslexikon ,hrsg. R.Herzog  
        u.a.:3.Aufl. ,1987,Spalte 3737 ff;K.Hesse,Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der  
        Bundesrepublik Deutschland,20.Aufl. ,1995,Rn. 2,4; T.Maunz/R.Zippelius,Deutsches  
        Staatsrecht,30.Aufl.,1998,§5 1. 
162:.J.Isensee,Staat und Verfassung ,in: J.Isensee/P.Kirchhof(Hrsg.),Handbuch des  
        Staatsrechts der Bndesrepublik Deutschland,Band I,1987,§ 13 Rn. 122. 
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The constitution`s basic role is setting up limits to the exercise of  the nation State´s public 
powers, to guarantee legal protection from any abuse of public power. 
The constitution is no closed, rigid body of basic rules:the constitution´s clauses are  open to  
flexible interpretation, flexible enough to adjust to fast changing political,social and economic 
changes. There are limits,however,to the flexibility of  constitution: basic guiding principles 
are unchangeable, principles on human dignity, human rights, the principles of  republican 
State and parliamentary  democracy, the rule of law, the basic federal structure, the basics in 
social welfare system :they all are  unchangeable basic guiding principles which never can be 
changed even  by unanimous vote of  Parliament(Article 79 Abs.3 Grundgesetz).The 
constitution, thus stable enough to preserve the basic values of a stable society, and flexible 
enough to help to reinforce the state´s unity and the society´s  varieties in order  to survive by 
responding to modern challenges in a world of permanent modernization and globalization.  
 
As to the stipulation of guaranteeing fundamental rights of freedom, the constitution is the 
embodiment of basic values and  universal human rights,163  
 
2. Great Britain 
Peculiar position of the status of constitutional law in the United Kingdom, the absence of a 
written constitution and entrenched bill Bill of Rights and the fact that in British law the 
„state“ has no legal identity and is not a legal concept(but the state can hold property.This 
relates to the fact that the UK comprises four different countries in a unitary or “union” 
structure.). 
Although there has been an absence of a written constitution since the Instruments of 
Government (1653-60),British political and legal language over the centuries has been rich in 
its discussion of the principles of the “Ancient Constitution “ , built on fealty and feudal 
bonding ,developed through precedent guiding the custom and practice of the realm , 
embracing ever wider estates into its body politic. 
The “Revolution “  and Bill of Rights of 1689 were far from a revolution, rather a 
reestablishment of ancient order with the Crown at its apex  and constitutionalised – though 
not the executive – and everything thereunder in its rightful place, and it was believed, a place 
for everyone.That the “Ancient Constitution “ existed was never doubted. What it 
meant,however, no-one really  knew. 
If the British system of government was built on the Rule of Law and Parliamentary 
Sovereignty, this was held to be evidently true even though practice often denied the twin 
assertions of British Constitutionalism. In the latter case, Parliament is dominated by a 
government-it would not be government if that were not the case- and what Parliamentary 
Sovereignty too frequently produced was de facto Executive Sovereignty. 
 
3.Spain 
 
The Notion of Constitution in the Spanish  Constitution . 
The 1978 Spanish Constitution is  written Constitution, rigid in nature, containing the 
supreme rule which prevails over that of any other source of law. 
 
The constitution´s purpose is to organise the basic political structure of the Spanish people. 
Having got a 87.78 percent vote of approval in the referendum, and being approved by an  
 
163:Hesse,Konrad, Die Verfassungsentwicklung seit  1945,in: 
       E.Benda/W.Mairhofer/H.J.Vogel (Hrsg.) ,Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts,  2.Aufl.,   
      1995,§3 Rn. 27.) 
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even wider margin by the first democratically elected  Spanish Parliament since 1936, voting 
against the Franco regime´s institutional and legal apparatus. For this reason the Constitution 
has always been considered a rule of “ national consensus “ among all the  political forces, a 
fact which has given it a greater  legitimating authority than any other  Spanish  constitution  
in history. 
 
4.Sweden 
 
The notion of    “ Constitution “  in the Swedish legal order : 
The term  “Swedish Constitution “  includes  Sweden´s  fundamental laws .The Constitution 
of Sweden is built  on four  fundamental laws :  The Act of Succession(1810), The Freedom 
of the Press Act(1949:105), the Instrument of Government (1974::152) and the Freedom of 
Expression Act (1991:1469).   
Amendments  of fundamental laws require two identical decisions by the Parliament with a 
general election intervening before they can be approved. 
The fundamental laws are at the top of the hierarch.Immediately under the level of  
fundamental law comes the Riksdag Act.  
The provisions concerning the restriction of certain rights and freedoms are the next level. 
The next  level down is the sphere of facultative law. Law is established as the basic principle, 
but the Constitution  offers a wide range of opportunities for the Parliament to use  provisions 
in law to authorise the Government to issue prescriptions in certain matters. 
The way in which the  constitutional rules have been incorporated into the legal system has 
varied. There is today no single statute entitled “the Swedish Constitution”. The central 
provisions of the Swedish Constitution are to be found in the “Instrument of Government 
which is very similar to that of other countries in Europe. The  “ Instrument of Government  
contains rules: 
- regarding fundamental rights and freedoms,  
- rules  on the different institutions of the Government etc. 
 
The Swedish constitution like any constitution does contain  general statements of principle,  
which are declared to form the basis on which the  Constitution is constructed. 
The opening  provision of the Swedish Constitution 1:1 stipulates that : 
 
“ All public power in Sweden proceeds from the people. Swedish democracy is founded on 
the free formation of opinion and on universal and equal suffrage.It shall be realised through a 
representative and parliamentary polity and through local self-government. Public power is 
exercised under the law.”  
 
Clauses establishing general policy goals are to be found, eg. In provision 1:2 of the 
Constitution: that the personal, economic, and cultural welfare of the individual shall be the 
fundamental aim of public activity. These  policy goals are not regarded as rules of law in the 
proper sense and therefore not justiciable. 
 
Important task of  the Swedish Constitution is, according to Chapter 2,  to safeguard the 
citizen´s fundamental rights and freedoms in his relation with the State. 
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5. Conclusion on the functional role of main national constitutional systems 
    of the EU Member States  
 
 
The functional role of main national constitutional systems of the EU Member States is 
to establish, inside the respective nation state, the basic legal source, the rule of law, highest 
ranking in the legal hierarchy of laws, prevailing all other national laws, laying the basics of 
organising the policy-making.They all are  representing static systems balancing the existing 
“ready  made” nation state. They are also to safeguard the citizens´ fundamental rights and 
freedoms under the respect for the rule of law. 
 
 
 
C. The constitutional quality of the political and legal system of the European Union 
     on the basis of the Founding Treaties on EU/EC.  
     The EU´s constitutional essentials, not depending on a formal text  
     called “Constitution”  
 
I.    Introduction: The nature and development of European Union law: 
       The nature of the secondary law of the EC as developed under the TEU`s  1st 
          pillar, the Treaty establishing the European Community-TEC-  
 
The European Union´s law created by the Union´s institutions according to the 
provisions of the Founding Treaties establishing the European Union and the European 
Community is constituting an identity shaping essential  of a constitutional quality of the 
European Union. The constitutional quality essentials of the European Union and of the 
European Community are emanating from the Founding Treaties on EU and EC. 
The European Community has evolved from what many believed to be a purely inter-
governmental organization governed by public international law into a quasi-federal 
entity with an autonomous legal order. The  nature of the European Community is 
marked by the EC primary and the autonomous secondary law as developed under the 
TEU`s  1st pillar, the Treaty establishing the European Community-TEC-,by  the main 
characteristics of the EC law and by  constitutional principles in EC law.  
 
 The legal order of the EC is a body of rules which had not been created by one single 
stroke on the basis of one single constituting act in the sense of a national constitution .  
 
 
 
II.      General characteristics of the European Community´s primary and secondary law 
 
The European Community  constitutes a new legal order in international law for the benefit 
of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, even though  within limited field 
according to the above –under II. -   mentioned principle of attributed powers. 
 
The founding Treaty establishing the European Community – TEC- created an autonomous, 
independent   legal order of the Community, differently from other instruments under 
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international law, an own, autonomous specific legal order which is characterized by own 
institutions acting for and on behalf of the Community  and their respective Treaty objectives, 
competences and legislative powers . Furthermore , the Member States have , themselves , 
through a transfer of  parts of their own, national sovereign rights to the Community 
renounced the exercise of  that part of their transferred  national sovereign rights, while, at the 
same time, conferring the power to jointly exercise these respective rights upon the 
Community. 
 
The Community is, by this limited transfer of powers, entitled to implement the powers 
independently from the Member States, by creating an autonomous legal system 
through the  enactment of  Community law which is called the EC´s secondary law as it is 
based on the Founding  Treaty on EC as primary resource of  law for the enactment of 
Community law: 
 
“ In order to carry out their task and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty,the 
European Parliament acting jointly with the Council,the Council and the Commission shall 
make regulations and  issue directives,take decisions,make recommendations or deliver 
opinions.”, Article 249 1st paragraph TEC  164  
 
The  EC´s law in the sense of a provision having general application is, in terms of the 
TEC, called “ regulation”: “ A regulation shall have general application.It shall be binding in 
its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.”, Article 249 second paragraph TEC. 
 
The Article 249 1st and 2nd paragraph TEC can ,therefore, be regarded as the basic 
Treaty provision to stipulate the characteristic of the Community´s  legal order: it is its 
claim to be applicable and effective which is inherent to the autonomous character of the 
Community´s legal order. 
  
To ensure the effectiveness of Community law, the Community law has supremacy power 
over national law and has direct applicability throughout the Community without any 
national legislative act of transformation. Consequently, the Community constitutes a 
supra-national autonomous legal system. Community law represents an independent legal 
order, both vis-à -vis international law on the one hand and the national laws of the Member 
States on the other. 
 
 
 
III.    European Community law special  characteristics, its main features as  
          constitutional principles in EC law : 
 
 
1.   Constitutional transfer of power from the Member States to the Community 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The constitutions of  the Community´s Member States approach to the European method of 
integration accomplished through creating common binding rules  on the legal basis of a  
- transfer of  parts of nation states´sovereign legislative and executive powers 
 
164: consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, Official  
        Journal of the European Communities, December 24,2002, C 325/33 ( 132 ).  
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to the level of a common pooling of jointly exercised powers, jointly exercised through a legal 
body , called “ the Community” and acting through institutions to achieve common objectives 
through implementing common policies by basically using the istrument of creating common 
binding rules. 
 
The legal basis of creating Community law is the  Treaty establishing the European 
Community. The Treaty on EC is an agreement concluded between the Member States on the 
basis of international law, an agreement which, after ratification through the national 
legislative bodies according to the national constitution´s provisions, is applicable througout 
the Community and, as the primary law of the Community, it is binding the Member States 
and the institutions of the Commuinty.  
 
The act of  agreement on transferring parts of national sovereign powers to the Community 
constitutes an act of  constitutional transfer of power from the Member States to the 
Commnity because the transfer of power is based on constitutional clauses in the Member 
States´national constitutions: 
 
1.2  National  Constitutions contain “ gateway “ clauses to open the national law to the   
      European  Union law: 
 
1.2.1.   France 
The  French judicial system is divided between the administrative court and the ordinary 
courts, and the ordinary courts, and the "split" occurred when the supremacy of Community 
law over French law was accepted in 1975 by the Cour de Cassation, the highest of the 
ordinary judicial courts, but was rejected in practice by the Counseil d’Etat, the supreme 
administrative court, until as late as 1989. In the case of Semoules, the problem was expressed 
as a jurisdictional one: the Conseil d’Etat ruled that, since it had no jurisdiction to review the 
validity of French legislation, it could not find such legislation to be incompatible with 
Community law nor could it accord priority to the latter. And although the French 
Constitution provided for the primacy of certain international treaties over domestic law, in 
the view of the Conseil d’Etat, decisions on the constitutionality of legislation were matters 
for the Conseil Constitutionnel – the French Constitutional Court – to make before the 
legislation was promulgated. 
However, in the Cafe Jacques Vabres case in 1975, when faced with a conflict between 
Article 95 of the EC Treaty and a later domestic provision – article 265 of the French 
Customs Code –, the Cour de Cassation took a different view of its jurisdiction. The Cour de 
Cassation held that the question was not whether it could review the constitutionality of a 
French law. The court based its decision on Article 55 of the French Constitution, rather than 
adopting the communaturaire or "global" approach that the Article 55 approach could have 
damaging effects as regards those Member States whose constitutions did not contain a 
similar provision. 
It was until 1989, however, that the Conseil d’Etat finally abandoned its so-called "splendid 
isolation" and decide to adopt the same position as the Conseil Constitutionnel and the Cour 
de Cassation – decision Nicolo. It has been suggested that earlier decisions of the Conseil 
Constitutionnel which indicated that it was for the other French courts to ensure that 
international treaties were applied, acted as a spur to the Conseil d’Etat to reverse its original 
position. 
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In France, the main obstacle to the recognition of supremacy of EC law was the jurisdictional 
limitation of the French courts. In other Member States, in particular in Germany the 
difficulties which arose related to the fundamental constitutional nature of the national 
legislation which appeared to contravene Community law. 
 
1.2.2   Germany 
Article 24 of the German Constitution allows for the transfer of legislative power to 
international organizations, but in litigation which arose over apparent conflicts between 
Community legislation and provisions of the German Constitution, the extent of power which 
could be transferred in accordance with this Article was questioned, in particular, the focus of 
the case law was on whether Article 24 permitted the transfer, to an organization outside the 
German constitutional structure, of a power to contravene certain basic principles protected 
under the Constitution itself.  
After the ruling of the Court of Justice in the case Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH. V. 
Einfuhr und- Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (1972) received by the German 
Administrative Court, the German Administrative Court was worried about principal 
constitutional items. The consequences were not only that Germany would be held to 
have given away power which it was not constitutionally permitted to give, but also that 
in so doing it would be empowering a supranational executive which was not bound by 
the same guarantees as those of the German Constitution. With these concerns in mind, 
the Administrative Court ruled, in the face of the conflicting judgement of the Court of 
Justice, that the Community deposit system breached basic principles of German 
constitutional law, and it requested a ruling on the matter from the Federal 
Constitutional Court. This ruling was given by the Constitutional Court in 1974: 
This Court – in this respect in agreement with the law developed by the European Court of 
Justice – adheres to its settled view that Community law …forms an independent system of 
law flowing from an autonoemous legal source; the Community is not a state, in particular 
not a federal state, but a "sui generis community in the process of progressive integration" 
within the meaning of Article 24 (1) of the Constitution ... Article 24 of the Constitution deals 
with the transfer of sovereign rights to interstate institutions… But Article 24 of the 
Constitution limits this possibility in that it nullifies any amendment of the Treaty which 
would destroy the identity of the valid constitutional structure of the Federal Republic of 
Germany by encroaching on the structures which go to make it up … 
By 1986, however, the Federal Constitutional Court gave a judgement which revised 
considerably its earlier 1974 decision. This decision is known as the Solange II case, the 1974 
decision being the first Solange case. This means the “so long as” case. The Federal 
Constitutional Court stated here that so long as the Community had not removed the possible 
conflict of norms between the provisions of Community law and national constitutional rights, 
the German court would ensure that those rights took precedence over Community law. 
Germany had completed the legislative part of the process of ratification of the Maastricht 
TEU in December 1992, amending its Constitution, but before the Federal President signed 
the formal instrument of ratification, constitutional complaints were lodged alleging that 
ratification would breach the Constitution. The second chamber of the Federal Constitutional 
Court gave judgement on 12 October 1993, ruling that ratification was compatible with the 
Constitution ( confirming cooperative ties between the Court of Justice and the Federal 
Constitutional Court concerning safeguarding democratic control of EU governance), and 
confirmed this position in his judgement on the constitutional compatibility  of  the  
ratification of the  Amsterdam TEU. It also did not dispel the ratification of the Nice TEU. 
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Brunner v. The European Union Treaty (1994) is powerful judgement warning to the 
Community institutions and the Court of Justice that Germany’s acceptance of the supremacy 
of community law is not unquestioning acceptance of every measure and every judgements 
that emanates from Community institutions. The critical paragraph 99 of this judgements 
refers to the “open-handed treatment of Article 235” and the difference between interpretation 
and amendment of the Treaty, suggests that the Constitutional Court will not readily defer to 
the Court of Justice on such questions.  
 
1.2.3  Italy 
The EEC Treaty Ratification Act 1957, whereby the Italian Parliament gave full and complete 
execution to the Treaty instituting the EEC, has a sure basis of validity in Article 11 of the 
Constitution whereby Italy “consents, on condition of reciprocity with other states, to 
limitations of sovereignty necessary for an arrangement which may ensure peace and justice 
between the nations” and then “promotes and favors the international organizations directed 
to such an aim”. The article 11 of the Italian Constitution permits such limitations of 
sovereignty as are necessary to constitute a concrete actualisation of general validity of the 
European Community principles. This has formed the basis for the Italian courts’ acceptance 
of the supremacy of Community law, although, as in the case of other Member States, this 
acceptance has not been unconditional. 
The Constitutional Court in the judgement Frontini v. Ministero delle Finanze (1974) 
expressed similar reservations to those voiced by the German Federal Constitutional Court. In 
particular, although it appeared to accept the effectiveness of Community law within its 
proper field of application, the Italian Court confirmed that it would continue to review the 
exercise of power by the organs of the EEC to ensure that there was no infringement of 
fundamental rights nor the basic principles of the Italian constitutional order. 
The Frontini decision was followed in 1984 by the case of Granital in which the Italian 
Constitutional Court accepted that, in order to give effect to the supremacy of Community 
law, Italian courts must be prepared in the case of a clash to apply Community law and to 
disregard the conflicting national law. However, this acceptance by the Constitutional Court 
was not unreserved, and its reservations have left open various questions concerning the 
supremacy of Community law in Italy. The problems which the Granital case have unsolved 
are of great relevance. First, the Constitutional Court has reserved to itself not only the 
questions of conflicts between Community provisions and basic constitutional principles or 
inalienable rights of the human being, but also the question of national law which challenges 
the very division of competence established by the Treaties, on the grounds that such division 
draws constitutional force from Article II of the Constitution. This is a consequence of the 
markedly different approach to the issue of the supremacy of Community law adopted by the 
Court when contrasted with the view taken by the European Court: a difference which could 
still lead, in the future, to further conflicts. 
In Spa Fragd v. Amministrazione delle Finanze (1989), the Court examined whether a system, 
such as that applying to preliminary rulings on validity of Community acts, whereby a 
declaration of invalidity may not produce any effect in the proceedings before the referring 
court, is consistent with the constitutional principles on judicial protection. Unlike the 
Frontini, the Fragd decisions shows that the Constitutional court is willing to test the 
consistency of individual rules of Community law with the fundamental principles for the 
protection of human rights that are contained in the Italian Constitution. 
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1.2.4  The United Kingdom 
The acceptance of the supremacy of community law within the United Kingdom has certainly 
not been unproblematic. Since the British Constitution is largely unwritten it is difficult to 
speak of “amending” it. What are known as constitutional conventions in the United Kingdom 
law cannot be formally created, but rather they evolve or emerge over a considerable period 
of time. No special mechanism exists for amending rule or conventions of a constitutional 
nature other than by an ordinary Act of Parliament. The central obstacle to acceptance by the 
United Kingdom of the supremacy of EC law is the fundamental constitutional principle of 
the sovereignty of Parliament. According to this principle, Parliament has the power to do 
anything other than to bind itself for the future. A fundamental principle of this nature clearly 
made it very difficult, constitutionally, for the United Kingdom to transfer to the European 
Community institutions a sphere of exclusive legislative power.    
With those problems in mind, it was nevertheless decided, after the EC Treaties were signed 
and ratified by the United Kingdom in 1972, to give internal legal effect to Community law 
by means of an Act of Parliament: the European Communities Act 1972.165  
The central provision of the Act is section 2(1) which provides as follows: 
“All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created 
or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from time to time 
provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are without 
further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be 
recognised and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly; and 
the expression ‘enforceable Community right’ and similar expressions shall be read as 
referring to one to which this subsection applies.”  
Despite earlier judicial comments to the contrary in Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company 
v. British Transport and Docks Board (1994), the following cases: Shields v. Coomes (1979), 
Macarthys v. Smith (1981), Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd (1982),Pickstone v. 
Freemans (1989) demonstrated a willingness to accept the principle of supremacy of EC law. 
In a recent phase of its acceptance of the supremacy of Community law, the House of Lords 
had stated that there is no constitutional barrier to an applicant before the United Kingdom 
courts directly seeking judicial review of primary legislation, which is alleged to be in breach 
of Community law. As in the Factortame (1991) case, although this is presented by the House 
of Lords as a natural extension of its earlier case law and based on the will of Parliament Act 
from 1972, the impact of the ruling is nonetheless quite dramatic. 
 
 
165: Birkinshaw,Patrick, “ British report “ on National constitutional law and European  
        Integration , Parliamentary Sovereignty and Transfer of Sovereignty , Relationship  
        Between national Constitutional Law and Community Law ,Judicial Acceptance of  
        Community Law´s Supremacy ,  in: “ Die Entstehung einer europäischen  Verfas –  
         sungsordnung “, Jürgen Schwarze (2000), Nomos Baden-Baden,  pp. 205-286  
        (  221-245). 
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1.2.5  Conclusion: 
 
The outlined national constitutions` clauses are transferring parts of national sovereignty 
to a common “pooling “, the EU level of jointly exercising common, formerly distinct nation 
states` powers, thus attributing and limiting the EU´s legislative powers to create an  own, 
autonomous legal order of the EU as a “ sui generis “ community in the process of 
progressive integration  under the Founding Treaty on EU concluded and ratified by still 
sovereign nation states. 
 
 
2.   Basic provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community: constitutional 
principles  and their functional role  in EC primary law and as case law crafted by 
the Court of Justice  
 
 attributed, limited powers 
 subsidiarity of Community powers 
 effectiveness of the Community law 
 supremacy of EC law over conflicting national law 
 
 
2.1 Constitutional principles of attributed, limited powers, subsidiarity and effectiveness 
of Community law  in the EC Treaty: they manifest the “sui generis “ nature of the EC 
 
The Treaty establishing the European Community –TEC- states that the Commnity while 
fulfilling its task as set out in the Articles 2 and 3  „    166 
 “shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the 
objectives assigned to it therein.”, Article 5  1st paragraph TEC      167 ) 
and “Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of this Treaty.”, Article 5  third paragraph TEC . 168 ) 
This is the Treaty´s stipulation of the principle of attributed powers, which is the nation 
states´ reassurance that they did n o t  provide the Commnity with a power to decide by the 
Community to enlarge the scope of powers, thus having no – competence-competence. 
 
“ In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, 
in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.  
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives 
of this Treaty. „ : Article 5  second  paragraph TEC stipulates the principle of 
subsidiarity. 169 ) 
 
 
166: Official Journal of the European Community, December 24.2002, C 325/33 ( 40 ). 
167: C 325/33 ( 41 ). 
168: C 325/33 ( 41,42 ). 
169: C  325/33 ( 42)  ; Wiener,Antje/Shaw,Jo(2000): on  constitutionalism of the European  
        Community,   in: Harvard  Law School  Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/99. 
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According to Article 10 TEC .”Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether 
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or 
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the 
achievement of the Community's tasks. 
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives 
of this Treaty. „ 
 
2.2 Funtional role of the Community´s primary and secondary law according to the     
      caselaw of the Court of  Justice - 
         limitation of sovereignty and transfer of powers from the Member States to the  
         Community 
 
Article 10 TEC   rules general  Member States´ obligations  to practice a  cooperative 
approach to the Community in order to guarantee the principle of effectiveness. The Court 
of  Justice has  crafted out the principle of  effectiveness: 
This principle, the Court had said repeatedly, is a duty to cooperate in good faith, willingly 
and constructively. Every national authority which has any responsibility in relation to 
Community law is bound by the obligations which result from Article 10: parliaments, 
governments and courts are all bound. It also applies to private bodies insofar as State powers 
have been delegated to them. All national authorities are Community authorities.  
 
Obligations resulting from Article 10 have developed gradually , step by step, in the 
caselaw of the Court of Justice which includes the most important principles of 
Community law  
- the rule that national courts must grant remedies for breach of Community law rules 
which are as effective as those for corresponding breaches of national law, and which are 
effective to protect Community law rights fully, notwithstanding any contrary rule of 
national law;  
- the rule that directives can have direct effects;  
- the rule that all national authorities, not only courts, may apply national law only if it is in 
accordance with Community law;  
- obligation of Member States to respect the powers of Community institutions and not to 
undermine them or interfere with them; it protects the integrity of the Community 
structure and system in a way that no other rule of Community law does.  
 
The Court of Justice chose to avoid the problem of Member States’ differing constitutional 
approaches to international treaties by describing the legal order created by the Member 
States under the EC  Treaty and stating the functional role of  Community law: 
 
 The Court describes the legal order as an entirely new system which is different in nature 
from international law. The Court argued not from the specific perspective of the 
constitutional law of any individual Member State, but instead spoke broadly of a 
constitutional transfer of power from the Member States. In the Court’s view, the specific,  
unprecedented nature of the EC Treaty and of the legal order it had created was to be 
understood on the basis that the states had limited their sovereign rights and had established 
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new political institutions which they had endowed with sovereign rights to accomplish  the  
objectives of the European Community  (principle of effectiveness ) 
 
The objective of the Community  is, according to Article 2 Treaty establishing the EC, 
by establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union and by 
implementing common policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 4,  
 
to promote throughout the Community  
 
 a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities,  
 a high level of employment and of social protection,  
 equality  between men and women,  
 sustainable and non inflationary growth,  
 a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance,  
 a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment,  
 the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and  
 economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States. „ 
 
The TEC´s use of the term “task” in Article 2 is misleading to a wrong understanding of what 
the Member States meant by stipulating Article 2.  Their desired purpose, the objective,and 
not the “task”  was the achievement of the different goals called in detail in Article 2, by 
establishing a Common Market and an Economic and Monetary Union and by implementing 
policies, the Common Market e.g. not serving as an end in itself, not being the desired 
purpose, not being the  objective of  the Community, but the Common Market being a piece 
of work , a needed  instrument, a task in order to help to achieve what the TEC is wrongly 
calling “task”,but meaning “the objectives” as they are stipulated. It is,therefore, advisable , to 
read the term “task” as used in Article 2 TEC, but to actually understand this term as 
“objective” of the Community. 
 
And to accomplish the Treaty´s objectives the Member States had established real and 
autonomous Community powers derived from a limitation of sovereignty by  a transfer of  
powers from the States to the Community, thus creating a body of law which binds both the 
Member States´nationals and the Member States themselves. 
 
The functional role of  the EC ´s  law  is to ensure  uniform application of Community 
law  to make the Common market work . This function explains and underlines many of the 
specific duties resulting from Article 10.  
The principle of uniform application  
 ensures that national  law rules can never prevent Community law being fully applied;  
 obliges national courts to refer a question of Community law to Court of Justice under 
the Article 234 when they find that it has been differently decided by different national 
courts or different national authorities, and when there is no further appeal from the 
decision of the national court which refers the question.  
 
Text of  Article 234 : 
„ 
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: 
(a)  the  interpretation of this Treaty; 
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(b)  the  validity  and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of the 
ECB; 
(c)  the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, where 
 those statutes so provide. 
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or 
 tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give 
 judgement, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. 
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member 
State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or 
tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice. „ 
 
 
As to the caselaw of the Court of Justice - limitation of sovereignty, and transfer of 
powers from the Member States to the Community : 
In Van Gend en Loos (1963) and Costa v. Enel (1964), then, the Court set out its theoretical 
basis for the principle of supremacy of Community law. The force and practical application 
of the principle became clearer still in its later decisions.  
Simmenthal (1978) is an interesting and an important case, since it spells out the practical 
implications for the Community legal order of the principles of supremacy and direct 
effect.  
The legal power of EC law having   full effect  against the Member State is explained for 
example in cases Factortame and Francovich. 
In Factortame (1991) the Court, as an interim measure, had ordered the UK to suspend the 
application of certain fisheries legislation. After this order, national court proceedings which 
had already begun reached the House of Lords which asked the Court of Justice for a ruling. 
The Court held that "it is for the national courts, in application of the principle of cooperation 
laid down in Article 5 of the EC Treaty, to ensure the legal protection which persons derive 
from the direct effect of provisions of Community law". 
In Francovich (1991) it was laid down the basis for claims for compensation against a 
Member State which infringes fundamental rights rules, in the sphere of Community law. 
The duty to give direct effect against the State to certain directives is expressed for example in 
the judgements Ratti, Moormann and Costanzo. 
Court held in the case Ratti (1979) that a private party may rely, against a State, on a 
directive, even if it has not been implemented, if the directive is unconditional and sufficiently 
precise.  
The Court  said in Moormann (1988) that this principle is based on(ex) Article 5 combined 
with (ex)Article 189 EC Treaty.  
- National administrative authorities are legally bound , equally  as national courts, to apply 
national law only if it is in accordance  with Community law, including directives – case 
Constanzo (1989). An administrative authority cannot ask the Court for advice under Article 
234, but it can ask the Commission for advice if it wishes to do so, or it can ask for a 
declaratory judgment from a national court if national law allows this.  
The duty to interpret national legislation so as to fulfil directives was explained by the Court 
in Marleasing (1990). The Court said: "... as the Court pointed out in its judgment in case Von 
Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (1984), the Member States' obligation 
arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by the directive and their duty under 
(ex)Article 5 of the Treaty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to 
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ensure the fulfillment of that obligation, is binding on all the authorities of Member States 
including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts. It follows that, in applying national 
law, whether the provisions in question were adopted before or after the directive, the national 
court called upon to interpret it is required to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the 
wording and the purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the latter 
and thereby comply with the third paragraph of Article 249 (exArticle 189) of the Treaty.”; 
i.e. this duty exists even when the interpretation needed to implement the directive is not the 
normal or natural interpretation under national rules of construction.  
This certainly became clear in the United Kingdom after the ruling in the well-known 
Factortame (1990) litigation, on the question of interim relief against a provision of national 
law which appeared to conflict with one of Community law. Having repeated much of its 
ruling in Simmenthal on the need for effectiveness and for the automatic precedence of 
Community law over national law, the Court addressed the issue of interim relief.  
 
In sum: 
These constitutional principles of  attributed, limited  and subsidiary powers  to ensure 
effective fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the EC founding Treaty characterize 
the “sui generis “ nature of the European Community and the functional role of 
Community law. 
 
3.   Conclusion: pleading for the integrative approach   
 The constitutional quality of the Founding Treaties on EC and EU and perspectives for 
the future: constitutional essentials to be incorporated in a new Treaty replacing  the 
Treaty on Constitution in case of actually failing of  ratification by the  enter Member 
States  
 
3.1 national constitutions` clauses  transferring parts of national sovereignty to a  
      common “pooling “ 
 
 
 The outlined national constitutions` clauses are transferring parts of national 
sovereignty to a common “pooling “, the EU level of jointly exercising common, formerly 
distinct nation states` powers, thus attributing and limiting the EU´s legislative powers to 
create an  own, autonomous legal order of the EU as a “ sui generis “ community in the 
dynamic process of progressive integration  under the Founding Treaty on EU concluded and 
ratified by still sovereign nation states establishing a political and legal order which is not 
a static one but which is a framework to allow and limit the gradual process of creating 
an ever closer Union of the peoples in Europe. 
 
Comparing the functional role of nation states´ constitutions and the functional role of 
the European Union´s political and legal order, of its   constitutional essentials: 
 
The EU` constitutional essentials ( attributed,limited power; subsidiarity; effectiveness) 
are totally different in nature, different from nation states´ constitutions. In view of the 
principle of attributed, but limited powers, without the  sovereign power of enlarging  
the scope of  competences, the  EU cannot be compared to the traditional, familiar 
nation state pattern. Any comparison to nation states´constitutions should be made in 
the light of the nature of the Member States´ collectivity of sovereign states jointly 
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exercising their common powers  to achieve common objectives through common 
policies, acting through common institutions and setting common binding rules with 
supremay over conflicting national laws, with a legal system of protecting the 
individuals´ rights before the Court of Justice :  a political and legal system which is 
already incorporated in the  existing Founding Treaties on EU/EC and which, therefore, 
can be called to be Treaties containing constitutional essentials even though they are not 
explicitly called  “ Constitution” .  
 
The Founding Treaties are the manifestation of the political and legal reality that the  
EU is still under construction. The EU  is still developing by dynamics on the basis of  
Founding Treaty formulas which are flexible enough to allow the traditional dynamical 
development by the European method of integration and cooperation between still 
sovereign Member States. The EU is  a federation of nation states, but no state, at least not 
yet. Insofar a written formal text called “constitution” may arise misunderstandings 
about the nature and the objectives of the European Union, which is not going to become 
a State. For the time being, a formal Constitution for the European Union would  undermine 
any serious endeavours to further strengthen the EU´s identity of being a still developing 
entity the finalité of which is not or at least not yet  necessary to design, because the essential 
of the EU is a integrative system of organising the cooperation between the Member 
States which, in each of the items on the intitutions´agenda , is manifesting peaceful 
policy.making among the Member States. And this is a “constitution” adequate  enough and, 
viewing at European history, not not to be underestimated, even nowadays. 
 
 
3.2 Establishing a formal text called “constitution” would risk to deny the sustainable 
constitutional development of the existing integrated duality of EU-level and nation state 
level as basic elements of  one emerging European constitutional order: 
 Viewing at  the national constitutions and at the Founding Treaties on EU/EC, we 
realize, in the European Union, the existence of a plurality of supreme texts of two 
inderdependent and mutually influencing levels, the nation states´level and the 
Union/Community level. Both levels´ constitutional orders are basic elements of one 
emerging European constitutional order . The emerging of one integrated European 
constitutional order could be at stake, if  a premature instrument called “constitution” 
came to raise contraproductive misunderstandings that a European Constitution was 
just about to make the final design of a European SuperState. 
 
It had not been easy to persuade national authorities to accept the supremacy of Community 
law when that law had been introduced without a constitutional amendment to guarantee its 
supremacy – as indeed was the case in France until the  amendment to facilitate the TEU 
changes, and in Germany and Italy whose constitutions already contained provisions which 
contemplated the transfer of legislative power to an international organization. 
 
Despite the fact that all of the Member States and their courts by now accept the practical 
requirement of giving priority to Community law over national law, few, if any, would be 
prepared to abandon their supervision of the Community institutions – and indeed of the 
Court of Justice to ensure that the Community does not attempt to extend the powers it has 
been given. However, on the more difficult Kompetenz-Kompetenz issue, they are not 
prepared to relinquish jurisdiction to examine the exercise of Community powers in order to 
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ascertain whether the Community has exceeded the limits of the powers specifically granted 
to it under the Treaties in accordance with the constitutional system of each Member State.  
This is particularly evident from the decision of the German Constitutional Court in Brunner, 
in which that Court referred somewhat cryptically to the ruling of the Court of Justice to 
extend the scope of Community powers on an open-handed reading of the Treaty, and in 
which it stressed that, in the future, a clear distinction would have to be drawn between the 
interpretation of existing powers and an actual amendment or extension of the Treaty. 
The gradual acceptance of the principles of direct effect and supremacy of Community 
Law has been sustained by a continuous dialogue between the European Court of 
Justice and the national courts: 
The relationship between European Union/Community law and the national  constitu- 
tions is not to be settled according to unilateral principles of hierarchy,by a mere stipu- 
lation within an instrument called “Constitution” . 
And national courts should not be torn between loyalty of their own constitution and 
loyalty to their Community duties. Both the Court of Justice and the national constitu- 
tions and supreme  courts could recognize that  
 
 the relationship between the European Union/Community´legal order and the 
nation states´constitutional orders can be seen from two different, but equally 
legitimate, perspectives , both focussing on a relationship of two interdependent 
and mutually influencing levels that both are basic elements of one emerging  
            European constitutional order, and that there is , at present,  
 a duality between two different methods of European integration both of which 
are  incorporated in the present three pillars Treaty  architecture of the Treaty 
establishing the European Union covering the supranational , sui-generis or 
federal like  nature of the European Community assuming the powers, functions 
and responsibilities traditionally,before the founding of the European 
Community for Steel and Coal, reserved for nation States´ Governments and 
Parliaments;  and  
 the powers subject to cooperation remaining essentially inter-governmental in 
nature. 
 
The two methods of organizing the cooperation between the Member States at European 
Union level  are reflecting a fundamental divergence of opinion among those who 
basically argued and still argue in favor of European cooperation. This divergence of opinion 
does not exist since the signing of the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaty on European 
Union only: the two different approaches to “an ever closer Union among the peoples of 
Europe “(Article 1 TEU) already exist since the Member States had established the ECSC . 
170   
What any attempt to establish a formal instrument called “Constitution” should 
consider is the fact that the Treaty on EU,however, is a compromise, an attempt to 
stabilize the tension between these two methods,  containing , however, intricately  
 
170:  ibid., supra, note 86.Calleo, David P. (2001). Rethinking Europe’s Future. Princeton: 
Princeton University  Press. 
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combined parts of an essentially hybrid system of mulilevelled and interdependent 
sovereignty. 171  
And  the enlargement issue has intensified the discussion about the deficiencies of the 
existing Nice Treaty on European Union being an insufficient framework for making the 
European Union of the Twentyseven efficiently work. 
 
The Treaty on European Union stands for the dialectics of a duality these two different 
methods are confronting the realities in European Union´s policies. This duality is 
represented by the two “supreme” texts of the Treaty establishing the EU and of the  
Treaty establishing the EC. Despite this duality of Treaty texts, there is, however,  
one emerged and still further developing constitutional quality of the European Union, 
developed until today on the basis of the TEC and TEU and  further to be developed in 
order to make the enlarged Union work. 
 
The planned dialogue –in 2007-  during the German  EU Presidency , between the EU 
Member States Governments on a political schedule to work on an acceptable, legitimate and 
concise text containing provisions on what an enlarged European Union needs and having at 
least legitimacy strengthening constitutional quality,  might be facilitated by the fact that,  
substantially, there has probably never been  before  such a broad common understanding 
about the Union´s institutional deficiencies  and such a community of  values among 
European States.  
 
As previously demonstrated by Russia´s energy price and export policy,   the European  
Union´s Member States  typically used to move toward deepening integration when 
occasionally stirred up  by external events.But even after facing the new challenges brought to 
Europe when the Cold War had ended, the Member States Governments failed to meet the 
needs for amending the Maastricht Treaty on EU  for  improving the enlarged Union´s 
decisiveness, transparency and democracy. The Member States failed to design and to 
agree upon a dominant common strategy. For, European integration still appeals to 
national interests or better: to those ones which are falsely or deliberately taken for 
national interests. 
 
The challenge ahead is to make out of the national interests  building blocks of European 
Unity rather than bulwarks of sovereignty. The draft of which was  the task of the Con-
stitution  of the European Union,the  entering into force is still the open question, and how 
to find  an alternative acceptable for entire ratification.  
 
And if a  formal Constitution will actually fail to get entire ratification, a modified alterna- 
tive will have the same mission to promote and safeguard  European identity as it is the 
171:  ibid., supra,notes 170,86.   
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mission of the Founding Treaties on EU/EC: 
 not to replace national constitutions, but  
 to be a constitutive element of two interdependent and mutually influencing 
levels –the national and the EU level- that both are basic elements of one 
emerging European constitutional order.  
 The European Union pillar of that  European constitutional order is  
characterized by the essentials of a  constitutional quality of the EU, 
notwithstanding a written document called “Constitution” or a  document 
amending the TEU will emerge.  
 In sum, if  a formal text called “constitution” appears to hinder rather than to 
serve the identity shaping of the EU, a final failure of ratification –which seems to 
be likely to happen if there will be no chance in a repeated voting in France and 
the Netherlands –will not be harmful if in time a realistic alternative will be 
prepared to have the same functional role as it would have been the 
“constitution”: to strengthen the identity shaping  and legitimacy building 
essentials of the enlarged  EU. 
 
3.3 The identity issue: maintaining and improving the legitimacy acquis  of the current  
     Treaty on EU  by  integrative approach. Constitutional essentials count more than  
      the formal aspect .  
        
The draft constitution was  meant to be released as a written text which is called 
”constitution”, but which may turn out clearly not be meant  to set up the final design of a 
European “Super” State, so that there is no reason for any respective serious doubts or fears 
within important parts of the peoples of the Union when the question of how to strengthen the 
EU is put on the European agenda again to find solutions to the  negative French and Dutch 
plebiscites. New solutions might get acceptance in all Member States when solutions 
convince what matters: essentials have priority, the formal aspect, the legal frame  is less 
important.  
 
What counts for legitimacy through  acceptability  is the   reasonable and  legitimate 
objective  to maintain  and improve  what has been achieved by European integration until 
now by  strengthening: 
 
 democracy , transparency and decisiveness of the European Union 
 
and to amend the existing Treaty on EU by integrating the accepted improvements in the TEU 
according to the established national procedures on ratification, also adding concise texts on 
the basic principles of the Union  and a  basic rights  catalogue  to serve the people´s 
fundamental rights and interests they find safeguarded be the Union and to be the only 
legitimate motive why the European Union exists. 
 
 
What allows to be optimistic about the chances of an approach considering that 
“ essentials count more than the  formal aspectt” is the fact:   The draft constitution´s 
substantial provisions on strengthening the EU´s institutions and legislation procedures by 
strengthening democracy, transparency and decisiveness and efficiency  of the EU had not 
met substantial opposition in the public  debates in the Member States. It is, therefore, no 
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surprise that the academic discussion is focussing on how to safeguard these substantial 
elements of the draft constitution in case of final failure for the ratification by the entire 
Member States of the EU. 
 
Integrating the substantial institutional and procedural provisions of the draft constitution into 
the existing Nice Treaty on EU-TEU- and the Treaty on European Community-TEC-is the 
idea of an pragmatic approach that had been developed by the  Bertelsmann Stiftung and its 
academic partner, the Centre for Applied Policy Research-C.A.P., University of Munich.  
172   
 
A draft of a new Treaty integrating the TEU, the TEC as well as the substantial provisions of 
the draft constitution should, following this concept, be negotiated by an Intergovernmental 
Conference-IGC- and be submitted to ratification by the entire national electorates according 
to the respective established national constitutional procedures, thus observing the same 
ratification procedure as it had been used for the Treaties on EU ( Maastricht,Amsterdam and 
Nice). 
 
The pragmatic integrative approach as developed by the C.A.P. covered the more 
technical aspects of how to create a new Treaty by merging Treaty provisions from 
different legal sources.  
 
What it did not discuss, however, is the crucial identity issue of the EU  : how  can it be 
achieved to  improve the EU´s acceptance by the electorates in 2009 -  with the help of 
what kind of  identity shaping provisions of a Treaty having the attributes of 
constitutional quality?  What do provisions on improving  democracy, transparency and 
decisiveness  to have to tell the citizens  in the EU about  the EU´s  motivation, objectives and 
instruments needed to strengthen the EU to safeguard the interests of the people?  
 
This means we need to discuss:  
 
 the identity issue and the shaping of constitutional quality of the EU:.  What is the 
EU´s identity? 
 The EU´s constitututional essential: the principle of subsidiarity. The multilevelled 
system of European Governance , the vertical division of powers between EU and 
Member States as  identity issue 
 EU Constitution and legitimacy. European identity shaping role of the Constitution ? 
EU objectives and basic values.  
 
In case of definite failure to ratify the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe  by the 
entire national electorates, we need to discuss what are the essentials to be part of a text to 
be submitted to ratification, a text destined  to make the enlarged EU work and to 
improve the chances to get accepted within the Member States.  The focal issues subject 
to improvements and integration into a new text  of the TEU/TEC are: 
 
 
172:The integrative approach is based on the “Grundvertrag für die Europäische Union –  
        Entwurf zur Zweiteilung der europäischen Verträge“, designed by the C.A.P. in 2000  to  
        contribute to the future drawing up of the draft constitution along the lines given by the  
        Founding Amsterdam TEU.  
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 EU  and democracy : filling the democratic gap ? Participatory democracy , 
participation of National Parliaments  
 
  transparency of the EU´s powers and decision.making  
 
 EU and  efficiency of the Council´s decision-making. Striking a balance between the 
equality of the Member States and strict proportionality of the European 
individuals(electorate)? The weighting of votes in the Council. Multiple-speed 
integration ? Enhanced cooperation: an  identity issue ? 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter IV 
The identity issue:  legitimacy compliance needed for any text  
to avoid gradual disintegration of the Union 
 
 
A. Identity shaping essentials of the European Union ? Factors  
contributing    to the permanent process of European identity building. 
 – form, levels and substance 
 
 
1. Definition of the European Union´s  identity shaping essentials  
 
Identity shaping essentials of any individual or legal entity are special features 
distinguishing one individual or one legal entity  from others. 
 
When the Heads of State or Government of the EU had decided to create a formal text 
called “constitution”, did they mean to make the EU distinguishable from other 
entitities?  
 
What  they meant was  to strengthen the identity of the EU:  
by making the EU more democratic,transparent and decisive and thus getting the EU closer 
to the citizens and deepening the EU enough to make it work as an enlarged European 
Union. 
 
2. Factors contributing to European identity shaping essentials:  
“European” actors, actions,  levels,  instruments: legislative acts,  “European” policy-
making, transnational political parties and  
 transnational structures of  Europe oriented media and public opinion 
 
A wide range of different actors, actions, forms, levels, instruments and substance 
contribute to a dynamic process of  shaping the European Union´s identity. Shaping the 
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EU´s identity  appears to be under permanent construction and to be permanently 
subjected to controversies in politics and scientific research. 
 
An identity shaping essential is the capability to act and to be realized and recognized as 
an decisive and efficient actor or as an inefficient actor. 
 
 
Jean Monnet´s prophecy is close to Europe´s identity: “ L`Europe ne se fera pas d´un seul 
coup ,mais de la solidarité des faits”. Europe is built and still is going further to be built on the 
dynamics of facts and actions: 
“European” actions are called all those activities- discussions,decisions on issues of 
policy matters having a so called “European” dimension as the origin or the impact, 
importance of the issue may be reaching beyond the national boundaries of single 
Member States of the EU. 
 Countless numbers of “European “ actions are discussed and decided within and also 
outside the EU institutions and even on national or regional and local level: they are 
European actions indepently from the level on which they are discussed or organised and 
decided.  
 
Whenever “European” actions  are discussed and decided on the “European level”,  
“European level” means strictly speaking that the actions are discussed and decided  
within the EU institutions and according to the TEU/TEC provisions. Whenever national 
or regional or local public bodies – Parliaments,Governments,town councils- are dealing with 
“European “ matters  they are discussing and deciding according to their own respective 
national, regional or local powers. 
 
All „European „ actions together - understood as „European“ ones in the broadest sense 
of the term  „European“ actions - are creating an awareness of the European dimension 
of their position, either a deliberate, mindful awareness of, or an unconscious feeling 
about an European dimension of each individual acting  together and forming a complex 
system of transnational networks acting across national borders: growing numbers of 
working groups and advisory committees composed of national technical experts who 
influence the nation state´s Government´s policies as well as the decision-making of the 
European Commission and the working-groups within the Council,as Christopher Hill 
describes and as Wessels states: 
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“Once started, the process generates itself: the socialisation within daily interactions shapes a 
European way of thinking which leads to new or reformed institutional arrangements, though 
the limits of moving towards a supranational mode of governance have been reconfirmed in 
the legal provisions as in the daily use.´”173  
 
All these European networks working in different areas of policies are drawing up their 
positions on the basis of their national experience and national interests during every meeting 
of national experts representing their respective EU Member States. Different national 
positions are entering a process of mutually confronting and influencing each other.  
 
 Finalizing the process of exchange of  views and opinion, as result may emerge a 
commonly held position on what may be called a common interest as accepted 
common solution to a given issue of formerly divergent positions. And the result can 
actually be called “ European”:Wessels uses the term “  the Emergence of this EU 
mode of  Governance” 174  
 No matter if the common position was found on the smallest possible common 
denominator. What  counts for achieving “European” results, for achieving a 
successful “europeanization” or “communitarisation” 175 
 of a topic of common interest to be dealt with in a transnational dialogue, is to 
achieve a common position and common action. 
 
The level of intergovernmental cooperation between the Governments of the EU is of 
high importance in the process of European identity building taking place,in legal terms, 
outside the institutional structures of the EU,outside the EU institutions Commission and 
Council,but in real terms, when the Council of Ministers´ Members are meeting as 
Representatives of the Member States assembled within the Council-  in all policy matters 
which  are not subject to the TEU/TEC rules on integration decision-making under the first 
pillar of the TEU Treaty architecture.  
173: Hill,Christopher, “The Actors in Europe´s Foreign Policy „, Routledge Verlag,London, 
1996; Wessels, Wolfgang , “Security and Defecne of the European Union. The institutional 
evolution:Trends and Perspectives”, contributions to the 6th ECSA conference, December 6, 
2002,   paper dated November 2002, 40 pages,  pp(.29,30). 
174:ibid.,supra,note 167,p.3.(Wessels). 
175: ibid.,supra,note 167,p.7)(Wessels). 
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Europeanwide identity shaping is a dynamic process of  mutually influencing levels of  
public opinion building through printed and TV and broadcasting media and  political 
decision-making on national government, parliament and on European institutions´ level. In 
terms of participatory democracy the European Parliament´s contribution to identity shaping 
of the EU, the necessary emergence of transnationally organised and operating political 
parties as well as the contributions of national parliaments is a wide field of open questions 
and waiting for specific scientific research .The identity shaping role of the European 
Parliament will be discussed later as part of considerations about the question whether a 
European public and European public media as well as European structures of Political 
Parties acting across national borders can be identified or not, required as prior 
conditions for an identity shaping role of the European Parliament and required for 
elections to it. 
 
The institutional framework conditions for an effective „europeanization“, no matter if 
achieved within or – by intergovernmental cooperation -outside EU institutions, are less 
important for the quest for the European identity. The EU institutions as such have, in so far, 
for the identity shaping, no importance. EU institutions do influence the identity building 
and shaping through the political discussions, through political fightings  for national 
positions and practising debates for orientation to find what positions might be feasible to 
turn out  as acceptable for a breakthrough which then might emerge as common position, 
while common position and national interest are not necessarily contradictory, they may turn 
out to be congruent, some times at least.  
 
EU laws, EC regulations and directives, and EU policies do reflect the  common political 
views of the EU´s legislative institutions, common views as the result of a multiple and 
effective network managed by actors who are actively and permanently conducting the 
dialogue on common European affairs. It is through their permanent working on  European 
affairs,  through their permanent  perception that they  are influencing, reviewing, developing 
what is turning out as  the emerging European position in each individual case ranging on the 
European agenda thus contributing to the permanent process of European identity 
building. 
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It is due to this dynamic process of identity building that Europe´s identity appears to be 
still under permanent construction and to be permanently subjected to controversies.  
Europe´s design  is open to new stages. It, therefore, cannot and must not be a ready-made, 
static design similar to the static constitution of a nation Member State. What counts is that 
Europe´s final shape cannot be designed yet, not at present,nor in the foreseeable future.  
 
In sum: 
Europe which is kept open for a final design, open for its finalité, can use its pluralistic 
identity to consolidate and help  its Members and candidates from Eastern, Southern, 
Southeastern,Northern and Western Europe to identify themselves with the EU and to 
find their place thus contributing to the Union´s cultural and political  unity of varieties 
on the basis of basic principles and values  which are common to all Members.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Identity and legitimacy compliance needed for any text to avoid gradual    
disintegration of the Union  
 
Whatever will be the form – a text called “constitution” or a text of provisions to be integrated 
into the existing TEU and TEC: it will have to reflect the Union´s identity,the 
unique,distinctive characteristics of a Union which make them not  to be mistaken for any 
other entities, states or organizations.The provisions will have to  clearly determine  the 
Union´s characteristics in  order to help that the Union  gets accepted by the people.  
 
Enhancing acceptability of the Union and of the text describing its characteristics means : a 
new text must enable the people  to easily identify themselves with a text which would 
reflect their own expectations why they need a European Union. A European Union to 
protect their vital interest in security, the protection of common values, their basic human 
rights, their interests within a world of globalization and challenges to their vital needs of 
security.  
 
A text which would reflect the European Union´s identity:  the necessary distinct image 
of  its 
 
 basic  values 
 own objectives, 
 own institutions 
 own powers,  including   a clear and distinct image of the distribution of powers 
between EU level and Member States level :subsidiarity issue  
 common policies and 
  efficient decision making procedures  
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to fulfil the people´s expectations from good, effective EU governance respecting basic 
rights and the rule of law, a text which would be called legitimate. 
 
Avoiding a coalition of the willing within the EU, needing consensus of all on the identity 
shaping essentials of the Union: 
 
As to the legitimacy issue: any text has to be in accordance with the basic standards as 
established by the Member States founding the European Community and the European 
Union: guaranteeing the basic standards: 
 
 being the objective and the basic Community method aiming at creating an 
ever closer Union of the peoples of Europe- and not an ever closer Union of 
the States(!). 
 
Supposed, no written text called Draft Treaty on  EU Constitution might get the necessary 
final unanimous vote by the national ratification procedures,  an identity oriented solution has 
to  help to avoid a  „coalition of the willing“ represented by those Member Countries which 
have already voted in favour of  the Constitution and which-as “ Kern - Europa”  might feel to 
be challenged to opt for enhanced multiple-speed integration. Such a turn of  events would 
increase the risk of a gradual disintegration of the Union as a whole. Therefore, the only 
feasible formula must be: Fight for the essentials, if you cannot bring to life the initially  
wanted specific legal  frame  in the sense of a written document called “Constitution”. 
 
Keeping up the Constitution´s essentials in terms of its “ Laeken declaration “ mandate, but  
without focussing on its formal legal frame and all of the structural elements, this can be 
done by  adhering to the already existing constitutional quality of the EU. The already 
existing constitutional quality of the European Union  is clearly  noticeable in the existing 
Founding Treaty on European Union  measured by standards of  
 
 democracy 
 legitimacy, transparency 
 decisiveness, effectiveness 
 
 
 
which are  essential  identity shaping  constitutional elements. These basic elements will have 
to be assessed how they work within the existing Founding Treaty on EU and if and how they 
need to be strengthened to serve the enlarged Union´s objectives and its identity shaping role. 
The result of such an assessment will help to see  what essentials of the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution need to be integrated into the existing Treaty on EU.  
 
The overall guiding line for the following steps of  the assessment is to maintain intact the 
substance of the Treaty on  Constitution.. Maintaining the essentials may be an endeavour 
which needs  to strike the balance of maintaining the present level of integration and of  
how to preserve the achieved level of  the traditional and well proven dynamism of the 
integration process of an enlarged EU, for:  otherwise the EU will have no stance at all to 
give convincing answers to the challenging questions : 
 
 What  is the European Union´s identity  to answer world-wide security risks as well as  
       pending questions like that one about  further Membership of the EU going bejond the  
      existing geographical boundaries ? What about Turkey ?  
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           What about the Ukraina ? 
      What about conceiving a EU Membership of Russia ? 
    
       What about a neighbourship policy of the European Union in relation to the  
      Union´s neighboruing countries of vital interest to the European Union in terms of  
      secure energy supplies from these countries like e.g. Aserbeidschan?The Union´s     
      president of the Council of Foreign Minister´s visit, Mr. Steinmeier, to countries  
      in the Transcaucasian region north of Iran, like Azerbaijan,  on February 19/20,  
     2007, manifests the Union´interest in designing a Union´n neighbourship policy; 
 
          What about Israel ? What about Australia ? What about the Membership criteria ?  
 
          What is the state of the Union: what are the basics of the European Union and its  
          condition of being, the basics of its “constitution”? 
 
It is all a matter of  the basic issue: what is  ”European Union identity” ? All those 
objectives, values, rules and practices governing the EU´s policies and institutions attempting 
to achieve the political objectives for which the European democratic Sovereign, the people, 
has given its legitimating democratic consent to build up the European Union by transferring 
and jointly exercising parts of national sovereignties? And the EU´s Constitution as the 
supreme political and  legal  framework  will it give the basic  political and legal  guideline 
for building the future enlarged European Union ?  To be an identity shaping guideline for 
giving the European peoples´ democratic consent to further European Union policy making, 
will the EU´s Constitution  be  transparent enough, democratic enough, efficient enough to 
allow to keep up the cohesion of the enlarged EU ? 
 
The legitimate basis as well as the limit to all  these questions is set by  the main issue of what 
is the identity of the EU as characteristics expected to  
 
to satisfy the people´s expectations that the enlarged Union might keep up the needed 
cohesion  
 
 to serve their interests by 
 giving  the best possible responses to the modern worldwide challenges, chances 
and risks which   allow to keep up the cohesion of the enlarged EU ? 
 
What about the extent to which the cohesion of the EU may stand to allow certain Member 
States representing a certain  number of Member States, without weakening the Community 
edifice, to cooperate and move beyond the level of integration achieved today ?   
 
 
Viewing at the difficult striking a balance between deepening and enlarging the EU, 
striking a balance between efficiency, decisiveness and identity shaping in European 
integration, on the one hand, and the cohesion of the enlarged  EU, on the other , the 
study´s focus will be directed on: 
 
 the reform of the composition of the European Union institutions and of the decision-
making process, analysing whether the result appears to   make the EU more effective 
or  whether it appears to be substantially doubtful  that deepening and  enlarging the 
EU nearly at the same time doesn´t work. 
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With regard to the voting system in the Council, reviewing  the decision made by the Treaty 
on Constitution for a re-weighting of votes, the benefits and limits of  recommending   a 
democratic system of a double  majority will have to be analysed, striking the balance 
between weighted votes reflecting a strictly democratic proportionality with regard to the total 
population of  the Union, and the equality of still sovereign nation states having one vote for 
each of the states. 
 
Before starting with analyzing these issues, I will discuss the one subject which is  essential 
and the common basis of all  detailed issues about essentials of nation state constitutions and 
EU “constitution” :  the identity issue. 
 
The legitimate basis as well as the limit to all  these questions is set by  the main issue of 
what is the identity of the EU ?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. The identity issue of the European Union:  „ constitution“ and  the  
     idea of Europe 
 
I.  Introduction : the identity issue, legal and living constitution, “sui generis” 
nature of the EU/EC and the secondary law, principle of attributed powers 
 
 
1. The identity issue , the EU  as a “sui generis “ collectivity, the European Union´s  final 
design, its “finalité “ kept open in a dynamic process of  creating an “ever closing Union 
among the  peoples of Europe “ 
In debates on  Europe  and European Integration, it is   the identity issue to  discuss what are  
the European Union´s objectives, tasks and instruments,  its internal and external role,  
specifically concerning its ability to be an effective global  actor in the field of foreign and 
security policy.176  
_________________________________________________________________________- 
176:Wessels,Wolfgang,  “Security and Defence of the European Union. The institutional 
evolution:Trends and Perspectives”, contributions to the 6th ECSA conference, December 6, 
2002,   paper dated November 2002, 40 pages,  pp(.6,10) ; Regelsberger, Elfriede/Schmalz, 
Uwe (2001): “The common foreign and security policy of the Amsterdam treaty: towards an 
improved EU identity on the international scene”, in: Monar, Jörg/Wessels, Wolfgang (eds.): 
The European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam, London/New York: Continuum, pp. 249-
266. 
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Identity of an individual as well as identity of an entity as legal person –incorporated by 
its legal constitution and developing a living constitution-  is usually marking the special 
features that make the difference between that individual and others and between that entity 
and others. 
 
Raising the European Unions´identity issue refers to the European Union as an entity which  
is the  collectivity of all the Member States of the EU, united  according to the Founding 
Treaties on EU/EC. The Treaty on  European Union is the legal constitution, the legal frame-
work for the collectivity of the Member States to act  according to the objectives, tasks, 
powers and legal instruments as attributed by the Treaty on EU including the Founding Treaty 
on European Community.As far  as the Member States of the Union do comply or do n o t  
comply with the provisions of this legal constitution – they are developing a  “living” 
constitution. 
 
The Union´s features as layed down in the legal constitution and  the Union´s features as 
developed by the living constitution make the Union distinguishable from other entities  and 
distinguishable from the single Member State and from the entire number of single Member 
States that have founded  the European Union: The European Union is a federation of 
nation states , it is no federal state, it is no International Organization under 
international law, it is a  “sui generis” collectivity, a  special collectivity of nation states, 
unique, beyond comparison with other entities traditionally known in international law. 
 
 
In order to understand the Union´s identity, the dynamic character of the collectivity 
called “European Union”, we look at the basic difference between the Union´s identity  
and the different identitities of the nation States in Europe. It is their own individual past, 
each nation state´s own history,  and their basic principles and objectives to respond to 
new challenges   which is the guiding orientation line for the nation states in Europe to have 
developed the essentials marking their respective identity which differs from each 
other´s national identity..  
 
Europe, however, is shaping its identity by orientating towards what is ahead and it  is 
not looking back: 
According to the legal constitution of the EU/EC, the founding Treaties on EU/EC, Europe is 
looking ahead towards managing the future stages in the process of  developing „an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe“: Europe´s orientation is directed towards the 
future, because it is still under construction and does not need a purely static order as 
nation states do,  but an open order which facilitates dynamics to give the necessary 
responses to challenges while building up Europe. Stable managing the stages of dynamic 
construction without risking the overall Grand Design of European integration needs to keep 
 160
open the final exact design of the European Union. This is why the EU´s so called 
„finalité“ is intentionally kept open in the Founding Treaty on European Union. 
 
2.  The legal resources:    the EC primary and secondary law  
 
The European Union had been created by the Treaty establishing a European Union. The 
Member States had negotiated, signed and concluded  that Treaty under the rules of 
international law, and ratified according to the constitutional nation state rules and procedures 
established for legislative ratification of  international  treaties concluded by every Member 
State. That Treaty is manifesting the collectivity of the Union´s Member States as sovereign 
states and Treaty making powers: it  provides rights and obligations of the Member States to 
be committed to common objectives of the Union, institutions and policies. The European 
Union is not endowed with a legal personality in the sense of  making laws binding 
individuals and legal entities within the European Union. That law making power is entrusted 
to the European Community: 
 
For, the Treaty on European Union is a “roof”: in addition to the rights and obligations of the 
Member States concerning the achievement of common objectives and policies of the Union, 
according to the Treaty´ s architecture of a roof covering three pillars,  the Treaty´ s first pillar 
is  the Treaty establishing the European Community- TEC-. 
 
The European Community  has legal personality to act through own institutions and making 
law.The TEC  is the primary resource of Community law: assigning rights and obligations to 
the EC´s institutions, the power to make regulations, directives and decisions: binding rules of 
secondary law made on the basis of the primary law  of the TEC.  
 
The “sui generis” nature of the EU is due to the “secondary law”:  
 
as noted above, the EC regulation is a  legislative act of  
 
 general application and  binding in its  entirety and  
 directly applicable in all Member States, which, once published in the Official Journal 
of the EU, section “L”= legislation , is directly having full force   and uniform  
application  throughout the EU, with  no need of  intermediary legislative act of  
transformation by Member States´ national legislative bodies. 
 having primacy over national law, and which is  
 launched by the EC´s legislative bodies: the Council and the European Parliament. 
 
It is  due to this legal nature of   being directly in full force and of having primacy over 
conflicting national law, that the  EC-regulation is comparable to a federal state´s 
legislation.. Federal laws of a federal state do directly enter into force throughout the 
federation with no further intermediary legislative act needed by the  single Member state 
within the federation to make the federal law to enter into force. 
 
The EC directive does not, in principle, directly rule the rights and duties of individuals – 
citizens and companies- in the Member States. The EC directive is   adressing  Member 
States´ legal rights and obligations to implement common objectives by  implementing 
national legislative acts ruling the details about the means necessary  to fulfil the EC directive. 
In principle, it does not have direct effect of giving individuals the right of revocation by the 
directive´s mere publication in the Official Journal. Individuals are entitled to claim 
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provisions of an EC directive only after national implementing acts of legislation have entered 
into force or if a Member State has implementation substantially delayed. The EC 
directive,however, can be compared to the federal law framing the objective and leaving the 
state law the legal discretion to set binding implementing provisions about the means 
necessary to achieve the common objective. 
 
3. Identity and the principle of attributed powers 
 
The legal nature of the European Community´s -EC´s -legislative power clearly shows that 
the EC, whenever making regulations or directives through the Community´s legislative 
institutions, the EC  is acting as a collectivity of  states. The legal constitution of the EC, the 
Treaty on EC, states that this collectivity does act  as a legal personality endowed with own 
rights and duties to act  in fora externa and interna on behalf of the EC according to its own 
institutional decision-making rules and on behalf of its own personality to be distinguished 
from the single personalities of the Member States. The EC as legislative actor is acting 
according to its own legislative power to accomplish  own objectives, tasks, and to use own 
powers and instruments  to act on its own by methods of  integration or  to act together with 
the Member States by using  cooperative intergovernmental methods.  
 
The EC enjoys powers which are limited by attribution. Modern sovereign nation states  are 
endowed  with the legislative power which, in principle, is not limited: it is called the 
“Kompetenz-Kompetenz”, the right to put  all imaginable areas within reach of own 
sovereignty under  national legislative powers. The EC has not such a “Kompetenz.-
Kompetenz”, the EC is hindered to enlarge its legislative powers  by autonomous action.. The 
legislative powers can be enlarged by the Member States only, through amendment of. the 
Founding Treaty  according to the established procedures of  negotiating, signing and 
ratifying .And this makes the EC substantially differ from the nation state:   
 
 
 the legislative powers of the EC  are  attributed and limited by the Founding 
Treaties on EU/EC. As the basic principle in EU/EC law , 
  the principle of attributed powers, clearly shows, the Founding Treaties on EU/EC 
are ruling the basic legal ties existing between EU/EC as collectivity on the one hand, 
and the single Member States, on the other hand, in a sense which, as far as the 
contents of the Founding Treaties are concerned , can be compared with a federal 
state´s legal “Constitution”. For ,  
 
 majority-voting EC legislative acts do substantially overrule national sovereignties, 
similar to the overruling of a minority of single states by a majority of  states in the 
legislative body “Länderkammer” or “Bundesrat” within a federal nation state.  
 
 In cases of unanimous voting in the EC/Council,however, the principle of equality of 
sovereign Member States demonstrates the real existence of a dominance of  
substantial remainders  of  sovereign rights of the Member States in areas of  what 
they believe to be reserved domains of vital national interests: 
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II. The identity issue and the constitutional quality of the Founding Treaties  
      on EU/EC:  
 
Tensions between the legal constitution de lege lata of the existing EU/EC-
Treaty  and the living constitution: the reality of nation states´recurring  to 
national resources: 
the limits of the legal,  institutional approach to finding the  EU/EC´s 
identity  
 
The mere existence and implementation of  EC primary law through EC legislation does 
usually escape public awareness within the European Union Member States, at least as far as 
the majority of citizens of the Union is concerned. The identity shaping role of EC secondary 
law legislation is rather a matter of experts´ concern. But the identity shaping role of EC 
legislation is a factor of increasing importance in European integration whenever the Court 
of Justice has made a verdict on national laws in matters of  high publicity and showing the  
European public  a gap existing between the legal constitution and the living constitution:  
 
 
The verdicts of the European Court of Justice do shape the EU´s identity in the view of 
the EU public by influencing, from time to time, the public awareness of the predominance of 
EU/EC secondary law overruling contradictory national law, as recently, in February 2007 
shown by the Court´s verdict that the German federal act on the Volkswagen Company- VW-  
violates EC internal market rules of free flow of capital. Or the Court´s verdict that  stand-by 
hours spent by  medical doctors at German hospitals are to be paid as on-duty working-hours. 
 
Any attempts are wrong which are  made in the course of discussions about these rulings to 
see the EU/EC as entity, on the one hand, and the Member States on the other hand, in an 
opposite position of totally different or independently acting political and legal levels. Those 
attempts to perceive a distinction between a EU identity and an identity of EU Member 
States do substantially misunderstand the reality of the EU´s policy- making and 
decision-making levels: 
 
 The national level and the European level of policy-making and decision-making do, under 
the legal as well as under the living constitution of the EU/EC,  not mark mutually exclusive 
opposite positions. The two levels are rather mutually influencing each other as parts of a 
multi- levelled complementary system of joint policy-making and decision-making.  
 
Studies on the development of the European Political Cooperation-EPC-and on the Common 
European Foreign, Security and Defence Identity  have shown that different national 
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concepts on European  identity do exist,  indeed, and which may in fact compete with each 
other.    177) 
In the course of the political deliberations held in Working Groups of the Council in 
Brussels, however, an   „europeanization“ of formerly pure national positions would be 
emerging: the formerly diverging national position is undergoing a process of mutually 
influencing initially diverging national positions  by being interpreted by other national 
positions, and thus the formerly diverging position can change and even  can be found, 
subsequently, later on, merging with a common position which then is called the E 
uropean position.  
 
What appears to be striking, however,  is  the Union´s Member States´ obvious deficit to 
take the chance and make use of  the Union´s resources of  the two levels of national and 
European level of policy-making and decision-making, using the EU as actor in the field of 
foreign and security policy: 
 As made evident by the case demonstrated of  some of the Member States´ joining the so-
called “coalition of the willing” waging the US led war on the Taliban in Afghanistan, as 
well as made evident by the case of the Member States failing to achieve a common 
strategy in the case of the US led war on Iraq in March 2003, it was and still is due to 
divergent national interests that some of the EU Member States had not used the institutional 
framework of the EU´s Common Foreign and Security resources to try to draw up a Union 
position, but they recurred to national resources instead of  strengthening their own national 
position by a joint position-building. Instead of jointly acting they preferred to be a political 
dwarf on the international stage, whereas the EU appears as a global player in matters of  
economic and trade relations. 
 
 
Wessels has, therefore, in a realistic view of the Member  States´ practice, doubted that the 
Member States would increasingly stick to legal provisions on a communitarisation of a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy because the “national resources “ would dominate and 
use the  intergovernmental decision-making structures rather than the legal structures as 
provided for by the Nice Treaty on EU.  “ Especially in managing international crises national 
actors re - emerge to run the machinery among themselves.” Drawing up a scenario on how to 
improve the efficiency of  the “ living” constitution  in the conduct of a Common Foreign and 
Security and Defence Policy, Wessels is sceptical:  
“ 
Foreign and especially defence policies remain in the intergovernmental oriented mode which 
gives national actors sufficient opportunities to use autonomously their own resources if 
perceived as necessary. This “high politics” area would stay resistant to the usual spill over 
pressures. The heads of government might take further steps towards a further rationalisation 
of the intergovernmental coordination of national instruments in the next IGC, but they will  
 
177:  ibid.,supra,note 173, Hill,Christopher, “The Actors in Europe´s Foreign Policy „,  
         Routledge Verlag,London, 1996. 
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not cross the borderline towards supranational procedures to use methods of communitarized 
resources.”178) 
         
In other words: national and European identities have, according to the legal 
“constitution”de lege lata of  the Treaty on EU the potential of mutually influencing each 
other, and, using the dialectics between national level and EU/EC level, developing new, 
common  positions called  European positions, but whenever “high politics “ are concerned, 
the Heads of State or Government would rather use the “living” constitution of the national 
resources than use methods of communitarised resources 
 
Viewing at this tension between the legal constitution in terms of the Founding Treaties on 
EU/EC and the living constitution as developed by the Member States changing mode of 
using the Union´s resources, it should not be underestimated the legal and political power and 
the identity shaping power of the Community´s legislative power strengthened by the 
constitutional principles as crafted out by the case law jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice: 
 
It is the special design, the ´suigeneris´ nature of the EC´s legislative power running an 
autonomous system of  legislation,which is similar to the nation state  system, similar even 
to the federal state as far as the legal effect of  direct and uniform applicability of federal 
laws within a federal state is concerned. 
 
This special design is a  clearly discernible  identity shaping element of the EU´s treaty 
architecture. This  EU/EC model of  creating an own autonomous legal order ruling the 
legal relations between the EU/EC and  the single Member States is the essential part of  
the EU´s  identity  around which are grouped other substantial identity shaping 
elements. 
 
The finding of that special design is a result which is  due to an institutional approach to find 
out, on the basis of the Founding Treaties on EU/EC,  the EU´s identity,  what are the 
institutions and what kind of powers do they use. But that legal feature of the EU/EC, 
resulting from the Founding Treaties, resulting from an institutional approach to the Founding 
Treaties,  is  not a sufficient answer to the question of  what is the EU/EC identity. 
 
 
178: Wolfgang Wessels, “Security and Defecne of the European Union. The institutional  
        evolution:Trends and Perspectives”, contributions to the 6th ECSA conference,  
        December 6, 2002,   paper dated November 2002, 40 pages,  pp(.29,30).    
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The institutional approach is not a comprehensive approach to give a full design of  the 
EU/EC´s identity. For, the institutional approach does not answer  the following 
questions about the EU/EC´s identity : 
 
 
 What is the kind of identity we may owe to Europe? 
 what are the basic elements of  an  EU/EC identity?  How can  Europe,the EU be 
perceived as an identity shaping force by a European public awareness? 
 
 Is there any  European public forum where European identity can be developed? 
 What kind of identity can be developed within a European public forum? 
 
A comprehensive approach to the EU/EC´s  identity has to cover the identity shaping 
essentials that reflect the heterogenous varieties of identities in Europe as a mirror of 
different cultures, histories, languages, but that also reflects what does unite the 
varieties of identities on the basis of one common heritage of  basic values. 
 
 
 
III. European identity and the idea of Europe: 
       A comprehensive approach to the EU/EC´s  identity shaping essentials:  
        reflecting heterogenous varieties of identities in Europe and one  
        common heritage of  basic values ? 
 
After having outlined under II. above this more technocracy than basic values oriented 
approach to the identity issue, we  now  discuss the cultural and basic value oriented 
approach to find out what European identity is. 
 
1. Identity indicators  
 
Taking actions to achieve objectives, the presentation of symbols and/or the existence and 
expression of feelings may indicate, may reflect the special traits of personality or character of 
an individual as well as the special traits of personality or nature of a collectivity called 
European Union: 
European identity may be a political  shape measured by the power and the use of it to act in 
order to achieve own objectives e.g. in the field of international relations covering political, 
economic, foreign and security policy including independence of  energy supply and  climate 
protection. The European Union is an actor participating in these areas, which are still marked 
by traditional  nation state related symbols like flags, national hymns.  
 
The European Union, too, is developing to use symbols to reflect the collectivity´s own 
objectives, actions, features:  
 e.g. the German Radio Broadcast Service “Deutschlandfunk” started on January 1st 2007  to 
broadcast the European Hymn of Beethoven´s 9th Symphony final choir “Freude,  
schöner Götterfunke” in addition to the German national hymn at the end of  the programme 
every day before midnight. Or recalling the Europe Day, May 05, the Schuman  Day. 
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European Union´s identity might also be measured by what the citizens in Europe may 
feel, wish or expect from the European Union, as it is reflected by the Eurobarometer-
polls: 
 
feeling European by appreciating  
 
 free movement of individuals beyond national frontiers, 
 using one European currency, 
 using the English language as lingua franca making free movement in Europe even 
easier,and-there is, above all,  
 peace between all Member States of the EU since decades. 
 
All these achievements are well known to Europeans, even if not present every day.  
 
 
2. The idea of Europe: an indefinite idea ? 
Institutions dedicated to scientific research and education concerned with  teaching and 
learning about the European integration are describing Europe as an indefinite  idea: 
 
 lacking precise limits, 
  provided with geographic boundaries shaped by hazard and not indispensably 
congruent with the boundaries of the European Union. 
 Habitual teaching Europe is describing    Europe´s identity as a non-conclusive cluster of 
basic values such as  
 
 the liberal and parliamentary democracy, 
  human rights, freedom of thought and speech, individual freedom from arbitrariness 
committed by public authorities, 
 rule of law, equal rights, independence of courts of justice, 
 stable social care systems to ensure basic standards for human welfare,   
 market  oriented economic policies,  
 role of Governments´ policies  framing  market oriented economies by giving  
incentives and  
 binding rules to ensure free competition among companies, thus contrasting any 
Governments´centrally planning of economic activities,but ensuring balanced and 
sustainable development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary 
growth, demanding measures against increasing unemployment rates to ensure  
 a high level of employment and of social protection under the conditions of 
globalization´s challenges to competitiveness ,  
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  a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment,including a growing desire to protect the world´s climate, 
  the raising of the standard of living and quality of life.  
 
All educational schemes on Europe show this Europeanwide basically shared  cluster of 
pursued values as reflecting Europe´s identity which thus is being shaped by a modern pattern 
of basic principles guiding the expected good Governance in European states. As challenges 
in a fast changing world need fast and effective responses, Europe´s identity is not   a 
closed system, it is not an order that would fix its formulas  once and for all:  
 
 Europe´s identity is shaped by essentials as well as by a dynamic openness to easen to reach 
further stages “ in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe”(Article 1,paragraph 2 TEU.  179)   
 
3. The idea of Europe: identity shaping principles and values of universal  
     nature, 
    identity shaping elements of manifold varieties in culture, history,    
     geography, languages, national and regional identities 
 
3.1  Europe´s  identity shaping values and principles: centuries old heritage  
       and of no exclusive, but universal character 
 
The future oriented dynamism of developing Europe´s identity should not make forget that  
Europe´s identity shaping basic  principles of liberty, respect for human rights, 
fundamental freedoms and equality, of tolerance and of the rule of law had been 
developed in Europe´s past during the European Centuries of the enlightenment and 
fighting for civil rights and democracy, whereas the period of peace and consent for 
unity building in Europe is lasting  a relatively short period of time since the end of the 
Second World War, with fortunately only one exception of the war in southeast Europe, 
in the former Yugoslavia. 
 
It was until the Second World War that the States in Europe felt their respective identity by 
defining themselves as enemies within a relationship of mutually felt hostility, thus identity 
shaping through hostile separation,demarcation,and not through cooperation yet. 
  
Europe´s design today, the idea of Europe is more than preventing war among the 
peoples of Europe only. It is the common sense of responsibility and respect for life in 
this one world, in a sane environment and under the rule of law: 
179:CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, December  
        24,2002 , Official Journal of the European Communities C 325/05 (10). 
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Today´s Europe is the grand counter design of cooperation oriented identity building. 
Europe´s design, the idea of Europe as it had been projected by Jean Monnet, Robert 
Schuman, Alcide de Gasperi, Paul-Henri Spaak and Konrad Adenauer,is much more 
than the answer to the question of how to prevent any further wars among the peoples in 
Europe only. 
 
Decades of peace, more than 60 peaceful years  in Europe are enjoyed nearly as a matter of 
course and taken for granted. Long lasting peace in Europe is partly owed to the balance of 
mutual deterrence between the East and the West during the Cold War period ending in 1989. 
It is  owed even more to the unique European method of integrating different nation 
states and national interests: in  each individual case of reaching common consent to a topic 
ranging on the common agenda and  negotiated, deliberated and decided according to legally 
binding common laws and rules of decision-making procedures applied in a common 
institutional framework forming the common EU institutions.   It is hard work, and it is every 
single common decision that can be called to be contributing to maintain and reinforce 
peace in Europe.   
   
What the idea of Europe is more, however, than preventing peace in Europe only, 
through  channelling common interests through common institutions, it is the common  sense 
of Europe´s task and commitment to give common response to common worldwide 
challenges to live in one peaceful world in respect for life. The idea of Europe is, actually, 
implementing the common sense of responsibility and respect for life in this one world ,in 
a sane environment and under the rule of law. 
 
 
The idea of Europe is not without defiance within the own confinements of Europe, 
challenged by visible signs of misleading nationalistic efforts made by some groups in 
Europe´s societies.  
Being European means being firmly patriotic, being aware of one´s own country´s 
cultural values and traditions,self-conscious enough to be open and to tolerate other 
countries and values  in Europe and in the world, being aware of the common cultural 
heritage:the respect for life,for living in peace,freedom and security.  
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“We are living, and we want to live,and we are aware that others are living and that they want 
to live.” This is the pure formula of the universal ethic as the greatest European,living in 
the 20th Century,Albert Schweitzer had formulated it as „ Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben“: 
respect for life. It should be in the common commitment to the respect for everybody´s life 
that we do have to share our unlimited responsibility in that one world. In so far the idea of 
Europe is more than preventing war among the peoples of Europe only. 
 
In so far, the  idea of Europe is the community of states  committed to basic values of    
liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of 
law. That is the substantial nucleus of  the idea of Europe. 
 
 The idea of Europe is not an abstract concept of bringing together nation states so as to form 
a European central state. The idea of Europe is to maintain its common basic values of liberty 
and fundamental freedoms within the enlarged European Union. And one of the essential 
questions is whether the European Union  is committed  to help to support these basic values  
also all over the world. Principles of liberty, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms 
and equality, of tolerance and of the rule of law are no exclusive, distinctive traits reserved 
to the states in Europe only.  For, these basic principles that are shaping Europe´s 
identity do have an essentially universal character at the same time. Universal values of  
liberty and respect for fundamental freedoms can, in principle, if  reasonably adapted to 
specific cultural traditions,  be applied worldwide.  
These identity shaping principles  are claiming and exercising universal dimension, they 
are marking the modern feature of good governance which every modern nation in the 
world does claim, which does not make it easier to identify the – specific- nature of the 
European identity by measuring it on the basis of these universal principles.  
 
Namely the rule of law in the Western understanding of being a binding universal 
principle is the rule of secular law created by the people and not created by any religious 
leaders. It is an open question whether 
 
 the rule of secular law and  
 the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms  
can rightly claim to be of universal value to govern and judge internal affairs in all countries 
all over the world and, in case of violation, may allow to  legitimate to intervene in internal 
affairs and own cultural traditions of foreign countries. Or  whether these principles are an 
arrogant, non-legitimate intervention in internal affairs. of another country. 
 
The right approach to giving the answer is to draw a strictly distinctive line between 
these principles, on the one hand, and the right and obligation to intervene for the sake 
of humanity against any  murder and torture committed against any groups of people 
within societies, no matter if minorities or majorities are murdered or tortured.  
 
This humanitarian intervention approach is an essential Western principle which  the 
European Union, the USA and significant numbers of countries in other parts of the world 
feel commonly committed to. In this field, joint positions and cooperation between the West 
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and countries including nuclear  powers like China,  India and Pakistan are emerging as 
common positions on fighting against terrorism, just in the light of the terrorists´ attacks 
against a “train for peace” on its way from Pakistan to India on February 19,2007. 
 
And in addition to this, Europe does not exist through a specific negating of other nations 
nor through defensive exclusiveness against other nations, which does not make it much 
easier either to identify Europe´s identity. No negating, no deterring of others did Europe 
demonstrate in the case of the relationship existing between Europe and the Islam: 
it was jointly with non-Europeans that Europe defended the Muslim Kosovo and Bosnia 
against the formerly totalitarian, non-democratic regime of the European orthodox 
Christian Serbia. European Governments made a rightly clear distinction between waging 
a war on terrorism and waging a war on the Islam, thus leaving no doubt that Europe does 
not exist as an entity that would define and owe its existence to exclude other nations or to 
be aggressive against any other nation, religion or non-European culture. 
 
The Western principles  of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law,never are free from conflicts,free from 
different views at diverging national interests and cultural traditions. The Western 
principles,however, are-as common heritage from enlightenment- tolerance born and they 
allow free competition and are dependent on free competition as well. Conflicts in human 
societies are reflecting contrasting characteristics in human nature of individuals, having and 
pursuing self-centered needs being in conflict with the needs of the society ,while it is just this 
conflict which is the genuine source of any progress under the prerequisite that no artificial 
governmental order imposes a compulsory and arbitrary settlement. Compulsory rulings on 
freedom from conflicts bring no freedom. Managing  conflicts in societies must not destroy, 
but safeguard the competition between the ideas to make the best possible use of  human 
resources for the sake of progress and a  human life in dignity. 
 
Kant, nature of morals in politics, universal principles and progress of societies: 
 
Progress of societies and mankind means using the antagonistic traits of  
individuals´character by peaceful means refusing wars as abused instruments in the 
pursuit of progress. Progress without wars  needs what the German idealist philosopher 
Immanuel Kant, in his study “Zum ewigen Frieden (1795) “ , is describing as a kind of 
global peace to be guaranteed by a sort of “United  Nations” forming a global federation 
of  free and sovereign states endowed with constitutions committed to the republican 
principle of representative institutions and distribution of powers: 
  
What progress without wars means is focussed in Kant´s study of  ethics and politics, of the 
general nature of morals and of specific  moral choices in politics. In the attachment to his 
draft Treaty on world peace, Kant claims  any political activity to be subjected to the rules 
of morals:  the conduct of international relations between states to be ruled by the same 
intentions as the moral choices are made by enlightened individuals with the obedience 
to the categorical imperative of making sure that the  principles guiding the actions of 
the individual should easily become universal principles.  
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A progress in the sense of  guaranteeing universal principles might actually be achieved 
by establishing a functioning   international system of social organization that will 
protect a vital,vivid competition , respect for the rule of law, social progress and 
solidarity among the peoples and binding rules on peaceful conflict prevention and 
conflict settlement. The need of binding and enforceable rules on peaceful conflict 
prevention and conflict settlement is obvious in present  times of globalization, international 
investments and flows of capital across national borders and beyond reach of national 
Governments as well as of the institutions of the EU, whereas these global activities across 
national borders are still without a  global frame of binding and enforceable laws on common 
principles guiding the conduct of these activities in accordance with universal ethics. There do 
exist some single voluntary commitments made by some big companies as global players like 
British Petroleum when BP voluntarily negotiated and concluded agreements with native parts 
of  the population living in remote ares of Canada on how to sagefuard the specific culture 
,traditions and environmental living conditions before BP started the exploitation of oil and 
gas. These  examples of voluntarily agreed codes on the ethics of  conduct of internationally 
acting companies are influencing societies to a large extent, they are still too fiew in order to 
be able to compensate  the absence of a global framework of binding rules. 
Unclear,however, would not be  the objective of such a global frame of binding rules. 
What, under the realities, is still unclear- how to make enforceable a global frame of 
binding rules on the respect for universal principles. There is a long way to go until 
achieving a global binding system of principles of liberty and competition,democracy 
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms , the rule of law,security 
through wealth and social security and solidarity among the peoples.The objective might 
appear to be utopian, an ideal of a standard as too perfect,not achievable.  
 
It is, however, the European practice of  creating and maintaining peace by primarily 
non-military means that Europe is committed to earnestly appeal to partners in the 
world to look at the convincing model of the European idea of basic principles of 
universal nature.  
 
3.2 European concept and USA concept of  basic values 
There are, however, some attempts to define Europe´s identity by trying to recall essentially 
different concepts of cultural values  existing between Europe and the USA: e.g. referring 
to the different concepts of justice,  e.g. the execution of Saddam Hussein on December 
30,2006, and to the unanimous condemnation of the death penalty by an impressive number 
of European Governments and printing press and TV media in Europe. 
  
Or referring to the different concepts of social protection and of the role of the State for 
balancing economic performance, social protection and for    the raising of the standard 
of living and quality of life including the protection and improvement of the quality of 
the environment just in the light of the visible dangers to the world´s climate affected 
through global warming.  
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And referring to the totally different positions on the legality of the U.S. led war on Iraq, 
having Great Britain as the partner of the USA, and demonstrating the lack of serious 
endeavours for one  European voice of a united Europe in such a  fundamental matter: 
These are current issues of European concern and claims to recognize the substantial 
differences of opinion still existing between Europe and the USA and having the 
potential of shaping Europe´s identity, taking into account that even the British 
Government has condemned the false, namely faked justifications of starting the war on 
Iraq, and now the British Government is  trying how and when to draw back without risking 
to even worsen the disastrous and wrotten security situation in Iraq, after even the new 
Secretary of Defence of the USA had to admit during the public hearing in the US Congress 
in December 2006 that he did not think that the war in Iraq could be won. 
 
What is, just after the faked “evidence” for creating the preconditions to wage the war on 
Iraq, still under discussion and without receiving convincing answers: 
 
 That is the question whether, under international law, worldwide defending universal values, 
also called Western values, is in accordance with the strict principle of non-intervention in the 
affairs of other nations, with the sovereign rights and territorial integrity of other states. Do 
crimes against humanity committed by dictators like Saddam Hussein against Shiite parts of 
the population legitimate the US led military intervention by the  so called “coalition of the 
willing” claiming to remove the dictatorship from power and to restore the rule of law and 
respect for fundamental freedoms in the Iraq and to install democracy? 
 
And, actually, referring to substantially different positions on the methods to prevent further 
deteriorating of  the world´s climate. While the European Union is clearly committed to the 
Kyoto-Protocol on binding reduction goals and measures to reduce the emission of  CO2, the 
U.S. continues to be opposed to ratification of the Kyoto-Protocol. It is the  different approach 
to energy consumption and to the development and use of modern energy saving technologies 
and alternative regenerative energies that reflects the different view at basic issues of  how to 
preserve the one world: a different approach to basic cultural values ? A special identity 
shaping approach ? 
 
4. European concepts of single EU Member States substantially differ from 
each other: in strategy of why and how to make use of the shaping of a 
European identity: 
 
It appears doubtful whether Europe´s experience made namely with the Iraq case would 
strengthen European identity. It appears doubtful as long as the European concepts of 
the single EU Member States still continue to substantially differ from each other.The 
reason for this is not that Member States would see European identity to be contradictory to 
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national identity. EU Member States recognize their nation and European  identity to be the 
two  sides of one coin to be nation and part of the process of European integration. What still 
differs is the different strategy of why and  how to make use of the shaping of a 
European identity: 
 
 The French nation considers its own European identity as the substantial challenge to 
strenghten the French nation by strengthening its influence on the European level of European 
affairs as discussed and decided by EU institutions according to the Founding Treaties on 
EU/EC. 
German history and German educational schemes, however, see a predominance of a 
growing European or even more international identity ruling over a German nation the 
identity of which is more and more getting less visible under worldwide trading, technologies, 
consumer interests and worldwide  tourism. 
 
5. Europe of the Regions – contribute to identity shaping 
An orientation bejond own national boundaries is also held   partly due to the realities of a 
growing Europe of the Regions. Interregional cooperation beyond national frontiers has 
contributed to enhance the formation of regional, decentralized structures within central  
states like France and Spain.  
 
6. In sum: Europe is presenting a variety of  identity shaping elements of manifold 
varieties in history, geography and culture, as well as in national and regional identities 
All these elements are not reflecting a homogenous shape of one single 
comprehensive European identity. The shape of European identity is not presenting 
one single independent and homogenous model consisting  of multiple levels as Weiler 
has described it. 180)  . 
The shape of European identity is rather a complex cluster consisting of an inorganic 
system of multiple dissimilar elements that substantially differ from each other in origin, 
nature and functional role : 
 
 
180: Weiler,J.H.H.” The constitution of Europe”,Cambridge ,1999. 
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By referring to the pluralistic identity of Europe and its common basic principles and 
values,we realize the nucleus of legitimacy of the European construction to create 
 “ an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe.” 
 
Europe´s idea of  universal principles and its successful way of peace-building and peace-
maintaining is giving vivid evidence that Europe´s idea is not utopian, but a practiced 
model. It is still under construction, but dynamically continuing with further stages  in 
the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. This 
experienced model does not want to compulsory impose Western principles on a 
worldwide scale what would easily be misunderstood as a wrong concept of a clash of 
civilizations as a fight of cultures  between the West and namely the Islam, a wrong 
concept that even everyone in the European Union did not and would not share, because 
such a “clash of  civilizations” would totally deny what the European identity firmly 
stands for: 
 
to be  founded on and to be guided by the principles of respect for  
 
 human dignity, 
 life,   
 human rights and fundamental freedoms,  
 liberty,  
 tolerance including respect for the peoples´ history, culture and traditions,  
 promoting  wealth and fundamental social rights,  
 promoting  peace, security and progress in Europe and  
 in the world,  
which means practiced tolerance on the basis of the European identity and its 
independence, as well as  
 
 respect for democracy, and 
 the rule of law, 
 
principles which are common to all  Member States of the European Union:  
 
this is the  21st Century design of the European Union. 
 
III. Conclusion on the European Union´s identity and perspectives for 
overcoming the ratification deadlock of  the EU´s  Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe: 
 
1. The European Union´s identity shaping essentials are, in legal terms, a cluster of  
attributes layed down in  the constitutional orders of the Founding Treaties on EU/EC 
and in the Treaty on Constitution: own objectives, tasks, institutions, competences, 
powers.  
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The relationship  between the European constitutional order and the national constitutional 
orders is not to be settled according to unilateral principles of hierarchy. The 
relationship  between the two  orders can be seen from two different, but equally legitimate 
perspectives:  
 
 
 the intergovernmental nation-state perspective denying the existence of a relationship 
of two interdependent and mutually influencing levels that both are basic 
elements of one emerging European constitutional order, and the 
 Union federal like perspective to establish a Constitution for Europe by settling a 
hierarchy of supreme texts with the supremacy of  a Constitution for Europe over 
national constitutions . 
 
There is , actually, a plurality of ‘supreme’ texts in Europe, but there does exist a 
relationship of two interdependent and mutually influencing constitutional levels -the  EU 
constitutional order and the nation constitutional orders-that both are basic elements of 
one emerging European constitutional order:  
it is the basic legal framework which ensures the secure development of the 
heterogenous cluster of manifold varieties of  different cultural and regional identities 
according to common basic values and principles. It is meant as a binding framework 
for the Member States to make Europe to contribute to stable and durable international 
relations for peace and security: if they want Europe really to be a real, efficient internal 
and external actor 
 
 to fulfil the expectations of  the peoples of Europe to live in security, peace, 
wealth and in a sane environment , 
 
and  to contribute, not necessarily with a single voice, but in   one voice as a real, 
efficient actor  
 
 in transatlantic relations between Europe and the USA 
 in relations with the rising, ambitious threshold countries in Asia, South America and 
in the Pacific 
 in the north-south dialogue with the developing countries. 
 
2. The EU, however, is in a severe crisis. It is still an open question how to overcome the 
ratification deadlock of the EU´s Treaty on Constitution. The central provisions of the  
Treaty on the Constitution of the European Union were and still are meant to deepen the 
Union, to strengthen the decisiveness and effectiveness  as well as the democratic legitimacy 
of the enlarged EU. In case of definite failure of the Treaty´s ratification by the required entire 
27 Member States, an alternative has to be found that avoids the deficiencies of the Treaty on 
Constitution: 
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The failure of the  Treaty on Constitution to get the approval in the French and Dutch 
plebiscites was held due, partly, to a lack of transparency the French and Dutch voters were 
missing in terms of how to  understand the EU´s Constitution.  The text of the  Treaty is long 
and, to many, bafflingly complex. It actually emerged not as an exactly pretty document 
itself—it runs over 200 pages. And in addition to this technical aspect, an even more 
substantial feeling of scepticism is held responsible for the negative French and Dutch votings 
:a widespread feeling in the EU, that due to the present and future extent of the EU´s 
enlargement, the citizens in the European Union are uncertain about the Union´s  identity and 
legitimacy. The Draft Treaty on EU Constitution was the final result of  a long standing public 
debate on the emerging of a European Constitution. But the discussion about the future EU 
constitution was a discussion between eliterian Members of the Convent. In the view of the 
people  in the EU, the functional role of the EU´s Constitution still kept on being unclear:  In 
their view, the EU Constitution could be a genuine new political and legal instrument to 
create  a EU  Superstate. To others,  the EU´s  Constitution is no instrument to create a EU 
Superstate, and nothing else but  the written text as a better sum up of what already exists : a 
reviewed  Founding Treaty on EU(Nice),already having constitutional quality, but lacking 
transparency and having difficulty in enhancing legitimacy, having difficulty in convincing 
the European  people about the objectives, policies and powers  of the EU. 
Realistic perspectives to overcome the deadlock, whether through modification of the existing 
Treaty on constitution or through fusion of the existing Treaties on EU/EC  need  entire 
ratification in all 27 Member States. To acquire ratification, any realistic alternative has to 
avoid the same deficiencies the Treaty on Constitution  is suffering from as noted above. And 
it has to avoid the deficiencies of the Nice Treaty on EU . 
For, the political leaders in the EU and experts at EU affairs do basically agree that the 
existing Nice Treaty on European Union was and still is no sufficient legal and political 
framework to satisfy the requirements to help the European Union of  then 25 and now 27 or 
even more Member States to respond to future challenges in a world of permanent 
modernization and globalization .  
A mere technical fusion of the existing Treaties on EU/EC would fail again.  
Thorough analyzing the legitimacy potential of the provisions on reforming the 
democracy, transparency and decisiveness of the European Union would facilitate the 
ratification chances. 
3. Reforming the democracy, transparency and decisiveness of the European Union 
would increase legitimacy and facilitate the ratification chances. 
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Chapter V   
The Union and Democracy 
The constitutional quality of the European Union – essentials                            
and perspectives for improving the enlarged EU´s democracy incorporated 
in a concise text of a fusion Treaty of  the existing Treaties on European 
Union and European Community 
 
A. Introduction 
 
I. Political decision required for  alternatives in case of definite ratification failure 
of the current Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe: presenting a modified 
Constitution treaty repeating the label “constitution” or a fusion of  the Treaties on 
EU/EC avoiding the label “constitution” 
 
It is rather a political  than a legal issue to decide – by the Union´s Heads of State or 
Government – whether to present a modified text of the Treaty on Constitution or a fusion of 
the Treaties on EU/EC  as an alternative to overcome the ratification deadlock. 
Both a modified text of the Treaty on Constitution and a fusion of the EU>/EC-Treaties have 
to present convincing solutions to improve the enlarged Union´s democracy, transparency and 
decisiveness. What appears to speak in disfavor of presenting a modified text of the Treaty on 
Constitution is the fact that the text which is called “constitution” has already been disreputed 
by the negative vote in the French and Dutch referenda. It cannot be excluded that a modified 
text which is called “constitution” will also be subject to polemics, misunderstandings and 
allegations that a “Constitution” would be the signal for the European Union to  run for 
“federal” Superstate while the term “federal” in still widespread British understanding is 
having the same meaning as the term “central”. 
It appears, therefore, for reasons of political opportuneness to be more desirable to 
present a fusion of the existing Treaties on EU/EC avoiding the label “constitution” : 
they are substantially treaties assigning constitutional quality to the European Union, 
but they are not called “constitution “.  
 
 
A fusion text, however, in order to enhance the legitimacy and acceptance quality, should be  
--  concise enough and 
--  present the required reform essentials to make the enlarged Union work in terms of 
improved democracy, transparency and decisiveness rather than raising walls of 
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defensive fortifications of national sovereignty. Organising the draft of which is the 
task of the Governments of the  European Union.  
 
A fusion model as alternative to the failing Treaty on Constitution  should  have the same mis- 
sion: to promote and safeguard  European identity.  Not to replace national constiutions, but to 
be a constitutive element of two interdependent and mutually influencing levels –the national 
and the EU level- that both are basic elements of one emerging European constitutional order.  
A fusion model as the European Union pillar of that European constitutional order should  
contain  the essentials of a  constitutional quality of the EU as follows:  
 
 
II. Constitutional quality essentials of the European Union –subject to reforms and 
constituent elements of  a fusion model – to increase democracy, transparency and 
efficiency of the European Union 
 
 
The activities of the European Union have a growing impact on society. European regulations 
are increasingly interwoven with those of national, regional and local authorities. More than a 
third of national regulations are of European origin. The growing importance of the fourth 
level of Government, the EU level – EU policies negotiated and decided by EU institutions 
according to the provisions of the TEU/TEC, means that this level, too, is required to meet 
constitutional quality standards.  
At national level, the authorities are bound by constitutional guarantees and general 
principles of proper administration. On the other hand, the development of the 
constitutional quality of the Union is still incomplete. It does not continue at the same 
level of the Union´s increased  effect on the fortunes of the people in the Member States.  
This risks to further damage the functioning of the EU, as, for example,  the unsuccessful 
French and Dutch plebiscites on the draft Treaty on Constitution had reflected refusal  or 
unvoluntary resentment about the  intention of the Constitution to deepen further European 
integration. Deepening the European Union, however, continues to be of vital importance for 
the peoples of the Union, and it is essential to strengthen support for the development of the 
Union:  
supporting the development of the Union means strengthening the identity, the 
legitimacy of the Union. This requires, therefore, that the same standards of proper 
administration should apply at European level as at national level. On European Union 
level this can be achieved by what the Laeken-Declaration had set as more detailed 
guide-lines for the Convent´s design of the future European Union: 
 
“- to propose a better division of Union and Member State competences; 
 
- to recommend a merger of the Treaties and the attribution of legal personality to the Union; 
 
- to establish a simplification of the Union's instruments of action; 
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- to propose measures to increase the democracy, transparency and efficiency of the European 
Union, by developing the contribution of national Parliaments to the legitimacy of the 
European design, by 
simplifying the decision-making processes, and by making the functioning of the European 
Institutions more transparent and comprehensible;    ”   180 a) 
 
The substance of  the  Laeken-guide-lines,actually,  is aiming at  stabilizing the Union´s  
legitimacy  by applying and improving the  three principles  of 
 
 
 democracy 
 transparency, including subsidiarity ,  and 
 efficiency. 
 
 
 
B.  Increasing democracy,  democratic legitimacy   
      of the    European Union 
 
I. The Treaty on European Union calls for enhancing further the 
democratic and efficient functioning of the Union  institutions 
 
1. Introduction  
 
People have entrusted tasks to the Union expecting “good governance” that they are 
efficiently and accountably carried out. The Maastricht Treaty on EU brought necessary 
improvements. Filling the democratic gap a leftover ? 
 
The Maastricht   Treaty on European Union- TEU- as well as the Amsterdam and Nice 
Treaty on EU declare in the Preamble that the Member States were “ DESIRING to 
enhance further the democratic and efficient functioning of the institutions so as to 
enable them better to carry out, within a single institutional framework, the tasks 
entrusted to them,”. 181) 
  
180a: ibid,supra, note 126. 
181:   Maastricht TEU, Official Journal of the European Communities, 29 July 1992,C 191; 
Amsterdam TEU,Official Journal, 10 November 1997, C 340;  consolidated Treaties, Treaty 
on European Union, Treaty establishing the European Community, Official Journal of the 
European Communities,24 December 2002, C 325/5 and C 325/33 ; 
http://www.ellispub.com/downloads/eu_cons_treaty.pdf); http://www.eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12001C/pdf/12001C_EN.pdf ;  Nice Treaty: Treaty of Nice 
amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities 
and certain related acts,in: Official Journal of the European Communities, 10 March  2001,  C 
80/01).  
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The Member States desire to strengthen what in other words is to be called the 
democratic legitimacy of the European Union. The people have entrusted tasks to the 
Union expecting that they are efficiently and accountably carried out  according to democratic 
principles,otherwise this would not demonstrate a sufficient  constitutional, legitimate reason 
for the transfer of parts of nation states´ sovereign rights to a joint exercise through the EU´s 
institutions.  
  
The  Maastricht TEU  had brought about  the necessary improvements:  
 
 expanding of the legislative and monitoring powers of the European Parliament,  
 codification of respect for human rights,  
 introduction of civil rights and  
 stipulation of the principle that decisions should be taken as closely to the citizen as 
possible. Since the Maastricht Treaty, the national parliaments of the Member States 
have increasingly intensified their influence on the positions their governments adopt 
within the EU Council.   
 
 
2.  Democratic improvement: enlarged legislative powers of the European Parliament 
 
It took a long way to go  from the Vedel-group ´s  studies in 1970,1971 on perspectives to 
enlarge the legislative powers of the European Parliament and to reach at  the 
Maastricht Treaty on EU (1992) .  As  far as regulations in the EU´s 1st pillar, the 
Community, are concerned, the Maastricht Treaty improved the legislative  powers of the 
European Parliament by introducing the co-decision procedure in certain policy areas, 
particularly the internal market. According to Article  189 1st paragraph Maastricht Treaty on 
EU: 
“  
In order to carry out their task and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, the 
European Parliament acting jointly with the Council, the Council and the Commission shall 
make regulations and issue directives, take decisions, make recommendations or deliver 
opinions.”  
Since Maastricht, the Council and the European Parliament are co-legislators: no regulations 
are drawn up without  both agreeing to them. This co-decision procedure is unchanged under 
the Amsterdam Treaty on European Union: Article 249 paragraph 1 Amsterdam  Treaty  
establishing the European Community 182  
 
As to the principle of democracy, this co-decision was a decisive step to get closer to fill the 
democratic gap on the Community level. Although different parts are interconnected while 
making Community legislation, the co-decision procedure has generally proved successful. 
It, therefore, should be extended to replace the cooperation procedure, which, as far as 
the democratic point of view is concerned, is not satisfactory. The cooperation procedure 
still applies  to policy areas such as energy  and environmental protection (Article 175 
paragraph 2 Amsterdam TEU),  public health( Article 152 TEU) ,social(Article 136 ) and 
transport policy(Article 70 TEU) , consumer protection ( Article 153 TEU).  
 
 
182: consolidated version , Official Journal of the European Communities, 24 December  
        2002, C 325/33( 132 ). 
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And, consequently, the Treaty on European Constitution does extend the co-decision 
procedure to replace the cooperation procedure in the fields of   health, safety, environmental 
protection and consumer protection for  establishing and ensuring the functioning of the 
internal market  by making “ European laws or framework laws”: Article III-65 paragraph 1 
 
“ 
Article III-65 
 
1. Save where otherwise provided in the Constitution, this Article shall apply for the 
achievement of the objectives set out in Article III-14. European laws or framework laws shall 
establish measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market. Such laws shall be adopted after consultation of the 
Economic and Social Committee. 
 
………………… 
3. The Commission, in its proposals submitted under paragraph 1 concerning health, safety, 
environmental protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a high level of 
protection, taking account in particular of any new development based on scientific facts. 
Within their respective powers, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers will 
also seek to achieve this objective. “ 
 
3. The European Parliament´s right to consultation before the conclusion of 
international agreements 
 
It is in certain cases requiring unanimous decision-making, that the European Parliament is 
acting beyond merely having the right to consultation: 
 
Treaties signed by the European Community often require the approval of the European 
Parliament . The procedure of  concluding international agreements is layed down in Article 
300 of the consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community,  183)  
 
This Article is unreadible. According to Article 300 3rd paragraph 
“ 
3.The Council shall conclude agreements after consulting the European Parliament,except for the 
agreements referred to in Article 133(3),including cases where the agreement covers a field for which 
the procedure referred to in Article 251 or that referred to in Article 252 is required for the adoption of 
internal rules.The European Parliament shall deliver its opinion within a time limit which the 
Council  may lay down according to the urgency of the matter.In the absence of an opinion 
within that time limit, the Council may act….”. 
 
 
183:consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, Official  
       Journal of the European Commnities,24 December 2002, C 325/33 (  150,151).  
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Article III-227 7th  paragraph second subparagraph of the Treaty on Constitution states: 
 
“7. The Council of Ministers shall adopt a European decision concluding the agreement on a 
proposal by the agreement negotiator. 
Except where agreements relate exclusively to the common foreign and security policy, the 
Council  of Ministers shall adopt the decision referred to in the first subparagraph after 
consulting the European Parliament. .” 
 
And according to Article III-227  7th paragraph third subparagraph : 
“ The European Parliament's consent shall be required for: 
(a) association agreements; 
(b) Union accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms; 
(c) agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organising cooperation 
procedures; 
(d) agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union; 
(e) agreements covering fields to which the legislative procedure applies. 
The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers may, in an urgent situation, agree upon a time-
limit for consent. “ 
 
 
 
4.  Supervision, monitoring:  new power of the European Parliament 
 
 
 As far as supervision, monitoring as an  instrument to respond to complaints from 
citizens of the Union  is concerned, the Maastricht Treaty on EU  had introduced  
 
 the right of any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having 
its registered office in a Member State, “to address  a petition to the European 
Parliament on a matter which comes within the Community's fields of activity and 
which affects him ,her or it directly.”, Maastricht TEU Article 138 d, Amsterdam/Nice 
Treaty on EU Article 194.     184)  
 
 an ombudsman (Maastricht TEU Article 138e (Amsterdam TEU Article 195): 
“empowered to receive complaints from any citizen of the Union or any natural or 
legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State concerning 
instances of maladministration in the activities of the Community institutions or 
bodies, with the exception of the Court of Justice and the  
            Court of First Instance acting in their judicial role.”,  and  
 
 to hold inquiries. , Article 193 TEC.  185  
 
 
184:consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, Official  
       Journal of the European Commnities,24 December 2002, C 325/33 (  115).  
185:ibid.,supra, note 184,C 325/33 (115). 
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The European Parliament, however, has not so far made sufficient use of these powers. As far 
as this is partly caused by the European Parliament itself, the Parliament had not yet 
appointed an ombudsman. Consequently, the Treaty on Constitution, Article III-
237,reminds: 
 
“ 
1. The European Parliament shall appoint anEuropean Ombudsman. ….” 
 
Holding inquiries: 
 It was  due to the Council that the European Parliament has not been able to hold inquiries.  
According to the Amsterdam/Maastricht/Nice Treaty on EU, without approval given by the 
Council and the Commission, the European Parliament  is not allowed to exercise the right to 
inquiry: 
 
According to Amsterdam Treaty on EU Article 193 (ex Maastricht TEU Article 138c) 
“…the European Parliament may, at the request of a quarter of its 
Members, set up a temporary Committee of Inquiry to investigate, without prejudice to the 
powers conferred by this Treaty on other institutions or bodies, alleged contraventions or 
maladministration in the implementation of Community law, except where the alleged facts 
are being examined before a court and while the case is still subject to legal proceedings. 
The temporary Committee of Inquiry shall cease to exist on the submission of its report. 
The detailed provisions governing the exercise of the right of inquiry shall be determined 
common accord of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission.” 186  
 
 
5. Controlling the Commission:  
 
Strenghtening the democatic legitimacy of the European Union under the current legal 
constitution of the Founding Treaties on EU/EC and the proposals made by the Treaty 
on Constitution: 
 
The European  Parliament´s right to control the Commission had been gradually strengthened 
in the course of the three Treaties establishing the European Union  
( Maastricht,Amsterdam,Nice). The European Parliament  has increasingly made use  of its –
under the Maastricht TEU – acquired power to influence the appointment of the 
Commission-  through the right to be consulted  before the Governments nominate the 
person they intend to appoint as President of the Commission, according to  Article 158 
Maastricht Treaty on EU. 187  
 
 
186:ibid.,supra, note 184,C 325/33 (115.) 
187:Official Journal, 29 July 1992, C 191. 
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The European Parliament´s right to be consulted has been strengthened  by  the right to a 
vote of approval concerning  the nomination of the President of the Commission and to 
approve the President and the other Members of the Commission as a body , Article 214 
Amsterdam  TEU: 
«  Article 214 (ex Article 158)  
1. The Members of the Commission shall be appointed, in accordance with the procedure referred to in 
paragraph 2, for a period of five years, subject, if need be, to Article 201.  
Their term of office shall be renewable.  
2. The governments of the Member States shall nominate by common accord the person they intend to appoint 
as President of the Commission; the nomination shall be approved by the European Parliament. 
The governments of the Member States shall, by common accord with the nominee for President, nominate the 
other persons whom they intend to appoint as Members of the Commission.  
The President and the other Members of the Commission thus nominated shall be subject as a body to a vote of 
approval by the European Parliament. After approval by the European Parliament, the President and the other 
Members of the Commission shall be appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States” 
 
” 188  
 
The Nice Treaty on EU Article 214 confirmed the European Parliament´s right to a vote of 
approval concerning  the nomination of the Commission´s President and the nomination of the 
President and the other Members of the Commission as a body, while the nomination of the 
President and the body of the Commission through the Council, under the Amsterdam TEU 
was subject to common accord between the Governments, both nominations are subject to 
qualified majority of the Governments under the Nice Treaty. 189  
 
As far as the right to dismiss a Commissioner or the body of the Commission is 
concerned, the European Parliament has no power under the current legal constitution of 
the Founding Treaties on EU/EC: 
The dismissal of any Member of the Commission who “no longer fulfils the conditions 
required for the performance of his duties or if he has been guilty of serious misconduct, the 
Court of Justice may, on application by the Council or the Commission, compulsorily retire 
him.” Article 216 TEU: the Nice TEU had not amended this Article , the ex-Article 161 
Maastricht TEU. 190   
 
The dismissal of a Commissioner , governed by the existing Treaty on EU, can be called  a 
complex procedure which is a difficult political hurdle to jump over by the European 
Parliament. 
 
 
188:Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union , the Treaties establishing  
        the European Communities and related Acts, Official Journal of the European Commu-  
        nities, 10 November 1997, C 340. 
189: consolidated version –following the Nice Treaty on EU, Official Journal of the European 
        Communities, 24 December 2002, C 325/33 ( 121). 
190: ibid.,supra, note 189, Official Journal of the European Communities, 24 December 2002,  
        C 325/33 ( 121). 
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The Treaty on Constitution attempts to strenghten the  European Parliament´s power of 
control by  
 stating that the  Commission as a College, shall be responsible to the European 
Parliament, and by  
 facilitating  the dismissal procedure through giving the right to pass a censure motion 
on the Commission,  
 
” A European Commissioner  shall resign if the President so requests”, Article 26 3rd 
paragraph Treaty on Constitution. 
 
Article 25 5th paragraph: 
“5. The Commission, as a College, shall be responsible to the European Parliament. 
 
The Commission President shall be responsible to the European Parliament for the activities 
of the Commissioners. Under the procedures set out in Article III-243, the European 
Parliament may pass a censure motion on the Commission. If such a motion is passed, 
the European Commissioners and Commissioners must all resign. The Commission shall 
continue to handle everyday business until a new College is nominated.” 191  
 
The Treaty on Constitution´s Articles 25 and  26 giving the power to the President of the 
Commission to force a Commissioner to resign and even more the European Parliament´s 
right to pass a censure and , if  a motion is passed, to force the Commission to resign  can be 
regarded as a breakthrough  to actually further strengthen the European Parliament´s power to 
influence a dismissal of a Commissioner and, actually, to exercise  the right to dismiss the 
College .  This would further fill the democratic gap on EU level 
 
 
6. Despite  improvements of the Union´s democratic quality through introduction of co-
decision legislative power of the European Parliament a democratic gap still exists: 
 
Despite those improvements, neither  the Amsterdam Treaty on EU nor the  Nice TEU 192   
do  correct the democratic deficit which is still existing on EU level.  It was up to the Treaty 
on Constitution  to make a clear statement on the principle of representative democracy:  
 
 In TITLE VI THE DEMOCRATIC LIFE OF THE UNION  the Treaty on Constitution states 
by  Article 45: “  The principle of representative democracy 
1. The working of the Union shall be founded on the principle of representative democracy. 
2. Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament. Member 
States are represented in the European Council and in the Council of Ministers by their 
governments, themselves accountable to national parliaments, elected by their citizens. 
3. Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. 
Decisions shall be taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen. 
4. Political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and 
to expressing the will of Union citizens. “193 
 
 
191: Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Official Journal of the European  
        Union, 18 July 2003, C 169/01  ( 14 ). 
192:ibid.,supra, notes 188,189. 
193:ibid.,supra,note 191, C 169/01 ( 19 ). 
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No doubt about the fact that the Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the 
European Parliament. And the European Parliament´s  right of co-decision in legislation 
“acting jointly with the Council”  is well established. 
 And it is true that the (national) Members of the Council of Ministers are Members of 
national Governments each of which is accountable to and  controlled by national Parliaments 
which have been democratically elected by their citizens in national elections. The 
democratic gap, the democratic deficit on EU level, however, is, to a certain extent, a 
matter of concern about decisions made by the Council by majority voting in which 
national parliaments do not have an adequate say while the Council does not depend on 
the European Parliament. The political monitoring of the  Council by the European 
Parliament is no real parliamentary control which is effective only by the power to 
release the acting executive from office. And the European Parliament has not that 
power in relation with the Council. 
 
Counterbalancing the lacking comprehensive democratic control of the Council, c 
concerning all the legislative acts of general application ( EC laws) taken by the EU´s 
institutions, national Parliaments should have  control over them . 
 
The question, then , is :does the Treaty establishing a Constitution fill the democratic 
gap by strengthening the participation of national Parliaments in the EU´s legislation? 
 
 
 
II.  The role of national Parliaments: Filling the Union´s democratic gap ? 
 
Enhancing the Union´s  legitimacy through transparency of the decision-
making process: Openness of government and the right of national 
parliaments to timely and comprehensive information ; national 
Parliaments and the principle of subsidiarity 
 
1.  More than a decade´s combat for the right  of national Parliaments to information 
on Union legislation 
 
The role of  national Parliaments contributing to the Union´s legitimacy through the right 
of parliaments to timely and comprehensive information during the Union´s legislation 
procedures on justice and home affairs had already been discussed by  the 1996  Intergovern- 
mental Conference on preparing the Amsterdam Treaty on the Union. A  right to get informed  
was related to decision-making also in other fields of the Union´s policy-making. In 1996  
good reasons were felt for including a specific provision in the Amsterdam Treaty on the 
Union which should lay down the national Parliaments´ right   of information.  
 
Until then the procedure of information of national Parliaments on the Commission´s 
legislative proposals was not ruled by provisions of the Treaty on European Union. A formal 
legal position of the national Parliaments to get informed as soon as possible was based on 
national agreements concluded between the national Government and the national Parliament. 
In Germany, before the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, the German 
Government regularly informed the German Länder as soon as possible on Community 
legislative projects, the information procedure had been ageed upon by the German Govern-
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ent and the German Länder. The Länder wanted to influence the German Government´s 
positioning in European matters that would influence the Länders´ compentences and 
interests. After the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on EU, the information procedure 
did not change,in principal, the legal basis, however,changed: the former administrative 
agreement between the German Government and the German Länder had been put on a new 
safe legal basis: on a German federal law. The German Länder had successfully made a 
bargain: they gave their consent to ratification of the Maastricht  Treaty under the condition 
that the German Government  
 
 accepted the Länders´ right to  information to be guaranteed in the German 
Constitution (Grundgesetz) while the details of the information procedure were subject 
to principles laid down in a German federal law; and in view of the fact that  
 the German Government had successfully negotiated the insertion of the principle of 
subsidiarity in the Treaty on EU.(Article G 4th paragraph inserting Article 3 b in the 
Treaty establishing the Treaty on the European Economic Commuunty, the clause on 
the principle of subsidiarity). 194)    
  
The Governments of the Member States ,however, in the course of the IGC 1996/97,actually 
failed to agree on the inclusion of a specific provision on national Parliaments´ right of 
information directly in the Treaty articles , but  they agreed  upon  the “Protocol(no.9) on the 
role of national parliaments in the European Union(1997) “, annexed to the  (Amsterdam ) 
Treaty on European Union : 
 
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,  
 
RECALLING that scrutiny by individual national parliaments of their own government in 
relation to the activities of the Union is a matter for the particular constitutional organisation 
and practice of each Member State,  
 
DESIRING, however, to encourage greater involvement of national parliaments in the 
activities of the European Union and to enhance their ability to express their views on matters 
which may be of particular 
interest to them,  
 
HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaties establishing the European Communities,  
 
I. INFORMATION FOR NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS OF MEMBER STATES  
 
1. All Commission consultation documents (green and white papers and 
communications) shall be promptly forwarded to national parliaments of the 
Member States.  
 
 
 
 
194: Maastricht Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Communities,  
        29 July 1992, C 191. 
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2. Commission proposals for legislation as defined by the Council in accordance 
with Article 151(3) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, shall be made 
available in good time so that the government of each Member State may 
ensure that its own national parliament receives them as appropriate.  
 
3. A six-week period shall elapse between a legislative proposal or a proposal for a measure to 
be adopted under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union being made available in all 
languages to the European Parliament and the Council by the Commission and the date when 
it is placed on a Council agenda for decision either for the adoption of an act or for adoption 
of a common position pursuant to Article 189b or 189c of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, subject to exceptions on grounds of urgency, the reasons for which 
shall be stated in the act or common position.” 195)   
  
 
Consequently, the role of the national Parliaments contributing to the Union´s legitimacy 
through the right of parliaments to timely and comprehensive information during the Union´s 
legislation procedure, then had been emphasized by the Convention preparing the text of the 
Draft Treaty on the Constitution for Europe. The Convention had identified responses to the 
questions put in the Laeken declaration: 
 
- it proposes a  better division of Union and Member State competences; 
 
- it recommends a merger of the Treaties and the attribution of legal personality to the Union; 
 
- it proposes  a simplification of the Union's instruments of action; 
 
“- it proposes measures to increase the democracy, transparency and efficiency 
of the European Union, by developing the contribution of national 
Parliaments to the legitimacy of the European design, by simplifying the decision-
making processes, and by making the functioning of the European Institutions more 
transparent and comprehensible;” 196 )   
 
Following this line, as regards the right of  national parliaments to timely and 
comprehensive information on “ European laws and framework laws” ,the 
Treaty establishing a  Constitution for Europe confirms the basic principles in the 
“ The PROTOCOL ON THE ROLE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION” 
197 ) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 195:  Treaty of Amsterdam, Official Journal of the European Communities, 10 November  
          1997, C340. 
196:   see the Preface of the Draft Treaty on the Constitution, Official Journal of the European  
          Union, 18 July 2003, C 169/7 . 
197:  Treaty establishing a  Constitution for Europe, Official Journal of the European Union,  
          16 December 2004, C 310/01 (  204  ). 
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The Treaty provision Article 24, paragraph 4,  states that, in cases of qualified majority 
making decisions , the European Council can adopt a decision allowing the Council of 
Ministers to act by qualified majority,and: 
 
 
1.1 National Parliaments shall be informed  before European laws are adopted in    
      ordinary legislative procedure 
 
National Parliaments shall be informed  b e f o r e  the European Council shall adopt, by 
unanimity, a decision  allowing for the adoption of European laws or framework laws 
according to the ordinary legislative procedure where the Constitution provides in Part 
III for European laws and framework laws to be adopted by the Council of Ministers 
according to a special legislative procedure: 
“Where the Constitution provides in Part III for European laws and framework laws to be 
adopted by the Council of Ministers according to a special legislative procedure, the 
European Council can adopt, on its own initiative and by unanimity, after a period of 
consideration of at least six months, a decision allowing for the adoption of such 
European laws or framework laws according to the ordinary legislative procedure. 
The European Council shall act after consulting the European Parliament and informing 
the national Parliaments.”, Article 24 “Qualified majority” 4th paragraph ,1st 
subparagraph.        198)  
 
1.2 National Parliaments shall be informed before extension of majority voting in a given  
     case:  
 
National Parliaments shall be informed no less than  four months before the European Council 
takes a decision ,by unanimity, on the   political important matter of  extending majority 
voting by allowing the Council of Ministers to act by qualified majority in a given area, where 
the Constitution provides in Part III for the Council of Ministers to act unanimously, Article 
24 4th paragraph,2nd subparagraph. 199   
 
1.3  National Parliaments participate in evaluation of  implementing the area of  
       freedom, security and justice 
 
According to Article 41  2nd paragraph,on  specific provisions for implementing the area 
of freedom, security and justice, stipulates  the participation of national parliaments in  
evaluation mechanisms: 
 
“2. Within the area of freedom, security and justice, national parliaments may participate 
in the evaluation mechanisms foreseen in Article III-161, and shall be involved in the 
political monitoring of Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust's activities in accordance 
with Articles III-177 and III-174. 
 
 
198: Draft Treaty on the Constitution, Official Journal of the European Union, 18 July 2003,  
        C 169/01 ( 13 ); Treaty establishing a  Constitution for Europe, Official Journal of the  
        European Union,   16 December 2004, C 310/01 
199:ibid.,supra,note 198.  
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2. National Parliaments and the principle of subsidiarity 
 
The unmistakenly clear provision on the role of national Parliaments in ensuring the imple  - 
mentation of the principle of subsidiarity is inserted in the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe – TCE -:  
 
According to the TCE , Part I, Title III Union Competences, Article 9 : Fundamental 
principles, 3rd paragraph, last sentence: “ National Parliaments shall  ensure compliance with 
that principle( of subsidiarity) in accordance with the procedure set out in the Protocol” ,   200  
and explicitly referred to by Article III-160 1st pararaph , Article III- 174, Article III- 177 2nd  
paragraph  in matters of proposals and legislatives initiatives in the field of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters  and  police cooperation as well as in matters of evaluation of 
Eurojust´s activities and the laying down of procedures  for scrutiny of  Europol´s activities: 
 
 Article III-160, states: 
 
“ 
1. Member States’ national Parliaments shall ensure that the proposals and legislative 
initiatives  submitted under Sections 4 and 5 of this Chapter comply with the 
principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with the arrangements in the Protocol on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
Member States’ national Parliaments may participate in the evaluation mechanisms contained 
in Article III-161 and in the political monitoring of Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust’s 
activities in accordance with Articles III-177 and III-174. ““   201)   
 
 
Member States’ national Parliaments may send to the Presidents of the European 
Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the Commission a reasoned opinion on 
whether a legislative proposal complies with the principle of subsidiarity, according to 
the procedure laid down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.”  202)   
 
 
 
Consequently, referring to Article III-160 of the  Treaty on the Constitution for Europe, 
the  PROTOCOL ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF 
SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY, paragraph 3 delineates  the participation 
of national Parliaments in the decision-making process on monitoring the application of 
the principle of subsidiarity in the law-making process of the Union/Community: 203)  
 
 
200:ibid.,supra,note 198, C 169/01  (10 ).and Treaty establishing a  Constitution for Europe,  
        Official Journal of the European Union,   16 December 2004, C 310/01 
201:ibid.,supra,note 200, C 169/01 ( 68, 70, 71). 
202: draft Treaty on the Constitution, Official Journal of the European Union, 18 July 2003,  
        C 169/01(57,58). 
203: Treaty establishing a  Constitution for Europe, Official Journal of the European Union,  
          16 December 2004, C 310/01 (  207 ). 
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“The Commission shall send all its legislative proposals and its amended 
proposals to the national Parliaments of the Member States at the same time 
as to the Union legislator. Upon adoption, legislative resolutions of the 
European Parliament and positions of the Council of Ministers shall be sent 
to the national Parliaments of the Member States.” 
“ 
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
WISHING to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens of the 
Union, 
RESOLVED to establish the conditions for the application of the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality, as enshrined in Article I-9 of the Constitution, and to establish a system 
for monitoring the application of those principles by the Institutions, 
 
HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the 
Constitution: 
1. Each Institution shall ensure constant respect for the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, as laid down in Article I-9 of the Constitution. 
 
2. Before proposing legislative acts, the Commission shall consult widely. Such 
consultations shall, where appropriate, take into account the regional and local dimension of 
the action envisaged. In cases of exceptional urgency, the Commission shall not conduct such 
consultations. It shall give reasons for the decision in its proposal. 
 
3. The Commission shall send all its legislative proposals and its amended proposals to 
the national Parliaments of the Member States at the same time as to the Union legislator. 
Upon adoption, legislative resolutions of the European Parliament and positions of the 
Council of Ministers shall be sent to the national Parliaments of the Member States.” 
 
 3.  Flexibility clause and national Parliaments 
 
The European Commission “ shall draw  national Parliaments´attention to proposals” 
based on the flexibility clause: 
 
“ARTICLE 17, Flexibility clause,  
1. If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined 
in Part III, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Constitution, and the Constitution has 
not provided the necessary powers, the Council of Ministers, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the European Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures. 
2. Using the procedure for monitoring the subsidiarity principle referred to in Article  9 (3), 
the European Commission shall draw national Parliaments' attention to proposals based on 
this Article. 
3. Measures based on this Article shall not entail harmonisation of Member States' laws or 
regulations in cases where the Constitution excludes such harmonisation.” 204)  
 
 
204:draft  Treaty establishing a  Constitution for Europe, Official Journal of the European  
        Union, 18 July 2003, C 169/ 01 ( 11 ). Treaty establishing a  Constitution for Europe, 
        Official Journal of the  European Union,   16 December 2004, C 310/01 
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4. National Parliaments  participation in the Union´s acts in fields of   
intergovernmental cooperation ? 
 
The Treaty on Constitution,  CHAPTER II SPECIFIC PROVISIONS ARTICLE 39,  relating 
to implementing  common foreign and security policy, does  not provide national 
Parliaments´ participation in the Union´s acts in the field of common foreign and security 
policy. 205) 
 
But according to ARTICLE 41 “Specific provisions for implementing  the area of freedom, 
security and justice”  ,paragraph 2. “ Within the area of freedom, security and justice,  
national parliaments may participate in the evaluation mechanisms foreseen  for in Article 
III-161,  and  shall be involved in the political monitoring of Europol and the evaluation of 
Eurojust's activities in accordance with Articles III-177 and III-174.”         206)  
 
 
5. National Parliaments shall be notified of  Union Membership application 
 
Title TITLE IX  
UNION MEMBERSHIP 
ARTICLE 57 
Conditions of eligibility and procedure for accession to the Union 
1. The Union shall be open to all European States which respect the values referred to in 
Article 2, and are committed to promoting them together. 
2. Any European State which wishes to become a member of the Union shall address its 
application to the Council. The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be 
notified of this application. The Council shall act unanimously after consulting the 
Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, which shall act by a 
majority of its component members. The conditions and arrangements for admission shall be 
the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the candidate State. That 
agreement shall be subject to ratification by each contracting State, in accordance with its 
respective constitutional requirements.” 207)    
 
 
 
205: Draft Treaty on the Constitution,Official Journal of the European Union, 18 July 2003, C  
        169/01 (  17 );Treaty establishing a  Constitution for Europe, Official Journal of the  
        European Union,   16 December 2004, C 310/01. 
206:ibid.,supra, note 205, draft Treaty on Constitution, C 169/01 ( 18 ); Treaty establishing a   
        Constitution for Europe, Official Journal of the European Union,   16 December 2004, C  
         310/01. 
207: ibid.,supra note 205, C  169/01  ( 21 ); Treaty establishing a  Constitution  for Europe,  
        Official Journal of the European Union,   16 December 2004, C  310/01. 
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III.  Comment on the  Constitution Treaty´s   democracy related  
       provisions: do they help to increase the Union´s  democratic legitimacy  
       through giving  national Parliaments a better  say as before and  
       necessary? 
1. European Parliament´s  co-decision legislative power under the Constitution Treaty 
provisions may be left unchanged and extended to replace cooperation procedures 
 
As to the issue of strengthening the European Union´s  principle of democracy, the  
introduction – through the Maastricht Treaty on EU -  of the co-decision legislative power for  
the European Parliament was a decisive step to get closer to fill the democratic gap on the 
Union/Community level. Although different parts are interconnected while making 
Community legislation, the co-decision procedure has generally proved successful. It, 
therefore, should be extended to replace the cooperation procedure, which, as far as the 
democratic point of view is concerned, is not satisfactory. The – Council´s unanimous 
voting-  cooperation procedure still applies  to policy areas such as energy  and environmental 
protection (Article 175 paragraph 2 Nice  Treaty establishing the European Community- 
TEC- ), social(Article 137 2nd paragraph 2nd subparagraph) and transport policy(Article 71 2nd 
paragraph TEC).. 208   
 
And, consequently, the  draft and the Treaty establishing a Constitution  for Europe – TCE -
does extend the majority-voting co-decision procedure to replace existing cooperation 
procedures for  establishing and ensuring the functioning of the internal market  by making “ 
European laws or framework laws”: Article III-65 paragraph 1. 209    
 
This achievement: 
 introduction of the European Parliament´s co-decision legislative power and  
 its extension to replace cooperation procedures for establishing and ensuring the 
functioning of the internal market -   
should  easily be integrated in a new draft modifying the Treaty on Constitution or in a 
merger Treaty merging the two Treaties on EU and EC. 
 
2. Participation of national Parliaments 
 
In cases where the Council (of Ministers)  takes decisions unanismously, irrespective of 
whether they involve legislation or policy, parliamentary involvement is in principle 
guaranteed through the national parliaments. It is their constitutional task they have to  
fulfil  what they are elected for: to control Governments´ exercise of public power, no 
difference whether  national or jointly exercised level called Union level.  
 
The internal relationship between national Governments and national Parliaments is not 
a matter with which the  Treaty on EU Constitution or a merger/fusion Treaty 
substituting the Treaty on Constitution in case of falling short of the entire ratification  
 
 
208: consolidated version Treaty establishing the European Community, Official Journal of  
         the European Community, 24 December 2002, C 325/33 ( 108, 94, 62).  
209: Official Journal of the European Union, 18 July 2003, C 169/01 ( 38 ); Official Journal  
         of the European Union, 16 December 2004, C 310/01. 
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needs to deal. However,   the Treaty on Constitution or  the drawing up of a merger 
Treaty merging the Treaties on EU/EC are offering the chance to help to ensure that 
national Parliaments can obtain better access to information at an earlier stage and 
more efficiently . And this is  the explicit intention of the Constitution Treaty´s 
provisions: to inform the national parliaments before the respective actions of the EU 
institutions are taken.  
 These provisions are not directly giving national parliaments a better say as before. It is up to 
the national parliaments to establish and improve procedures within their internal relationship 
between national Governments and national Parliaments to ensure the Parliaments´ influence 
on the position the national Government is planning to design and present within the EU´s 
council. That is the procedure to follow also in the cases of ensuring  “compliance with the 
Principle of subsidiarity “.  
 
The Article 9 3rd paragraph of the Treaty on Constitution , Part I, Title III Union 
Competences: “ National Parliaments shall  ensure compliance with that principle( of 
subsidiarity) in accordance with the procedure set out in the Protocol”  .          210)   
 This provision does not assign a direct right to intervention by the national parliaments: 
they have to “play the game “ directly with their own governments: 
 
For, it is a matter of constitutional standard within all EU Member States that the real 
power of a national Parliament cannot extend further than the influence it exercises on 
the own Government. National Parliaments may hold their Governments to vote against  
specific EU legislation on the Council´s agenda. The range of European actions for  
Parliaments to direct the course of  their country´s European interests is rather limited.  
 
National Parliaments are free to  strengthen their influence by enhanced 
interparliamentary cooperation only: enabling likeminded national Parliaments to 
influence their respective Governments. The success of this approach of strengthening 
interparliamentary cooperation depends on the national Parliaments´ initiative. However, 
whenever unanimous votes in the Council are needed, the chances to reach unanimity are torn 
down by one national Parliament and by one Member State only unwilling to join one 
common interparliamentary position.  
 
3. The European Parliament can act as an helpful agent, a catalyst for national 
Parliaments 
 
In cases of  lack of joint interparliamentary positions, the European Parliament can act as  
an helpful agent, a catalyst to bring national Parliaments into cooperative and 
constructive relationship with the Council and the Commission: 
 
It is helpful, therefore, that the European Parliament  has  the right to be consulted in 
cases of decisions requiring unanimity according to Article 24 4th paragraph 1st 
subparagraph of the Treaty on Constitution. 
  
 
210: ibid., supra, note 209, C 169/01 (  10 ); 
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It is helpful for organising cooperative ties between national Parliaments and the European 
Parliament that the  European Parliament has the right to be  regularly consulted on the 
main aspects and basic choices of the common  foreign and security policy and  of the 
common security and defence policy and to  be kept informed according to Article 39 6th 
paragraph and Article 40 8th paragraph  of  the Treaty Constitution 211)  
 
The European Parliament´s right to  consultation also presupposes that the European 
Parliament has an adequate right of access to information on actualities  together with 
regular information on the general shaping of the EU´s policies to follow  how  the Council´s 
policy evolves. 
 
4. The European Parliament´s right to consultation before the conclusion of 
international agreements 
 
The unreadible Article 300 of the consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community – TEC-  providing the European  Parliament´s right to consultation 
before the conclusion of international agreements should be  replaced by a readible version 
which, at the same time, resolves the uncertainties caused by  the text´s ambiguous range of 
interpretation. 212)    
 
As Article 300 3rd paragraph, 1st  sentence states: 
“3.The Council shall conclude agreements after consulting the European 
Parliament,…….”:  
This text  keeps open several interpretations of what “consulting” exactly means. 
Efficiency and democracy require  a less ambiguous  formula. The merger/fusion Treaty 
should bring more clarity and may accept what the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe stipulates for the conclusion of agreements with one or more third countries or 
international  organisations according to Article III- 225 TCE . 213) 
 Article III-227 7th paragraph of the Treaty Constitution  is a less ambiguous formula than 
Article 300 3rd paragraph. TEC.  Article III-227 7th  paragraph second subparagraph of the 
Treaty on Constitution states by clarifying, in the 3rd subparagraph, what “consultation” 
means:  
 
“7. The Council of Ministers shall adopt a European decision concluding the agreement on a 
proposal by the agreement negotiator. 
Except where agreements relate exclusively to the common foreign and security policy, the 
Council  of Ministers shall adopt the decision referred to in the first subparagraph after 
consulting the European Parliament. The European Parliament shall deliver its opinion 
within a time-limit which the Council of Ministers may lay down according to the urgency of 
the matter. In the absence of an opinion within that time-limit, the Council of Ministers may 
act.” : That provision leaves no  ambiguous range of interpretation of what “ the Council of 
Ministers shall adopt the decision(concluding the agreement) after consulting the European  
 
 
211:ibid., supra,note 210, C 169/01 (17,18 ). 
212 :consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, Official 
        Journal of the European Commnities,24 December 2002, C 325/33 (  150,151). 
213: Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Official Journal of the European  
        Union (OJ), 18 July 2003, C  169/ 01 (72). Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
        OJ, 16 December 2004, C  310/01. 
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Parliament” exactly means. It means: The Council shall conclude agreements after 
consent given by the European Parliament in those cases as explicitly  stated in Article 
III-227  7th paragraph third subparagraph : 
 
“ The European Parliament's consent shall be required for: 
(a) association agreements; 
(b) Union accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms; 
(c) agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organising cooperation 
procedures; 
(d) agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union; 
(e) agreements covering fields to which the legislative procedure applies. 
The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers may, in an urgent situation, 
agree upon a time-limit for consent. “   214)   
 
 
5. Supervision, monitoring: right to petition and holding inquiries 
 
a) As to the efficient use of the right to petition through a European Ombudsman 
the Constitution´s reminder Article III-237 : “ 2. The European Parliament shall appoint a 
European Ombudsman….”   should be an essential part of a Merger Treaty to enable the  
European Parliament to make sufficient use of its  power to be addressee of citizens´ petitions 
and to efficiently respond to petitions. 215)  
 
 It was  due to the Council that the European Parliament has not been able to hold inquiries.  
According to the Amsterdam/Maastricht Treaty on EU, without approval given by the Council 
and the Commission,the European Parliament was and also under the Treaty on Constitution 
still is not allowed to exercise the right to inquiry. 
 
b) As to the European Parliaments right of inquiry, the efficient use of this power depends ,  
as noted above,under the existing constitutional provision of Nice, Amsterdam Treaty on EU 
Article 193, on “provisions governing the exercise of the right of inquiry by common accord 
of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission.”  The Treaty on Constitution  
clears previous uncertainties whether the  Parliament could act on its  own 
initiative.According to the Constitution Article III-235, it shall now  be precisely by “ a 
European law of the European Parliament” that shall lay down the  “detailed provisions “ 
governing  the  exercise of the right of inquiry”. 216) 
 
What, in addition to the precise stipulation of a  “European law” as the legal basis to 
determine the exercise of the right of inquiry, is substantially new: that the European 
Parliament  shall act  on its own initiative after obtaining the approval of the Council of 
Ministers and of the Commission. 
 
 
214: ibid.,supra, note 213,  C 169/01  ( 73 ). 
215: ibid., supra, note 214, C 169/01  ( 75 ). 
216: ibid., supra note 213,  C 169/01 ( 75 ). 
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 This right to act on its own initiative is a substantial extension of the rights of  the 
Parliament and can be called innovation to strengthen the monitoring power of the 
European Parliament and thus strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the European 
Union.  
 
 
 
6. Controlling the Commission: strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the 
European Union 
 
The European Parliament´s right to control the Commission is part of the democratic 
legitimacy of the European Union. The extent of that right and the real power to make 
efficient use of that right for the benefit of the citizens in the European Union  is a substantial 
legitimacy shaping element of the democratic identity of the European Union. The importance 
of that identity essential is obvious in view of the legal constitution that still makes the 
Council the real power player in legislation, though the Council is not under the control of the 
direct elected Members of the European Parliament. 
 
As noted above, the European  Parliament´s power to influence the nomination of the 
Commission and thus to exert control over the Commission  has gradually, under the 
current legal constitution of the Founding Treaties on EU/EC, been  strengthened:  
it developed  from the right to be consulted to the right to a vote of approval concerning  the 
nomination of the Commission´s President and the nomination of the President and the other 
Members of the Commission as a body. The respective  Article  214 of the Treaty on EU – 
consolidated version under the Nice Treaty- should be an essential part of a merger 
Treaty. 
 
The European Parliament´s power to control the Commission through direct influence 
exerted on the Commission´s nomination and appointment could be further strengthened  if 
the composition of the Commission is altered in such a way that no Member State has a right 
to its “own” commissioner. According to the Treaty on Constitution, Articles 25 and 26,  
however, European Commissioners shall be selected on the basis of a system of equal rotation 
between the Member States, which leaves the principle of an “own” commissioner un-
changed. There appears no reason to see that political situation may change .  
 
As far as the right to dismiss a Commissioner or the body of the Commission is 
concerned,  and in view of the legal situation , as noted above, that under the current legal 
constitution of the Founding Treaties on EU/EC the European Parliament has no power to 
dismiss a Commissioner or the College, the Treaty on Constitution is presenting a 
substantial breakthrough:  
 
The Treaty on Constitution´s Articles 25 and  26 giving the power to the President of the 
Commission to force a Commissioner to resign and giving the power to the  European 
Parliament´s right to pass a censure and , if  a motion is passed, to force the Commission 
to resign. This  right of the European Parliament to pass a censure may actualls further  
strengthen the European Parliament´s power to control the Commission..  
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This would further fill the democratic gap on EU level and  strenghten the legitimacy of 
the European Union. The Treaty on Constitution´s Articles 25 and 26 should be an 
essential part of the merger Treaty. 
 
 
Chapter VI    
The Union and Transparency 
The constitutional quality of the European Union – essentials                            
and perspectives for improving the enlarged EU´s transparency 
incorporated in a concise text of a fusion Treaty of  the existing Treaties on 
European Union and European Community 
 
 
I. Introduction: the interdependencies of transparency, democratic  
    accountablity ,  acceptability and legitimacy of the European Union 
 
The constitutional quality of the European Union is not determined by the features of its 
democratic principle only. It also depends on its transparency of  what the Union stands 
for: thus marking the distinct identity shaping essentials. 
 
The European Union´s identity  and  legitimacy are closely interconnected. The better 
the Union´s essentials, the more its distinct features are clearly discernible for the 
peoples of Europe who may recognize its ability to solve problems the single Member 
States cannot solve any more, the better it is for improving the Union´s democratic 
accountability, acceptance, better: legitimacy. The Union´s acceptability depends on  its 
transparency of what exactly the Union does and of  how it does it and  of  what it is all 
about: the transparency of  its objectives, tasks, competences, institutions, powers. It is 
obvious, Public confidence in good governance practised by the European Union 
depends on the Union´s transparency. 
 
Public confidence in the European Union depends not only on its ability to solve 
problems challenging the peoples of Europe across national borders. Public confidence 
in the European Union depends also on the extent to which the public European 
decision-making process as layed down in the legal constitution: the Founding Treaty on 
European Union  is accessible and intelligible, accountable. The Maastricht Treaty had 
n o t helped to increase the Treaty´s  accessibility.   
 
Improvements, therefore, needed to be made in this respect. Various options are 
recognizable in the course of the process to reform the legal constitution of the European 
Union: 
 
 First, the principle of open government needs to be regulated clearly and 
properly at European level. This includes  
 an accountable distinguishable attribution of powers ( competencies ) to the 
European Union: if problems can be solved only at European level, the EU must 
 199
be given the necessary powers and instruments, providing in each case of EU 
legislation an accountable explanation as to why EU/EC  regulations are 
required, whereas the European Union must leave to the Member States those 
matters that they can handle themselves on national level only( principle of 
subsidiarity). And, in addition, 
 Second, decision-making procedures can be considerably simplified in order 
to improve the Union´s efficiency. 
 Third, the merger EU Treaty can be formulated more clearly , more concisely, 
without meddling with its content: 
-- objectives of the EU ( raison d´ ètre ) 
-- fundamental rights of the peoples in the EU 
-- competencies, tasks of the  EU, clearly distinguishable from Member States´  
    competencies 
-- instruments:  institutions and law-making powers of the EU 
       --basic rules of  decision-making procedure. 
 
 detailed rules for the application of the merger Treaty are decided by the EU 
institutions according to the law-making procedures. 
 Fourth, the quality of EU legislation can be improved 
 
 
II.   Principle of Openness of  European governance by legislation 
 
The European Parliament and the Council are the co-legislators, as well as being  
institutions for conferring, holding political consultations. European legislation 
increasingly affects the public directly. The openness of  European governance by 
legislation therefore needs to be properly regulated if European Union´s legitimacy shall 
be improved through transparency and accountability of EU legislation in the 
peoples´view. Two aspects should be dealt with: 
 
 public awareness of what exactly the European Union is needed for and of what 
exactly  are the Union´ s  powers clearly distinguishable from the Member States´ 
powers, the principle of subsidiarity aspect, and  
 
 public and parliamentary access to information and clarity in decision-making. 
 
 
1. The Principle of subsidiarity  in all Founding Treaties on EU and in the Treaty 
establishing a  Constitution for Europe 
 
1.1    Introduction: subsidiarity of Union action ensures the Union´s  
          acceptability and legitimacy 
 
The principle of subsidiarity has met comprehensive  recognition in all Founding 
Treaties on EU as well as in the Treaty on Constitution.  This is no matter of course. 
For, in view of different traditions to balance central power levels of Governance and 
decentralised levels of power in the Member States, it was due to German efforts made 
in the course of  the Intergovernmental Conference preparing the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union that the Member States accepted to insert  the principle of subsidiarity 
 200
in the Treaty´s text. The traditional concerns of the German Länder to prevent 
unitarian approaches to the issue of distributing the powers between Union level and 
Member States´level had lead the German Länder  to successfully defend their sovereign 
rights in the course of further communitarization. And the principle of subsidiarity was 
their victorious vehicle.  
 
European Governance is not an end in itself. Specifically  exercising Governance in the 
Community way-through the European Community, the Union´s 1st pillar legislation-  
the legislative competencies the Union´s Member States confer on the Union are not an 
end in themselves: European Governance has the mission to achieve common objectives, 
common to the Member States and as laid  down in the Founding Treaty through which 
the Member States have conferred parts of their sovereign nation states´powers  to a 
common pooling and jointly exercising the common powers. In order to improve the 
Union´s acceptance in the public, whatever the Union-through the Union´s institutions – 
takes action to attain objectives the Member States have in common, it must be clearly 
distinguishable what exactly are the objectives the Union is striving for. It means that a 
merger Treaty´s provisions  have to make it clearly distinguishable  where the Member 
States are no longer able to offer satisfactory answers to common social , economic and 
political challenges. 
 
The prerequisite for legitimacy building acceptance of the European Union is that  the 
Member States, when drafting and presenting a merger Treaty, are visibly committed to 
the basic principle:   
that decisions  of the European Union´s institution should be taken as closely to  the 
citizen.  
 
1.2 The principle of subisidiarity under the EU´s  founding Treaty and  
      Treaty on Constitution 
 
a)     General Definition 
 
“In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take 
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States  
either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason 
of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better  achieved at Union 
level.”, Article 9  3rd paragraph Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,  
217) 
 
The  principle of subsidiarity and its functional role was mentioned  for the first time  in the 
history of the EU founding Treaties in the Preamble and in  Article A of the Maastricht 
Treaty on EU – TEU- by stating:  
 
 
217:ibid.supra, note 213, C 169/01 ( 10 ). 
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“Preamble:….. 
RESOLVED to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples 
of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity ,..” 
 
 
” Article A:……. 
This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen. “  218) 
 
And the general definition of the principle of subsidiarity, as noted above, is stipulated by   
Maastricht TEU Article G  paragraph 5 amending the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, amending by inserting Article 3b  Treaty on Community . 
 
 
The principle of subsidiarity was reaffirmed by the Amsterdam Treaty on Union, by the 
Laeken Declaration on the future Constitution and, actually, by the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution: 
“ 
TITLE III: UNION COMPETENCES 
Article 9: Fundamental principles 
1. The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The use of 
Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. 
 
3. Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives 
of the intended action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, 
either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason 
of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better  achieved at Union 
level. 
The Union Institutions shall apply the principle of subsidiarity as laid down in the Protocol 
on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, annexed to the 
Constitution. National Parliaments shall ensure compliance with that principle in accordance 
with the procedure set out in the Protocol.”  219)  
 
The Constitution´s text follows the political orientation line given by the Laeken 
Declaration of the Heads of State or Government: 
 
 
218: :Maastricht Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Communities,  
         92/C 191/01. 
219: The “Laeken Declaration”, ibid.,supra.note 126, the  draft Treaty establishing a  Consti- 
         tution for Europea,in: Official Journal of the  European Union, 18 July 2003, C 169/01  
         ( 10) ; OJ 16 December 2004, C 310/01; the   Nice Treaty on EU, consolidated version  
         of the Treaty establishing the European   Community, Official Journal of the European  
         Communities 24 December.2002, C  325/33 ( 42). 
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The Laeken declaration , noted above, reaffirmed  the principle of subsidiarity  embedding it 
in the European Union´s legitimacy as derived from the Union´s democratic values as laid 
down in the Union´s legal constitution and practised by the Union´s living constitution. The 
Union´s legitimacy as derived from the Union´s objectives it pursues and derived from the 
powers and instruments it possesses, as well as derived from  democratic, transparent and 
efficient institutions: 
 
 “A first series of questions that needs to be put concerns how the division of competence 
can be made more transparent. Can we thus make  a clearer distinction between three 
types of competence: the exclusive competence of the Union, the competence of the 
Member States and the shared competence of the Union and the Member States?  
 
At what level is competence exercised in the most efficient way? How is the principle of 
subsidiarity to be applied here? And should we not make it clear that any powers not 
assigned by the Treaties to the Union fall  within the exclusive sphere of competence of 
the Member States? And what would be the consequences of this?”   220)  
 
 
And  the achieving of the Union´s objectives is put under the observance of the 
principle of  subsidiarity according to Maastricht TEU Article B, last paragraph, as well 
as according to Amsterdam TEU  and Nice TEU Article 2 last paragraph,making 
reference  to the principle of subsidiarity : 
 
“The objectives of the Union shall be achieved as provided in this Treaty and in accordance 
with the conditions and the timetable set out therein while respecting the principle of 
subsidiarity as defined in Article 5 *of the Treaty establishing the European Community.” * 
ex-Article 3 b  221)  
 
b) Ensuring the effectiveness of the principle of subsidiarity 
 
The basic philosophie and the application of the principle of subsidiarity follow the  
  
“Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proprtionality”,  which 
is annexed to the  Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe .222  
   
 
The text of the Constitution´s Protocol is identical with the  text of the Protocol on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality attached to the 
Amsterdam TEU, as far as the basic philosophy (functional role) of the principle  is  
concerned:   
 
 
 
 
220: ibid.,supra, note  126. 
221:Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing  
        the European Communities and related acts,Official Journal of the European  Communi- 
        ties –OJ-,, 10 November 1997,  C 340; OJ, 24 December 2002, C 325/05 ( 11). 
222: Official Journal of the European Union,16 December 2004, C 310/01 (207).  
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“43. Declaration relating to the Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality  
 
The High Contracting Parties confirm, on the one hand, the Declaration on the implementation of Community 
law annexed to the Final Act of the Treaty on European Union and, on the other, the conclusions of the Essen 
European Council stating that the administrative implementation of Community law shall in principle be the 
responsibility of the Member States in accordance with their constitutional arrangements. This shall not affect 
the supervisory, monitoring and implementing powers of the Community Institutions as provided under Articles 
145 and 155 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. “ 223)  
 
Both texts contain the obligation that for any proposed Community/Union  legislation, the 
reasons on which it is based shall be stated with a view to justifying its compliance with the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; the reasons for concluding that a 
Community/Union objective can be better achieved by the Community/Union must be 
substantiated by qualitative or, wherever possible, quantitative indicators. 
 
 
What substantially differs in the Constitution´s text of the protocol  compared to the 
protocol annexed to the Amsterdam TEU  are 
 
a) the assignment of  the Commission´s  obligation to declare,explain and prove with 
eidence that regulations are necessary and  
b) the active participation of national Parliaments . 
 
To make the principle of subsidiarity effective, the Constitution´s text  explicitly assigns to 
the Commission the  obligation that  
 
a)  any legislative  proposal should contain a “ detailed statement making it possible to 
appraise compliance with the principles of  subsidiarity and proportionality.” and  
 
b) the Commission shall  “  send all legislative send all its legislative proposals and its 
amended proposals to the national Parliaments of the  Member States at the same time as to 
the Union legislator.Upon adoption, legislative resolutions of the European Parliament and 
positions of the Council of Ministers shall be sent to the national Parliaments of the Member 
States.”, 3rd paragraph of the Protocol. 224)  
 
What counts in terms of ensuring the effectiveness of the principle of subsidiarity is the direct 
influence given to the national Parliaments: their reasoned opinions on a Commission´s 
proposal´s non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity represent at least one third of all 
the votes allocated to the Member States' national Parliaments and their chambers, the 
national Partliaments´vote is binding the Commission to review its legislative proposal  and 
decide to maintain, amend or even withdraw its proposal ,giving reasons for its decision.  
 
 
223: Protocol annexed to the Amsterdam TEU: Official Journal of the European  Communi- 
         ties, 10 November 1997, C 340. 
224::see Protocol, 3rd paragraph and 4th paragraph, 2nd  sentence,ibid.,supra.note 222,JO, 16  
         December 2004, Official Journal of the European Union, C 310(01 (207). 
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The national Parliaments´ right to active participation in the legislation of the European 
Union and, complementary, the Court of Justice having  jurisdiction to hear actions on 
 grounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity  by a legislative act,ensures the 
effectiveness of the principle: that is a substantial innovation brought up by the 
Constitution, 6th paragraph and 7th paragraph of the Protocol.225)  
 
 
 
And as to using  the procedure for monitoring the subsidiarity principle in order to 
ensure the effectiveness of that principle,  the  Treaty  establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
actually, states, in addition to Article 9  3rd paragraph on the principle of subsidiarity,as noted 
above 226)  
“ 
Article 17: Flexibility clause 
1. If action by the Union should prove necessary within the framework of the policies defined 
in Part III to attain one of the objectives set by the Constitution, and the Constitution has not 
provided the necessary powers, the Council of Ministers, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall take 
the appropriate measures. 
2. Using the procedure for monitoring the subsidiarity principle referred to in Article 9(3), 
the Commission shall draw Member States’ national Parliaments’ attention to proposals 
based on this Article.”  227)  
 
 
Part II of the Constitution, the Charter of fundamental rights of the Union, states in the   
Preamble that the Charter reaffirms the rights “ with due regard for the powers and tasks 
of the Union and the principle of  subsidiarity,”.228)    
 
Aiming at ensuring the effectiveness of the principle of subsidiarity, the Constitution´s 
Articles on implementing the Union´s policies refer to the role of  the Member States´ 
national Parliaments  to ensure that the Union´s legislative proposals comply with the 
principle of subsidiarity ,for example in the field  of the “ area of freedom,  security and 
justice: 
 
“ 
Article III-160 
1. Member States’ national Parliaments shall ensure that the proposals and legislative 
initiatives  submitted under Sections 4 and 5 of this Chapter comply with the 
principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with the arrangements in the Protocol on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
 
 
225: ibid,supra, note 222; see also  OJ,18 July 2003, C 169/01   (95). 
226:ibid.,supra ,note 222; see also  OJ,18 July 2003, C 169/01   (10).  
227:ibid.,supra ,note 222; see also  OJ,18 July 2003, C 169/01   (11). 
228:ibid.,supra ,note 222; see also  OJ,18 July 2003, C 169/01   (23).  
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Member States’ national Parliaments may participate in the evaluation mechanisms contained 
in Article III-161 and in the political monitoring of Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust’s 
activities in accordance with Articles III-177 and III-174. 
 
Member States’ national Parliaments may send to the Presidents of the European 
Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the Commission a reasoned opinion on 
whether a legislative proposal complies with the principle of subsidiarity, according to 
the procedure laid down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.” 229)   
 
 
 
1.3 Conclusion: making the principle of subsidiarity effective:  
through holding public subsidiarity admissibility debates in the national 
Parliaments, in the European Parliament and in the Council in addition 
to  the right of information  
 
a)concerning theCommission´s obligation to substantiate:to declare, explain and 
prove with evidence why regulations at Union level are necessar,and the Commissio´s 
obligation to send to national Parliaments all its  legislative proposals and its amended 
proposals to the national Parliaments of the  Member States at the same time as to the 
Union legislator.Upon adoption, legislative resolutions of the European Parliament and 
positions of the Council of Ministers shall be sent to the national Parliaments of the 
Member States. 
 
b) ) Proposal to hold public subsidiarity admissibility debate in the 
Council,  in the European Parliament and in national Parliaments, an 
“added value” compared to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Protocol on the 
application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality,annexed to 
the Treaty on Constitution 
 
 
 
a)  The Commission´s obligation to substantiate its position on the principle 
of subsidiarity is a constitutive element of legitimacy of the Union´s 
power.It is  an expression of constitutional quality of the Union and, 
therefore, the a.m.  obligation should  be directly stipulated in the merger 
Treaty on Union. 
 
No doubt, the principle of subsidiarity has met comprehensive recognition in all 
Founding Treaties on EU as well as in the Draft Treaty on Constitution. 
However, this principle has proven difficult to apply it  in practice. 
 
 
229: ibid.,supra ,note 222; see also  OJ,18 July 2003, C 169/01 (23).  
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Subsidiarity shows two sides. On the one hand, the principle of subsidiarity assumes that 
problems that the Member States can no longer solve themselves are actually solved at 
European Union level: by actions decided within EU institutions according to EC 
competences and procedures on  making  bills into EC legislation. This implies that the 
Member States must also be prepared to formulate objectives at the EU level and 
provide the EU with the means and instruments to achieve the objectives as efficiently as 
possible. And this has often not been  the case. It is unfair to reproach the EU for not 
having a solution to cross-border crime, illegal immigration, drug trafficking, women 
slavery and organised prostitution and similar cross-border crimes. The EU must be 
given the necessary instruments if those problems can be solved at European Union level 
only. 
 
On the other hand, the European Union must attempt to leave to the Member States 
those matters that they can handle themselves. Here,too, the application of the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity leaves much to be desired and what the  Treaty on Constitution 
and the above mentioned “PROTOCOL ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF 
SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY” attempt to set  right. Despite the agreements 
made on this matter by the EU institutions, after the Maastricht Treaty on Union had 
entered into force, the Commission,in submitting its proposals,did not provide an 
adequate explanation as to why EC regulations at Union level were required.The 
Commission simply affirmed that it had assessed a proposal in the light of the principle 
of subsidiarity. And no proper assessment was carried out either by the national 
Parliaments or by the Council. 
 
Certain aspects of the rules, therefore, had to be tightened up: 
 
 
The Commission,under the existing Treaty on EU as well as under the Draft Treaty on 
Constitution, has the exclusive right  of  initiative in EC matters. When the Commission 
submits a proposal of  “law”  (under Draft Treaty on Constitution) or a proposal of EC 
regulation or EC directive under the existing Treaty on Union, it therefore has 
primary responsibility for explaning and proving that regulations are necessary. It is 
not enough, under the existing Treaty on EU,  simply to affirm that the 
Commission has assessed a proposal in the light of the principle of subsidia-
rity .  
The Commission,therefore, when submitting a proposal, should declare, explain and prove 
with evidence why regulations at Union level are necessary. This obligation is a constitutive 
element of legitimacy of the Union´s power : this obligation is an expression of constitu-
tional quality of the Union and, therefore, the obligation should and easily could be directly 
stipulated in the merger Treaty on Union, with reference  made to further details as  
arranged in a Protocol  on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. 
 
The Commission`s explanation should focus on three main issues: 
 
1. Subsidiarity:  
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 Why is  regulation at Union level necessary ? 
 
2.   Proportionality: 
 
 Would a less stringent regulatory instrument be as much as is needed (e.g. 
a  recommendation instead of a directive, or a directive instead of a regulation) ? 
 Would a less detailed form of rules be sufficient ? 
 
3.  Cost, benefit analysis; susceptibility to fraud; enforceability: 
 
 What are the costs for the EU, the national government, the business 
community? 
 How easily can implementation be monitored ? 
 
 
The  Treaty on Constitution, Article 9, including the Protocol on the application of the 
principle of subsidiarity and proportionality,annexed to the Treaty on Constitution, is in 
line with the above mentioned  three main issues,and could easily be stipulated in a 
merger Treaty on Union,stating that: 
 
 “The use of Union  competences is governed by the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.” 
 “The Union Institutions shall apply the principle of subsidiarity as laid down in the 
Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
annexed to the Constitution. National Parliaments shall ensure compliance with that 
principle in accordance with the procedure set out in the Protocol.” 
 According to paragraph 4 of the Protocol  
“The Commission shall justify its proposal with regard to the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. Any legislative proposal should contain a detailed statement making it 
possible to appraise compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
 
This statement should contain some assessment of the proposal’s financial impact and, in 
the case of a framework law, of its implications for the rules to be put in place by Member 
States,including, where necessary, the regional legislation.  
 
The reasons for concluding that a Union objective can be better achieved at Union level 
must be substantiated by qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative indicators.  
 
The Commission shall take account of the need for any burden, whether financial or 
administrative, falling upon the Union, national governments, regional or local authorities, 
economic operators and citizens, to be minimised and commensurate with the objective to 
be achieved. 
 
The Commission shall send all its legislative proposals and its amended proposals to the 
national Parliaments of the  Member States at the same time as to the Union 
legislator.Upon adoption, legislative resolutions of the European Parliament and positions 
of the Council of Ministers shall be sent to the national Parliaments of the Member States.” 
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b) Proposal to hold public subsidiarity admissibility debate in the 
Council,  in the European Parliament and in national Parliaments, an 
“added value” compared to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Protocol on the 
application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality,annexed to 
the Treaty on Constitution: 
 
Since the Commission´s proposals are made public, the Commission´s arguments are 
also accessible to the public, national Parliaments, decentralised authorities and interest 
groups. These need time to study the arguments,e.g. two months, except in cases of  
emergency procedures, and to make their responses known. And subsequently,on the 
basis of these arguments and the responses received, it should be possible to hold an 
“admissibility debate” in the Council and in the European Parliament. 
 
The admissibility debates would cover the substantial issues, and focus on the three 
main issues as mentioned above. This also has the advantage that the Commission´s 
proposals are first discussed at political level and enable the Commission, after such 
reviewing debates, to  decide to maintain, amend or withdraw its proposal,while giving  
reasons for its decisions, b e f o r e   the Commission´s proposal is being considered by 
working groups. 
 
The proposal to hold  public debates on “subsidiarity” sounds technical, but 
is basically political.  Public debates on subsidiarity   would do more to reflect the 
primacy of the political dimension at Union level. These political debates should be 
conducted publicly. A subsidiarity debate of this kind would be a substantial “ added 
value “ compared to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the subsidiarity Protocol and can improve 
the public´s understanding of what the Union does and why it does it.  
 
Public debates on subsidiarity will not always lead to unanimous conclusions. In certain 
cases some Member States might be able to achieve specific policy objectives indepen-
dently while others might not. The guiding principle in interpreting subsidiarity should 
be that the former states,too, before joining the Union, take the general and common 
interests of the Union into account in formulating their national positions in the light of 
interdependencies between national and common interests. 
 
A great deal of Union legislation merely amends existing directives or regulations. It 
would not be, therefore, quite efficient to hold public admissibility debates   
on  e v e r y  proposal submitted by the Commission. The Constitutional Treaty 
should therefore state that such debates can be held only if a Member State has 
explicitly requested it. 
 
In addition, the merger Treaty should state that the principle of subsidiarity should 
not be misused as a covert means of limiting the Commission´s powers. The subsidiarity 
test should therefore be accompanied by the necessary guarantees, including the existing 
legal rights of appealing to the Court of Justice. 
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2.Enhancing the Union´s  legitimacy through transparency of the decision-
making process  of Union Institutions: 
  
 European Parliament and Council of Ministers meeting in public 
when examining and adopting legislative proposals 
 Openness of government and public access to information under the 
Treaties on Union 
 
2.1 Citizens´ right of  access to information on Union Institutions´ 
documents being weighed against the importance of secrecy 
 
Transparency of the Union´s decision-making process strengthens the democratic 
nature of the Union and the public´s confidence in the Union´s governance and legisla-
tion. Improving public access to the information available to the Union´s institutions and 
being the basis of their decisions can be an efficient policy to strengthen the Union´s cre-
dibility, legitimacy. 
 
The issue of  public access to information and its effect on the European Union´s  legiti-
macy had already been discussed  during  the negotiations on the MaastrichtTreaty on 
European Union. The Netherlands had put forward for consideration of the inclusion of 
a provision,modelled on the Dutch Government Information (Public Access)Act,which 
would lay the basis for an adequate level of openness.  
 
The basic idea was that government information is in principle accessible, unless there 
are specific reasons for its keeping confidential. During the negotiations, the Dutch pro-
posals did not get sufficient support, and the provision was therefore not directly stipu-
lated in the form of an legally binding Article within the text of the Treaty on European 
Union.  
 
However, a Declaration No. 17 “DECLARATION on the right of access to 
information “ was annexed to the Maastricht  Treaty on European Union, merely 
recommending that the Commission submits to the Council “no later than 1993 a report on 
measures designed to improve public access to information availale to the institutions.”  230)  
 
The course of action,however, changed in 1992. Under pressure from public opinion, 
especially after the first Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, the 
European Council at Birmingham, held in October 1992, did a first decisive step:  
the Council and the Commission were instructed  to take measures to ensure that 
European citizens have maximum access to information held by these institutions.  
 
Following difficult negotiations,the Council and the Commission reached 
agreement on a code of conduct. That code of conduct contained the rules for citizens 
who submit a request for information to one of these institutions. Unfortunately, this 
provision, which the Council had elaborated in its Rules of Procedure, had been largely 
  
 
230: Maastricht Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Communities,  
        29 July 1992,C 191- 
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limited in scope. As the the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands  had reported in its 
Memorandum on the Intergovernmental Conference 1996 preparing the Amsterdam Treaty on 
European Union, the  Government of the Netherlands  had voted against the code of conduct 
and the decision amending the Rules of Procedure, and appealed to the European Court of 
Justice, pleading that the Union should draw up regulations to give citizens a substantial right 
of access to information and also adequate means of appeal. The Dutch Government also took 
the side of a private individual who appealed to the European Court against a decision 
rejecting a request for information,pleading: each individual rejection of a request for 
information must be properly justified, with the importance of public access to 
information being weighed against the importance of secrecy.       231)  
 
 
Subsequently, following the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference preparing the 
Amsterdam Treaty on European Union, as to any  Union citizen´s  right of  access to 
institutions´ documents, reaching a more advanced level of legally binding Treaty provision,  
Article 255 Amsterdam Treaty establishing the European Community – TEC -  
stipulates the basic principle of the right of  access, while leaving the elaboration of 
specific provisions regarding access to each institution´s documents to each institution´s 
own rules of procedure: 
“ 
1. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its 
registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to European Parliament, 
Council and Commission documents, subject to the principles and the conditions to be 
defined in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3. 
2.General principles and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing this 
right of access to documents shall be determined by the Council, acting in accordance 
with the procedure referred to in Article 251 within two years of the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
3.Each institution referred to above shall elaborate in its own Rules of Procedure 
specific provisions regarding access to its documents.”  
 
And, according to Article 207 paragraph 3 Amsterdam TEC regarding the application 
of Article 255 paragraph 3 TEC, the Council has elaborated in its Rules of Procedure 
the conditions under which the public shall have access to Council documents: 
 
“3. The Council shall adopt its Rules of Procedure. 
For the purpose of applying Article 255(3), the Council shall elaborate in these Rules the 
conditions under which the public shall have access to Council documents. For the 
purpose of this paragraph, the Council shall define the cases in which it is to be 
regarded as acting in its legislative capacity, with a view to allowing greater access to  
 
 
231: The Government of the Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Memorandum: 
        “ The Netherlands and Europe. The Intergovernmental  Conference 1996”.Den  
        Haag, p. 265. 
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documents in those cases, while at the same time preserving the effectiveness of its 
decision-making process. 
In any event,when the Council acts in its legislative capacity, the results of votes and 
explanations of vote as well as statements in the minutes shall be made public.”   232)  
 
 
The  Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Part I,Title VI :”The democratic life of 
the Union”, Article 49,specifically paragraphs 3 and 4,  stipulates the   general rule of a 
right of access while a European law shall lay down the general principles and limits which, 
on grounds of public or private interest, govern the right of access to such documents. The 
legitimacy building functional role of the right of access to Union´s documents is 
explained in Article 49 paragraph 1:to promote good governance and ensure the 
participation of civil society, the Union Institutions, bodies and agencies shall conduct 
their work as openly as possible. 
 
“Article 49:Transparency of the proceedings of Union Institutions 
1. In order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the 
Union Institutions, bodies and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible. 
2. The European Parliament shall meet in public, as shall the Council of Ministers when 
examining and adopting a legislative proposal. 
3. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having 
its registered office in a Member State shall have a right of access to 
documents of the Union Institutions, bodies and agencies in whatever form 
they are produced, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Part III. 
4. A European law shall lay down the general principles and limits which, on 
grounds of public or private interest, govern the right of access to such 
documents. 
5. Each Institution, body or agency referred to in paragraph 3 shall determine in its own rules 
of procedure specific provisions regarding access to its documents, in accordance with the 
European law referred to in paragraph 4.”  233)  
 
Article 49 of the  Treaty on Constitution is proving  continuity of what has been 
achieved in striving for the Union´s citizen´s right of access to institutions´documents , 
and could easily be incorporated in a new Treaty, being a concise and comprehensive 
provision  which constitutes the legally binding basic rule of a right of access.  
 
 
232 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing  
        the European Commnities and related acts, ibid., Official Journal of the European  Com- 
        munities, 10 November 1997, C 340. 
233: Official Journal of the European Union, 16 December 2004, C 310/01; Official Journal  
        of the European Union, 18 July 2003, C 169/01( 20 ). 
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2.2 The Union institutions meeting in public-  European Parliament,Council 
of Ministers 
 
As common standard in the Member States of the European Union, legislative bodies 
are meeting in public plenary session when examining and adopting a legislative 
proposal. So does  Article 49 2nd paragraph of the Constitution provide that “the  
 European Parliament shall meet in public, as shall the Council of Ministers when 
examining and adopting a legislative proposal.”         234)  
 
  
 
3.  Enhancing the Union´s  legitimacy through transparency of the decision-
making process:  
Openness of government and the right of parliaments to timely and 
comprehensive information 
 
The role of the national Parliaments contributing to the Union´s legitimacy through 
the right of parliaments to timely and comprehensive information during the Union´s 
legislation procedures on justice and home affairs had already been discussed by  the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference on preparing the Amsterdam Treaty on the Union. But this 
right also concerned decision-making in other fields of the Union´s policy-making. In 1996 
were felt to see good reasons for including a specific provision in the Amsterdam Treaty on 
the Union which should lay down the parliamentary right of information. The Governments of 
the Member States ,however, actually failed to agree on the inclusion of a specific 
provision in the Treaty articles, but agreed upon   the “Protocol(no.9) on the role 
of national parliaments in the European Union(1997) “, annexed to the 
(Amsterdam)Treaty on European Union : 
 
“THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,  
 
RECALLING that scrutiny by individual national parliaments of their own government in 
relation to the activities of the Union is a matter for the particular constitutional organisation 
and practice of each 
Member State,  
 
DESIRING, however, to encourage greater involvement of national parliaments in the 
activities of the European Union and to enhance their ability to express their views on matters 
which may be of particular 
interest to them,  
 
 
234: ibid., Official Journal of the European Union, 18 July 2003, C 169/01( 20 ). 
        Official Journal of the European Union, 16 December 2004, C 310/01; Official Journal  
        of the European Union, 18 July 2003, C 169/01( 20 ). 
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HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaties establishing the European Communities,  
 
I. INFORMATION FOR NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS OF MEMBER STATES  
 
1. All Commission consultation documents (green and white papers and 
communications) shall be promptly forwarded to national parliaments of the 
Member States.  
 
2. Commission proposals for legislation as defined by the Council in accordance 
with Article 151(3) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, shall be made 
available in good time so that the government of each Member State may 
ensure that its own national parliament receives them as appropriate.  
 
3. A six-week period shall elapse between a legislative proposal or a proposal for a measure to 
be adopted under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union being made available in all 
languages to the European Parliament and the Council by the Commission and the date when 
it is placed on a Council agenda for decision either for the adoption of an act or for adoption 
of a common position pursuant to Article 189b or 189c of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, subject to exceptions on grounds of urgency, the reasons for which 
shall be stated in the act or common position.”  235)    
 
Consequently, the role of the national Parliaments contributing to the Union´s legitimacy 
through the right of parliaments to timely and comprehensive information during the Union´s 
legislation procedure, then had been emphasized by the Convention preparing the text of the 
Draft Treaty on the Constitution for Europe. The Convention had identified responses to 
the questions put in the Laeken declaration: 
 
- it proposed a better division of Union and Member State competences; 
 
- it recommended a merger of the Treaties and the attribution of legal personality to the 
Union; 
 
- it proposed  a simplification of the Union's instruments of action; 
 
“- it proposed measures to increase the democracy, transparency and 
efficiency of the European Union, by developing the contribution of national 
Parliaments to the legitimacy of the European design, by simplifying the decision-
making processes, and by making the functioning of the European Institutions more 
transparent and comprehensible;”  236)  
  . 
 
235: Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing  
         the European Communities and related acts, ibid., Official Journal of the European  
         Communities, 10 November 1997, C 340. 
236:  see the Preface of the Treaty on the Constitution, Official Journal of the European  
         Union, 16 December 2004, C 310/01; 18 July 2003, C 169/01 ( 07 ). 
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Following this line, as regards the right of  national parliaments to timely and 
comprehensive information on “ European laws and framework laws”,  the 
 Draft Treaty establishing a  Constitution for Europe, Article 24, paragraph 4,  states 
that, in cases of qualified majority making decisions , the European Council can adopt a 
decision allowing the Council of Ministers to act by qualified majority. The European 
Council shall act after consulting the European Parliament and informing the national 
Parliaments, and any initiative taken by the European Council shall be sent to national 
Parliaments no less than four months before any decision is staken on it: 
 
“Where the Constitution provides in Part III for European laws and framework laws to 
be adopted by the Council of Ministers according to a special legislative procedure, the 
European Council can adopt, on its own initiative and by unanimity, after a period of 
consideration of at least six months, a decision allowing for the adoption of such 
European laws or framework laws according to the ordinary legislative procedure. The 
European Council shall act after consulting the European Parliament and informing the 
national Parliaments. 
Where the Constitution provides in Part III for the Council of Ministers to act 
unanimously in a given area, the European Council can adopt, on its own initiative and 
by unanimity, a European decision allowing the Council of Ministers to act by qualified 
majority in that area. Any initiative taken by the European Council under this 
subparagraph shall be sent to national Parliaments no less than four months before any 
decision is taken on it.”  237)   
 
According to Article 41 , concerning specific provisions for implementing the area of 
freedom, security and justice, paragraph 2 stipulates  the participation of national 
parliaments in  evaluation mechanisms: 
 
“2. Within the area of freedom, security and justice, national parliaments may participate 
in the evaluation mechanisms foreseen in Article III-161, and shall be involved in the 
political monitoring of Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust's activities in accordance 
with Articles III-177 and III-174.” 238)   
 
 
And, as noted aboce, Article III-160, states: 
 
“ 
1. Member States’ national Parliaments shall ensure that the proposals and legislative 
initiatives  submitted under Sections 4 and 5 of this Chapter comply with the 
principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with the arrangements in the Protocol on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
Member States’ national Parliaments may participate in the evaluation mechanisms contained 
in Article III-161 and in the political monitoring of Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust’s  
 
activities in accordance with Articles III-177 and III-174. 
 
 
237:Official Journal of the European Union, 16 December 2004, C 310/01; 18 July 2003,  
       C 169/01 ( 13 ). 
238:ibid.,supra, note 237, C  310/01; C 169/01 ( 18 ). 
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Member States’ national Parliaments may send to the Presidents of the European 
Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the Commission a reasoned opinion on 
whether a legislative proposal complies with the principle of subsidiarity, according to 
the procedure laid down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.” 
 
 
Consequently, referring to Article III-160 of the Draft Treaty on the Constitution for 
Europe, the  PROTOCOL ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF 
SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY, paragraph 3 delineates  the 
participation of national Parliaments in the decision-making process on 
monitoring the application of the principle of subsidiarity in the law-making 
process of the Union/Community:  
 
“The Commission shall send all its legislative proposals and its amended 
proposals to the national Parliaments of the Member States at the same time 
as to the Union legislator. 
Upon adoption, legislative resolutions of the European Parliament and 
positions of the Council of Ministers shall be sent to the national Parliaments 
of the Member States.” 
 
 
“ 
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
WISHING to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens of the 
Union, 
RESOLVED to establish the conditions for the application of the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality, as enshrined in Article I-9 of the Constitution, and to establish a system 
for monitoring the application of those principles by the Institutions, 
 
HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the 
Constitution: 
1. Each Institution shall ensure constant respect for the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, as laid down in Article I-9 of the Constitution. 
 
2. Before proposing legislative acts, the Commission shall consult widely. Such 
consultations shall, where appropriate, take into account the regional and local dimension of 
the action envisaged. In cases of exceptional urgency, the Commission shall not conduct such 
consultations. It shall give reasons for the decision in its proposal. 
 
3. The Commission shall send all its legislative proposals and its amended proposals to 
the national Parliaments of the Member States at the same time as to the Union legislator. 
Upon adoption, legislative resolutions of the European Parliament and positions of the 
Council of Ministers shall be sent to the national Parliaments of the Member States.” 239)   
 
 
239:ibid.,supra, note 237, C  310/01; C 169/01 ( 95 ). 
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4.  Enhancing the Union´s  legitimacy through transparency of the decision-
making process:  
the  openness of consultation within the Council 
 
Under the Maastricht Treaty on European Union-TEU-   Council meetings were held “ en 
cadre restraint”, they were held closed,  unless it was unanimously decided that a session 
should be public. Article 151 Maastricht TEU had no explicit provision. This situation 
was not satisfactory.  
Preparing the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference  on the future Amsterdam TEU, 
Governments considered that the sessions of the Council, acting as the European 
Community´s legislator, should be open to the public as far as possible. By “as far as 
possible” Governments meant that the Council´s debate on admissibility ,i.e. the subsidiarity 
test, concerning every proposal made by the Commission should be open to the public, as 
should the final vote in the Council, including explanations of votes. Wheras the intermediate 
phase of negotiations held within the Council,on the other hand, could remain closed. 
Governments held  this position to be desirable because the consultations performed within 
the Council, even when acting as legislator, had an intergovernmental, interstate character to 
some undeniable degree. Full public access, therefore, to all sessions would lead only to a 
situation where the actually held negotiations were taking place outside the institutional 
framework of the Council which rightly could not be appreciated. 
 
Consequently, resulting from these 1996 Intergovernmental Conference  considerations, the 
Amsterdam Treaty establishing the European Community ,Article 207,3rd paragraph, 
kept the principle of openness of the Council´s sessions to the public under specific 
limits, trying to balance the openness to the public,on the one hand, and  preserving the 
effectiveness of its decision-making process,concluding that “in any event, when the 
Council acts in its legislative capacity, the results of votes and explanations of vote as well 
as statements in the minutes shall be made public”: 
 
“3. The Council shall adopt its Rules of Procedure.  
 
For the purpose of applying Article 255(3), the Council shall elaborate in these Rules the 
conditions under which the public shall have access to Council documents. For the purpose of 
this paragraph, the Council shall define the cases in which it is to be regarded as acting in its 
legislative capacity, with a view to allowing greater access to documents in those cases, while 
at the same time preserving the effectiveness of its decision-making process. In any event, 
when the Council acts in its legislative capacity, the results of votes and explanations of vote 
as well as statements in the minutes shall be made public.” 240)    
                                                                    
And, finally, Article 49 of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is 
 stipulating the European Parliament´s and the Council´s meetings in public.: 
 
 
 
240: Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treties establishing  
         the European Communities and related acts, Official Journal of the European  
         Communities, 10 November 1997, C 340. 
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This is the final step in this evolutive process of gradually achieving  substantial 
improvements  in gaining transparency through openness of  the consultation and 
decision-making procedures namely in the Council:: 
 
“ 
Article 49  
Transparency of the proceedings of Union Institutions 
 
1. In order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the 
Union Institutions, bodies and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible. 
 
2. The European Parliament shall meet in public, as shall the Council of 
Ministers when examining and adopting a legislative proposal. 
 
3. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered 
office in a Member State shall have a right of access to documents of the Union Institutions, 
bodies and agencies in whatever form they are produced, in accordance with the conditions 
laid down in Part III. 
 
4. A European law shall lay down the general principles and limits which, on grounds of 
public or private interest, govern the right of access to such documents. 
 
5. Each Institution, body or agency referred to in paragraph 3 shall determine in its own rules 
of procedure specific provisions regarding access to its documents, in accordance with the 
European law referred to in paragraph 4.” 241)   
 
  
 
5. Alternative Treaty and Simplification of the Treaty text 
 
Considering the  Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe to be probable to fail 
ratification by all needed 27 Member States and, therefore , to fail entering into force, the 
European Union is in need of an acceptable alternative, which meets  the needs of  reflecting 
the identity of the Union, showing the peoples in Europe what and how the Union is standing 
up for protecting their rights,  as well as meeting the needs of making the larger Union work, 
thus reinforcing the Union´s legitimacy and acceptance. 
 
There is a strong belief among political leaders  and European Union experts that the existing 
Treaties on European Union and on the European Community: the  CONSOLIDATED 
VERSION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION and the CONSOLIDATED 
VERSION OF THE  TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
 
  
 
241:ibid.,supra, note 237, C  310/01; C 169/01 ( 20 ). 
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are  not practicable to manage a European Union of the Twentyseven and even more to 
give the adequate response to the common challenges. 242)  
 
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, is , through  its core provisions on 
strengthening democracy, transparency including subsidiarity, and efficiency of taking action,  
aiming at  improving the   constitutional quality of the Union. The public demand for  these  
essentials of the Founding Treaty on European Union to continue and to be strengthened for a 
better working of the enlarged Union was, in principal,  no controversial issue throughout the 
debate about a Constitution. And these essentials should be maintained further on, whatever 
the legal framework might be in case the  Constitution´s  ratification actually fails.  
 
The  approach to finding an acceptable solution, replacing the Treaty establishing a  Constitu- 
tion for Europe, a new text which appears to be acceptable in terms of democracy, transparen- 
cy  and efficiency, would be an integrative approach:  
 
 making the political decision on choosing  the constitutional quality shaping essentials 
of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution as identified above: democracy, 
transparency and efficiency, added to  the Union´s  basic objective and its basic values 
of protecting the rights of the European citizens as well as describing  the Union´s 
main tasks and instruments; 
 integrating these essentials into  the existing Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and thus amending the Nice Treaty on 
European Union; 
 negotiating and adopting the new text of a revised Treaty on European Union by  an 
Intergovernmental Conference meeting both  the needs of efficient negotiating and the 
needs of  transparency and public debate, thus the needs of  traditional preparing rati- 
            fying the new  text according to the national constitutional procedures in the Member  
 
         States; 
 promoting ,throughout the negotiating procedure, the accessibility and acceptance of 
the new text . 
 
Promoting the accessibility and acceptance of the new text means : 
making the  constitutional quality shaping essentials of the Union part of a new  Treaty 
merging the current Treaty establishing the European Union and  the current Treaty 
establishing the European Community the structure and the text of which  strongly needs 
simplification, accessibility. 
 
For, under the current Treaty on European Union, the legal structure makes up one 
European Union which rests on three pillars. The first of which is the Treaty establishing 
the European Community (EC Treaty), ruling the mode of European integration through EC 
law-making.  
The legal order created under this first pillar is characterized not only by legislation that 
is both verifiable and enforceable and the central role it affords the European 
Commission as initiator, but also by the fact that it safeguards enforcement of the 
Treaty, is subject to parliamentary control and provides legal protection. 
 
 
242: Official Journal of the European Communities, 24 December 2002, C 325/5 and C  
        325/33. 
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The other two pillars are ruling the method of cooperation through enhanced 
intergovern-mental cooperation in the fields of a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
and of  Police and   Judicial  Cooperation in Criminal Matters. The Community, the first 
pillar, is a legal person, but the Union itself does not (yet) share this  legal status, a fact which 
has lead and still leads to considerable confusion. 
 
Resulting from constant amendments, the text of the Treaty on European Union has 
grown to a genuine hotchpotch, in some cases referring to the  Nice Treaty on European 
Union inserting new provisions or amending existing provisions. As a result, the Treaty is 
rather inaccessible, not only to the general public, but also  to EU experts and 
administrators themselves. 
 
Meeting the needs of a new text which might better be accepted by the different 
European national electorates is no simple task expressing the awareness of European 
matters as they are: 
the history of the European Treaties is marked by compromises that are both creative and 
complex of nature. From the point of view of efficiency, these compromises might always 
well have disregarded the principles of logic  and made the text inaccessible, but in the 
tradition of European integration policy making compromises did and do reflect the 
maximum the negotiating parties were and are and will be willing to concede at any given 
moment. Quite a bunch of matters should therefore be viewed within their political context. 
This applies, for example, to the Treaty architecture of  pillars. In other cases, however, it can 
easily turn out that the text of an amended Treaty could quite easily be simplified: 
There is a widely held opinion that the Treaty needs radical simplification : 
 
Simplification of the text should be seen as a political challenge to enhance transparency, 
acceptance and legitimacy of the Treaty, and this political challenge cannot be 
responded by a mere technical approach to the matter. Simplification of the text, 
however, should be seen as separate from the substantive amendments recommended 
above,such as the simplification of decision-making procedures.  
 
What is required is, therefore, mainly a forceful driving out of the text. There is no need 
to harmfully interfere with the substance of the provisions of the  Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe as regards the provisions on the essentials: 
 
 basic objectives, 
  values, 
 fundamental rights, 
  democracy, transparency, efficieny,  
 main tasks and instruments.  
 
Being aware of the difficulties involved, it is essential that work be started promptly to 
tackle with the substantial issues, and not focussing only on a time-table to be set up by 
the German EU Presidency as planned to be launched towards the end of the Presidency 
next June 2007.  
For, time is running short enough if a new Treaty should enter into force before the European 
electorate will vote for the European Parliament in 2009. As a first step, a  Reflection Group 
could authorize a small group of independent lawyers to deal with the matter quite prior to the 
Intergovernmental Conference, and parallel to this more technically preparatory platform, a 
Europeanwide discussion with the European citizens should be performed, both 
focussing on the coming elections to the European Parliament ,and focussing on the new 
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Treaty´s essentials simply  showing what and why the European citizen is going to cast 
his vote for.- 
 
Chapter VII    
The Union and Efficiency, Decisisiveness 
 
Constitutional quality shaping essential: Efficiency of the 
European Union, focussing on the issue of improving the decision-
making within the Council  
 
A. Introduction 
 
Efficiency of the European Union is an identity and legitimacy shaping  essential : being 
important for the Union´s visibility and acceptance by the European citizens. 
A European Union which, in the citizens´ view , would not meet their needs of an 
efficiently running  good European Governance policy-making to protect their rights, 
could never expect acceptance: it would risk loosing legitimacy. Efficiently functioning 
institutions are one of the legitimacy building and identity shaping essentials of the 
European Union. 
  
The efficiency of decision-making in the Council does depend, not only but to a large 
extent, on the Council´s decisiveness. The more enlargement increased the number of  
Member States, the less each  Member State influences decision making, the more it is 
made difficult for an ever greater Member States to collect sufficient votes to obtain a 
qualified majority, or a blocking minority which would have an adverse effect on the 
Council´s decisiveness.  
 
It was one of the crucial issues discussed, negotiated already at the Intergovernmental 
Conference 1996/97, but without reaching consensus as this issue was focussing on  one 
of the core sensitivities of  nation states´ claiming the respect for equality of  each 
sovereign state in the Union: the revision of the then existing system of weighted votes. 
This issue was one of the essential leftovers which remained unresolved by the 
Amsterdam Treaty and was taken up again by the Nice Treaty on European Union.  
 
Efficiency oriented  elements  of establishing a merger  Treaty on European Union  on 
the basis of the essentials  made up by the  Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe  and 
by the Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities,in the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union and the  
consolidated version of  the  Treaty establishing the European Community   243)   would 
have to deal with  the following focal issues: 
 
 
243: Official Journal of the European Communities, 10 March 2001, C/80/01,and 24 March  
       2002, C 325/05  and C 325/33. 
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B. Improving the Union´s efficiency through clarity of the decision-making 
procedures and through institutional adjustments  
 
I. The dynamic process of developing the enlarged Union´s efficiency of  
decision-making aiming at balancing the Union´s enlargement and 
cohesion,decisiveness – from the 1996/97 IGC  to the Nice Treaty on EU and 
the Constitution Treaty 
 
The issue of decisiveness, the issue of efficiency  had  already  been  the issue of the 
institutional adjustment during the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996, and that issue is 
still the present issue of great importance for the Union´s future:  
 
 how to maintain,within the European Union of the Twentyseven and of even more,  
the acquis communautaire,i.e. the internal market and the common legal order, and  
thus  a European Union that is capable of decisive internal and external action. 
 
 
Both efficiency oriented issues – clarity of the Union´s decision-making procedures and 
institutional adjustments – are two sides of one coin: the enlargement  of the Union. The 
European Union of the Twentyseven and even more  is likely to fail without reforms 
ensuring the efficiency of the decision-making procedures of the Union´s institutions. 
 
 
1. The Intergovernmental Conference 1996/97 and efficiency of decision-making in the 
Council: the system of weighted votes, limits of extrapolation 
 
1.1  The Council´s decisiveness and the system of weighted votes facing the 1996/97 
Intergovernmental Conference 
 
Efficiency oriented steps of reforming the European Union through institutional 
adjustment  is never undertaken without awareness of  the basics of the Union´s 
composition and decision-making structures. Both the composition and decision-making 
structures of the Union´s institutions date from  1957, when the Community comprised 
six Member States. Checks and balances were needed between the smaller Benelux 
countries on the one hand and the  three big Member States on the other. A suitable 
balance,therefore, had to be struck,in 1957, between strict proportionality in majority 
voting on the one hand, and the nation state´s sovereignty related equality of all Member 
States,expressed by unanimous voting on the other. 
 
No easy matter is decision-making in the Council in a Union comprising twentyseven  
(since January 1st,2007) or even more Member States.This is true not only for decisions 
that require unanimity. It is also true for those decisions taken by a qualified majority 
vote. As far as the first pillar (Treaty establishing the European Community ) is 
concerned, Council decisions should, in principle, be reached on the basis of a qualified 
majority.  
`In principle´  means: even though the Treaty text stipulates the majority-decision making, it 
is still an implied part, a  tacitly working essential part of the constitutional quality that the 
Union is built on the principle of “consensus” all Member States, just the smallest 
one,too, can firmly rely on if they are recurring to claim their vital  national interest in a 
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given case under negotiation within the Council. It is still alive in the realities of decision-
making of the Council, and it is today not limited to use in agricultural  policy only:  
 
 the  March 1966 compromise of the then Six Member States of the European Economic 
Community realized that France accepted the principle of majority decision-making in the 
EEC´s agricultural policy, but all Member States agreed to the formula that each Member 
State may recur to a national veto and reject   an intended majority decision-making in a given 
case put on the Council´s agenda. The Luxemburg compromise had set  an end to the policy 
of the empty chair France  had practised between July 1965 and March 1966,trying without 
success in the end to oppose to the use of qualified majority decision-making in the field of 
the EEC´s agricultural policy to start with on January 1966, as it had been laid down in the 
Rome Treaty on the European Economic Community 1957. This Luxemburg compromise 
never could and, until now, never can be found in a written text of the Founding Treaties, 
but it is part of the constitutional quality of the European Union as being based on the 
principle of consensus governing the political and legal ties between all EU 
Member States in the majority  decision-making process within the Council.. 
 
Within the 1st pillar´s system of checks and balances, majority decision-making, a system 
of weighted votes, is justified, from the point of view of both the larger and smaller Member 
States. For, it was only due to this Community decision-making procedure that the internal 
market could be completed and enforced. This also applies to the Community´s economic and 
commercial policy, i.e. the protection of the Member States joint economic interests in the 
world economy, including safe energy supply from third countries´ energy resources.  
 
This system, however, was to the advantage of the smaller Member States. As early as the 
1970s (Spierenburg report) and again in the course of preparing and holding the 
Intergovernmental Conference 1996/97 – IGC 96 -   this system was subject to critical 
review in view of the enlarged European Union´s  need of  efficiently running decision-
making of the Union´s institutions. 
 
The Intergovernmental Conference 1996/97 reviewed the crucial issue of how to manage 
the Council´s efficient decision-making in a Union comprising 15 and later even more 
Member States. The IGC had to deal with three options open to the Union:  
 
 extrapolation,  
 measures in the Community sphere and 
  measures in the intergovernmental sphere of intrastate cooperation between the 
Member States of the Union.  
 
The first one of these options was based  on the status quo,i.e. keeping the existing 
institutional Treaty provisions unchanged and entering the negotiations  on enlargement  
without any fundamental changes to the institutional system of the Union. This was the 
method adopted for all negotiations with candidates then:  
 
 the number of votes for each Member State in the Council  
 the number of members of the European Parliament and the Commission 
 
were arrived at simply by extrapolating the existing rules. 
 
While preparing the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, there was a widely felt awareness of 
the damaging effects further extrapolating would have: if the same method was used next 
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time, the efficiency and decisiveness of the Union, including the quality of law-making and 
of administration , would, as a result, unavoidably be damaged severely. For, already the 
accession of  the former EFTA countries  1995 had strained the extrapolation model nearly 
beyond the limit: the causing of institutional disorder by dividing and sharing what had been 
17 portfolios before among the then 21 new Commissioners showed that the Commission had 
already reached the limits of what  could be managed successfully. 
 
In addition, the larger the Union got, already in the period following the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union and the Copenhagen and Corfu summits, the less influence each individual 
Member State  could exert on the Union´s policy-making within the Union´s institutions.: the 
weight of the votes held by each Member State was diminished  the more partner Member 
States each Member State needed to push through or to set up a blockade against a particular 
decision. The Ioannina settlement by making institutional concessions was an omen of the 
conflicting interests that could be expected later. Already in 1996. it was widely felt among 
the members of the Intergovernmental Conference, that, going on extrapolating the formula 
for obtaining a qualified majority , the point soon would come when a  group of small 
countries together representing a minority of the population of the European Union, would be 
able to force a majority decision. Large Member States would then dispute that the existing 
method of allocating votes not only gave the small countries an unacceptable advantage but 
that it also would undermine the democratic legitimacy of the Union.  
 
For, seeking the support of more and more partners to influence decision-making was 
regarded as a problem by the larger Member States  in particular. They felt that they 
had been allocated too few votes. They argued that their relative share of the total 
number of votes had dropped with every enlargement of the Union: 
 The four large Member States, during the IGC 1996/97, had held 10 votes, 
  Spain held 8,  
 Belgium, Greece, Portugal and The Netherlands each held 5,   
 Austria and Sweden each held 4,  
 Denmark, Finland and Ireland each held 3, 
  Luxembourg held 2. 
 
Out of a total of  87 votes, 62 or the equivalent of  almost exact 70 % were needed for a 
qualified majority. 26 votes at least were needed for a blocking minority. A minority of 
25 votes could therefore be outvoted. If such a minority were formed by, for example, 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany, this meant that a group of 
countries together representing, in 1996/97, 150 million EU citizens could be outvoted. 
While this number constituted a minority of the total population of  the Union, at 40 % 
it was a substantial minority, of which the number of votes held, 30 %, was no 
equivalent.  
This meant: Each new enlargement would lead to even greater gaps. After all, facing the 
future accession of the Central and Eastern European countries, apart from Poland, 
only smaller countries appeared likely to accede to the European Union in the 
foreseeable future, in the way of seeing the situation during the IGC 1996/97.   
 
 
There was,therefore,throughout the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996, a 
widespread judgement that continuing the extrapolation model would block the 
decision-making with grinding noises: 
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The decisiveness of the Union would be diminished to an unacceptably low level. The 
resulting lack of efficiency would endanger the survival of the internal market and thus 
endanger the driving force behind the integration process. Although the internal market had 
been put in place on January 1st 1993, it could not yet and it cannot yet be regarded as being 
complete:   
even and just now, in early 2007, new regulations are still needed to some extent, both to 
maintain the market through keeping pace with technological progress, world trade, the 
globalisation´s impact on the internal market, economic and financial flows´shifts and 
new political judgement about perspectives of how to adapt to globalisation, and to 
develop supplementary Union´s policies to stimulate, steer and remedy the market´s 
deficiencies through deciding on social and environmental as well as on energy policy as 
provided for in the Maastricht Treaty and in the Amsterdam Treaty on EU (e.g. Article 
175 (ex Article  130 s):  
For, care had and still has to be taken to ensure that unnecessary national and European 
Union legislation  does not block the efficient functioning of the internal market. 
 
Efficiency oriented steps of reforming the European Union´s Council decision-making 
required, therefore, a suitable balance to be struck between strict proportionality on the 
one hand, and the nation state´s sovereignty related equality of all Member States,on the 
other. 
 
 
1.2   The 1996/97 Intergovernmental Conference in search of alternatives to 
        extrapolating  the existing system of weigthed votes 
 
 
Member States of the Union were, therefore, in search of alternatives, along the lines : 
 
 to strike a feasible, acceptable balance between the voting strength of the large, 
medium-sized and small Member States. 
 
Member States Governments preparing the IGC 1996/97  had discussed two possible 
alternatives aiming at giving greater voting strength to the countries with large 
populations: 
 
1.21 Allocating extra votes to the larger countries: 
 
 This would have required as a necessary consequence to introduce more proportionality 
in the voting strengths of individual Member States. Doing so, the traditional voting key 
of 70 % required for a qualified majority would have corresponded more closely to the 
population numbers represented. This option would, however, have been difficult to 
effect. Not only would the smallest Member States have opposed it: the largest ones 
would have had to accept that greater proportionality would have led to Germany 
acquiring more votes than any other Member State. 
 
1.22 Introduction of the double key option: 
 
The existing vote allocation would have remained unchanged, but a second voting key 
would have been added: a qualified majority would have been required to represent at 
least a certain percentage – in principle 50 % - of the Union´s population. This would 
have ensured that, after further enlargement, a majority of the European Union´s 
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population could not have been outvoted. Furthermore, the double key option was 
meant, in theory, to be developed in a number of  modes: 
 
 decision-making in  non-controversial fields could have proceeded on the basis of 
a simple majority ( one country, one vote ), secured by a 50 % population 
requirement ,      o r    
 a “super qualified majority “  could have been introduced as an alternative to 
unanimity ( 80 % of the vote, 70 % of the population). 
 
 
The issue of the “double key option” , however, remained  unresolved by the IGC 
1996/97, and therefore, had  not been introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty on 
European Union, but had been further examined within the Nice Treaty on EU 
negotiations as well as by the Convent on a Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe . 
 
The reason for the 1996/97 IGC´s failure to resolve the issue of the system of weighted 
votes in the Council was a basically political one: the different national concepts of how 
to use the Intergovernmental Conference as an instrument to defend different national 
concepts of the European Union and to use the Union´s constraints within the difficult 
correlation between deepening and enlarging the European Union: 
 
 
2.  The Intergovernmental Conference 1996/97  and  different national 
concepts of the correlation between deepening and enlarging the European 
Union under the  Community´s law on the principle of effectiveness 
 
The  issue of  the enlarged Union´s efficiency of decision-making was subject to different 
concepts of  the correlation between deepening and enlarging the Union among Member 
States holding  the Intergovernmental Conference 1996/1997. 
 
It had not been by the Laeken Declaration of the Union´s Heads of State and 
Government launching the Convent on Drafting the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe, that the issue of  how to  ensure the Union´s efficiency trough achieving 
clarity of the decision –making procedures and through institutional adjustment, had  
been put forward on the Union´s agenda for the first time: 
 
With the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union 1992, the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round and the finalisation of negotiations  with four new Member States on 
accession to the Union, the European Union had taken significant steps towards further 
development. These steps took account of the events of 1989 and after. They can be regarded 
as the conclusion of an era which was characterized by the division of Europe. The Member 
States of the the European Union were  faced with the challenge of finding a real response to 
the fundamental changes caused by the collapse of communism. It was the common view of 
the majority of the Member States´Governments that the only possible solution was to 
integrate the Countries of Central and (first)Eastern Europe, later on adding South-Eastern 
Europe(Bulgaria,Rumania) into  western economic and political structures. These countries 
themselves desired such integration, including membership of the European Union, for 
economic, political and military security reasons. It had also been and still is in the Union´s 
interest to ensure that these countries did not fall into a political vacuum and move towards 
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instability. 
 
Viewing at the great economic and social differences existing between the Union and the 
countries of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, a number of unavoidable obstacles 
needed to be cleared before the gateway to membership was open. The institutional 
adjustment of the Union was not the least of these obstacles. Most of the Union´s Member 
States´Governments,therefore, wanted to find a balance between the political wish, on the 
one hand, to bring forward the moment at which the countries of Central, Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe accede to the Union, and, on the other, attempting to ensure that 
the existing Union maintains its cohesion and decisiveness. The political formula, 
then, was: deepening and enlarging the Union at the same time, instead of 
enlarging first or deepening first. 
 
For,  since the signing of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union and the 
Copenhagen summit in 1993 when the European Council decided the Copenhagen 
criteria candidate countries wishing to accede to the Union had to comply with, the 
Member States of the EU had common positions on the basic principles of the criteria, 
but they  had different positions on the objective of the Union´s enlargement and on the 
need for deepening the Union, especially through institutional adjustment     to avoid 
negative results from the  enlargement. 
 
The European Council at Copenhagen had drawn up a list of general criteria in order to 
preserve maximum political scope for manoeuvre without making any firm commitments to 
dates of accession, nor did the European Council draw up commitments to reform the Unions´ 
institutions as a prerequisite to accession. The European Council concluded as follows: 
 
“ The European Council today agreed that the associated countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union. Accession will take 
place as soon as the associatied country is able to assume the obligations of membership by 
satisfying the economic and political conditions required.” 
 
Membership required and still requires that the candidate country had achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for the 
protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market eco-nomy as well as the 
capacity to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. 
Membership necessarily involved and involves the candidate´s ability to assume the 
obligations of membership including commitment to the objectives of economic,monetary and 
political Union. 
 
The Copenhagen criteria explicitly commit candidate  countries only. The text of the 
Copenhagen criteria ,however, must not be interpreted as a one-way formula which would 
commit the candidate countries only. The text  does imply  that the European Union was 
and still is  obliged to do anything necessary to avoid negative impacts  enlargement 
might have on the Union´s  effectiveness, decisiveness. Under EC law any Union institution 
is commited to the principle of  effectiveness to  guarantee the well functioning of the acquis 
communautaire. This means that the Union´s capacity to absorb new members , while 
maintaining the momentum of European integration, was and still is also an important 
political and legal commitment in the general interest of both the Union and candidate 
or new Member countries.  
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The substantive criteria , as laid down in the  Copenhagen Council relate, 
therefore, to both the candidate countries and the Member States of the 
Union itself. While candidate countries had and have to prove mainly efforts in the political 
and economic field, the Member States of the European Union were and are obliged to 
have got their own houses sufficiently in order so that the Union´s enlargement will not 
have an ill effect on the European integration. It was and still is in the basic  and common 
interest of all Member States of the European Union that an enlarged European Union will not 
lose either its decisiveness or its effectiveness. And in any case, under the EC law principle 
of effectiveness, it is overdue that immediate and full attention and implementation will 
have to be given to the issue of decisiveness of the Union of Twentyseven, regardless of 
the question of if, how and when to replace the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe in case of definite ratification failure. 
 
 
As far as the Member States´position on a correlation between “deepening and enlarging” 
was concerned during the post-Maastricht and post-Copenhagen period of preparing the 
1996  Intergovernmental Conference  on amending the Maastricht Treaty, mainly by 
institutional reforms, the Union´s Member States France, Germany and the United Kingdom 
wanted the accession of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but did not pledge 
definite dates on which negotiations were to start. Germany, then, had pressed for rapid action 
in gaining closer European integration (deepening the Union) and in stabilizing Germany s  
relations with France.  
As far as the issue of deepening the Union was concerned, it is today, nearly two years after 
the voters of France had rejected the Draft Treaty establishing a Cinstitution for Europe in 
2005, worth remembering that it was just France after 1993 that had shown deep sincereness 
about the issue of what might be the impact the accession of the Central and Eastern  
European countries would have on the efficiency, decisiveness, cohesion and thus the identity 
of the European Union. It had exactly been France that strongly pleaded for deepening the 
Union by a closeknit European Union structure and for preserving close cooperation with 
Germany.   
Facing the present efforts made within the European Union towards enduring solutions to 
draw up a legitimate identity shaping Treaty on the Union with clearly and concisely 
written constitutional quality essentials,it is worth remembering that it had been France 
and Germany that , already preparing their positions on the Intergovernmental Conference in 
1996, both countries had pleaded for institutional reforms aiming at  wide-ranging effect on 
efficiently working EU institutions required as a prior condition of any further 
enlargement of the European Union. 
 
Taking,in so far, the opposite, the United Kingdom welcomed the future accession of the 
Central and Eastern European countries as a vehicle towards making the European Union 
structure less closeknit. While at the same time the Mediterranian Member Countries of the 
European Union supported the accession perspective given to the Central and Eastern 
European countries by the 1993 Copenhagen summit, and they tried, however, to obtain 
compensation in getting political commitments to a southward enlargement of the 
European Union, and they did not express as much concern about deepening the Union 
prior to enlargement, but about preserving their share in the existing financial transfer 
mechanisms working through the EU Regional Fund. 
 
Any judgement on future perspectives of how to reach a legitimate legal framework 
provided with constitutional quality essentials of the  European Union needs to 
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remember these interconnected different political interests and viewpoints, as referred to 
above. They had been, they are and they still will be alive. There were and there will be 
Member States of the European Union that attach great importance to an efficiently 
working European Union: the European Union is the anchor of stabilizing economic 
prosperity and peace in Europe.   
 
It is,therefore, important to remind the fact that decisions  amending  the EU founding 
Treaty or on drawing up a new  merger Treaty must be unanimous,and are subject to 
the ratification  approval of the Member States.  
 
 
3. The Nice Treaty to deal with the institutional reform “leftover”: 
reinforcing the  Council´s  decisiveness and giving larger countries greater 
voting strength and  raising the blocking minority threshold in a Union of 
the Twentyseven 
 
The “leftover” of the Amsterdam Treaty on European Union: the issue of  efficient decision-
making in the Council through balancing the voting strenght of larger and smaller 
Member States in the Council had to be negotiated by the Intergovernmental Conference 
preparing the draft of the Nice Treaty on EU  stipulating the reforms needed to create the 
prerequisites for later  enlargement of  the Union of the Twentyfive, the draft had been agreed 
upon by the fifteen Heads of State and Government at the Nice European Council on 
December 07-10,2000. The Member States  tried to find consensus on how votes would be 
weighted in compliance with the total size of the Union´s population to enhance the 
democratic legitimacy of the Council´s decision-making and, by doing so, to improve the 
Council´s decisiveness and thus making the European Union to act more efficiently. 
 
The result of the Nice Treaty on EU,however, is an increased voting 
strength of the large Member States by nearly three times as much than 
before,on the one hand, and the raised (to 91 votes out of a total of 345 
votes) threshold for the blocking minority in the Union of 27 in terms of  
strengthening the Council´s decisiveness,on the other:  
 
Before the European Union enlarged from the Fifteen to the EU of the Twentyfive  on May 
01,2004, the Council´s voting procedures where, in policy matters under the 1st pillar of the 
Treaty on EU, the Treaty establishing tbe European Community,  the Council was required  
by a qualified majority, the votes of its members were weigthed according to Article 205 2nd 
paragraph  TEC:           244)  
  
Belgium 5 
Denmark 3 
Germany 10 
Greece 5 
Spain 8 
France 10 
Ireland 3 
 
 
244:Official Journal of the European Communities, December 24,2002, C 325/33 ( 118). 
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Italy 10 
Luxembourg 2 
Netherlands 5 
Austria 4 
Portugal 5 
Finland 3 
Sweden 4 
United Kingdom 10. 
 
Before the “Twentyseven “ enlargement of the European Union and before the Nice 
Treaty on EU entered into force, for their adoption, acts of the Council  required at 
least: 
-62 votes in favour where the Treaty on European Community  required them to be adopted 
on a proposal from the Commission, 
-62 votes in favour, cast by at least 10 members, in other cases. 
 
Before the Nice Treaty on EU, each Member State had been assigned the number of votes as 
quoted above and roughly in proportion to the population of that Member State.  Out of the 
total of  the 87 votes were 62 votes required for voting on matters requiring “qualified 
majority voting” in the Council. The consequence of  “qualified majority voting” was that, 
unlike international organizations and unique, EU Member States could be outvoted on 
most types of legislation. This was the case just for larger countries: 
 
 qualified majority   voting  was meant to be a compromise in favor of larger 
Member States claiming that a weighting of votes should reflect their larger 
populations by a proportionally larger vote than the vote of smaller States. 
 Qualified majority voting,however, favored smaller states because at least one 
small Member State was required to vote joining a number of large States to reach the 
required 62 votes. Whereas a group of small States needed at least one large State to 
reach the required 62 votes. E.g., even if large Member States like France or Germany 
voted against a proposal from the Commission - say on qualifications for architects - 
they still were bound if the other Council members voted „yes„ 
 
 
The “ innovation “ , however, introduced by the  Nice Treaty to increase the voting 
strength of the larger EU Member States in the Council by nearly three times as much, 
and to increase the voting strength of the smaller Member States by nearly twice as 
much only:   
Article 205 TEC had been  amended,on 1 January 2005,in accordance with the “ Protocol 
on the enlargement of the European Union  “ 245)  
  
According to the Protocol´s Article  3 “Provisions concerning the weighting of votes in the 
Council “ the votes in the Council are weighted according to   the “20. Declaration on the 
enlargement of the European Union “, attached to the Nice Treaty on EU, corresponding to 
the table “ for an elarged Union of 27 Member States “ with the accession of Bulgaria 
and Rumania on January 01,2007.  Out of a total of 345 votes,acts of the Council, for  
 
 
245: Official Journal of the European Communities, December 24,2002, C 325/33 ( 163,  
        164,165 ): 
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their adoption under the Nice Treaty, require at least 258 votes in favour, cast by a 
majority of members, where this Treaty requires them to be adopted on a proposal from 
the Commission.  
In other cases, for their adoption acts of the Council shall require at least 258 votes in 
favour cast by at least two-thirds of the members..  246)  
 
“Thresholds” had been set up according to the “Declaration on the qualified majority 
threshold and the number of votes for a blocking minority in an enlarged Union”: 
“Insofar as all the candidate countries listed in the Declaration on the enlargement of the 
European Union have not yet acceded to the Union when the new vote weightings take effect 
(1 January 2005), the threshold for a qualified majority will move, according to the pace of 
accessions, from a percentage below the current one to a maximum of 73,4 %.  
 
When all the candidate countries mentioned above  have acceded, the blocking minority, in 
a Union of 27, will be raised to 91 votes, and the qualified majority threshold resulting from 
the table given in the Declaration on enlargement of the European Union will be 
automatically adjusted accordingly.”  247)   
 
 
4. Efficiency of decision-making:  alternative, flexible forms of cooperation 
between the Union´s Member States within the Union´s Treaty institutional 
system in order to strengthen the Union´s decisiveness 
introduction of multiple- speed integration or differentiated cooperation ? 
 
4.1   Integration  and  cooperation :  flexibility through multiple speed 
integration and variable geometry discussed at the 1996/97  IGC 
 
Another issue  the IGC 1996/97 had discussed to make  the enlarged union work  was 
the issue of how to secure the decisiveness and  the efficiency of the Council´s decision-
making by introducing alternative forms of cooperation between Member 
States  permitting flexibility, differentiation without undermining the cohesion 
of the Union. 
 
All Member States were well aware of the need for alternative forms of integration or 
cooperation that will increase as the growing number of Member States would tend to  
affect the decisiveness of the Union. Within a Union of 20 to 27 or more Member States, 
a certain degree of differentiation in the integration process appeared inevitable. It was 
held to prove impossible in the future to place all the Member States in the same 
category in all the fields of policies covered by the European Union Treaty, let alone at 
the same time. 
 
 
246: Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties establishing  
         the European Communities and certain related acts,2001, Official Journal of the  
         European Communities, March 10, 2001, C 80/01 ( 80, 82,83). 
247: ibid.,supra,note 246,Treaty of Nice , C 80/01 (  85 ). 
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Like-minded Member States would seek ways of filling the gaps in those areas in which 
the Union proves incapable of meeting their expectations and needs. In a Union of what 
would ultimately be 27 and even more states of an enlarged Union of what was already 
the perspective in 1996/97 after the Copenhagen summit had  given aspirants the 
perspective to accede to the Union, flexible forms of cooperation were considered to be 
the only way of keeping the integration process within an  enlarged Union going. 
 
Governments of  Member States had examined the scope for and problems arising from 
flexible forms of cooperation. No Government,however, had, until 1996/97, assessed 
developments in that direction in a public document. For, ideas in Europe on flexible 
forms of integration or cooperation were still embryonic and involved unknown political 
risks at that time. The German  paper on “variable  geometry” published by Mr. 
Lamers, the German  Christian Democratic Union Member of  Parliament (Deutscher 
Bundestag) and Member of the Committee of Foreign Relations of The Bundestag, had 
been met with great, European wide attention and was, at that time, the only widely 
known non-governmental attempt to perform a thorough and courageus analysis. The 
reluctance ,at least receptive position of the Member States´Governments to deal with 
this issue is understandable, as the Member States were venturing into unknown 
territory. They had no sure knowledge about the consequences of any form flexible  
cooperation between Member States of the European Union. They had to consider the 
chances to enhance integration and the risks that had to be weighed carefully. It was 
obvious that any differentiation between Member States willing to join a cooperation 
with other Member States while leaving behind Member States that were not willing to 
join would give rise to extremely complex political, institutional and legal problem: 
 
The main question was how the EU institutions, composed of and for all 
Member States, could continue to play a role in enabling smaller groups of 
Member States to integrate more closely. While preparing their positions for 
presenting at the IGC 1996/97, most  Governments shared the opinion that in further 
elaboration of views on flexible forms of  cooperation, the single institutional framework of 
the European Union must  not be damaged in any way. At quite an early stage of the 
preparation for the IGC, it was the Government of the Netherlands that continuously 
advocated that the Union should, if at all possible, go in a single direction. Governments 
did not see flexible cooperation as the priority action of the Union. The fact that the 
United Kingdom had been allowed to opt out of the Social Charter in the Maastricht 
Treaty on European Union, and the fact that the Treaty on European Union allowed   
Member States to join the Monetary Union while allowing Member States not yet 
willing or not yet being able to join were free to hold themselves back and free to join 
later: these facts constituted no rule in principle, but a last-resort-measure of temporary 
nature. 
 
The question the Member States had to answer at the IGC 1996/97 was  whether 
flexibility of integration or cooperation between the Union´s Member States would  
enhance the Union´s decisiveness and efficiency or hamper it, whether the advantages of 
flexibility would outweigh the risks. To understand the situation  the Member States had 
been facing  ten years ago, for the sake of clarity, the relevant terms should be defined 
here, well bearing in mind that the terms are often less easy to distinguish in practice 
than in theory of European integration. 
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To begin with, it is worth recalling the Treaty architecture of the Treaty on European 
Union, the architecture of which does represent two basically different forms of  
cooperation practised between the Member States of the Union, namely: 
 
 integration and 
 cooperation. 
 
Integration means developing and maintaining the Community legal order, i.e. the 
institutional structure of the European Community, the first pillar of the Treaty on 
European Union. This legal order is characterised not only by legislation that is both 
verifiable and enforceable, and the  central role it affords the European Commission as 
initiator, but also by the fact that it safeguards enforcement of the Treaty, and that it is 
subject to parliamentary control and provides legal protection. 
 
Cooperation means developing and maintaining intergovernmental forms of  reaching 
agreement between the Member States to operate together in fields that are not directly 
related to the internal market,such as Common Foreign and Security Policy including 
defence policy as  well as Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation, as ruled by the  2nd  
and the  3rd pillar under the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty on European Union. 
 
Two forms of integration are to be distinguished de lege lata, on the basis of  the 
European Union´s primary law, the Founding Treaties, as well as on the basis of  
European Union´s practice of integration, namely: 
 
 multiple-speed integration  and 
 variable  geometry. 
 
 
Multiple-speed integration means that while the policy objective is the common 
objective, the same objective for all Member States,  the speed at which the common 
objective is being achieved individually by each Member State varies. This idea was not 
a new idea. It was and it still is a tried and tested method of achieving gradual 
convergence when new Member States join the European Union. Multiple-
speed integration is not an end in itself but a means to an end: 
It enables a core group, or rather a leading group of Member States to 
proceed with further  integration. 
 
In the  case of variable  geometry, it is not the speed but the objective that 
varies for each group of countries, i.e.: 
 
 their targets are different as well as  
 the pace of  implementation . 
 
One example of variable geometry is the United Kingdom´s decision to opt out of the 
European Union´s social policy. In the field of  the Union´s social policy  the Council is 
allowed to 
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“  adopt, in the fields referred to in paragraph 1(a)to (i),by means of directives, minimum 
requirements for gradual implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical rules 
obtaining in each of the Member States. The Council shall act in accordance with the 
procedure referred to in Article 251…”, Article 137 paragraph 2,lit.b Treaty establishing 
the European Community, and  
“The Council shall act in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251,” according 
to which(Article 251 paragraph 2) the   Council is acting by a qualified majority after 
obtaining the opinion of the European Parliament. 248)  This is  the voting procedure of 
legislation under the terms of the 1st pillar of the Treaty on EU, the integration pillar. 
 
The United Kingdom´s opting out of the social policy meant that a separate social 
agreement had to be added to the Treaty of Maastricht for the remaining eleven 
Member States. As with the multiple-speed model, differences in the rate of 
integration arise between the Member States by using the variable geometry 
model. But opting for divergent objectives icreases the risk if the gradual 
disintegration of the Union as a whole. 
 
The often used expression “ Europe à la carte “  can be seen as a  more advanced form 
of variable geometry, in which the freedom of choice of the Member States is held up 
almost as an ideal which ,basically,is not in favor of the Union´s cohesion. 
 
The term “ a Europe of  concentric circles” had been used mainly in France during the 
1990´s, describing a situation where groups of an ever smaller number of countries – the 
inner  circles comprising relatively tightknit groups such as the Union – exist within the 
larger whole of the European continent:the outer circle of countries cooperating with 
each other in a looser form, as within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe-CSCE. The inner circles were and are operating at two speeds – the European 
Monetary Union- and, at present, the operating of the common single currency, the 
Euro zone,  or be based on the principle of variable geometry, the former Western 
European Union(WEU). 
 
4.2     The 1996/97  IGC   and  differentiated cooperation  in the field of  
          Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs   
          and  the  1996/97  IGC 
 
The Maastricht Treaty on EU had established the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
by Article J.   249)   
 
The Maastricht Treaty on European Union considered the fact that not all the Member 
States were and are willing to be working towards the same treaty objectives to the same 
extent, as e.g. the United Kingdom´s position on joining the US led war on 
Iraq-without taking care of seeking a common European Union position,  was 
and is proving. 
 
 
248: Official Journal of the European Communities, 24 December 2002, C 325/33 ( 93 ).  
249: Official Journal of the European Communities, 29 July 1992, C 191. 
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It was outside the scope of the internal market and of  the making of EC laws (regu- 
lations and directives) under the 1st pillar of the Treaty on European Union, that the 
Maastricht Treaty on EU  allowed differentiated cooperation  between the Member 
States  by  “ closer cooperation “:  in  the field of a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy of the European Union,  including the eventual framing of a  Common 
Defence Policy, Article J.4 1st  paragraph, and in the field of  Cooperation in the 
fields of justice and home affairs under Article K of the Maastricht TEU. “ Closer 
cooperation “   according to Article J.4 5tb paragraph  “ the development of 
closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the 
framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run 
counter to or impede that provided for in this Title. “, and according to Article K.7  “  the 
establishment or development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States in 
so far as such cooperation does not conflict with, or impede, that provided for in this Title. “   .   
250)    
 
 
An example of differentiated cooperation by “closer cooperation “ in the field 
of  Common Foreign and Security Policy was the WEU, the former organisation 
comprising a number of European Union Member States, which had existed for some 
years and was incorpora-ted in the inexperienced Common Foreign and Security Policy 
provided for by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. The Declaration No. 30  “ 
DECLARATION on Western European Union “annexed to the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union stated in No.5 of the Declaration the principle of “closer 
cooperation”: 
 
“4. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the 
security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States 
under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established 
within that framework.  
5. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation 
between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic 
Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.”    251)    
 
The IGC 1996/97 had to consider a decision on the future of the WEU. Not all the 
Member States were prepared to enter into closer  defence cooperation arrangements. 
The WEU ,therefore, continued to provide a framework for closer cooperation among a 
smaller group of countries within the broader context of the European Union until 2002 
they year when WEU expired. 
 
Another example of differentiated cooperation by closer cooperation  that already existed 
before the IGC 1996/97 started was and is the Schengen process which aimed at bringing 
about the free movement of people, one of the objectives of the Treaty on European 
Community. Each Member State of the Eropean Union was free to join Schengen. The  
 
 
250: ibid.supra,note 249. 
251: ibid.supra,note 249. 
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Schengen Convention also stated that the –  intergovernmental – Schengen rules would 
disappear as soon as there are Community rules that have the same function to establish a 
common legal order governing the free and secure movement of people within the 
Community.  
And , consequently, annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty on European Union , the  
Declaration No. 47 “  Declaration on Article 6 of the Protocol integrating the Schengen 
acquis into the framework of the European Union “ stated: 
“ The High Contracting Parties agree to take all necessary steps so that the Agreements 
referred to in Article 6 of the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the 
framework of the European Union may enter into force on the same date as the date of 
entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. “  252)  . 
 
 
In view of the current  and future “closer  cooperation “  operations, the  19969/97 IGC 
had to answer  the question of  how, within a Union of 20 to 27 Member States or even 
more ,  a certain and inevitable degree of differentiation in the integration process could 
be guided to direct the course of the Union´s process of integration in the right direction: 
the delegations were aware of the need  
 
 to consider carefully to what extent differentiation appeared necessary,   
 what conditions needed to be met and, more generally, 
 what the consequences of this process would be for the the cohesion of the Union. 
 
It seemed to the delegations to be obligatory, in other words,  
 
 to find a way of permitting differentiation without undermining the cohesion of 
the Union more than is strictly necessary. 
 
In general, there was,therefore a growing common estimation that variable geometry 
should preferably and primarily be  avoided. For, allowing Member States´ objectives 
relating to finding common responses to commonly shared challenges would only 
encourage Euro-pean disintegration. And, by contrast, there was a growing common 
estimation presented by delegations´ members that the Member States´ Governments 
would not strongly object to a multiple-speed approach. But the impact of each new 
initiative in this direction did have, however, to be evaluated in each case. Most 
Governments´s proposals , in substance, were of  one opinion that the 
following criteria be applied to assess such initiatives aiming at introducing 
multiple-speed in a given case: 
 
 differentiated integration must be compatible with the objectives of the Treaty on 
European Union; 
 each Member State must be free to participate if it can and wants to meet the 
requirements for the fast track: 
 
252: Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing  
         the European Communities and other related acts, Official Journal of the European  
         Communities, 10 November 1997, C 340. 
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 differentiated integration must not undermine the Community legal order or, in 
principle, impair the cohesion of the internal market; 
 Member States which elect to opt out must not be allowed to oppose the 
formation of a leading group which does meet the above-mentioned criteria. 
 
 
4.3 From “ closer  cooperation “  to “enhanced coperation” under   the  
Amsterdam Treaty on European Union, the Nice Treaty on EU and the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
 
a)The Amsterdam Treaty on EU ,  under title V, Articles 11, 17,  confirms the 
Maastricht TEU´s  acquis of provisions on a comprehensive Common Foreign and 
Security Policy including “ all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the 
progressive framing of a common defence policy, in accordance with the second 
subparagraph, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so 
decide.”,Article 17 1st paragraph.        253)  
 
And as an innovation, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced cooperation in the field of 
armaments: 
“The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member 
States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments.” , 
Article 17 1st paragraph last sentence.  254)    
  
 
 
Taking up the IGC´s proposals on  differentiated cooperation , the Amsterdam TEU 
confirmed  the Maastricht ex-Article J.4 5th paragraph  
as far as the cooperation in defence matters within the WEU was concerned, and 
incorporated “ the development of  closer cooperation between two or more states “on 
a bilateral level” within the WEU and in the North Atlantic Alliance in the Treaty´s 
Articles stating under Article 17 paragragph 4 (ex Article J.7 4th paragraph . 
255)   
“ 
4. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between 
two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic 
Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this 
Title.  
 
5. With a view to furthering the objectives of this Article, the provisions of this Article will be 
reviewed in accordance with Article 48.”   
 
 
253: ibid.,supra, note 252. 
254: ibid.,supra, note 252. 
255: ibid.,supra,note 252. 
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And the Amsterdam Treaty on European Union inserted  a new Title VII(ex Title 
VI a)  “Provisions on closer  cooperation”,  Article 43 (ex Article K.15) of 
the Treaty on EU: 
 
“  TITLE VII (ex Title VIa)  
PROVISIONS ON CLOSER COOPERATION  
Article 43 (ex Article K.15)  
1. Member States which intend to establish closer cooperation between themselves may make use of the 
institutions, procedures and mechanisms laid down by this Treaty and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community provided that the cooperation:  
(a) is aimed at furthering the objectives of the Union and at protecting and serving its interests;  
(b) respects the principles of the said Treaties and the single institutional framework of the Union;  
(c) is only used as a last resort, where the objectives of the said Treaties could not be attained by applying the 
relevant procedures laid down therein;  
(d) concerns at least a majority of Member States;  
(e) does not affect the ‘acquis communautaire’ and the measures adopted under the other provisions of the said 
Treaties;  
(f) does not affect the competences, rights, obligations and interests of those Member States which do not 
participate therein;  
(g) is open to all Member States and allows them to become parties to the cooperation at any time, provided that 
they comply with the basic decision and with the decisions taken within that framework;  
(h) complies with the specific additional criteria laid down in Article 11 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community and Article 40 of this Treaty, depending on the area concerned, and is authorised by the Council in 
accordance with the procedures laid down therein.  
2. Member States shall apply, as far as they are concerned, the acts and decisions adopted for the implementation 
of the cooperation in which they participate. Member States not participating in such cooperation shall not 
impede the implementation thereof by the participating Member States.  
Article 44 (ex Article K.16)  
1. For the purposes of the adoption of the acts and decisions necessary for the implementation of the cooperation 
referred to in Article 43, the relevant institutional provisions of this Treaty and of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community shall apply. However, while all members of the Council shall be able to take part in the 
deliberations, only those representing participating Member States shall take part in the adoption of decisions. 
The qualified majority shall be defined as the same proportion of the weighted votes of the members of the 
Council concerned as laid down in Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
Unanimity shall be constituted by only those Council members concerned.  
2. Expenditure resulting from implementation of the cooperation, other than administrative costs entailed for the 
institutions, shall be borne by the participating Member States, unless the Council, acting unanimously, decides 
otherwise.  
 
Article 45 (ex Article K.17)  
The Council and the Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament of the development of closer 
cooperation established on the basis of this Title.   “   256)    
 
 
 
256: ibid.,supra, note  252. 
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b)    “Enhanced Cooperation “ under the Nice Treaty on European Union: 
 
The term “closer cooperation” used under the Amsterdam Treaty Article 43 had been 
amended by the term “ enhanced cooperation “  under Article 43 of the  ”Consolidated 
Version of  the Treaty on European Union”,   257) 
 (the amendments are marked below): 
 
“TITLE VII 
PROVISIONS ON ENHANCED COOPERATION 
 
Article 43 (*) 
Member States which intend to establish enhanced cooperation between themselves may 
make use of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms laid down by this Treaty and by the 
Treaty establishing the European Community provided that the proposed cooperation: 
 
(a)is aimed at furthering the objectives of the Union and of the Community, at protecting and 
serving their interests and at reinforcing their process of integration; 
 
(b)respects the said Treaties and the single institutional framework of the Union; 
 
(c)respects the acquis communautaire and the measures adopted under the other provisions of 
the said Treaties; (the amended version stated: “does not affect….) 
 
(d)remains within the limits of the powers of the Union or of the Community and does not 
concern the areas which fall within the exclusive competence of the Community; 
 
(e)does not undermine the internal market as defined in Article 14(2)of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, or the economic and social cohesion established in 
accordance with Title XVII of that Treaty; 
 
(f)does not constitute a barrier to or discrimination in trade between the Member States and 
does not distort competition between them; 
 
(g)involves a minimum of eight Member States;( the amended version: Article 43 paragraph 
1 (d): “concerns at least a majority of Member States.”) 
 
(h)respects the competences, rights and obligations of those Member States which do not 
participate therein; 
 
(i)does not affect the provisions of the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the 
framework of the European Union; 
 
(j)is open to all the Member States,in accordance with Article 43b. 
(*)Article amended by the Treaty of Nice. 
 
 
257: Official Journal of the European Communities, 24 December 2002, C 325/5 (28) .  
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Article 43a (*) 
Enhanced cooperation may be undertaken only as a last resort, when it has been 
established within the Council that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained 
within a reasonable period by applying the relevant provisions of the Treaties. 
 
Article 43b (*) 
 
When enhanced cooperation is being established,it shall be open to all Member States. It 
shall also be open to them at any time,in accordance with Articles 27e and 40b of this 
Treaty and with Article 11a of the Treaty establishing the European Community,subject to 
compliance with the basic decision and with the decisions taken within that framework.The 
Commission and the Member States participating in enhanced cooperation shall ensure 
that as many Member States as possible are encouraged to take part. 
 
Article 44 (**) 
 
1.For the purposes of the adoption of the acts and decisions necessary for the implementation 
of  enhanced cooperation referred to in Article 43,the relevant institutional provisions of this 
Treaty and of the Treaty establishing the European Community shall apply. However, while 
all members of the Council shall be able to take part in the deliberations, only those 
representing Member States participating in enhanced cooperation shall take part in the 
adoption of decisions. The qualified majority shall be defined as the same proportion of the 
weighted votes and the same proportion of the number of the Council members 
concerned as laid down in Article 205(2)of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community,and in the second and third subparagraphs of Article 23(2)of this Treaty as 
regards enhanced cooperation established on the basis of Article 27c.. 
Unanimity shall be constituted by only those Council members concerned. 
Such acts and decisions shall not form part of the Union acquis . 
 
2.Member States shall apply, as far as they are concerned, the acts and decisions adopted for 
the implementation of the enhanced cooperation in which they participate. Such acts and 
decisions shall be binding only on those Member States which participate in such 
cooperation and,as appropriate,shall be directly applicable only in those States. Member 
States which do not participate in such cooperation shall not impede the implementation 
thereof by the participating Member States. 
 
Article 44a (***) 
Expenditure resulting from implementation of enhanced cooperation, other than 
administrative costs entailed for the institutions, shall be borne by the participating Member 
States, unless all members of the Council, acting unanimously after consulting the 
European Parliament, decide otherwise. 
(*)Article inserted by the Treaty of Nice. 
(**)Article amended by the Treaty of Nice. 
(***)Article inserted by the Treaty of Nice (former Article 44(2)). “ 
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In the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy “ enhanced cooperation “ , 
according to Article 27 a Treaty on EU,   
“ shall be aimed at safeguarding the values and serving the interests of the Union as a 
whole by asserting its identity as a coherent force on the international scene. It shall 
respect: 
— the principles, objectives, general guidelines and consistency of the common foreign 
and security policy and the decisions taken within the framework of that policy, 
— the powers of the European Community, and 
— consistency between all the Union's policies and its external activities.” 
 
The  Member States may  use” enhanced cooperation” for the  implementation of a joint 
action or a common position.” It shall not relate to matters having military or defence 
implications.”, Article 27 b  Treaty on EU.   246)   (246: ibid.,supra note 245, C 325/05  
( 20 ) 
 
 
c)     The  Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe- TCE- stipulates, in 
chapter III, Article 43,  “enhanced cooperation”, a provision which does not change the 
substance of the Nice TEU Articles 43- 44 (a) on enhanced cooperation , but which 
presents  a more concise text.  258)   
 
According to Article 43 paragaraph 1 TCE, “enhanced cooperation shall  
 
 be granted by the Council of Ministers as a last resort, when it has been established 
within the Council of Ministers that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be 
attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole, and provided that it 
brings together at least one third of the Member States. 
      c compared to Article 43 (g) Nice Treaty on EU:” (g)involves a minimum of eight  
      Member States); 
 aim to further  the objectives of the Union, protect its interests and reinforce its 
integration process”, but, according to Article III-322 , “ shall 
 comply with the Union's Constitution and law.”,and “  shall 
  not undermine the internal market or economic, social and territorial  coehsion. 
It shall 
 not constitute a barrier to or discrimination in trade between Member States, nor 
shall it distort competition between them.”  
 “ respect the competences, rights and obligations of those Member States which 
do not participate in it. Those Member States shall not impede ist 
implementation by the participating Member States.” ,Article III-323. 
 
 
 
258: Official Journal of the European Union, 16 December 2004, C 310/01. 
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TEC Chapter III “Enhanced cooperation” 
( amendments are marked below): 
 
“ 
Article 43: Enhanced cooperation 
1. Member States which wish to establish enhanced cooperation between themselves within 
the framework of the Union's non-exclusive competences may make use of its Institutions 
and exercise those competences by applying the relevant provisions of the Constitution, 
subject to the limits and in accordance with the procedures laid down in this Article and in 
Articles III-322 to III-329. 
 
Enhanced cooperation shall aim to further the objectives of the Union, protect its interests 
and reinforce its integration process. Such cooperation shall be open to all Member States 
when it is being established and at any time, in accordance with Article III-324. 
 
2. Authorisation to proceed with enhanced cooperation shall be granted by the Council of 
Ministers as a last resort, when it has been established within the Council of Ministers that the 
objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the Union as 
a whole, and provided that it brings together at least one third of the Member States. 
( compared to Article 43 (g) Nice Treaty on EU:” (g)involves a minimum of eight Member 
States). 
 The Council of Ministers shall act in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article III-
325. 
3. Only members of the Council of Ministers representing the States participating in enhanced 
cooperation shall take part in the adoption of acts. All Member States may, however, take part 
in the deliberations of the Council of Ministers. 
Unanimity shall be constituted by the votes of the representatives of the participating States 
only. A qualified majority shall be defined as a majority of the votes of the representatives 
of the participating States, representing at least three fifths of the population of those 
States. 
Where the Constitution does not require the Council of Ministers to act on the basis of a 
Commission proposal, or where the Council of Ministers is not acting upon initiative of the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, the required qualified majority shall be defined as a majority 
of two thirds of the participating States, representing at least three fifths of the population 
of those States. 
 
4. Acts adopted in the framework of enhanced cooperation shall bind only participating 
States. 
They shall not be regarded as an acquis which has to be accepted by candidates for accession 
to the Union. “ 
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II. Comment on the criteria related to differentiated integration through   
     multiple-speed integration and to  differentiated cooperation, enhanced  
     cooperation as guiding-line for  a merger Treaty 
 
1. Within a European Union of 27 and even more Member States, a certain degree 
of differentiation is inevitable and should be accepted to an extent which, in each 
case, must  not undermine the cohesion of the European Union. 
2. Variable geometry should preferably be avoided, because opting for divergent 
objectives increases the risk of the gradual disintegration of the European Union 
as a whole. 
3. The multiple-speed approach to differentiated integration is the preferable 
option because the friendly integrational approach does share the same policy 
objective common to all the Member States,  allowed to vary the speed at which 
the common objective is achieved. 
4. Differentiated integration by multiple-speed integration must not 
undermine the Community legal order or, in principle, impair the  
cohesion of the internal market: 
Particular importance should be attached to this criterion. Careful consideration 
must always be given to the question of whether integration as part of smaller 
circle of Member States will perpetuate, improve or actually harm the internal 
market, especially in those European Union´s policy areas which touch on the 
well functioning of the internal market. 
 
For, the survival of the internal market depends on there being 
 
 free competition within certain parameters that apply equally to all the parties; 
 parameters laid down at European Union level, creating a level playing 
field; 
 Small groups of countries being  nonetheless given the opportunity to 
take more far reaching measures and reach agreement on this at 
Community level, namely in the social and environmental protection 
and safe energy supply fields; 
 Establishing in each case whether the differentiation of norms and 
policy will gadually undermine the level playing field. 
 
        One of the crucial political issues will be : are the  leaders willing and  
        able to maintain free competition with Member States that cannot, or do  
       not yet want to apply the leaders´ norms? How large may the gap be  
       between the leaders and the rest? How can the friendly integrational (the  
       willing) Member States ensure that multiple-speed integration will not  
       take on a life of its own, so that the lead of the group in front does not  
       become permanent?   
 
   5. Last, but not least, the question is : can the legally binding and the securing nature    
        of the Community structure which secures the cohesion of the internal market be  
        adapted to cope with multiple-speed integration? Flexibility demands adaptation,  
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        but flexibility must not be allowed to undermine the Community´s  decision- 
       making   structure.This constitutes the core of European integration. The  
       preservation and development of the Community legal order with its  
       relatively efficient rules on decision-making and its democratic and legal 
      safeguards are to be  regarded as indispensable for the proper functioning 
      of the internal market and the observance of the rules of that market 
 
   6. As far as  differentiated cooperation through intergovernmental coopera- 
      tion in the fields governed by the 2nd and the 3rd pillar of the Treaty on 
      European Union  is concerned:  
 
     The problem  was  that neither the European Community –before the   
     Maastricht Treaty entered  into force – and, after the Maastricht Treaty entered  
     into force, nor the Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation under the Maastricht  
     TEU had and have been able, to date, to put an efficiently working system in place  
     that covers the whole of the European Union as easily can be seen from the  
     recently endeavors of Spain failing to  get adequate support from all EU Member  
     States to cope with the problems existing at the common EU border in view of  
     refugees coming from Africa and looking for a better life in Europe. 
 
          The implementation of the free movement of persons at  Union level requires a  
           unanimous decision, and one Member State in particular was opposed to the idea.  
           Should an alternative form of cooperation have been sought in such a case,  
           one that did not need a Community decision? In the case in question, it was justi- 
           fied  in  the circumstances for a smaller group of states to take further actions  
           together.  
          
          The  arguments for and against will always have to be considered again in similar  
           situations in the future. The still early and recent history of Schengen  
          demonstrates the kind of dilemma that arises when certain Member  
          States   continue to block  EC decision-making while  others want to  
          push ahead with more  radical measures. Such situations will occur more  
            frequently, especially if a reform of the rules on Commmunity decision-making  
            will fail so that blockades of this kind  cannot be avoided. 
 
      
 Summarizing: as far as differentiated integration through multiple-speed  
     integration in  matters of the Community policies ,namely of  the internal market  
      and of  the  legal order is concerned, or  “enhanced “ cooperation in matters of   
       Foreign, Security and Defence Policies  and  of Justice and Home Affairs  
       cooperation: 
 
The Member States´ delegations , at the eve of the IGC 1996/97 and during the IGC, 
considered it realistically that differentiated integration should be the last resort 
for use only to prevent stagnation in the process of integration. Taken as an 
exception, differentiated integration appears to be a legal and legitimate 
way to ensure the well functioning of the internal legal order and of the 
internal market of the Union as well as to ensure the well functioning of the 
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Union´s external role by speaking with one voice in order to achieve the 
Union´s objectives and not to undermine the internal legal order of the 
Union. 
 
For, differentiated integration within the larger future Union groups of Member States 
would emerge to seek closer integration and enhanced  cooperation in specific policy 
areas and , in each single case, would have to make choices and weigh up objectives that 
cannot be achieved to the same extent at the same time by all Member States of the 
European Union. For, differentiation may in some cases provide a solution within a 
larger Union to the problem of how to preserve the dynamism of the integration process 
loooking carefully at the chances and risks that developments in this direction might 
entail for the well functioning of the internal market and of the legal order of the 
Community and looking at the consequences for the cohesion of the European Union as 
a whole as an internal and external actor. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter VIII 
Constitutional quality shaping essential:  
Efficiency of the European Union, focussing on the issue of 
improving the  
 
 decision-making within the Council  in the field of European 
Foreign, Security and Defence Policy 
 
 
The European Union: speaking with one voice?  The legal constitution for  
stronger external action by the European Union in the field of European 
Foreign,Security and Defence Policy 
 
 
I.  Extending the qualified majority voting namely on  deciding on   joint  
   positions and joint actions in the field of Common Foreign and Security  
  Policy :  the  response to challenges in international security  
 
1. The state of international security challenging the European Union to speak with one 
voice 
 
With the radically changed political and security situation  since the end of the 1980s in Eu- 
rope, the political and military threat that existed in the past had disappeared. No longer was 
Western Europe faced with the risk of a large-scale attack mounted over a broad front with 
little warning. The reduced threat had caused the United States of America to adapt a more 
restrained role concerning Western Europe while at the same time increasing the scope for the  
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larger European countries to pursue a foreign policy free from former constraints exerted by 
the Cold War. Peoples of Central and Eastern Europe got the perspective to see their countries 
represented by democratically elected governments and  join Western cooperative fora, 
joining the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The strategic 
situation changed, opening the way to significant developments in the field of arms control 
and disarmament and to other challenges to international security in a wider sense influenced 
by worldwide search for secure and sane energy supply and by worldwide concerns about 
global warming.  Confrontation had given way to cooperation, which had and still has to be 
seen against the background of an increased risk of worldwide instability, both in Europe and 
namely in Europe´s neighbourhood in the Middle East and in Africa. 
 
Over fifty years of peace based on deterrence cultivated a comfortable belief that the spectre 
of war had been eliminated from the European continent. This, however, had proved not to be 
the case. With the end of the Cold War, the centuries-old conflict between nationalities, 
between the right of self-determination and the maintenance of political unity came to the 
surface again. International crises and conflicts do not directly threaten the territorial integrity 
of Western Europe, crisis like the disastrous civil war like instabilities in Iraq, the Israel-
Palestine conflict,  Europe´s dependencies on primary energy resources´ imports  from 
countries like Russia and the uncertainties about the impact the energy price conflicts between 
Russia, on the one hand, and Ukraine and White Russia,on the other, do have on the EU´s 
secure energy supplies from Russia in the long run. These are crisis that can nevertheless 
have serious consequences for the stability and/or vital interests fo Europe as a whole: 
 
For, if the peoples of the Member States of the European Union will see reason enough 
to identify themselves with the European Union it is for the Union´s capacity to 
guarantee stability,namely: peace, security and economic ,social and environmental 
health. 
 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia had led to a serious armed conflict which threatened to 
spread  to neighbouring countries. The case of the Kosovo is still without a durable solution. 
Border disputes and minority issues could spark off conflicts elsewhere,too, like in Georgia 
and Armenia in the Caucasus.  Eastern and Southeastern European countries like Bulgaria and 
Rumania are fighting with grave economic and social problems as well as fighting with 
organised crime  and corruption, which may endanger their transformation into politically and 
economically stable democratic states. And ,vice versa, these countries do strongly hope for 
the European  Union´s contribution to their own stability after they had joined the European 
Union on January 1st 2007. 
 
And, last but not the least of the security risks for the European Union, uncertainty as to the 
political course Russia will take after the expiration of Wladimir Putins presidency and the 
nature Russia´s future political system makes it impossible to predict the security situation 
in Europe. The relationship between the central power in Moscow and the “ near 
abroad” of Russia is still far from clear. Russia is still by far the biggest military and nuclear 
power in Europe. The “ near abroad “ of Russia ,namely the  region of Asia Minor in the 
Caucasus, as well as the region of Transcaucasia north of  Iran,  in west-central Asia 
northeast, east and west of the Caspian Sea ( Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan) , these are countries in the European Union´s nearby region: 
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Socioeconomic, political and in some cases military instability are characteristic features of 
that nearby region, as well as of other nearby regions such as the Mediterranian, the Middle-
East and the Gulf.  
 
There is the growing influence of Iran in the region after the situation in Iraq became 
disastrous. Europe will have to strengthen visible contributions to stability namely in the 
Middle East, as far as the the use of violence orientation of Islamic fundamentalists 
severely affects the stable and peaceful relationship between Islamic parts and non-Islamic 
parts of  the peoples living in the European Union, and as far as  the lack of a durable 
peaceful settlement between Israel and Palestine giving the Palestinians a State and giving 
Israel security will continue to affect stability in the whole region as well as the security of the 
European Union. 
 
Security and stablity can be gradually and severely undermined by a continuing 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles and by the development and the 
transfer of related technology. This is an obvious risk  that must be controlled by peaceful 
means of diplomacy and negotiations to be continued with Iran on the basis of mutual 
respect and firmness as far as the development of highly enriched Uranium and the 
development and use of centrifuges by Iran  is concerned. 
 
Other dangers include:extremism, religious or otherwise, terrorism and growing 
international organised cime, all of which can be combated effectively only at 
international level, and acting with one voice  as far as the EU´s role of an 
active and effective player is concerned.   
 
 
 2. The provisions of the Treaty on European Union concerning  the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy ( CFSP )  -     from  European 
Political Cooperation – EPC -   to   CFSP 
 
2.1  Experience of unanimous decision-making within the second pillar   of 
the Treaty on European Union : blocking the European Union acting with 
one voice  
 
The Europeann Union´s  Member States´ conduct of the Common  Foreign and Security 
Policy as well as of the Common Security and Defence Policy and  of the Home and Justice 
cooperation in criminal matters  shows  that the Member States tend to take single action 
on national level when they are challenged to respond to threats to international 
security. When they take the  intergovernmental cooperation this method requires  deciding 
by unanimity which too frequently renders the Member States insufficiently able to take 
decisions properly and promptly.  
 
The question,therefore, is whether an efficient “one voice” of the European Union is 
reachable . Acting with one voice of the European Union in the field of Common Foreign 
and Security Policy appears to be manageable through applying the EU´s  instruments 
of common positions and of joint actions as provided for by the Treaty on European 
Union and foreseen by the Treaty on Constitution: 
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It is necessary and feasible under the current Treaty on EU  to extend the 1st pillar 
Community method of integration through majority-voting decisions to decision-making on 
policies under the second and third pillar, at least as regards the decisions on participation 
in the implementation of possible common positions and joint actions which do 
implement  strategy oriented decisions of the Council. The  decisions on the Union´s 
principles of and general guidelines for  the common foreign and security policy, 
including for matters with defence implications, decisions on common 
strategies,however, require  unanimity:   
 
 the European Council can adopt, on its own initiative and by unanimity, a 
European decision allowing the Council of Ministers to act by qualified majority in 
that area to decide on common positions and joint actions.       259)  
  
The  legal constitution of the Union´s conduct of Common Foreign and Security Policy- 
CFSP- under the Treaty on European Union is the result of a dynamic process ranging from 
European Political Cooperation – EPC – to the CFSP. 
 
 
2.2 The dynamic process from  European Political Cooperation – EPC -   to  
Treaty provisions on  CFSP extending the scope   bejond mere economic 
issues to be implemented by new instruments:  common positions and joint 
actions  
 
European Political Cooperation – EPC – had been launched in 1972. EPC  had been 
restricted to the political and economic aspects of security. It achieved permanent form in 
1985, under Article 30 of the Single European Act. 
 
With the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union on 1 November 
1993, one of the Union´s task was and is to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy-
CFSP- under Article J.1 of the Treaty  to replace the existing  European Political Cooperation. 
Article J.1: 
 
“ 
1. The Union and its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and 
security policy, governed by the provisions of this Title and covering all areas of foreign and 
security policy.  
 
2. The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be:  
 
-  to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;  
 
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;  
 
 
259:Articles 12, 13, 14, 15, 23 2nd paragraph  Treaty establishing the European Union,  
       consolidated version, Official Journal of the European Communities, 24 December 2002,  
       C 325/5 ( 14, 15, 18 ). 
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-  to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of 
the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the 
objectives of the Paris Charter;  
 
-  to promote international cooperation;  
 
-  to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.”  260)    
“ 
 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy shall  include 
 
 “  all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the eventual  
( “progressive”) framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a 
common defence “, Article J.4  Maastricht Treaty on EU.  261)  , confirmed by Article J.7 1st  
paragraph Amsterdam Treaty on EU – TEU -, again by Article 17 1st paragraph Nice TEU 
and,actually, by  Article 15 1st paragraph   Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe – 
TCE- “The common foreign and security policy”,paragraph 1,replacing the Article J.4 
Maastricht TEU which used the less dynamic term “ eventual “ framing of a common defence 
policy. 262)    
 
By the Treaty on EU, both the the scope of policy itself and the policy instruments 
available had been expanded in relation to the former European Political Cooperation-
EPC-: 
 
The European Political Cooperation had  restricted the  scope of  the European Comuunity´s 
security policy to the political and economic aspects of security.  
The Maastricht Treaty on EU had  abandoned this restriction and expanded the Common 
security cooperation beyond political and economic aspects of security to common defence 
matters of  intergovernmental cooperation between Member  States. 
 
The new instruments available under the CFSP were “common positions” and “joint 
actions”. The latter, in particular, were and are seen as a more far reaching form of policy 
agreement which is binding on the Member States of the European Union.  263)    
 
 
260:Official Journal of the European Communities, 29 July 1992, C 191.  
261: ibid.,supra,note 260.. 
262: Amsterdam Treaty on EU, Official Journal of the European Communities, 10 November  
        1997, C 340 ; Nice TEU, consolidated version , Official Journal of the European  
        Communities, 24 December 2002, C 325/05 ( 16 ); Treaty establishing a Constitution for  
        Europe , Official Journal of the European Union, 18 July 2003, C 169/01 ( 11 ); Official 
        Journal of the European Union, 16 December 2004, C 310/01. 
263: Articles 14 and 15 Nice Treaty on EU,consolidated version, Official Journal of the 
        European  Communities, 28 December 2002, C 325/5 ( 15 ). 
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3. Evaluation  of  CFSP and CSDP de lege lata: the Member States   
prepared to translate political will into joint positions and joint actions ? 
 
3.1   The situation before the Intergovernmental Conference 1996/97 
 
Fourteen years after the entry into force of the  Maastricht Treaty, it is hardly 
surprising that  there is still now no question about the legal constitution (the situation 
de lege  
lata ), the attribution of  a common foreign and security policy  power to the European 
Union, attributed by the Founding Treaty on European Union, that is held  to speak and 
to act with one voice and with common positions and joint actions taken promptly and 
properly on the basis of a common modern  term of security in a comprehensive, wider 
sense of security going beyond merely military challenge and response: e.g. challenged  
by confidence-building  and peace-keeping requirements namely in Afghanistan where 
the security dilemma might decrease the more civil reconstruction projects successfully 
prove confidence-building in the eyes of  the people in Afghanistan  
 
A totally different issue,however, is the situation of the living constitution. the real 
situation of the CFSP, as the wars on the Taliban and on Iraq had made evident the role 
played by the Member States of the European Union: see below the following chapter 11 
of the present study . 
 
The aim of the 2nd pillar of the Treaty on European Union – Common Foreign and Security 
Policy- is to strengthen the Union´s external action and enhance the Union´s capacity for 
decisive action. To this end the EU had  been provided with the power of a wide range of 
policy instruments, the use of which would combine economic, diplomatic and military 
elements in differing combinations, depending on the characteristics of a specific regional and 
sub-regional situation. The origins of many problems in neighbouring regions of the European 
Union could and still can be traced to socioeconomic factors as well as religious and/or ethnic 
disaccords (e.g. Kosovo, Iraq),and can therefore be influenced  to some extent by 
socioeconomic instruments. Preventive diplomacy or mediation would and will sometimes 
achieve results. In some cases, however, if diplomacy is to be effective, it must be backed 
up by a military option. 
 
For, the wording of Article 15  of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe – TCE- 
“The common foreign and security policy”,paragraph 1:  264)   
 
 “ The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all 
areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the 
progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence.”  
 
 indicates – in the tradition of the Treaty on EU - the wide sense of the term “ security “  
covering a wide scope  of  areas and actions relating to the Union´s  foreign and  security 
policy, empowering the European Union to negotiate and “ conclude international agreements 
with one or more third countries or international organisations where the Constitution so  
 
 
264:Official Journal of the European Union, 16 December 2004, C 310. 
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provides or where the conclusion of an agreement is  necessary in order to achieve, within the 
framework of the Union's policies, one of the objectives fixed by the Constitution, where 
there is provision for it in a binding Union legislative act  or where it affects one of the 
Union's internal acts”, Article III-225 TCE, following the traditional line of the European 
Union´s treaty-making power on the basis of the Court of Justice jurisdiction concerning the 
so-called AETR-case . 265)  
 
The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy in all areas of 
security  in the wide sense of the term “ security” covers 
 
 common interests – not as an abstract academic formula but as a “case” oriented 
definition of a given  challenge and of the Union´s reasoning of why to move to 
action –  
 areas of common interests for common  action, areas reaching beyond mere 
military conflicts, areas of common interests such as common security by 
safeguarding  
 
 free flows of energy supply,  
 
 the security of well functioning space-based European communication satellite  
     systems to keep them safe from military threats in order to secure free flows of  
     information and data;  
 
 world climate by preventing climate change and by combating  global  
     warming 
 
 free and legal worldwide competition between existing and emerging new big  
     economies such as China and India;  
 
 conflict prevention and conflict management through the deployment of  wide  
     range  socio-economic instruments to assist economic, social and political  
     stabilization policies in world regions of common interest 
 
 combating poverty in developing countries by helping to use their own  
      resources and through opening the Union´s market  
 deployment of  military resources  for common defence and peace keeping  
       actions under United Nations´ mandate 
 
 
265: see Pletsch,Michael, thesis on the EEC´s  treaty-making power, dissertation Bonn 
University, 1980:the author had contributed  the basic theory to the European  Court´s obiter 
dictum (in the so-called AETR-case) that the EEC has, except explicitly attributed treaty-
making powers, additional tacitly attributed, implied powers to conclude international 
agreements in order to prevent the undermining of the internal legal acquis of the Union 
through single actions of the Member  States outside the Union´s procedures. 
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Shortly after the entry into force of the Maastricht TEU, however, it was evident that 
the living constitution, the reality of the Union´s external power in the field of 
Common Foreign and Security Policy was substantially different from the legal 
constitution  under the existing Founding Treaty on EU concerning the enlarged Union´s 
power of decisive external action.  
 
 
The CFSP procedures  based upon European Political Cooperation,   introduced since 1985 
and codified in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, in its origins had been at its most 
effective in deploying more moderate foreign policy instruments such as demarches , political 
consultation. and the exchange of information. The Maastricht Treaty on EU had the 
potential to develop these moderate instruments   further into a common foreign policy 
instrument, resulting in an ever-increasing number of common positions , based on Article 
J.2 (Maastricht TEU), Articles  12  and  15  Nice TEU, and joint actions,based on Article J.3 
Maastricht TEU, Articles 12  and 14  Nice TEU. 
 
Joint actions were meant to enable the Member States and the European Union institutions, 
in areas where they have considerable interests in common, to make their shared views 
explicitly binding, by means of combined diplomatic action, Community(TEU´s first 
pillar)  and national measures. The combined approach had meant to be  an achievement, 
for, it had always been regretted that the EPC had no such binding force, along the lines of 
directives and regulations issued within the Community framework 
 
The inauguration of the CFSP  by the Maastricht TEU in 1992 gave rise to expectations 
which could not and which cannot be realised in a short period of time. Though  
experience of the CFSP was  still limited, even in the light of the growing number of joint 
actions., the experience of the CFSP  had made obvious  significant weaknesses as 
shortcomings 
 
 in  joint analysis,  
 slow decision-making processes,  
 difficulties in coordinating the first and second pillars and  
 the issue of democratic control.  
 
 
Not later  than during the preparatory work of the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996/97 
reviewing the Maastricht TEU and preparing the Amsterdam TEU, it had, therefore, been 
readily understood that there were limits to the scope for joint action in areas which were 
and still are viewed at by the majority of the Member States as the ultimate domaine 
réservé, as the ultimate resort of  national sovereignty whatever the substance of the Post-
Westphalian nation state´s sovereignty might really be worth under the realities of modern 
challenges of globalisation.  
 
The ineffectiveness of the CFSP was therefore to be judged in more than technical terms 
only. It was and it is still now, after the Nice Treaty o n European Union and under the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe the entry into force of which is pending,  
is primarily a political problem:whether nation state´s Governments are ready to 
demonstrate a  political will  to review their traditional understanding of  the nation 
state´s  sovereignty and to recognize their severely limited scope and range of  influence 
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if the nation state continues to be reluctant to take common positions and joint actions to 
make the European Union speak and act with one voice. 
 
It is one of the great and severe weaknesses of the  1996/97  Intergovernmental 
Conference that the Member States gave the impression that an institutional approach 
to reform the Treaty provisions on decision-making procedures would improve the 
Council´s decisiveness and thus the Union´s effectiveness. The institutional approach of  
the IGC, however, could not hide the fact that any change of  provisions on institutional 
decision-making procedures cannot compensate the absence of the political will of the 
Member States´Governments to make use of new institutional provisions.   
 
The Member States continued the same institutional approach to the efficiency issue of 
the Council´s decision-making when they gave the mandate to the IGC to prepare the 
Nice Treaty amendments and the mandate to the Convent and to the IGC again to 
reform the institutions of an enlarged European Union of the Twentyfive –since 01 May 
2004, and of the Twentysevene since 01 January 2007. And the old weakness known 
from the institutional approach since the 1996/97 perpetuated: the national 
Governments´art of  establishing common institutions but cooking the consensus rule 
too long and thus prolonging the old concept of nation state sovereignty. 
 
 One of the key issues  discussed at the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996/97 was 
therefore whether the Member States  were prepared to translate political will into action by 
means of new provisions in the Treaty which would lessen the need for rules of consensus 
when it comes to taking and implementing decisions as promptly and properly as possible. 
 
 
It took and it still will take a long time to design and to learn to conduct a common policy, 
common in the true sense of the word. This is particularly the case in an area such as foreign 
policy and, even more, security where nation state´s  sensitivities and behavioural 
peculiarities, excentricities tend  to amount to a large extent while misunderstanding  the 
traditional nation state´s potential to defend national interests on a worldwide scale and 
at the same time ignoring the functional role of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy  to offer one voice to reinforce the Member States´ potentials. 
 
The inauguration of the CFSP  by the Maastricht TEU in 1992 gave rise to expectations 
which could not and which cannot be realised in a short period of time as of two decades 
– even if the challenge to common security has been seriously increased since the 
September 11 2001 terrorists´ attacks in the USA, followed by attacks in Madrid March  
2004 and London 2005, proving the serious situation of a terrorists´ network that is not 
a closeknit system that could easily be targeted and prevented, and the dangerous nature 
of which apparently will not be mitigated, but increased by the catastrophic situation in 
the Iraq. 
 
In turn, all this has led to a widely –felt sense of disappointment, which, however does no 
justice to the potential and to the achievements of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. 
 
When it comes to joint action, the European Union has focused for the time being on a 
limited number of regions and issues. The regions are – historically listed:   
Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle Eastern peace process(  the Maghreb, South Africa, 
southeast Europe ( former Yugoslavia ), East Africa ( coast of Somalia, Djibouti, on Mission 
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Enduring Freedom), Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine (together with USA, Russia and China), 
Democratic Republic of Congo(ensuring under UN mandate first free and peaceful national 
elections), Libanon ( deploying naval forces under UN mandate to control smuggling of 
weapons destined to supply Hamaz in Libanon), Iran ( non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 
talks). 
 
Thus, the issues were: the OSCE process ( election observers in Russia, Ukraine), arms 
control, non-proliferation, anti-terrorist coalition, peace-building and peace-keeping ( election 
observers in Palestine, economic assistance, assistance to the Palestine police force), the 
Stability Pact for the former Yugoslavia, the EU administration in Mostar, and economic 
aspects of international security, to mention some of the joint actions and themes as 
representative for the whole range of CFSP joint actions. 
 
Experience of the CFSP is still limited, even in the light of the growing number of joint 
actions as referred to above. Thus any evaluation of the CFSP undertaken with a view at 
helping to judge the decision-making procedures, based on limited experience made with the 
CFSP can, therefore, be no more than provisional.  
 
What appears to be clear, at any rate, is, the growing awareness that the instruments of 
joint action and common positions help the collectivity of the Member States  to pool 
their  contributions and to target them. if the Member States are willing and ready to  
lessen the need for rules of consensus when it comes to taking and implementing decisions 
as promptly and properly as possible. 
 
  
3.2   The  IGC 1996/97  considering ways to a more effective CFSP through 
increasing the effectiveness of decision-making as essential of the EU´s  
constitutional quality 
 
It was one of the tasks of the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996/97 (IGC 96/97)to analyse 
and to negotiate whether the Common Foreign and Security Policy could be made more 
effective and decisive. This study is focussing on the decision-making aspects of how to 
improve the effectiveness of the CFSP as constitutional quality essential of the Union and 
leaving apart the issues of capacity for analysis, funding and consistency of external action. 
 
3.21 Alternatives to the consensus rule? Institutional attempts to increase 
the effectiveness of decision-making in the field of Common Foreign and 
Security Policy- CFSP- 
 
The IGC  1996/97 had to investigate whether there was any scope for increasing the  
effectiveness of CFSP decision-making. In so doing it meant to focus primarily on 
alternatives to the consensus rule. This applied both to the adoption and to the 
implementation of joint actions: 
 
 
 Article J.3 of the Maastricht TEU  stipulated unanimous decision-making of the 
Council  for adopting joint action in matters covered by the foreign and security 
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policy, unless the exceptional rule of qualified majority  is explicitly stipulated.  
Article J.3 paragraph 1 states that the Council shall decide,on the basis of common 
guidelines from the European Council, that a matter should be the subject of joint 
action. That decision is subject to consensus,  to be taken by unanimity.  
 
 Article J.3 paragraph 2 stated that the Council might itself, when adopting the joint 
action and at any stage during its development, define those matters on which 
decisions concerning the implementation of a joint action are to be taken by a 
qualified majority: 
 
Experience shows that the Council until the IGC and since the Maastricht Treaty´s 
on the European Union entry into force the Council had never made use of his right 
to take a decision on implementing a joint action by a qualified majority. It 
appeared to be possible that this situation might be improved if Article J.3.2 were 
amended to ensure that all decisions on implementing a joint action were to be taken by a 
qualified majority. But, such a relaxation of the voting system by making decisions on 
implementing joint actions a principle rule, might have had the effect of deterring Member 
States from deciding on joint action; 
 
 Wider use of the abstention option when adopting a joint action,which implies the 
acceptance of the decision of those voting in favor,see declaration no.27 to the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union: 
“DECLARATION on voting in the field of the common foreign and security policy  
                    The Conference agrees that, with regard to Council decisions requiring unanimity, Member States   
                   will, to the extent possible, avoid preventing a unanimous decision where a qualified majority exists  
                   in favour of that decision. “  266) 
 
 The application of decision-making by consensus when adopting a decision on joint 
action could be restricted by introducing a system of consensus minus one. Decision 
making on the basis of consensus minus one would have to be the rule,except where 
the vital interests of member states were at stake, in which cases the consensus rule 
would  apply. The burden of proof would then be on the  Member State which 
was invoking its vital interests. 
 
 The idea put forward by the German Government, namely the introduction where 
possible of majority decision-making for the adoption of a joint  action had been 
considered by other delegations. This option covered the first of the alternatives listed 
above, since majority decision-making in respect of the realisation of a joint action 
also implied  majority-voting of its implementation. The majority decision-making 
here means majority-decision-making  within an intergovernmental context. This  
266:ibi.,supra, note  249,Official Journal of the European Communities, 29 July 1992, C 191. 
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is to be distinguished  from majority decision-making within the Community 
framework, which is a process  based on the Commision´s exclusive right of initiative,the 
involvement of the co-decision of the European Parliament and the role played by the Court 
of Justice in reviewing the legality of the Community legislation. Communitarisation of the 
CFSP along these lines was  be seen by Member States of the Union during the IGC 
96/97 as an option for the longer term.  
 
The options listed above with regard to the adoption of joint actions were also relevant to 
decision-making on common positions pursuant to Article J.2. 
 
The Amsterdam Treaty on European Union, Article 23, 2nd paragraph,  
achieved innovation of the decision-making through extending majority 
decision-making to adopting a decision on joint action as well as to adopting 
a decision on common positions, while the predecessor, the Maastricht TEU 
had  limited majority decision-making to decisions on implementing a joint 
action. 
 
     Article 23, 2nd   paragraph, Amsterdam and Nice TEU reads as follows: 
 
     “……the Council shall act by qualified majority: 
 
—when adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any other decision on the basis of 
a common strategy, 
—when adopting any decision implementing a joint action or a common position, 
—when appointing a special representative in accordance with Article 18(5).” 267)  
 
And pursuant to the findings during the negotiations at the IGC 1996/97 concerning the 
application of the consensus rule when adopting a decision on joint action , Article 23 , 
2nd paragraph continues: 
 
“ 
If a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, 
it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall 
not be taken. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be 
referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity.  
 
The votes of the members of the Council shall be weighted in accordance with Article 
205(2)of the Treaty establishing the European Community. For their adoption,decisions 
shall require at least 62 votes in favour,cast by at least 10 members (**).  “ (**)This 
subparagraph will be amended on 1 January 2005 in accordance with the Protocol on the 
enlargement of the European Union (see Annex)”          268)  
 
267:consolidated version of the Nice Treaty on EU, Official Journal of the European  
       Communities, 24 December 2002, C 325/05 ( 18  ). 
268: ibid.,supra, note  267, C 325/05 (16 ). 
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3. 22     Decision-making on  matters of a Common Defence Policy de lege  
             lata 
 
A common defence policy of the European Union is subject to the provisions of  the Nice 
TEU  Article 17: 
 
“   
Article 17 (*) 
1.The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the 
security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence 
policy,which might lead to a common defence,should the European Council so decide. It 
shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in 
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 
The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific 
character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the 
obligations of certain Member States,which see their common defence realised in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible 
with the common security and defence policy established within that framework. 
The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported,as Member States 
consider appropriate,by cooperation between them in the field of armaments. 
 
2.Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue 
tasks,peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management,including 
peacemaking. 
 
3.Decisions having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall be taken without 
prejudice to the policies and obligations referred to in paragraph 1,second subparagraph. 
 
4.The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation 
between two or more Member States on a bilateral level,in the framework of the Western 
European Union (WEU)and NATO,provided such cooperation does not run counter to or 
impede that provided for in this title. 
5.With a view to furthering the objectives of this Article,the provisions of this Article will be 
reviewed in accordance with Article 48. “  269)    
 
As far as the European Union´s decision-making in the area of a common 
defence policy is concerned, Article J.4 paragraph 4, Maastricht TEU had 
stated  that : 
“ The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to 
the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence 
policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.” 
 
And  Article J.4 paragraph 3 concerning   issues having defence 
implications dealt with under  Article J.4,  had clearly kept  those issues off   
reach of   the procedures set out in Article J.3., which meant that these 
 
269: ibid.,supra,note 267, Official Journal of the European Community, 24 December 2002, 
        C 325/01 ( 16 ). 
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 issues were beyond any considerations on a use of  majority 
decision-making. 
 
Keeping up  this provision of the Maastricht TEU,  Article 23 ,2nd paragraph, 
Nice TEU  states , too, 
 
“  This paragraph shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications.”, which 
means that there is no majority decision-making in defence matters  under Article 23 
Amsterdam TEU, too.       270)  
 
 
  
 
 
 
3.23    Unanimity, consultation  and  qualified majority decision-making in  
             the field of  a  Common Foreign and Security Policy  under the  
             Treaty  establishing a  Constitution for Europe -  TCE-  
 
 
The Treaty on Constitution confirms the principles and instruments of the Union´s  
CFSP as provided for by the current Treaty on European Union: 
 
 
In the field of the Union´s Foreign and Security Policy the  Treaty on Constitution 
confers 
 
 the unanimous voting to the European Council in matters of identifying the 
Union´s strategic interests and determining the objectives of its common foreign 
and security policy, including matters with defence implications.European 
decisions relating to the common foreign and  security policy shall be adopted by 
the European Council and the Council of Ministers unanimously, except in the 
cases referred to in Part III., Article 39 2nd and 7th paragraph. 
 
 Member States shall consult one another within the European Council and the 
Council of Ministers on any foreign and security policy issue which is of general 
interest in order to determine a common approach. Before undertaking any 
action on the international scene or any commitment which could affect the 
Union's interests, each Member State shall consult the others within the 
European Council or the Council of Ministers. Member States shall ensure, 
through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to assert its 
interests and values on the international scene. Member States shall show mutual  
solidarity. Article 39  5th paragraph. 
270: ibid.,supra, note  267, C 325/01 ( 16 ). 
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 The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common 
foreign and security policy.European decisions on the implementation of the 
common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission  outside 
the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and  strengthening international 
security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, Article 
40 1st paragraph. 
 
  the qualified voting to the Council of Ministers which shall adopt the European 
decisions  “ on Union actions and positions on the basis of a European decision of 
the European Council relating to the Union's strategic interests and objectives, as 
referred to in Article III-194(1)”: Article III-201, 2nd paragraph..               271)     
 
The respective Articles of the  Constitution read as follows:   261)   (261:ibid.,supra, note 
260 
 
“Article III-194 
 
1. On the basis of the principles and objectives referred to in Article III-193, the European 
Council shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union. 
 
European decisions of the European Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the 
Union shall relate to the common foreign and security policy and to other areas of the external 
action of the Union. 
Such decisions may concern the relations of the Union with a specific country or region or 
may be thematic in approach. They shall define their duration, and the means to be made 
available by the Union and the Member States. 
 
The European Council shall act unanimously on a recommendation from the Council of 
Ministers, adopted by the latter under the arrangements laid down for each area. European 
decisions of the European Council shall be implemented in accordance with the procedures 
provided for by the Constitution. 
 
2. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the field of common foreign and security 
policy, and the Commission, for other fields of external action, may submit joint proposals to 
the Council of Ministers. 
 
Chapter II 
 
COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
 
Article III-195 
 
1. In the context of the principles and objectives of its external action, the Union shall 
define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of 
foreign and security policy. 
 
 
271: Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,  Official Journal of the European Union,  
        16 December 2004, C 310/01 subs. 
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2. The Member States shall support the common foreign and security policy actively and 
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. 
 
The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political 
solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union 
or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international 
relations. 
 
The Council of Ministers and the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall ensure that these 
principles are complied with. 
 
3. The Union shall conduct the common foreign and security policy by: 
 
(a) defining the general guidelines; 
 
(b) adopting European decisions on: 
 
(i) actions of the Union, 
 
(ii) positions of the Union, 
 
(iii) implementation of actions and positions; 
 
(c) strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy. 
 
Article III-196 
 
1. The European Council shall define the general guidelines for the common foreign and 
security policy, including for matters with defence implications. 
 
If international developments so require, the President of the European Council shall convene 
an extraordinary meeting of the European Council in order to define the strategic lines of the 
Union's policy in the face of such developments. 
 
2. The Council of Ministers shall adopt the European decisions necessary for defining 
and implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general 
guidelines and strategic lines defined by the European Council.” 
 
.Article III-201 
1. European decisions referred to in this Chapter shall be adopted by the Council of Ministers 
acting unanimously. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not 
prevent the adoption of such decisions. 
When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council of Ministers may qualify its abstention 
by making a formal declaration. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the European 
decision, but shall accept that the latter commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the 
Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union 
action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the 
members of the Council of Ministers qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least 
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one third of the Member States representing at least one third of the population of the Union, 
the decision shall not be adopted. 
2. By derogation from paragraph 1, the Council of Ministers shall act by qualified 
majority: 
(a) when adopting European decisions on Union actions and positions on the basis of a 
European decision of the European Council relating to the Union's strategic interests 
and objectives, as referred to in Article III-194(1); 
(b) when adopting a decision on a Union action or position, on a proposal which the 
Minister has put to it following a specific request to him or her from the European 
Council made on its own initiative or that of the Minister; 
(c) when adopting any European decision implementing a Union action or position; 
(d) when adopting a European decision concerning the appointment of a special 
representative in accordance with Article III-203. 
If a member of the Council of Ministers declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national 
policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a European decision to be adopted by qualified 
majority, a vote shall not be taken. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs will, in close 
consultation with the Member State involved, search for a solution acceptable to it. If he or 
she does not succeed, the Council of Ministers may, acting by a qualified majority, request 
that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity. 
3. The European Council may decide unanimously that the Council of Ministers shall act 
by a qualified majority in cases other than those referred to in paragraph 2. 
4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not apply to decisions having military or defence 
implications. “ 
 
 
 
 
Comment: The Member States´obligation to practice solidarity and 
consultation within the Union´s Council before taking single State´s 
external action is no innovation, it is a clarification of the current Treaty 
obligations and should be incorporated in any new text in case of final 
entire ratification failure of the Constitution treaty: 
 
As to the issue of  the Union´s  decisiveness in the field of Common Foreign and Security 
Policy ,  we realize a crucial area of  nation state´s sovereignty and responsibility. It is an 
area where the need of balancing   national sovereignty and the Union´s  decisiveness is 
obvious. There cannot be given one abstract answer to all single cases of  possible 
conflicts between nation state´s interest to keep the equality of all Member States in 
matters of foreign and security policy, on the one hand, and the interest of the Union to 
achieve and maintain its decisiveness of external action. 
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What the Treaty on Constitution can do is providing a framework for decisions trying to  
balance potential conflicts in every given single case : 
 
In the field of the Union´s Foreign and Security Policy the  Treaty on Constitution 
confers 
 
 the unanimous voting to the European Council and to the Council of Ministers  
in matters of identifying the Union´s strategic interests and determining the objectives of 
its common foreign and security policy, including matters with defence 
implications.European decisions relating to the common foreign and  security policy 
shall be adopted by the European Council and the Council of Ministers unanimously, 
except in the cases referred to in Part III., Article 39 2nd and 7th paragraph. 
 
The Treaty on Constitution confirms the principle established by the Treaties on EU 
that decisions having defence implications are kept off from majority voting. The 
situation remains unchanged: the sovereignty of the Member States is upheld by 
unanimous decision on matters with  defence implications, which are matters of life and 
death and not subject to majority voting. 
 
This may hamper decisive action of the European Union as organisation. But, on the 
other hand, the Treaty on Constitution does not set  free the Member States from their 
obligation to develop “  mutual political  solidarity among Member States, the 
identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing  
degree of convergence of Member States' actions.”, Article 39 1st  paragraph. 
 
 
Recalling the Member States´ obligation under “mutual political solidarity among 
Member States “ is not an innovation introduced  by the Treaty on Constitution. The  
Treaty on Constitution confirms what the Treaty on European Union states by  Article 
23 1st  paragraph 2nd subparagraph: “ In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State 
concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action..” 
when abstaining in a vote on decisions taken by the Council acting unanimously in 
matters of Foreign and Security policy. That legal commitment to mutual solidarity as 
stipulated in Article 23 1st paragraph Treaty on EU is emanating from the constitutional 
principle of  effectiveness, Article 10 Treaty establishing the European Community, and 
confirmed by Article 3  2nd subparagraph Treaty on EU: 
“ The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole 
in the context of  its external relations, security, economic and development policies.” 
 
The (Coinstitution)Treaty´s  provision on the Member States´s obligation to consult 
one another within the Union´s European Council and the Council of 
Ministers is no innovation.Article 39 5th paragraph states: 
 
“  
 Member States shall consult one another within the  European Council and the Council 
of Ministers on any foreign and security policy issue which is of general interest in order 
to determine a common approach. Before undertaking any action on the international 
scene or any commitment which could affect the Union's interests, each Member State 
shall consult the others within the European Council or the Council of Ministers. 
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Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is 
able to assert its interests and values on the international scene. Member States shall 
show mutual solidarity.“ The provision is a clarification of  Article 16 Treaty on 
European Union:  
 
“Article 16 
Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter 
of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that the Union's 
influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent 
action.” 
 
The  clarification,made by Article 39 5th paragraph, wants to clearly 
express  what is a matter of course: to consult before taking action. The  
clarification of that consultation rule  is the result of  the  experience the European 
Union has made when Member States of the Union joined the two US led coalitions 
waging the wars on the Taliban and Al Qaida in Afghanistan and on the Iraq. In both 
cases Member States of the European Union participated  in a way outside the 
institutional structures of  the European Union though there was no doubt that the cases 
of  starting and waging the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq would affect the Union´s 
interests to assert its  values on the international scene. 
 
 The  chapter IX will deepen that issue, trying to find out:is there a gap between the 
Union´s potential to be an actor in the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
realities of the Member States´ conduct of Foreign and Security Policy as proven in the 
cases of  some EU-Member States´ joining the wars on the Taliban /Al  Qaida  and  on 
Iraq. 
 
 
3.24  Efficiency of the EU´s external action: 
 Speaking for the European Union  with one voice in the field of a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy:   
The Troika 
 
 
Efficient external action of the European Union needs speaking with one voice. 
In implementing the Union´s Common Foreign and Security Policy, it is the “Troika”  
representing the European Union 
 
“ when  it is necessary for the European Union to conclude an agreement with one or 
more States or international organisations in implementation of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, the Council may authorise the Presidency, assisted by the Commis- 
sion as appropriate , to open negotiations to that effect. Such agreements shall be 
concluded by the Council on a recommendation from the Presidency.”,Article 24 TEU. 
 
The Troika consists of  
 
 the acting Presidency of  the Council(the Foreign Minister of the Member State 
being in chair of the 6 months´ term of Presidency) 
 the Member of the Commission which is responsible for foreign affairs,Article 24 
paragraph 1, Article 7 TEU; and 
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 the Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the common 
foreign and security policy, Article 26 TEU.             271)    
 
For example, when negotiating with the Russian Government on Russia´s commitment 
to the European Energy Charta, the German Foreign Minister, Steinmeier, in chair of  
the EU Presidency, he acted as member of the EU  troika: together with the 
Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. Mrs. Ferrero-Waldner, and with the Secretary-
General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security poli- 
cy, Mr. Solana, who held talks in Moscow on February 5, 2007. 
 
This Troika procedure does not seem to be the last resort of efficient external action: 
 
 The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe – TCE-  attempts to ease the 
procedure: 
 
According to Article III- 227 TCE  agreements between the Union and third States or 
international organisations shall be negotiated and concluded in accordance with the 
following procedure: 
 
 The Council of Ministers shall authorise negotiations to be opened, adopt negotiating 
directives and conclude agreements,Article III-227 paragraph 2  TCE. 
 
 In connection with the European decision authorising negotiation, depending on the subject of the 
future agreement, the Council of Ministers shall nominate the negotiator or leader of the 
Union's negotiating team.Article III-227 paragraph 4. 
 
 There is only one   “negotiator” or “ leader of the Union´s negotiating team”. The Treaty,however, 
is leaving open who exactly shall be “the” negotiator. This might,however, be Member  of the 
Commission responsible for matters of the CFSP. Or this might be the Union Minister for Foreign 
Affairs ; for, 
 
 The Commission, or the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs where the agreement exclusively 
or principally relates to the common foreign and security policy, shall submit recommendations to 
the Council of Ministers, which shall adopt a European decision authorising the opening of 
negotiations,Article III-227 paragraph 3. 
 
 The Council of Ministers may address negotiating directives to the Union's negotiator and 
may designate a special committee in consultation with which the negotiations must be 
conducted.Article III-227 paragraph 5. 
 On a proposal from the negotiator, the Council of Ministers shall adopt a European decision authorising  
       the signing of the agreement and, if necessary, its provisional application. 
 
 
This procedure under Article III-227 of the TEC  appears to be a breakthrough in making 
the European Union to speak with o n e  v o i c e   and  thus making the Union more decisive 
and efficient, and thus decisively contributing to improve the Union´s visibility and identity 
when acting on matters of  Foreign and Sectrity Policy where the European citizens expect 
the Union to prove efficient action in this field even more than in other policy areas.  
 
 
271:consolidated version after the signing of the Nice Treaty on EU, Official Journal of  
  the European Communities, 24 December 2002, C 325/05( 18,19).. 
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Chapter IX 
The living constitution and the European Union´s  external role  
The European Union´s 21st Century design for international 
security and cooperation ? 
 
Constitutional quality shaping essential:  
Efficiency of the European Union, focussing on the issue of 
improving the  
 
 decision-making within the Council  in the field of Common 
Foreign, Security and Defence Policy 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
The intention of Chapter IX  is to exemplify this study´s method  of  applying  the lesson 
taken from European integration history  to current issues  and to future challenges to 
the European Union, here in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
focussing on the Union´s experience made in the years 2001-2003 after the September 11 
attacks  and on the current crucial issue of international security and cooperation 
politics of how to overcome the deadlock in Iraq and the serious prospect of another 
deadlock in Afghanistan. 
 
This chapter does not  continue to discuss the potential  of the European Union´s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy – CFSP- on the basis of the legal constitution as 
provided by the Treaty on European Union. What this chapter discusses, however, is the 
issue of the European Union´s     l i v i n g  constitution:  
 
What does the living constitution in matters of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
reveal ? Are the Member States in matters of challenges of vital interest to all Member 
States  speaking with one voice? Do they want and practice stronger external action by 
the European Union in the field of European Foreign, Security and Defence Policy ? 
 
Or is there a gap between the Union´s potential to be an actor in the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy and the realities of the Member States´ conduct of Foreign and 
Security Policy ? Do the Member States comply with the provisions of the Treaty on 
European Union-TEU- when conducting  foreign and security relations with one or 
more third countries and international organisations ( UN, NATO )  if  the matter is 
subject to the rules of the Treaty on European Union  requiring the Member States to 
decide within the Union´s institutional structure and to act according to the TEU´s 
provisions on  the CFSP ?  Or do the Member States decide and act outside the EU´s  
institutions and in contradiction to the TEU´s  rules ?  
 
The Member States´s compliance with the Treaty rules cannot be measured by one 
abstract formula applied once and for all cases. Compliance in each individual case 
depends on a complex system of  political, security, legal and economic framework 
conditions varying from case to case and influencing each individual case.  
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What counts, however, is the unquestionable obligation to inform and consult one 
another within the Union´s Council before single Member State´s external action is 
undertaken whenever the single case does affect the objectives and values of the 
European Union on the international stage of  security and cooperation, including 
defence matters.  
 
 
 
In view of that obligation to inform and consult within the Council, the chapter is 
focussing on the reality of the European Union´s and/or the Union´s Member States´  
behaviour during the months after the September 11, 2001 terrorists´  attacks when the 
international community was facing the efforts made by the US-Government to build 
the “coalition of the willing “ preparing the US-led war on the Taliban in Afghanistan 
and, consequently, the war on Iraq. The chapter wants to examine the role the European 
Union played  in the international decision-making on waging these wars.  
 
This chapter starts with displaying the facts describing the world security situation,  
the global World order after the Sept. 11 attacks and  the kind of response given by the 
European Union.  
 
The intention is to find out  whether the   Member States of the European Union  did  
use the instruments of a Common Foreign and Security Policy under the current  Treaty  
on European Union they had created  in order to strengthen the external  role of the 
European Union. 
 
The question is: How did the EU´s Member States respond to the  Global risks and new 
risks to Europe´s security situation after the September 11, 2001 terrorists´attacks ? What 
kind of  dilemmata  of collective security policy were facing the international community 
and thus  the European Union?  Did the EU have to face a  revival of the nation  state in 
strategic doctrine and foreign policy? Or did the European Union emerge as an actor in 
foreign relations and security cooperation by  influencing the preparatory phase of 
coalition-building   and  the   waging of the war on the Taliban and on Iraq? 
   
Did the world order build coalitions and  sustain multilateralism? If the world was and 
is policed collectively or not at all , then , what is  the European Union´s  contribution to 
international security through cooperation ? After the military situations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan turned out to be “critical”,  does the  European Union – the joint national 
and collectivity levels-  contribute to civil reconstruction and thus contribute to 
international security and cooperation beyond merely military strategies and merely 
military means?  
 
Does the European Union take the chance to design comprehensive foreign and  security 
policies in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq that  reflect  the objectives  and instruments 
of the identity of the European  Union  : common objectives and actions demonstrating 
the  interdependent and complementary  cooperation  of  Union level and Member 
States´ levels ? 
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B.   The  world security situation,global world order after September 11  
 
I.    The notion „ international security and cooperation „ 
 
1.   Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations :  
      the right of individual or collective self-  defence  and the notion „ international  
      security „ 
                                                                                                                                       
International security and cooperation are abstract notions  that  require  definition .1 
 In international  law , there is no explicit  definition of both terms . Article 51 of the Charter 
of the United Nations ( CUN) contains the term  „ international security „ , but does not 
explicitly  define it. 
 
Article  51   stipulates  the right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack  
occurs against a Member of the United Nations , until the  Security Council  has taken  
measures necessary to  maintain international peace and security . 
Text of  Article 51  CUN  : 
„ Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or  collective 
 self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
Measures taken by Members in  the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately 
reported to the  Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibi- 
ty of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at   any time such action as it 
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore    international peace and security.  „ 
 
Attempting to interprete  Article 51 , in order to understand the notion of `international 
security ` we look at the   linkage between the terms `international security`  , ` international 
peace ´   and violence . 
 „Containing violence has always been the key to security“, says Delpech .1a 
International security is the situation in which  an individual person or a collectivity of 
individuals organized as states and thus being Members of the United Nations realize that 
they are safe because the absence of any violence : use of force to impose other peoples´ or 
other states´ will upon them is guaranteed . They  expect   that their  surviving in freedom , on 
this fast-shrinking globe , is bound up with the freedom of all people to achieve their 
objectives and to settle international disputes only  by peaceful means , by means of 
diplomacy .  
  
Achieving  freedom by peaceful means does include , if necessary , international cooperation 
and does exclude any use of  force other than the use of  force for the exercise of the right of 
individual or collective self-defence. 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.Stefan Verosta  on the term " international security " in the Charter of the United Nations  
    in:Internationale Festschrift für Alfred Verdross, München 1971,  pp. 533-547 ( text in  
    English ) . 
1a  Thérèse Delpech (2001): The Imbalance of Terror,in: The Washington Quarterly,Winter  
     2002,  pp. 31 – 40 ( 39 ) . 
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As to the linkage between security and peace,  Henry Kissinger ,in his famous book  
„  Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy „ , still convincing today , is referring to the two 
terms “ security and peace”  in their relevance for relations between states: Kissinger 
describes peace ,  considered  by a national psychology , as „  the `normal `pattern of relations 
among states and which has few doubts that reasonable men can  settle all differences by 
honest compromise .“  2   
 
And as to the correlation existing between peace , security and use of force , Kissinger points  
out : 
 
„ The motive force behind international settlements has always been a combination of the 
belief in the advantages of harmony and the fear of the consequences of proving obdurate. 
A renunciation of force , by eliminating the penalty for intransigence , will therefore place the 
international order at the mercy of its most ruthless or its most irresponsible member .“ 3 
 
 
2.   The objective of  the strategic doctrine. The strategic doctrine´s  definition  
       of   ` threats `    and the notion   „ international security „ 
 
The strategic doctrine´s traditional definition of  “threats” to “international security is related 
to states as initiators of “threats”: states were and are threatening the peace among states, 
states were and are waging wars on other states. Since the September 11,2001, terrorists´  
attacks the international community is aware of the increasing role of organised and well 
planning  individuals who are attacking states and civilians  through single actions   causing 
death and damages to an extent that traditionally was “reserved” to states. The traditional 
strategic doctrine tried to improve preventive and defensive action of States against potential 
and real aggressions from other States. Since the September 11,2001,attacks, however, 
strategic doctrine is trying to answer the challenge of how to respond to terrrorists´attacks. 
Since the terrrorists´  bombing attacks against passenger trains in Madrid in March 2004, 
there is no doubt that the September 11,2001, attacks were not the only crime of that 
disastrous extent. The strategic doctrine,however, has not found  a comprehensive and 
convincing remedy to respond to this kind of  threat to international security. 
 
For understanding this kind of  threats to international seurity, we look at the correlation 
existing  between  international security and the  strategic doctrine´s   crucial test of defining 
the kind of  threats( planned or pending actions putting security at risk ) that require taking 
defensive action. Looking at the Strategic doctrine´s objective  deepens the 
understanding of what international  security means : 
 
The objective of strategic doctrine is to use power to achieve political objectives . 
Strategic doctrine must define what objectives are worth to strive for and define the means  
and the extent of  the use of force if necessary to defend the objectives of the state – whether 
to achieve a peaceful  or to  prevent a violent transformation of  political , economic , social , 
military stability of a nation . 
 
2 Henry A. Kissinger ( 1957 ): „ Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy „, p. 4 . 
3 Kissinger , pp. 4,5 . 
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Strategic doctrine  as  the  response to  concepts  of  aggression  including new types of 
challenges to national and/or international security  is  to make clear what kind of  
strategic transformations a state is prepared to resist   and what to define as a threat . 
Strategic doctrine describes  threats  as pending  acts of aggression that are unambiguous acts   
 that  substantially  harm , destabilize or even  destruct  a nation . 4   
 
The strategic doctrine of the USA ,  in the Cold-War-period as well as in the Post-Cold-war 
period  , counted on US allies that had to hold the first line until the USA could realize if 
threats to national security or international  balance of powers were becoming unambiguous . 
 
After the collapse of communism , the US strategic doctrine had  underestimated the  
challenges to international security . It was already in the very early stages of the Cold-
War period , that already Kissinger described what is the kind and nature of threats to 
international security, and it is still valid today. Kissinger pointed out that 
 
„ we have confused the security conferred by two great oceans with the normal pattern of 
international  relations; we have overlooked that concepts of aggression developed in a period  
of relative safety may become dangerously inadequate in the face of a new type of challenge. 
A power favored by geography or by a great material superiority,...,can afford  to let a threat 
take unambiguous shape before it engages in war . And  the most unambiguous  threat is overt  
military aggression against its territory. „  5 
 
3.    Kinds of threats , new dangers threatening international security in 2002  
 
By the end of the last century,hopes concerning a “new world order ” had vanished.  
Delpech  recalls that  the strategic literature defines a  full range of “new threats.” 6 
 
The  pattern of threats against national and international security  contains   
– military aggression by states , 
– violations of human rights 
– suppression of minorities , national sovereignty  and right of self-determination in conflict 
 
„ New threats „ are  
– proliferation of weapons  of mass destruction , biological and chemical weapons , 
–  environmental devastations, global warming,  environmental catastrophes like  shortages 
in natural resouces ,namely in water supply, 
– shortages and even cutting of primary energy resources  
– terrorists´attacks   and 
- dangers from poverty, from  wealth´s gap between industrialised and developing 
countries. 
Dangers in wealth gap  is a long standing danger that is  threatening international security :  
the internationally  widespread  weakness in spending to battle poverty : 
  
The UN general-secretary , Kofi  Annan, in a speech held on the World Economic Forum  in 
New York on Febr. 4,2002, warned international business and political leaders that  
 
4 see  Kissinger on  the term „ unambiguous acts „ , p. 10 . 
5 Kissinger , p. 8 . 
6 Thérèse Delpech (2001): The Imbalance of  Terror , in: The Washington Quarterly,Winter 
2002,p.31. 
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globalization risks a devastating boomerang effect if the world´s elite fail to increase spending 
to battle poverty  and desease in developing countries  and act quickly to open up markets in 
rich countries.  
Annan  making reference to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, warned that some poor countries 
will collapse into conflict and anarchy and become a threat to global security and international 
business.  7  In 2002, after the September 11,2.001,attacks, the international public was  not 
fully aware yet of the risks resulting from global warming as it is now, in 2006/07, after the 
publication of the United Nations´ reports on the causes and extent of the expected worldwide 
devastating effects of global warming called, by the new UN general-secretary on 02 March 
2007,  as the new threat to international security. 
 
II.  The Sept. 11 terrorist  attacks   and the impact on the world security situation  
       and  on global world order  
 
An introductory remark on the use of the terms „ world security situation „ and  global 
world order :The term „ world security situation „ means the facts that prove  the 
existence of  lethal threats  affecting  one or more countries  in the world . The term 
global world order means the existence of at least one state or  more states  that have  
the power to impose their  will on other states ,  acting either   independently from each 
other or acting as collectivity  to  set the rules of international power politics.    
 
1. The Sept.11 terrorists´ attacks :      A traditional  threat or a new kind of 
threats  reaffirming or  changing  the notion of   „international security “ ? 
 
1. 1    Terrorist  attacks : a new phenomenon ? No surprising phenomenon 
since J. Robert Oppenheimer´s study on dangers of nuclear terrorism(1946) 
 
Terrorist attacks are no new phenomenon in history : throughout history , indivi-
duals used force to impose their will upon others to achieve objectives by other than 
peaceful means . 
Even in literature the terrorist issue does exist :  e.g Albert Camus´ „ Les Justes „  is dealing 
with the ancient anarchists´  bombing assaults against  members of the former Russian 
emperors and raising the ethical question whether human oriented political goals  justify the 
use of inhuman means . 
Terrorists´ attacks as a threat pending on the USA , as threats that in fact become true as it did 
on Sept. 11 did not really surprise . Terrorists´attacks as a threat pending on the USA  had 
been discussed  by the US government long before the Sept. 11 attacks happened : 
 
The father of the atomic bomb , J. Robert Oppenheimer, in the spring of 1946 , 
answering questions in a congressional hearing  whether small units of men could 
smuggle an atomic bomb into New York and blow up the whole city , he said it could be 
done and people could destroy New York.  Mr. Oppenheimer´s secret study on the dangers 
of nuclear terrorism, known as the „ Screwdriver Report „ caused political U.S. leaders to 
realize that there was no defence against such an attack  and , believing to be defenseless, had 
chosen  „ to play down its  possiblility „ . 8  
Long  before  the Sept. 11 attacks occurred , apart from specific questions about terrorists´ 
7   International Herald Tribune ( IHT )  ,Febr. 4,2002,pp.1, 8, report  on World Economic 
     Forum ,New York , concerning  post-Sept.11 threats  and globalization risks . 
8   Kai Bird   and Martin Sherwin : „ A fair foreign policy is the best  defense „ ,in:  
     International Herald Tribune (IHT)Dec. 13,2001,p.7 
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threats, the USA was basically aware of the security situation ,  that the USA   was not 
invulnerable due to speedy  modern weapons of mass destruction  that had reduced the „ 
traditional margin of safety „  so that the USA could not hope for other powers to hold a first 
defensive line while the USA was analyzing „ whether a threat has become unambiguous „.9 
 
1.2  Terrorists´ threats in recent times, before Sept. 11,2001  
 
It was not the first time that terrorists had attacked the World Trade Center in New York. 
Terrorists` bombs in the hands of  Islamic extremists  had shattered the basement garage of 
the World Trade Center in the early 1990íes. 
And as to terrorists´threats  in recent times , it was already US President Clinton who was 
reported to have authorized  a limited and covert war on Bin Laden . 
Being  reluctant to mount a major attack on the Taliban ,  US President Clinton , during the 
last two years of his presidency,long before the events of Sept. 11, was reported to have 
authorized  a confined planning for lethal force  within the boundaries to  use  weapons 
aiming from distance at an enemy that would be defined as individual terrorists , and not 
against those who provided sanctuary for terrorists targeting the United States. President 
Clinton was reported to have authorized killing instead of capturing Bin Laden. 10 
 
The US  Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)  was reported to have paid a team of about 15  
Afghan agents  for four years ,before Sept. 11 ,to regularly track Bin Laden in Afghanistan. 
Reports  indicated that the US search for Bin Laden was more concentrated and aggressive 
than previously disclosed, but had never the necessary high level of confidence about their 
information without confirmation from other intelligence.11   
 
2.    What did not change since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 , is the  basic 
national  and international security situation:    lack of traditional margin 
of safety 
 
2.1  World order before Sept. 11  
 
Thérèse Delpech interpretes   the „ post-Cold-War „  10 years from December 25,1991, 
until September 11,2001,    „ may become known as the interwar years „. 12   
She calls the Sept. 11 terrorists´ warfare „   a new  phenomenon : the „ asymmetric 
warfare „ : „Such an extraordinary attack, in real time and real space,gave asymmetry a 
horrific shape.Those who planned the attacks seem to have operated from a list detailing 
the striking differences between the United States and themselves and to have played on 
those differences as much as they could.“ 13 
 
We will try to find out what does Delpech understand by   „ a  n e w  phenomenon : the 
  „ asymmetric  warfare „ ?  To understand Delpechs notion of the   terrorists´  asymmetric 
warfare , we turn to the  „  interwar years „ : 
 
 
9      Kissinger , p. 9 . 
10   International Herald Tribune ( IHT ) , Dec. 20 , 2001, pp. 1. 4 . 
11   IHT,  Dec. 24-25,2001, p. 3 . 
12   Thérèse Delpech , The Imbalance of  Terror,in: The Washingtom Quarterly,Winter 2002,  
       p.31 . 
13  Delpech , p. 32 
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Ten Years before Sept. 11, in December 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed .With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union collapsed  a fifty years´old global order of world security 
that was based on the two pillars of  world powers  – a two powers´system of checks and  
balances : Moscow and Washington. 
 
Two world wars had created that  system of global governance for the 20th century , a system 
of  maintaining world peace and order . 
 That system of Cold-War global governance was  held together , in the field of  foreign 
and security policy ,  by  a  strategy of  deterrence oriented  balance of powers policy . 
Deterrence policy was based on   threatening to keep the option up to wage  a nuclear  all-out 
war . 14 The  deterrence strategy  ruling  the Cold-War-period was the roof under which the  
multilateral framework of the United Nations´ system of  attempting to achieve collective 
security developed and enhanced the Security Council´s role as  forum of veto-playing powers 
USA, Britain ,France , Soviet Union ,China in matters of  world peace and security . 
 
Since the collapse of communism , the US is the only world power to be left over , 
alongside with  a number of other powers having the potential   of gaining  world power 
status : Europe , Russia , China , the ambitious India as well as the economic giant Japan.. 
Hopes  existed, in the short period , after the collapse of communism until the Sept. 11, 
attacks, to ensure  collective international security  through bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation. Delpech says that „ major actors —the United States,Russia,and China —
worked with a curious mix of cooperation and confrontation. „.15 
 
 In addition , in  the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union , it was the 
phenomenon of the globalization which gave the impression that the role of the nation 
state had become obsolete due to  transnational crossbordering effects of transnational 
flows of capital and data communications  and  international investments  going bejond 
reach of nation states´ powers to influence the transnational movements of  financial 
flows  and  the global reach  of globally acting international companies .  
 
As to that role of globalization  , there was the belief that  “ conditions of globalization 
made a major, sustained conflict most unlikely. The terrorist attacks, however, have 
altered those comfortably held assumptions. 16  
 
2.2  The role of  international security  and the global World order after  
       Sept. 11  
 
Hopes for collective security and  multilateralism cooperation ? 
Sept. 11 had , for the moment , smashed the  vision  of a multipolar balance of powers  
system.  The hegemonial power USA had not been challenged by states , but by private 
individuals , adherents to the Al Qaeda terrorist network aiming to defend the weak 
peoples against the hegemonial superpower. They failed .And  the states, mainly acting 
outside the  institutional structures of NATO and EU ,   were the  victors led by  the 
superpower USA  forging and leading an international coalition  that had got the  unanimous 
endorsement by  the UN Security Council. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
14 Kissinger  , The notion of all-out war and the notion of a surprise attack , in: Nuclear 
Weapons and  
       Foreign Policy,1957 , p. 30 . 
15   Delpech , p. 31 . 
16   Campbell , Globalization´s First War ? in: The Washington Quarterly ,Winter 2002, p.8 . 
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The lead by the hegemonial power USA  seemed to continue to accomplish the Post-Cold-
War vision of  collective security within a multilateral system of international security and 
cooperation . 
 
2. 21    The strategic impact that the Sept. 11 attacks do have on the national and  
              international  security : globalization of technologies and terrorists´ attacks 
              as  „  asymmetric warfare „ 
 
The security situation of the USA apparently became clear   that the USA  was not 
invulnerable. This was  due to the existence and the use – by terrorists - of  speedy  modern 
weapons of mass destruction  that had reduced the „ traditional margin of safety „ .   
The USA , therefore ,  was , in fact , before and  when the terroritsts´attacks occurred , not in 
the position to  hope for other powers to hold a first defensive line while the USA was 
analyzing „ whether a threat has become unambiguous „ . 17   Exactly by the time the Sept. 
11 terrorists´  attacks happened, they immediately became unambiguous in their lethal 
nature and it was too late to resist it so that the  traditional margin of safety had fallen 
down to zero . 
 
Terrorists´ threats immediately becoming unambiguous is exactly what Delpech describes : 
“.. the most effective missile shield provides no protection against this type of attack .... If no 
consistent strategy is recognizable,if no anticipation can be expected,preparation is almost 
impossible. „   This is what Karmon describes to be the crucial nature of the war on terrorism: 
„Who is the  Enemy and What is the Coalition?“ 18 
                                                       
This „ down-to-zero“  impact the terrorists´attacks did have on the US  national security (mar- 
gin of safety )  is   similar to the strategic impact speedy modern weapons of mass destruction 
do have on the security situation of a nation as well as on the international security. For,  the 
national security of any civilized nations in the world was affected : 
 
The terrorists  were   using modern technology devices  that  caused  tremendous devastations  
and  thousands of lethal casualties deeply shaking the USA nation´s sense of national security 
and psychological stability.  Campbell desribed „ the terror attacks and the damage done „ , 
the „  incalculably negative impression on the U.S. psyche „ . 19 
The  extent of the losses of lives and the extent of the devastations , this  was believed, in 
pre-vious times, to be a traditional pattern of state-to-state aggression .  
 
What was realized to be new, therefore, about the Sept. 11 terrorists´attacks , is the ambi-
guous correlation between globalization  and  terrorism :  
 
- for the first time in history , it was individuals who used devices of mass destruction; 
    . Campbell indicated the  „comlex connections and comparisons between terrorism and 
      globalization  „ 20 ;  and  
 
17 Kissinger , p.  9 . 
18 Delpech , pp. 33 , 34 : And  Karmon ,Ely(2001): The War on Terrorism, Who is the  
Enemy and  What is the Coalition  ? The International  Policy Institute Counter Terrorism-
ICT,October15,2001; http://www.ict.org.il/ 
19 Campbell , p.   8 .  
20 Campbell , p. 10 . 
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- the terrorists  used  non-sophisticated tools to make globalization and  modern technology  
      operative for  mass destruction , and terrorists are determined to sacrifice their own lives  
      and thus achieving a high degree of  devastating , lethal success.  
 
Kai Bird and Martin Sherwin pointed out that „ on Sept. 11 Islamist terrorists used knifes and 
box-cutters to turn commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction. .....The globali- 
zation of technology has  reached a point where weapons of mass destruction can be wielded 
by a handful of individuals . In such a world , the United States ` military prowess is its very 
last line of defense .. To Americans peril in this interdependent world ,they are foolishly 
squandering their first and strongest line of defense : their reputation for fair play. In this 
sense Sept. 11 was the ultimate failure of a foreign policy that has systematically sullied the 
reputation of the United States .“  21  And Delpech calls the Sept. 11 terrorists  to be  „ 
something different,something unrecognizable,something irreconcilable with concepts 
inherited from past experiences of  either war or terrorism has come into being.This new 
phenomenon, however,does have a name:asymmetric warfare .“ 22 
 
Demonstrating the impact the Sept. 11 attacks did have on the international security , there 
was and still is  a widespread , even worldwide feeling , that  the terrorists´ attacks against the 
US nation were , at the same time , attacks against any other civilized nation .The attacks 
were felt they might happen to any other nation . The attacks  were felt to  indicate an 
impending danger to harm or devastate other people at any other place in the World 
representing , in the eyes of the terrorists , the Western way of life the terrorists were lethally 
opposed to. 
 
2. 22   Strategic doctrine , collective security  and alliance policy after Sept. 11 
 
Alliance policy of the USA is described to be based on the same assumption as US 
strategicdoctrine does  : The strategic doctrine`s task is to design and implement military 
deterrence by  „ assembling the maximum force „  tending  „   to equate deterrence with a 
system of general collective security which gave rise to the notion that , unless all allies 
resisted aggression jointly , no resistance was possible at all .“ 23  
„ ...the greater the force  , the greater the reluctance to employ it. Both our military and our 
coalition policy tended to make it difficult to understand  decisive action against peripheral 
threats : the former  by posing risks disproportionate to the objectives  in dispute, the latter by 
causing us to limit our actions to what could gain allied support . „  24 
 
The strategic doctrine is achieving collective security through the design and implementation 
of alliance policy. US alliance policy  performed  coalition building aiming at preparing the 
warfare against the Taliban and the Al Qaeda network of terrorists. 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
21 Bird / Sherwin : „ A fair foreign policy is the best defense „ ,in: IHT Dec. 13,2001 , p.7 . 
22 Delpech ,  p.32 . 
23 Kissinger , on „ The dilemma of American security „,in : „ Nuclear weapons and foreign 
policy“,    p.51 . 
24 Kissinger, p.52 
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3.  US-led coalition building : NATO`s and EU´s  response 
 
 
 Alliance policy of the USA was at stake  , as  USA´s NATO allies demonstrated reluctance  
to join  US efforts in extending the war on terrorism in Afghanistan  to the states `of the evil `  
Iraq , Iran and North Korea ( as they were called by President Goerge W. Bush ).  
Involving allies  already  had the same problems in times of the  Korean war in the early 
1950ies  when the USA facing the opposition of the US allies refused any expansion of the 
Korean War . 
The USA had forged a coalition including traditional friends like  Britain , former enemies 
like Russia, and including China that is not challenging the USA yet . „ A new ,closer 
relationship might emerge between the Cold War adversaries .“, says Delpech .  24a    
 
On Sept. 12,the day after, the US were considering an immediate response. But US President 
Bush and the British Prime Minister  Blair , both speaking on the phone on Sept. 12, agreed 
not to retaliate with an immediate military strike.  Many Europeans believed that hasty  
military action not only would be ineffective in deterring future terrorism but also would 
shatter any hopes of building an international coalition.   
 
President Bush, in the fight against terrorism, had set up his   doctrine of „ either you`re with 
us or against us „ , a rhetoric that Miller called not to be „ the stuff of a new multilateralism „ .  
25 a President Bush was reported to assure that he did not want to „ pound sand with millions 
of dollars in weapons „ . 25  Bush and Blair, therefore,   aimed first at  moving fast  to 
coalition building , using the diplo-matic front to capitalize on international outrage about the 
terrorist attack. They wanted support from NATO and the United Nations so that they would 
have the political,  diplomatic and legal  framework to permit a military response afterward.  
 
Accordingly, building up an anti-terrorism  alliance,  the US government paid up debts to the  
United Nations,  made concessions to Pakistan,  Russia and Central Asian republics. The 
USA needed bases in Central Asia and  endorsements from NATO and the Security 
Council  to give legitimacy to US military actions : 
 
3.1   Invocation of Article 5 Washington Treaty: demonstrating the principle of 
collective defence by  NATO: “  Sept. 11,2001 terrorists´ attack against USA an attack  
against the Alliance.” 
 
The invocation of Article 5  Washington Treaty  demonstrated the principle of collective 
defence :” assistance is not necessarily military and depends on the material resources of each 
country. Each individual member determines how it will contribute and will consult with the 
other members, bearing in mind that the ultimate aim is to restore and maintain the security of 
the North Atlantic area .” 26 
The principle of collective defence was interpreted by  presenting the following NATO 
positions : 
 
 
24a Delpech ,  p.35  
25a Miller, Steven E. ,“The End of Unilateralism or Unilateralism Redux ?,“in:The  
                                                      Washington Quarterly,Winter 2002,p 19 . 
25 President George W. Bush , in: IHT  Jan. 29, 2002 , p. 1 . 
26   NATO Press Release (2001)124 , Sept. 12, 2001.        
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3.11    Statement by the Secretary General of NATO Lord Robertson,Sept. 11, 
           Brussels,NATO    
 
„   I condemn in the strongest possible terms the senseless attacks which have just been 
perpetrated against the United States of America. My sympathies go to the American people, 
the victims and their families. These barbaric acts constitute intolerable aggression against 
democracy and underline the need for the international community and the members of the 
Alliance to unite their forces in fighting the scourge of terrorism.”    27 
 
 
3.12    Sept. 12:  Invocation of Article 5 Washington Treaty ; 
 Statement by the North Atlantic  Council - 12 September 2001        27a         
„   What is Article 5?  
The decision : 
 "If it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, 
it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty," stated 
NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, after a meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council on the evening of 12 September. 
This is the first time in the Alliance's history that Article 5 has been invoked.  
 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: 
„The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and 
consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in 
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties 
so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other 
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to 
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.  
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall 
immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be 
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to 
restore and maintain international peace and security. „ 
What does Article 5 mean ?  
Article 5 is at the basis of a fundamental principle of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation. It provides that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each 
and every other member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed 
attack against all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the 
Ally attacked.  
This is the principle of collective defence.  
 
 
27     NATO Press Release , PR/CP(2001)121 , Sept. 11, 2001 . 
27a   NATO Press Release (2001)124 , Sept. 12, 2001.        
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“Article 5 and the case of the terrorist attacks against the United States: 
The United States has been the object of brutal terrorist attacks. It immediately consulted 
with the other members of the Alliance. The Alliance determined that the US had been the 
object of an armed attack. The Alliance therefore agreed that if it was  
determined that this attack was directed from abroad, it would be regarded as covered by 
Article 5. NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, subsequently informed the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations of the Alliance's decision.  
Article 5 has thus been invoked, but no determination has yet been made whether the 
attack against the United States was directed from abroad. If such a determination is 
made, each Ally will then consider what assistance it should provide. In practice, there 
will be consultations among the Allies. Any collective action by NATO will be decided by 
the North Atlantic Council. The United States can also carry out independent actions, 
consistent with its rights and obligations under the UN Charter.  
Allies can provide any form of assistance they deem necessary to respond to the situation. 
This assistance is not necessarily military and depends on the material resources of each 
country. Each individual member determines how it will contribute and will consult with 
the other members, bearing in mind that the ultimate aim is to "to restore and maintain the 
security of the North Atlantic area".  
By invoking Article 5, NATO members have shown their solidarity toward the United 
States and condemned, in the strongest possible way, the terrorist attacks against the 
United States on 11 September. 
If the conditions are met for the application of Article 5, NATO Allies will decide how to 
assist the United States. (Many Allies have clearly offered emergency assistance). Each 
Ally is obliged to assist the United States by taking forward, individually and in concert 
with other Allies, such action as it deems necessary. This is an individual obligation on 
each Ally and each Ally is responsible for determining what it deems necessary in these 
particular circumstances.  
No collective action will be taken by NATO until further consultations are held and 
further decisions are made by the the North Atlantic Council. 
 
Lord Robertson will now officially inform the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, that  
the North Atlantic Council has agreed this statement.  
 
During a press conference, Lord Robertson reaffirmed that NATO allies will take such actions 
as deemed necessary, including the use of force, adding that members shall respond 
commensurate with their judgement and resources.  
Earlier in the day, Lord Robertson, had consulted with EU High Representative for 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and Ambassadors from partner 
countries had joined NATO allies, within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, to express 
their deepest sympathy to the American people. They condemned yesterday's terrorist attacks 
and made a pledge "to undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of terrorism." They added: 
"We stand united in our belief that the ideals of partnership and co-operation will prevail."    
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3.13   Invocation of Article 5  confirmed , Oct. 02, 2001 
 
Frank Taylor, the US Ambassador at Large and Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism briefed  
the North Atlantic Council - NATO's top decision-making body- on 2 October on the results  
of investigations into the 11 September terrorist attacks against the United States. As a result 
of the information he provided to the Council, it has been clearly determined that the  
individuals who carried out the attacks belonged to the world-wide terrorist network of Al-
Qaida, headed by Osama bin Laden and protected by the Taleban regime in Afghanistan. 28 
 
At a special press conference, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson announced that since 
it had been determined that the attacks had been directed from abroad, they were regarded as 
an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty . When the Alliance invoked the 
principle of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on 12 September, it stated that it needed to 
know whether such actions had been conducted from abroad before the Article could become 
fully operative. This has now been determined, but Lord Robertson explained that, at present, 
it was premature to speculate on what military action would be taken by the Alliance, be it 
individually or collectively. 
 
3. 2   NATO implements  invocation  of  Article  5 
 
The Supreme Allied Command in Europe ( SACEUR ) Statement to the Media on 
October 09, 2001, confirmed the implementation  of the invocation of Article 5 : 
  
„ Today marks a historic first for NATO. Today, for the first time in the organization's 52-
year history, assets are being made available to the continental United States, on their request, 
in support of Article 5 operations. Two of a total of  five NATO Airborne Warning and 
Control Systems aircraft    - the AWACS - began deploying today to the United States from 
our base in Geilenkirchen, Germany. The remaining aircraft will follow in the next few days.  
 
 These NATO aircraft, manned by multinational crews from 12 NATO nations, provide a 
critical air surveillance and early warning capability in operations. This deployment will 
directly support those aircraft under the command of the North American Aerospace Defense 
Command, or NORAD for short, by providing assets required to support  the global campaign 
against terrorism. 
 
In addition, NATO naval assets presently on exercise off the coast of Spain were re-assigned 
today to a new mission.Effective immediately, the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean 
(STANAVFORMED), consisting of nine  ships from eight NATO countries, will set sail to 
provide an allied military presence in the eastern Mediterranean and to demonstrate our 
resolve. 
 
 These two actions underline the unwavering commitment of the 19 NATO nations to fight 
 terrorism. Of course, we stand ready to provide any  additional support requested by the 
United States, on order  of the North Atlantic Council. „29 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
28 NATO press  release on briefing by US Ambassador to NATO Council,Frank Taylor,  
        Oct.  02,2001. 
29 Supreme Headquarter of the Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE)  News Release,  
        Oct. 10, 2001.  
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3.3   The European Union`s immediate response to Sept. 11 
 
3.31  Individual European Governments  and the EU collectivity of EU Member States 
immediately made their  statements of  solidarity   
 
In addition to the individually made and published  European Governments´ 
statements on solidarity with the USA , in   a  Joint declaration by the heads of 
state and government of the European Union, the President of the European 
Parliament, the President of the European Commission, and the High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy,Mr.  Sola-
na,declared ( Sept. 14, 2001 )  : 
„...an expression of  solidarity with the American people, Europe has declared 14 September 
  a day of mourning. We invite all European citizens to  observe, at noon, a three-minute 
silence to express our sincere and   deepest sympathy for the victims and their families.  
 On 12 September, the European Union condemned the perpetrators,   organisers and sponsors 
of these terrorist attacks in the strongest   possible terms. The European Union announced that 
it would make every possible effort to ensure that those responsible for these acts of  savagery 
are brought to justice and punished. The US administration   and the American people can 
count on our complete solidarity and   full cooperation to ensure that justice is done........” 
 
3.32  The EU´s response - as organisation- to Sept. 11 ,  a bunch of    
          measures mainly outside the scope of  defence,  military matters : 
-The European Central Bank took steps , including an interest rate cut, to maintain confidence  
  in the markets . 
-The EU agreed  on counterterrorist agenda,including a common legislative framework on  
  definitions of terrorism and a European arrest warrant to replace national extradition  
   procedures.The EU agreed on new legislation to dry up sources of terrorist finance. 
-The EU launched a trade deal with major implications for Pakistan´stextile industry and new  
  external assistance  programs. 
-The EU redoubled its humanitarian aid efforts in and around Afghanistan. 
-The EU  decided to establish a EU presence in Afghanistan to plan the massive  
  reconstruction work in which the EU wants to be a key player in the years ahead. 
-EU Rapid Reaction Force : 
  The EU had started to set up military capacity:  building a Rapid Reaction Force  
  that is planned to be able to mount certain peacekeeping and crisis management   
  operations,  as well as humanitarian missions involving troops. This was  in the very early  
  stages. While a  number of individually acting EU member states started to  contribute to  
  the force which Britain started to lead in  Afghanistan under United Nations auspices,this  
  was  n o t   seen as an EU operation run under the Treaty on EU.  30 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
30 Chris Patten , European commissioner for external relations, made comments on the EU’s 
         potential of the common foreign and security policy, see:  IHT, Jan. 02, 2002, p. 8. 
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III.  The limited role of the EU as organisation reflecting the realities of the  
         dominating US- led  warfare against the Taliban and AL Qaeda network  of  in- 
         international  terrorism and US led  warfare on Iraq  
 
A „ war in the computer age „,  a military  breakthrough in the US reliance 
on foreign military  bases and the  impact  on  US Alliance policy : beginning of US 
unilateralism ? 
 
1. The Taliban,in 2001/02,  being deposed : The Afghan model  a possible tem-
plate for  American military action against Iraq or other terrorist-supporting states ? 
 
After effective coalition building , did  the USA ,actually , return to unilateralism ?   The  
USA , basically , waged the  Afghanistan war on their own : with US  long-range bombers 
performing global reach without depending on bases close to the war theatre  and thus 
demonstrating the global reach of the imperial like military superpower USA., giving the 
impression not to depend on diplomacy ties  with countries close to the war theatre.  
The coalition built up by the US government to back the US led military actions had given 
political and diplomatic legitimacy  to the USA warfare in  Afghanistan. The coalition 
building was , insofar , helpful , but it was no militarily decisive action  to influence the 
course of US-led warfare in Afghanistan .In the situation of the year 2001/2002, this had 
direct impact on the role of the European Union:  
 
Any attempt to draw up a EU common position and a joint action decided within and 
implemented within the EU´s Council – without substantial military capacities of the Union 
as such , the planned Rapid Reaction Force of the Union was in early stages only- would 
have had  no political effect on the issue of military intervention in Afghanistan, of 
coalition building and of contributing to a military action in Afghanistan. It would have 
been of academic value only, discussing the issue of the European Union as an actor in 
the field of  Common Foreign and Security Policy under the realities of the US political 
and military power shortly after and seriously affected under the psychological  trauma 
of the September 11 assault:  
But for the EU´s internal cohesion it would have been important if the EU Member 
States concerned had informed and consulted one another within the Union´s Council 
aaccording to  the provisions of the Treaty on EU before they undertook joining the US 
led coalitions to wage the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
On the international stage, even if the European Union as such  would already  have had 
established full military capacities to influence the political issue of  military 
intervention in Afghanistan and the issue of coalition building, it would not have 
changed the basic determination of the US Governmentt to take action: 
„ Military contributions from others are in general neither sought nor needed.“, said Miller  
commenting on President Bush´s  „ with-us-or-against-us „ approach  to terrorism , and 
adding: „ More than any other state, the United States is able to operate militarily as lone 
ranger .“   And Miller adds : „ Washington is likely to view the coalition as a source of 
support and an instrument of U.S. policy, but others are likely to see it as a mechanism for 
influencing U.S. decisions or restraining U.S. action—„, 31 
 
 
31 Miller ,Stephen E. , The Washington Quarterly,Winter 2002, pp.19 , 20 ; 25 . 
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The USA had initially  run the whole warfare in Afghanistan  , and did not admit others to US 
war councils : Even  British SAS soldiers were expected to follow US command .   The 
experience made  in the Kosovo  , when the US  had to discuss tactics and operational 
decisions  with NATO allies , the US military command said :” Never again “. 32  
 
The,initially, effectively waged  US-led war in Afghanistan, starting in October 2001, after 
coalition-building, had , within weeks , crushed the Qaida militant network in Afghanistan. 
The top Al Qaida leader is  not yet  caught. The US faced practical necessity of letting peace 
take hold. The US president still insisted that his goals were unchanged- a broad war against 
all terrorists with a global reach. The US would maintain a  presence and continue its aid 
while Afghanistan would strive for stability and a semblance of normality . 
 
On Jan. 03,2002,Defence Secretary Rumsfeld described the U.S. effort in Afghanistan as 
successful, citing the end of Taliban rule and the installation of an interim government 
publicly committed to ridding Afghanistan of  terrorists. And he acknowledged that the war in 
Afghanistan would not be over until the fugitive top leaders were found.  
 
The U.S. government had decided to rely , for the search of fugitive top leaders ,on local 
militias. This decision,  not to insert large numbers of US forces for the manhunt, was  report-
ted to have been  driven less by a fear of US casualties than by a determination to avoid the 
mistakes made during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. The US didn´t want 
to be perceived as an invading force, the US wanted to gain the trust and confidence of 
Afghans and others in the Muslim world. 33   
 
The US early success was routing the Taliban from Afghan cities, the Taliban being deposed 
and had then given way to a frustrating search for Taliban and Qaida leaders. The ability of 
Afghan local forces to complete the task set by President Bush of bringing the top fugitive 
leaders to justice remained uncertain.  
 
Throughout 2006, however, the Taliban increased their resistant activities:nearly 140 suicide 
bombing assaults were counted. Mullah Dadullah, Taliban commander, was reported to have 
announced to start with an offensive in spring 2007, with 6000 to 10000 fighters against the 
international ISAF-forces operating under NATO command  and against the US-led coalition 
Operation Enduring Freedom, both under US-generals´  command  because the USA have 
deployed more than half  of  nearly 50000 foreign soldiers, four times as much than in 
December 2001 when the US-led international miltary forces started deployment in 
Afghanistan.  
At present, in early March 2007, the Taliban have regained strong positions in Eastern and 
Southern Afghanistan, and the regional warlords in Northern Afghanistan prove the weakness 
of the Central Government in Kabul. While the NATO led ISAF is waiting for the German 
Airforce reconnaissance Tornado aircrafts to support the anti-Taliban offensive.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
32: Pfaff ,William : “ In its quest for supremacy, US may squander partnerships “, in: IHT Dec. 15-
16,2001,p.6);  see also Clark, Wesley K.,(2001).Waging Modern War : Bosnia,  
Kosovo and the  Future of  Combat ,  (New York : Public Affairs) . 
33:    IHT Jan.07,2002, p.6  
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In 2002, however, when the Talibans´ return appeared unrelastic, the ultimate success of the 
proxyforce approach was  carefully being  watched because of the implications bejond the 
war in Afghanistan since the Afghan model of US military success in the early stages of the 
operation had been  considered as a possible template for  American military action against 
Iraq or other terrorist-supporting states.   
 
 
2.    New US military strategy  of using new configuration of forces  causing the early 
military success in Afghanistan : the „ war in the computer age „, reducing US reliance 
on foreign bases and risking sustainable military success through neglecting sufficient 
menpower resources in the battle-field 
 
In Afghanistan , initially, at the ouset of the US led strikes against the Taliban , small numbers 
of the US Special Operations forces worked closely  with CIA  agents . Both were  organizing   
offensive operations by the Northern Alliance  and other opposition  groups and to direct the 
US air strikes that shattered the Taliban army. 34  The  US  warfare in Afghanistan used 
permanent high-altitude air strikes in which  bombs came out of the blue with uncanny 
accuracy:the  „ War in the Computer Age „.35 
The „ war in the computer age „ was described to be  the new style of US warfare using 
high-tech weapons changing the dynamics and the scope of battle the long-term impact of 
which is still uncertain for  foreign policy , especially  alliance related foreign and  
security policy :    
 
The US coordinated small US combat special forces teams operating on the ground  and high-
performance aircraft – very-long-range B-2 and B-52 bombers  with precision-guided 
weapons , digital communications underpinning the US forces and a new battlefield weapon: 
small , expendable unmanned predator drones .36   
 
Pilots and special forces teams on the ground communicated directly with air force pilots 
patrolling overhead  and practiced an  highly  improved cooperation inventing new tactics.  
With target coordinates going directly to pilots via satellite, the US airforce often cut its 
response time to less than 20 minutes  between the moment a Taliban target was spotted and 
its  destruction.    This new configuration of forces – a few hundred men scattered in roving 
teams, a dozen heavy bombers rotating over the country ,  accurate target spotting, fast 
transmission of complex data and precision-guided bombs  as well as improved combat power 
by unmanned aircraft , drones, monitoring the vast and remote airspace with no nearby bases 
for US strike aircraft, the drones seeing potential threats and discretly operating from 
neighbouring countries :  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
34 see  comment by The New York Times  on  “ Special Operations “ , in :IHT Jan. 28,       
2001,p.6 . 
35 Fitchett,Joseph (2001) :“War in the Computer Age „ , in: International Herald 
36 Tribune,Dec.28,2001, p. 1. 
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– this new combination of forces was reported to mark a breakthrough in reducing US 
reliance on military bases in nearby countries close to or surrounding the warfare 
theatre.      37  At the same time the war in the computer age underestimated the needs 
of  sufficient battlefield menpower and civil reconstruction workers to prevent the 
Talibans´   comeback. 
 
3. Individual  EU member states´  and  US military success backing peacekeeping in 
Afghanistan. Peacekeeping  a matter of international security and  credibility , 
international legitimacy  
 
The EU Heads of State or Governments had decided on their summit  on Dec. 14-15,2001, in 
Laeken , to send  3,000  to 4,000 peacekeepers to Afghanistan to serve as stability  force for 
the new government in Kabul as a matter of concern about international security and 
credibility trough peacekeeping and assistance  
given to  civilian reconstruction. 
The deployment of peacekeepers was and is  an effort done by  individual EU member 
countries and not an effort done by the European Union as organisation of the collectivity. 38  
Britain  contributed 1.500 soldiers to the force, limited to Kabul and the immediate vicinity,  a 
soft  profile  mission of patrol and of support, agreed by NATO and  operating distinctly from 
the US effort operation “Enduring Freedom” to hunt down  Taliban fighters and members of 
the Al Qaida terror group. 
 
The US force offered the peacekeepers   „ essential enabling support to deploy and sustain the 
force“,and to  provide airpower , special forces and Marines , as  British Defence Secretary  
Hoon reported to the House of Commons. 39  
 
Among the countries to make up the rest of the force initially were France, Germany, Jordan 
and Turkey, subject to an overall command by the United States. 
 
A small British contingent 200 soldiers arrived in Kabul by December 22,2001, for the 
induction of an interim government. They  operated  on the basis of rules   worked out with 
the local authorities.The objective was  supporting the induction of an interim government, 
then to settle on an military technical agreement with the newly installed local political 
leaders that would outline the force´s  powers before the rest of  the troops could take up 
position. 
On December 19,2001, the  UK Government had sent a letter to the UN secretary-general, 
Kofi Annan, outlining Britain´s  plans in an effort to obtain a Security Council´s  resolution 
by December 21 that would authorize the force ISAF  to back civilian reconstruction  and 
give  it  international legitimacy. Britain led the force for three months and was  expected to 
turn that role to Turkey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37  IHT  Dec. 28, 2001,p.4  . 
38   IHT  Dec. 15-16,2001 , pp. 1, 5 : “ European Union plans a peace force for Kabul” 
39   IHT Dec. 20, 2001,p.1 . 
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4. How to win the peace in Afghanistan and in Iraq? 
US military troops and other nations´ troops exposed to guerilla assaults and suicide 
bombing assaults  in Afghanistan and in Iraq : Afghanistan´s and Iraq´s reconstruction 
at stake, political and economic stability of the regions at  risk , dangers to international 
security  
 
At present time,it is impossible to say how long the International Stabilization Forces-ISAF- 
in Afghanistan including the US military presence in Afghanistan will have to continue. This 
is also true for the US military presence in Iraq: 
 
The US Government has not yet presented any plausible long-term exit strategy for the 
withdrawal from Iraq without  even more destabilizing the whole region in view of the 
pending conflict between the US and Iran concerning the issue of  Iran´s ambitions to develop 
nuclear technology  and concerning Iran´s influence on the .Shiites in Iraq and on the 
Hisbollah Shiites in Libanon. 
 
Since the war on Iraq began  in March 2003,after having smashed Saddam Hussein´s military 
troops´ structure within weeks ,the USA were and are still challenged by the open question of  
.how to win the peace in Iraq. After the Democrats´ victory in the US elections to the US 
Congress held in autumn 2006 and after  the confession of  the new  Defence Secretary, 
Robert Gates, made in the Senate´s hearing on his nomination in Decemer 2006, answering 
the question whether he believed the war in Iraq could be won: “No,Sir, it cannot.”, it is worth 
to remember that it was still on November 3,2003, that the US Congress had given a , then, 
final  approval to the  US President ´s request for a further $7o billion in military and civil 
spending on Iraq. And it is worth remembering the prophecy made when  the USA appeared 
to settle down for what the US Defence Secretary Rumsfeld in 2003 had acknowledged would 
be “ in a  long,hard war we are going to have tragic days, as this is.” 40 
 
“Following a  truck bombing of the UN compound on August 19,daily attacks on American 
soldiers in Iraq continue to mount. The missile attack, launched November 02, on an Chinook  
military transport helicopter ,shooting down it over Ameriya,near  Falluja, a city where Anti-
American residents clash almost every day with American soldiers.”41    
 
The killing of 16 US soldiers and wounding of 20 others in November 2002, was one example 
of countless numbers of  subsequently   growing  American casualties.Iraqi guerillas opposed 
to the American occupation had been using mortars with great effectiveness across central 
Iraq, US soldiers were and are killed by roadside bombs planted by insurgents in Baghdad and 
across the country, the area known as the Sunni Triangle and the heart of the resistance, 
mortar attacks on the headquarters of the American civilian authorities in Baghdad, 
explosions were and still are shaking buildings in Iraq, suicide bombers are permanently 
striking targets across Baghdad : all those actions were and are adding to a growing sense of 
insequrity in Baghdad and across the country. 
 
40:IHT,The International Herald Tribune,Novemver 3,2003, p.9:” Attack in Iraq puts  
     Rumsfeld on the defensive “ . 
41: ibid.,supra,note 40,The International Herald Tribune,November 3,2003,p.1,9. 
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In view of the strong pressure, starting in November 2003 and even stronger today in the 
United States and worldwide,  for a military withdrawal from Iraq , a  US rush for the exits 
would leave Iraq chaotic and a danger to neighbouring countries and the international security 
as a whole. 42    And this is why the new US  Defence Secretary, Gates, admitted end of 
February 2007 in Washington,that the US Government is not planning permanent military 
presence in Iraq, a military US presence would continue in Iraq on a reduced scale of  US 
military units,at least in the longer term,similar  to the reduced US military presence in 
Germany and in South Korea. 
 
 
Facing  that disastrous military situation in Iraq it is still an open question how to win 
the peace in Iraq. It may be a perspective that the US Government now, in early March 
2007, appears to accept the recommendation  made by the independent US “ Iraq Study 
Group”-the Baker Commission-  to assume direct talks with Syria and Iran on ways to 
peace in Iraq. The US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice had announced during a 
hearing in the US Congress that she was willing to  meet the Syrian and the Iranian 
Foreign Ministers in an international  conference on Iraq to be held on March 10,2007, 
in Baghdad.  
 
 
What rests for the European Union to be done for the time being, facing that situation: 
it is a stand-by position to see what might be the Union´s contribution to reconstruct 
Iraq for stability and security in the Iraq and in the whole region as soon as the military 
and political situation will allow. 
 
 
C.  Collective international security policy facing dilemmata problems   
after Sept.11:  the revival of the nation states´ behaviour and the impact on 
NATO`s and the  European Union`s role in international security and 
cooperation 
 
 
I.  Security dilemma : US military unilateralism – danger of splitting the                
anti-terrorist alliance ?  
 
Growing technological gap in armament  and  the US   military strategy`s impact on the US 
Alliance policy risking  a volatility  of  US  alliance policy moving from multilateral 
cooperation to US military  unilateralism and back again 
 
 
 
 
 
42: Brooks,David: ”Why the U.S: can´t walk out of Iraq yet”.in:The Iternational Herald  
       Tribune, WednesdayNovember5,2003,p.8 
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After   Sept.11, 2001, the core question in the field of international security and cooperation 
was whether it took only  an attack against the United States to arrive at a new foreign  and 
security policy of maintaining peace and order . Miller raised the question  whether the Sept. 
11 attacks led to „ The End of Unilateralism or Unilateralism Redux ?“ 43a  Delpech  
underlined : „ U.S.security will depend increasingly on its ability to keep alliances alive,to 
build coalitions, and to sustain multilateralism.“ 43 b 
 
US foreign and  security policy was and still is  facing two different issues  of  military 
strategy oriented dilemmata: 
 
-- The one issue is the question whether   the US foreign and security policy might cause   a 
split in the Alliance , a split caused by the ever faster growing technological armament of 
the  USA , while the NATO Members fall too  far  from being  on an equal technological level 
with the USA. The realities of  the US administration´s priorities given to technological 
development and military capacities compared to the defence budgets spent in European 
Union Member States continuously are risking to widen the  growing technological gap 
in weapons between the USA and Europe. It is an issue that is traditionally under 
discussion not only in the yearly held Munich conference on international security. The 
growing technological gap is risking to have ill effects on international security and 
cooperation: leading to a volatility of US alliance policy moving from multilateral 
cooperation like ISAF military actions in Afghanistan to US military unilateralism and 
back again 
 
- - The other issue of  dilemma facing collective security policy is the possible impact the 
new US military strategic doctrine  may have on the future Alliance policy of the USA : 
 
Due to the US military strategic doctrine designed and implemented under the former 
Defence Secretary , Rumsfeld, for the first phase of the war on the Taliban, the US were 
using  high-tech weapons,long-range transport aircrafts , satellite based communication 
systems , small groups of special forces teams operating on the ground and cooperating with 
local forces:  focussing on waging wars on own US account and mainly outside the scope and 
institutional framework consultation procedures of NATO : The US intention was not to 
depend any longer on bases in countries neighbouring the war theatres. The US preferred 
to  count on coalitions that might be flexible and  changing in composition  and thus 
reducing the need for counting on support given by NATO alliance . 
 
 
43a: Miller , Stephen E. , in: The Washington Quarterly,Winter 2002,pp. 15 – 29 . 
43b:  Delpech , p. 39 : „ The World will be policed collectively or not at all „. 
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Counting on  own military power ,US military strategic doctrine  raised fears within the 
Western Alliance that the US military strategic doctrine would   further destroy any hopes that 
existed in the Post-Cold-War period , after the collapse of Communism , to  strenghten 
multilateralism .  What was practised right  at the end of 2001 and in 2002, was  the US 
tendency towards  unilateralism , the conclusion of which was that the USA  „ should move 
from unilateralism to multilateralism „ 43c . And what was practised , too , was  a revival of 
the nation state behaviour as proved by individual EU and NATO Member States. 
 
1.  US military unilateralism through a growing technological gap in weapons            
       - risking  a split anti-terrorist alliance 
 
In view of the existing technology level of  the US military capacities Stephen E. Miller said: 
 
“ This coalition will not be easy for Washington to preserve or manage.“  43d 
 
 
1.1 The US lead in military technologies risked a  split alliance – and still risks.  
         Dangers to multilateralism through scientific research on biological weapons ?  
 
 
The US lead in military technologies,growing faster , as proved by the US performance in the  
Early stages of  the wars  in Afghanistan and Iraq,  risked a  split alliance , with US forces 
fighting wars aided by local allies, and the Europeans confined to peacekeeping and other 
infantry roles. The US lead in military technology risked and still is risking ( US vs. Iran ? ) 
that  the USA will fight alone in major battles , such as it was feared after the military strikes 
on the Taliban in Afghanistan, and  then happened to be  an attack on Iraq . 
 
New dangers to multilateralism were emerging through scientific research on biological 
weapons: absolutely dominating US military power was not  a mere vision yet, but reaching 
close to reality . According to  reports on TV, USA scientific research institutes were 
developing genetically manipulated biological weapons aiming at destroying any existing 
weapons belonging to potential adversaries: 43 e 
 Genetically manipulated weapons are supposed to destroy.e.g. the protective plastic material 
covering the anti-radar protectiv shield of  aircraft bombers , or they may  be capable of  
destroying the concrete layers of airfields thus keeping off  the enemies´ aircrafts  from taking 
off and  getting airborne. 
 
 
.   
 
43c:  Miller , p. 26 .  
43d:  Miller , p.25 
43e:  German Monitor, TV report November 29,2003. 
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1.2 Fears about  US unilateralism – a blueprint for global governance in the 21st 
century ? 
 
 Risto E.J. Pentilla pointed  out “ what we  see, concerning the war against terrorism ,  may 
well be a blueprint for global governance in the 21st century .” 44  
Pentilla compared the unity proved in the war against terrorism to the 19th century Concert of 
Europe ,including the victors of the Napoleonic Wars( Austria,Britain,Prussia and Russia ) 
maintaining, on the basis of the Vienna Congress in 1815 , peace and prosperity in Europe . 
 
Another serious observer , Thomas L. Friedman, however, had warned  that the role of NATO 
was at stake and that Europeans would have no credibility when they complain about US 
unilateralism , but keep on being reluctant to better invest in the planes and equipment 
needed in modern warfare.   
 
Friedman recalled the four key assets needed to fight a modern war. But he focussed on 
purely military assets only and lost  out of sight the real challenge which, after  the first 
powerful military strike,is winning the  peace. Friedman´s  military key assets are: 
 
-     many large transport aircraft to deploy troops to far-flung battlefields; 
- precision-guided bombs and missiles that can hit enemy targets with a high degree of 
certitude, thereby shortening the war and reducing civilian casualties ; 
- large numbers of  Special Operations teams that can operate at night using night-vision 
equipment; and 
- secure, encrypted communications so that ground and air units can be knit together in a 
hightech war without the enemy listening in.45 
 
The reason why  other NATO countries than the USA fell short of these technological assets , 
is , as Friedman recalled , the fact  that Europeans don´t  feel threatened by  countries like 
Iran, Iraq and North Korea and therefore are reluctant to spend much on defence .  
 
Meanwhile,in March 2007, the US demonstrate, by planning to install, in Poland and in the 
Czech republic, a radar supported anti.missile protection shield, the  intention to protect 
Europe against Iranian middle-range missiles, and, thus are influencing the European con- 
cerns about security.  
 
The result is that  US allies fear growing US tendency for   military unilateralism and  
Europe´s dependence on US unilateral acts  unless   the European contribution to a  
multilateral burdensharing is not subject to steady and constructive review. 
 
 _________________________________________________________________________ 
 
44:    Pentilla, Risto E.:  “ The Concert is back , and it seems to be working “,in:  
          International Herald Tribune, IHT ,December 28, 2001,p. 8 . 
45:    Friedman, Thomas L. : “ The End of NATO ? Europe had better catch up “,in: IHT  
         Febr.04,2002,p.6  . 
 
 
As Friedman has put it : “ ...we are increasingly headed for military apartheid within NATO. 
America will be the chief who decides on the menu and cooks all the great meals, and the 
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NATO allies will be the busboys who stay around and clean up the mess and keep the peace – 
indefinitely. “ 46 
 
 „ Those who join the U.S. team are clearly expected to follow the U.S. lead ;“, says 
Miller .47 
 
 
2. US military unilateralism enhanced through new US military strategy and  impact on  
     US Alliance policy 
 
2.1 The US military strategy´s success in Afghanistan and the impact on the US Alliance 
       policy  - bypassing NATO ?  
 
Following the first stages of US military success to remove the  Taliban regime from power in 
Afhanistan, widespread fears expressed in Europe were focussing on the political risk that US 
military unilateralism might bypass NATO and  diminish the hopes of getting multilateral 
political backing for US antiterrorist actions . The US government was reported to have 
decided that „ there will not be a single coalition but rather different coalitions for different 
missions  „ in which US units will hope to work with local forces againts terrorists or regimes 
that back terror.  48  
 
The US lead in military technologies growing faster , as proved by the US performance in the 
war in Afghanistan , risked  a  split alliance , with US forces fighting wars aided by local 
allies and the Europeans confined to peacekeeping and other infantry roles. The US lead in 
military technology risked and still risks –in the case of USA versus Iran-  that the USA will 
fight alone in major battles , such as USA allies feared US government´s   military action  
against Iraq  and other countries of the “ axis of evil “. 
 
The secretary general of the North Atlantic Alliance,Robertson, warned that trans-atlantic 
solidarity was threatened if " the Americans do the cutting edge while the Europeans are 
stuck at the bleeding edge, if the Americans fight from the sky and the Europeans fight in the  
mud .“, he was reported saying that in a conference in Munich on international security  on 
February 03,2002. 49  The issue of Europe´s contribution to the Alliance is a permanent item 
on the conference´s agenda. It was still under the impression of the Sept.11 attack that the 
February 2002 Munich conference  raised concern about Europe´s failure to spend more and 
put more political push behind reshaping and modernizing the NATO member countries´ 
armed forces along lines compatible with US-style warfare.  NATO General Secretary 
Robertson warned that Europe risked being reduced to the status of a  “ military 
pygmy “  and  Europeans could not expect to have political influence on 
Washington if they had no effective  military power to bring to a coalition . That´s 
still true in 2007. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
46: IHT,Febr. 4,2002,p.6 . 
47: Miller , Stephen E.  „ The End of Unilateralism......“in: The Washington Quarterly, 
       Winter 2002, p. 19 .  
48: Fitchett,John, report „ Pentagon in a League of its own”, IHT Febr. 04,2002, pp. 1,3 . 
49:IHT  report February 04,2002, pp.1,3 . 
 
What was  meant about the  concepts of burden-sharing in the US – European transatlantic 
relationship  became apparent when a German participant in the February 2002  Munich 
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conference was talking about his uneasiness about US threats against Iraq , US senator 
John McCain from  Arizona was reported to have snapped back : “ I would tell our German 
friend to go out and buy some weapons before questioning US intentions or power .” 50 
 
 
 
2.2  US alliance policy at stake -  uncertainties about extending the fight against  
       terrorism 
 
 
Alliance policy of the USA were  at stake  , as  USA´s NATO allies demonstrated  reluctance  
to   US ideas of  extending the war  on terrorism in Afghanistan  to the countries Iran , 
Iraq and North  Korea,  countries  called by US President Goerge B. Bush as an  „ axis  
of evil „ that could provoke preemptive US action . 51 
 
The US lead in military technologies and risks about a  US split alliance policy  were and 
still are endangering European prospects of  influencing US policy on  fighting 
terrrorists .  
European political leaders in Britain, France ,Germany and Russia expressed concern about 
the three countries´ depiction as “ axis “ intent on developing weapons of mass destruction. At 
the conference on international security matters, held in Munich on February 02-03,2002, 
European security officials were reported to have expressed alarm about what they saw as the 
US president´s   “  aggressively  unilateral stance “ . 52   
 
And consequently, the European security officials´  alarm  turned out to be right when the US 
Government had to admit  that the evidence presented to the UN Security Council by US 
Secretary of State,Colin Powell, on the existence of arms of mass destruction in Iraq  had been 
faked. 
 
The involving of allies  had already  faced the same problems in times of the  Korean war in 
the early 1950ies  when the USA facing the opposition of the US allies refused any expansion 
of the Korean War . 
  
 
 
 
 
 
50:IHT February 04,2002, pp.1,3. 
51:IHT February 04,2002, pp.1,3. 
52:IHT February 04, 2002, p.1 . 
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II. Affecting the Union´s interests:  
          Security dilemmata,  revival of nation states and  consistency  
         of coalition-building 
 
1. The  anti-terror coalition in the case of Afghanistan : revival of nation  
state behavior  
 
The hegemonial power of the US,had , in the course of the events after Sept. 11 , sent a 
politically decisive signal to  Europe: the Member States did not pick it up to strengthen  Co  - 
operation within the institutional structure of the Treaty on European Union. Instead, they 
appeared to give more importance to single action by nation states outside the Union´s  
policy-making, thus giving the impression of  a  revival of the nation state concept. 
 
1.1   Nation states joining the anti-terror coalition in self-defence and avoiding the 
  ire of the United States 
 
In the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union , it was the phenomenon of the 
globalization which gave the impression that the role of the nation state had become obsolete 
due to  transnational crossbordering effects of transnational flows of capital and  data 
communications  and  international investments  going bejond reach of nation states´ powers 
to influence the transnational movements of  financial flows  and  the global reach of globally 
acting international companies .  
 
And as to the role of the nation state in security policy of  war prevention and warfare in 
the times of globalization , Campbell said: „Perhaps we have unintentionally sub-scribed 
to the persistent optimism of the prophets of globalization who either inferred or 
explicitly stated that conditions of globalization made a major, sustained conflict most 
unlikely.“  53 
 
The events following the Sept. 11 attacks  had proved the five hundred years old nation state 
to be  still alive :The Al Qaeda terror  while attacking   actors and symbols representing 
globalization did  use  the instruments of globalization as well as devices of modern 
technology  as weapons : long-range yets , the mobile phone , anonymous orders given for 
transnational cash-flows. 
 
 But the nation states´  effective response  detected hidden cash-flows , orbit based satellites 
detected terrorist strongholds, intelligence agencies detected the  commanding key-people of 
the terrorists. Due to American bombs, to Russian  supplies in weapons  delivered to the 
Northern Alliance , support given by Pakistan and  due to consent given by China , the 
Taliban had been defeated. 
 
 
 
53: Campbell,Kurt M. „ Globalization´s First War ? „,The Washington Quarterly,Winter  
       2002, p.8. 
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The nation states did  become members of the coalition because they  had 
instantaneously  realized that the global reach of  the terrorists were threatening the 
dominant role of the nation states to set up the basic rules of  the international actors in 
power politics . And it was, basically,  not friendship with the  United States that the 
respective states wanted to join the coalition club, they were   „  avoiding the ire of the 
United States „ , Miller comments . 54 
The nation states also strengthened their role of being the master within NATO and the 
European Union, both trying to pool nation states´ sovereignties in the field of  foreign, 
security and defence policy: 
 
-- The NATO , after having  invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty declaring the 
attack hit against the NATO member USA  to be an attack against   the  collectivity , against 
the alliance,  NATO, then, had  played rather a marginal role in the field of  decisive 
contributions made to the warfare theatre .  NATO  as  organization was no decisive 
actor . Individual member states of NATO made the decision and took action to 
contribute to the US led war in Afghanistan : the big member states were the actors : 
USA,Britain,France and Germany . 
 
 
1.2 Anti-terror coalition of nation –states :  the European Union  experienced its own  
limits in the case of the war on the Taliban in Afghanistan 
 
The European Union , as a matter of fact , in the course of the events following the Sept. 
11 attacks , had to experience  its own limits . The leading people of  the European  
Union , neither the President of the Commission, Prodi, nor the High Representative for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU , Solana , did  take decisive action in 
matters of deciding on  policy-oriented common- positions and joint actions for military 
contributions to the US led war in Afghanistan .  
The Heads of State or Government , individually and not as members of the European 
Council did take action . The nation states´ democratic , directly elected sovereign 
Parliaments and the national Governments were and  are still the ones to decide on 
matters of life and death , war and peace : what they missed,however, was what they 
definitely should have done : to decide within the EU´s  Council and according to the 
provisions of the Treaty on European Union ruling the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy under title V .  54a  
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
54:  Miller, Stephen E. „ The End of Unilateralism or Unilateralism Redux „ „,The  
        Washington Quarterly,Winter 2002, pp.15 – 29 ( 22 ) .  
 
54a: Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Communities, 24 December  
         2002, C 325/05 ( 13 ). 
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Individual European Union  Member States (here: the Netherlands , Germany etc)-and   
not the European Union´s  Rapid Reaction Force-  which still remained  to be set up -  had 
taken    command over the peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan. As Wessels said : “The 
EU as an organisation was not regarded as a central actor.”  54b . 
 
The high-tech weapons´ performance in Afghanistan  had changed the dynamics and the 
scope of battle and  influenced the strategy of NATO and EU : a Rapid Reaction Force 
of 60.000 soldiers under the complicated institutional system of the EU appeared  not to 
meet the requirement of NATO and EU for an independent strategy design and strategic 
capabilities for strategic military actions on an own account and on the basis of own access 
to strategic high-tech devices of  long-range aircraft  transport facilities , teledetection and  
satellite based data communication systems . 
 
Democratic societies  fear losses of lives , they fear  T.V. reports on dead soldiers arriving 
home . That´s still the background for the growing critics concerning the “ safe “ deployment  
of German military forces in Northern Afghanistan, Mazar-i- Sharif and Kondoz,  where they 
did not have casualties  killed in military action until now in March 2007, while Germany´s 
partners deployed in Southern Afghanistan namely US,Canadian and British Forces have 
deplored soldiers killed in action in increasing fights with Taliban forces. 
If   democratic societies want to avoid their soldiers to come into close contact with  enemies , 
the consequence must be to increase the national defence budget for the purchase of expen-
sive military facilities far beyond the  German defence budget of 1,5 percent  share in 
grossnational product. 
 
 
2. The war on Iraq coalition : the Iraq coalition of nation-states assuming to act in  
      prevention and self-defence. 
USA and     the case of   Great Britain´s joining the war outside the European  
Union´s institutional policy making framework : The EU again experienced its  
 own limits  
 
 
In the case of the US led war on Iraq, the  European Union had to experience its own 
limits again.As a matter of fact ,  the US Government , on the eve of  the war on  Iraq , failed 
to push the UN´s Security Council to endorse a strike on Iraq, and felt free to act unilaterally, 
launching a US led coalition mainly held by the USA and Great Britain.   The leading people 
of  the European Union , neither the President of the Commission, Prodi, nor the High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security policy of the EU , Solana , did  take 
decisive action to cause Great Britain  to consult  within the institutional structure of the 
European Union on the basis of Articles 16 and 3 Treaty on European Union.. It was Great 
Britain , individually and not as Member State of the European Union that took action 
joining the USA, without the endorsement by the  Council of Ministers of the European 
Union: 
 
 
 
54b: Wessels,Wolfgang:”Security and Defence of the European Union.”,contribution to the  
         6th   ECSA   Conference in Brussels, November 2002, p. 24. 
  
 
 
 293
The fact that the European Union did not act  as organisation has had the ill effect that 
the Member States of the European Union did not use the Union´s potential to exert 
political influence in order to mitigate the negative consequences arising out of the 
disastrous wars on the Taliban and on Iraq:  the  severe security dilemmata as follow 
below: 
 
 
3.  Security dilemmata facing the  consistency, sustainablity of coalition  
      building -    The  EU ,  western  values and Islamic World clashing ? 
 
 
Perceptions in the Islamic world  concerning  the fight against international terrorism after 
the September 11 attacks tried to make  the US-led coalition against the Taliban and Al Qaeda 
appear to start a clash between Western values  and the Islamic  world . Bin Laden declared 
war on the Western world. AL Qaeda terrorists were and are claiming they were  defending 
the Islam  against Western aggression and humiliation . 
 
There were those in the Islamic World who judged  the terrorist attacks to be  a just revenge 
for real or imagined injustice,even if they did not approve of terror tactics. 
 
In view of the issue of  a real or potential confrontation between the Islamic world and the 
hegemonial power, the USA and their Allies, there appear two points demonstrating that the 
US-led coalition was and still is facing a substantial security  dilemma : 
 
 
3.1  Security dilemma –coexistence of people with  fundamentally different world 
         views?   
 
In the course of  the events following the Sept. 11 attacks  and  the anti-Taliban/Al Qaida 
coalition building and increasingly throughout the disastrous situation in Iraq there was and is 
facing  the European Union and affecting its international security interests  the crucial issue 
concerning the international security : defenders  of  worldly oriented universal values  of 
freedom and  defenders of  spiritual, religious oriented  „ absolute truth „ : can they coexist ?  
 
„ The strength of an absolute ideology against our moderate societies“, Delpech comments. 55 
Western values are in conflict  with  absolute truth oriented positions held by extremists : 
 
Since the Sept. 11 attacks,launched by non-state terrorism,we can no longer  examine terrorist 
violence for traces of good, utopia or even the folklore of national , cultural or religious 
liberation .It is less possible than even before, to characterize terrorist violence as mistaken 
and wrongful, but nevertheless understandable response to hardship and oppression: terrorist 
violence is, in fact, unacceptable. 
 
Western values:rooting in the enlightenment  fundamental rights of  human dignity,basic  
freedoms, respect for life, rule of law, tolerance, freedom of opinion and speech,  however , 
appear to be in conflict with religion  oriented defenders of a   truth  taken as absolute. The 
problem is the lack of a common basis between extremist fundamentalists and defenders of 
Western values. 
 
 
55  Delpech,Thérèse , The Imbalance of Terror, The Washington Quarterly,Winter 2002, p.38. 
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The one security dilemma  issue is that the US  and the US led international coali- 
tion   claimed that they did  not  fight war against the Islam , but that they defended  
common  universal values by  fighting Islamic extremists who don´t mind using violence. 
 
The security dilemma is that , on the one hand , as respect of different opinion is at the 
core of Western values , civilized people in Western societies duly respect those of other 
faiths or different views at the world. In Islamic countries, however, the public or  
published perception of Western values is often different from Western understanding 
and Western practice, on the other: 
 
Western liberal ways of life and so-called  “ cool “ attitudes are often felt to miss the proper 
manner of respect for other cultural traditions, namely in Islamic countries. This is why US 
strategy has recently acknowledged deficits in the US practice of  US soldiers´  approach  to 
Islamic civilians in Afghanistan and in Iraq and is training US units to prove more respectful 
behavior and to avoid the deliberate or unconscious violation of Islamic values and traditions. 
 
Western values defended by  response to Sept. 11 attacks is the ethic of  individual 
freedom    and tolerance that  opportunities  for all do exist in the  country , that is the 
source of a nation´s unity and strength.Western civilization , western values  tend to 
make  believe  that its enlightenment based  ideas about human rights , individual 
freedom and (in US formulation ) the individual pursuit of happiness -  through 
`opportunities do exist for all `  -  were valid for all the rest of the world . 
 
But people in the Western world have, on the other hand , expressed doubts as to 
whether Islam in general can be reconciled with Western form of society , fundamental 
rights, individual freedom and tolerance, pluralism. They wonder how people with 
different world views will coexist in  Western societies in  the future . For , if it is true that 
Islam is primarily a way of life handed down in religious laws , a way of life whose authority 
comes from the undiminished , unquestioned  word of God , then a sort of coexistence 
appears to be unthinkable: 
 
The theocratic order , which Islam as a whole still appears to be, holds up divine law against 
mere human law . Sovereignty of the people , an idea of the European rooted Enlightenment , 
conflicts with divine sovereignty and an order laid down in law for all situations and all time .  
 
The claim to absolute truth of the Koran collides with the farewell to absolute truth  in 
worldly matters that are not  related to religion that characterizes  the West..  Truth is 
something to be discovered , and not something fixed once and for all. Democracy is open to 
truth in the sense that  all views and beliefs are supposed to take part in peaceful  and open 
discourse. Many in the West doubt about whether both ends can meet . Whereas Mahathir 
bin  Mohamad , prime minister of  Malysia , in his comment , adapted from an address on the 
World Economic Forum meeting  in New York , pointed out   that “ the real Islam is not about 
extremist politics “. 56   
It is in that sense true to speak of a clash of cultures . But it is not a matter of „ the West 
against the Rest „, as Samuel Huntington puts it. It is a matter  of  Islamic claim to an absolute 
truth. Respect of different opinion is at the core of Western values . But fundamental rights , 
freedom of opinion cannot, must not accept a position that denies tolerance and the pluralism 
of  different views. 
 
56:IHT , Febr. 08,2002,p. 4 . 
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Due respect for a sovereign nature of Islam would be a solution to the security dilemma. A 
sovereign   Islam would be characterized  as an Islam that is duly to be respected for the 
historical corpus of religious law, whose conceptions guide the Muslims´  lifelong daily  
routine, presenting no problems in the field of religious rites and that would be compatible 
with democracy.  
 
And  as to the evolutive effect of  the individual´s  pursuit of happiness , according to William  
Pfaff  “ immigration changes the face of the West “, sheer numbers of immigrants had decided 
the matter of adaptation to values in the USA by the American society adapting to the 
immigrants , implying continued evolution of American society away from its Western 
European origins .57 . 
This evolution may be a perspective  for  getting solutions to the security dilemma facing 
western values by demonstrating  how Islamic religion oriented way of life may well coexist 
with Western values of pluralism and tolerance , in a way   to see an Islamic enlightenment 
that ends religious intolerance  , as Thomas L.Friedman underlines . 58 
 
Difficulties , hoewever , may still arise where , in Islamic practice and rites , principles of 
self-determination and individual rights to freedom are restricted in favor of collective rules of 
behavior, including Islamic penal practice. 
 
The security dilemma facing the Western world , however , even if  there might emerge 
perspectives to reconcile , in Islamic practice and rites , individual rights and collective rules 
of behavior , the security dilemma still will be : 
any efforts to discredit bin Laden and his pseudo-Islamic program appear to create little 
opposition against the pseudo-ideas of bin Laden in the Islamic states. Governments and  state 
media in the Arab Middle East are still blaming Israel and the USA for all the troubles of the 
Muslim world , and the Islamic states  have done little to counter bin  Laden´s message by  
improving  their own peoples economic and social situation .59 
 
 
3.2   Security dilemma :  conflict between  fighting against terrorist extremists and  
different perceptions of worldwide US  dominating powers  
 
It is a dilemma facing international security  and the global role of the USA that fighting 
against terrorist extremists is in conflict with perceptions of  worldwide US dominating 
powers :  
 
 
 
 
57: Pfaff ,Wilhelm ,in: IHT,Febr. 7,2002,p.7 . 
58: Friedman Thomas L.,in: IHT,Dec.17,2001, p.6 . 
59: see on  western values and Islamic religion: IHT,Dec. 24-25,2001,p.6 ;   “ The war on  ideas “,  
      editorial comment IHT Dec. 29-30,2001, p. 6; see:Friedman on: Islamic religion,: IHT , January  
      07, 2002. 
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Americans always believed that  American society including Americanization of global 
popular culture represents what is best and most advanced ( „ the Best against the rest „).  
That is  the background for the common, even mistaken , American notion that other peoples 
hate the USA because they envy it. Before Sept. 11 , the USA had a sort of universal 
influence and domination of international society uncomparable to any empires in history.  
 
  
After Sept. 11,  the question is , as raised by Pfaff ,  “ Will the new  world order rest solely on  
American might ?”,  how the US will , in the next two or three decades , make use of its 
power and whether the US will , without imposing itself , be  intellectually and culturally 
dynamic enough  to induce,in the society , a consent on values to be of  identity –shaping 
ethic and moral orientation. 60 
 
Western values were described by Robert Hunter to be USA´s “ empire rules “ dominating an 
unbalanced world .61 
Hunter  insisted that the structures dominated by US rules and that replicate a grossly 
unequal world  should have to be redesigned so that markets working within a new framework  
were to produce more equitable results and thus to avoid , in the long run , that more cohorts 
of partly educated young people grow up in anger and despair and to feel  justified to act as  
vengeful fundamentalists that feel entitled to attack the USA or other industrialized Western 
countries directly. 
 
What is meant by  Hunter´s   description of Western values  to be „ empire rules „ was called 
„  the new Roman empire“  role of the USA : under the headline „ Wir und die anderen",  an  
US American  writer, Jedediah Purdy , had   published in the German weekly “Die 
Zeit”,August 2001, before the Sept. 11 attacks happened . She  raised the question  why the 
USA was hated  and  why  Islamic people , even if abhorrent of war ,  could not help but have 
a sense of  humiliation when thinking of  the US dominant role in  foreign policy , 
international law , economics and culture  throughout the whole  world.  Her answer was that 
the US had no understanding of what Islamic  religion means .61 a 
  
An improved political culture of  mutual understanding is a prerequisite of strategic 
dimension:A stable  relationship between the  anti terror coalition and the Islamic world  
requires  comprehensive actions to ensure international security.   Kai Bird and  Martin 
Sherwin may be interpreted  in that sense :  
Bird and Sherwin called  for a „ smart foreign policy that addresses the underlying grievances 
that foster suicidal rage .“ Referring to U.S. policymakers , who , since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union , have pursued   a „ triumphalist „ stance based on Amerika´s  belief in 
unvulnerability and invincibility as the world´s only superpower, Bird and Sherwin pleaded  
for a „ radically new foreign policy „  committed to „ sound  moral principles „ and based on 
human  rights, a foreign policy “ to encourage the weak and afflicted  to  take  their grievan  - 
 
 
60:  William Pfaff : “ Will the new  world order rest solely on  American might ?”, in: IHT Dec. 29- 
        30,2001,p.6 . 
61:   Robert Hunter Wade´s article on the Roman empire like dominant role of the USA in world  
         economics and world politics, in: IHT Jan. 3 , 2002,p. 7 .  
61 a   Jedediah Purdy , Fellow of New America Foundation,Washington: " Wir und die 
          anderen" ,in : DIE ZEIT , Nr. 35 , August 23, 2001, p. 3. 
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ces to the United Nations , the World Court and the new  International Criminal Court  „  , 
thus calling for a new design in political  culture in the conduct of  foreign and security poli-
cy . 62 
 
Bird and Sherwin recalled  Oppenheimer´s   insistence „ that the purposes of this country in 
the field of foreign policy cannot in any real or enduring way be achieved by coercion. „. 
 
I would add  that foreign policy should not be  reduced to the use of force , but should include 
comprehensive actions of  diplomatic, economic, cultural and political  dialogue and  
technical and financial assistance policy for civil reconstruction in war affected countries  like 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
Unless foreign and security policy conducts that comprehensive approach, international 
security will continue to destabilize. And fighting Islamic extremists, the USA continue to 
risk , through extending their war on the Taliban and  Al Qaeda to Iraq and other countries, to 
forge a coalition between moderate and extremist Islam people. The crucial security issue of 
how to avoid coalitions between moderate Islamic and fundamentalist extremists Islamic 
people and of  how to hold the anti terror coalition together is whether the US-led anti 
terror coalition will be  in the position to take comprehensive actions to make common 
values to be accepted as  convincing driving force behind the anti terror fight . 
 
The real challenge the USA and allies are facing is, therefore,  to take  comprehensive action: 
proving respect for different religious and cultural traditions in Afghanistan and in Iraq, 
implementing a comprehensive approach to restore peace by civilian reconstruction and 
encouraging selfdetermination , thus enhancing credibility of common values bejond the 
use of purely military  instruments – and thus contributing to international security. 
 
 
 
 
3.3  Security dilemma : consistency  of the anti terror coalition and the role     
        of the Israeli – Palestinian  conflict  
 
 
There is still another specific issue characterizing the security dilemma in the light of   
Western positions  conflicting with  positions held in Islamic countries : the Israeli – 
Palestinian conflict 
 
Abhorrent of terrorism , there was a growing feeling of confusion in the Arab world about the 
US role after Sept. 11 , and there was  a growing criticism of US bias toward Israel . The 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict had  become a  core issue for  the international  security  policy 
including  the anti-terrorist coalition building policy, and the unresolved Israeli – Palestinian 
conflict is continuing to be the core issue for the international security in the perception also 
and just of Islamic countries. 
 
62      Kai Bird   and Martin Sherwin : „ A fair foreign policy is the best defense „ ,in: IHT 
          Dec. 13,2001 , p. 7. 
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Many in the Arab world hoped that Sept. 11 was a turning point in the way the USA deals 
with terrorism , in a way that would also move US policy toward bridge-building with the 
Arab world by better taking care of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict , which many in the Arab 
region view as central to US.-Arab relations.  
 
The  Arab world  appears to be disappointed that the USA could live through Sept. 11 and not 
move more forcefully to resolve a dispute that has inflamed and continues to inflame suicide 
bombers and increased the popularity of radical groups in the Islamic Resistance Movements, 
known as Hamas in Palestine and known as Hizbollah (Shiites) in Libanon.. 
  
The war on terrorism , according to Crown Prince Abdullah ibn Abdulaziz, Saudi Arabia´s de 
facto  ruler , was undermined by what he called , in an interview , the indefensible position of 
the United States in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict : “  In  the current environment , we find it 
very difficult to defend America, and so we keep our silence. Because, to be very frank with 
you, how can we defend America ?” 63 
.  
It should not to be forgotten that it  was a growing sort of feeling of humiliation expressed by 
Arab commentators and officials who said  it was  as if the marginalization of  Mr.Arafat had 
become a metaphor for the region as a whole. “ Everybody is baffled, including the leadership 
in the Arab world. Nobody understands the US policy. They don´t know how to deal with it. 
If they tried to convince the public that by following a pro-American stance they can exert 
some influence,it is now out in the open that their influence is near zero .”, a Jordanian 
political scientist,Radwan Abdullah was reported to have expressed  his deep concern .64   
 
At present, in March 2007, the impact the unresolved issue of the Israeli-Palestine does have on 
the security in the Middle East and on international security has even worsened since Sept. 11, 
2001, in view of the disastrous situation in Iraq which fully makes the US Government 
inoperative and weaker than before to prove responsibility through visible determination to 
resolve the Israeli-Palestine conflict. 
 
 
3.4  Security dilemma :  long-term fight against terrorists  and  the danger  
       of  abusing    the basic principles and losing legitimacy 
 
The US- led coalition in Afghanistan was and still is meant to  fight a long-term war against 
terrorists .64 a The survival of the – now NATO led ISAF called coalition- requires the 
principles to be respected , basic principles  in the name of which the coalition fights the war 
under the mandate of the United Nations.As the NATO led ISAF units fighting against the 
reinforced Taliban groups in Afhganistan´s southern parts are under the command of US 
Generals as well as the US led military operation “Enduring Freedom “ are under US 
Generals´ command, there is a security dilemma: 
                                               
63 IHT report Jan. 30,2002,p. 1: “ Saudi Leader Reaffirms Alliance with US“ 
64 IHT report by Howard Schneider, Febr.4,2002,p.5. 
64a:The President of the German Intelligence Agency – BND -,Ernst Urlau, in a public  
        interview,  05 March 2007, Bonn, said that he is uncertain about the outcome of  the  
        long-term fight against fundamentalists´ terrorism.(General Anzeiger Bonn). 
 
 
 
 
 
 299
 
-- the notion „ terrorism „ is ambiguous and  risks being abused to cover any measures against 
minorities in other parts of the worls.. There is a need for creating a convention on what 
terrorism is. 
 
-- Any fights against terrrorists as individuals should respect the rule of international law to 
have a Court  to decide whether prisoners are entitled to treatment under theGeneva 
Convention on Prisoners of  War . 
 
 
 
3.41   Security dilemma : Consistency in the anti terror fight and the ambiguity of the   
           term   „ terrorism „ 
 
The security dilemma in the conduct of   coalition policy is that  the ambiguous notion of  
terrorism may have an ill effect  on  attempts to  hold   international  coalitions together : 
 
International cooperation on international peace and security are challenged by the  fact that  
the term  “ terrorism “ is ambiguous . A legally binding common  definition of the term does 
not exist .   
The war on terrorism is allowing governments to use the term terrorism to seek the protection 
of national sovereignty against any attempts made on behalf of  national minorities to claim 
their rights of self-determination. This is the motivation guiding for example the Russian 
Government´s reluctant position on the Kosovo´s striving for independence from Serbia on 
the basis of  the right of self-determination.This is only one example out of  a number of  
other examples demonstrating the conflict existing between the minorities´ right  of self-
determination and  national governments´ temptation to accuse minorities of terrorism.  
 
The ambiguity of the term “terrorism” ,  the deliberate or unconscious abuse of  the fight 
against international terrorism is the political background of the fact that the US led 
coalition´s efforts to free Afghanistan from bin Laden´s Qaida organization had become  a 
diffuse campaign of global reach.As the conflict between Pakistan and India  about Kashmir 
demonstrated , it is the ambiguity of the term terrorism that each of the longtime rivals 
accused the other of state-sponsored terrorism and threatened cross-bordering retaliation. 
However, after the terrorists´ assault against a “ peace” train from Pakistan in February 2007, 
the Governments of India and Pakistan are just improving cross-border cooperation, both 
countries uniting in the fight against terrorism.  That´s another example to demonstrate the 
crucial issue of  the term “terrorism “ and  the impact the practical use of that term does have 
on  international security. 
 
Consistency in the war  against terror,however, needs to  recognize the difference between 
legitimate democratic movements from rogue groups using violence to promote their 
objectives . What is needed for  holding the international anti-terrorist coalition together is a 
Convention to define and fight terrorism.65 
 
 
65 David L.Philipps “ Wanted , a Covenant to define and fight terrorism”,  IHT Jan. 4 ,2002,  
     p.6 . 
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3.42   Security dilemma : Security issues in cases of emergency ( terrorists´attacks  
                                             prevention )  and  respecting the rules of international law   
                                             (treatment of Taliban and AL  Qaeda detainees,  
                                              treatment of prisoners in Iraq) 
 
 The US were risking international credibility and consistency in the war against terror  as   
the US,initially , refused  to apply the  procedural protections of the Geneva Convention on 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War  to  former Taliban and  Al Qaida fighters to be or not to be 
prisoners of war . 
 
Claims of prisoner of war status cannot be decided by a government but must be resolved by 
the kind of legal hearing by a “ competent tribunal “ that the Convention requires , and that 
detainees  shall remain protected under the convention  until their status  has been decided – 
concerning  the  suspected terrorists held captive at the US Navy base at Guantanamo Bay in 
Cuba.66  
 
The initial decision of the US administration  that Taliban and Al Qaida fighters were not 
entitled to the procedural protections of the Geneva Convention  had alarmed most of US 
allies .67  
The allies called for  applying America´s  standards of justice in the name of which and  for 
the purpose of defending the Western standards of values and of the rule of law the US led 
coalition had fought against the terrorists . The allies reasoned that lack of due respect for  
the rules of the Geneva Convention would endanger international security by 
undermining the credibility of the USA and also potentially endangering future Western 
troops who may fall into enemy hands.68 
 
The US government, actually, responded to the allies´ pleas and excluded  AL Qaeda terrorist 
network detainees from the protection under the Geneva Convention, but encluded  detainees 
who had fought for Afghanistan´s Taliban.  
 
At stake was and still is the  credibility of the USA, by respecting International Law , on the 
one hand , and the international security , on the other : International Security may , in 
specific cases , require to interrogate detainees held at Guantanamo in order to get 
informations on pending  terrororists´ plans to further launch attacks. Interrogating , under the 
rules of the Geneva Convention , on other issues than name , rank and military unit , is not 
allowed , but appears to be justified if , in cases of apparent emergency , interrogating is the 
only option to prevent severe damages to lives of the people targeted by terrorists. 
  
It is also a credibility issue applying America´s standards of justice to the Guantanamo  detai-  
nees´  rights to trial in a court of law. And no doubt : the inhuman  treatment of  Iraqi priso-
ners in US military prisons  (tortures in Abu Ghraib ) was contradictory to the rule of law the 
US led coalition  had and has fought to depose Saddam Hussein and to help installing the rule 
of  law. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
66 IHT Jan. 29,2002,p.3 on dispute over detainees ;  US government  split on detainees´status 
and the applicabilty of Geneva Conventions see IHT report , Jan. 28,2002,p.1,3 . 
67 IHT Jan. 30,2002, p. 8 , editorial comment “ Prisoners of War “. 
68 see also Lee Dembart´s article “ A law –abiding America is safer “ in:IHT,Jan. 
30,2002,p.8. 
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4.   Security dilemma : winning the war  and winning the peace  
 
4.1     Winning the war on Taliban and  peacekeeping  for reconstruction in Afghanistan 
 
Stability , peace and security in Afghanistan will depend on a successful civil reconstruction 
in Afghanistan. Military, social and economic instabilities foster extremist groups and 
encourage them to organize local and regional revolts against the central Government under 
President Hamid Karsai and against the ISAF , the   
 
It was readily seen in December 2001 what at present, in March 2007, is still apparent under 
the return of the Taliban to organize military resistance and suicide-bombings against the US-
led ISAF/NATO operations in Afghanistan:  
Winning the war on Taliban will take not to ignore the reconstruction work while peace- 
keeping is not easy.69.  
 
The security dilemma throughout the last five years is: 
 
- the administration´s reluctance to  accept that reconstruction requires increasing numbers 
of  foreign peacekeepers ,  
- the Taliban  has benefited from that reluctance and returned back to Afghanistan, but 
civilian  reconstruction requires peace-keeping through improved military presence e.g. by 
the planned deployment  of   German Tornado reconnaissance aircrafts in 2007, 
 
- by laying out ambitious goals but refusing to provide the necessary civil reconstruction 
funds and investmnents,the administration is risking the total loss of  national prestige that 
the initially successful military campaign had generated. „American credibility in 
attacking the next sponsor of   terrorism would be compromised „  without  massive 
reconstruction efforts.  
   
The war on Taliban is not won yet: there are southern provinces with major security problems 
because of  increased amounts  of  armed attacks and  suicides´  bombings, with major 
security problems namely because of the announcement of  a  Taliban led military offensive 
expected for spring 2007. No doubt, increased  military operations would further delay the 
progress of civil reconstruction assistance projects in Southern provinces of Afghanistan for 
rebuilding the state under the United Nations´sponsored Bonn Accords ( 27 November until 
05 December 2001 ) and on the basis of   the Constitution, in force since 26 January 2004. 
.. 70 
 
The core requirement for successful  reconstruction is  peace. As to the intentions of the still 
existing Taliban groups , as well as to the intentions of the different powerful warlords ruling 
in Afghanistan, there is still uncertainty about restoring stability and  peace in Afghanistan. 
 
 
 
69: IHT, Dec. 13,2001, editorial comment,p.6. 
70: IHT, November 4, 2003,p.5 “ Afghans´blueprint for future”. 
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4.2 Winning the war  i n   Iraq  : winning the peace through  reconstruction ?     
 
The  disastrous security situation in Iraq is  worldwide well-known. The new US defence 
Secretary, Robert Gates, shares the nationwide common opinion that the war in Iraq cannot  
be won. Civil war like violent conflicts between Sunnites and Shiites, daily suicide bombings 
with lethal casualties among civilians and among the US led coalition soldiers do not stop.  
While winning the war – who exactly was and is in the eyes of the US led coalition  the 
enemy?-  is not imaginable, winning the peace in Iraq would depend on: 
 
 finding out who is ready and able to be speaker of the  Shiites and Sunnites and to talk 
together on ways to peace in Iraq, and 
 integrating Iraq´s  main neighbours, Syria, Iran, Saudi.Arabia, in internatonal talks on 
Iraq´s  security and cooperation for civil reconstruction. 
 International assistance to civil reconstruction. 
 
 
Winning the peace in Iraq may require even more than successful “  mere “  economic, 
social reconstruction works : it may require to win the Iraq War III : 
 
 
The USA, in summer 1990, had thought   it won the first Iraq war in 100 hours, but lost the 
peace to Saddam Hussein and  his Baathist followers.  The USA,in November 2001, thought  
the US led coalition  won the second Iraq war decisively in one week, but Saddam Hussein,  
his murdering  Baathist party and his imported terrorists chose to run away from the open 
battlefield  and to fight from  underground. The US led coalition lost the peace to Saddam 
Hussein before and after his execution end of Dcember 2006: the world , obviously,was and 
still is watching the war theatre of Iraq War III.  The US led coalition is fighting on several 
war fronts: 
the  people of Iraq´s Shiite south and Kurdish north – 80 percent of the population of 23  
million – are making progress toward reconstruction and self -governance. 
 
During Saddam Hussein´s lifetime and  after his execution end of December 2006,  the main 
battle field of Iraq War III  was  the Sunni triangle, the area around Baghdad,where Saddam 
Hussein´s sons and secret police long victimized other Iraqis. The terrorist´s aim was  to 
increase suffering by driving out the United Nations amd Red Cross relief workers. Another 
aim was  to assassinate Iraqi leaders and police officers who dared to cooperate with the 
liberation forces of the US led coalition. The key goal appered  to kill enough Americans to 
cause the US public to want the US  withdrawal from Iraq. Public pressure on the US Iraq 
policy increased  even  more after the elections to the US Congress in autumn 2006. A 
premature and total withdrawal of the US appears unrealistic and would worsen the civil war 
like situation: risking  Iraq to split apart :  Shiites in the south would set up a nation under the 
protection of  Iran.  Kurds in the  north would  try to break away into an independent 
Kurdistan. That would  probably induce Turkey,worried about separatism among its own 
Kurds, to seize the Iraqi oil fields of Kirkuk  And as to the  Sunni triangle, Baghdad would 
then become the arsenal of terrorism, importer and exporter of nukes, bioweapons and 
missiles. 
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The stretagic question to be answered by the USA and by all those  concerned with 
international security is what are the alternative options to be chosen in order to prevent what 
may happen as described above. Either the US troops stay in Baghdad until winning the Iraq 
war III  and winning the peace by fulfilling the prerequisites for Iraq´s  political  and 
economic stability including stable federal structures guaranteeing minorities. Or the USA 
withdraw too soon, thereby encouraging terrorism. 
 
The strategic objective that may be agreed upon on both sides of the USA – EU  
transatlantic relationship is:   
any actions to be taken by the military and civilian authorities of the US led coalition to win 
the Iraq War III and to win the peace in Iraq should not encourage terrorism.  
 
The  open question is  how to achieve this strategic objective?  
 
What are the adequate tactical actions and instruments ? 
 
Both  questions should  be discussed within the framework of  a   transatlantic  USA-EU 
partnership. The basics of  that partnership should be identified  in view of common 
challenges to international security. This includes the willingness and readiness of both sides 
to agree on common criteria for  adequate burden-sharing related to military contributions and 
to civil reconstruction contributions. 
 
 
D.    Conclusion :  
 
 
Chapter IX  exemplifies this study´s method  of  applying  the lesson taken from 
European integration history  to current issues  and to future challenges to the 
European Union,  here in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy focussing 
on the Union´s experience made in the years 2001-2003 after the September 11 attacks  
and on the current crucial issue of international security and cooperation politics of how 
to overcome the deadlock in Iraq and the serious prospect of another deadlock in 
Afghanistan. 
 
 
1. The facts displayed in Chapter IX  demonstrate the way of  response given by the 
European Union to the international security situation in the years 2001 – 2003 after the   
Sept. 11 2001 attacks, namely to the international coalition building under the US 
leadership. Apart from joint political solidarity addresses immediately given by the 
European Union as organization, this was the only contribution the European Union 
made as an organization. In the field of common foreign and security policy, namely in 
the field of defence policy, Europe´s contribution to the international military response 
of the anti terror coalition  in 2001/2002/2003 after the  Sept. 11 attacks   was the 
individual nation states´ contribution. Although the Treaty establishing the European 
Union clearly required Member States to consult one another within the Council of 
Ministers before undertaking action, single Member States joined the US led wars, and 
the European Union as well as NATO as  organizations of their  Member States´ 
collectivity  had been bypassed.  
 
NATO´s initial military contribution –surveillance AWACS aircrafts to  help secure US 
territory – did not play any decisive role in the Afghanistan 
 304
anti-terrorist ( Al Qaida ) surveillance operations run by NATO ( German ) navy  
vessels deployed around Somalia play any decisive role for the course  of the Iraq War 
II. And the present military contributions made, actually, by NATO,in the case of 
Afghanistan, and  led by US Generals largely depends on the dominating US military 
strategy and capacities, including the German Airforce Tornado reconnaissance 
aircrafts. The point is that no formal consultation is being made within the European 
Union´s Council though this is a crucial matter of the European Union´s  “ Common 
Foreign and Security Policy”. 
  
In view of the disastrous “security” situation in Iraq, international coalition building , 
after initial widespread rhetoric of  unlimited solidarity, is facing , at present , a crucial 
period of uncertainties about the further development of the USA foreign and security 
policy . It is a still open question whether international security policy will  build 
coalitions  and sustain multilateralism , whether  theworld will collectively police 
international security or not at all . 
 
2.     This is the European Union´s chance to contribute to influence  the further policy 
making in international security politics, especially to influence the strategies on winning 
the peace in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and , actually, to influence further the political 
decision-making on extending anti –terror actions to other  potential war theatres , e.g. 
Iran,by pleading for negotiations on the basis of mutual  respect. Taking the lesson from  
the European “friendly” behaviour of some EU Member States formerly excluding the 
Union´s institutions, the Member States should now properly  respect their own legal 
and political commitment under the Treaty on European Union and consult each other 
before undertaking any action concerning winning the peace in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
The European Union will have to design a comprehensive foreign and security policy 
including defence policy for common strategies, positions and joint actions  that are  not 
limited to military actions only ( the whole range of EU´s  instruments available for 
contributions to civil recon-struction in Afghanistan and Iraq). 
 
For, what the European Union, bejond purely  military contributions made by single EU 
Member States after consultation within the Council and bejond the Union´s joint 
capacities of Member States´ and Union´s technical and financial assistance to civil 
reconstruction,  can contribute   to international security: 
 
It  is a political invaluable know-how: developed since the signing of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community for Coal and Steel and on larger scale since the 
signing of the Treaty of Rome, exactly 50 years ago, on March 25, 1957,  after the 
experiences made in World War II , it is the basic and well practiced idea of 
cooperation: to show countries like the shattered Iraq how to overcome the disastrous 
situation starting from zero: 
 
 by designing and  constructing  the cooperation of different nationalities  through  
 safeguarding the identities of   different nationalities and 
  establishing a Community, a federation by 
 
 pooling parts of  sovereignties and 
 
 jointly exercising them 
 to achieve common objectives  
 through common institutions and decisions 
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 according to common rules  
 agreed upon on the  basis of  equality and solidarity. 
 
What the European Union can contribute- in terms of high political added value - 
 is the experience that international security cannot  be achieved  a g a i n s t  each other ,  but 
through  cooperation only : 
 
The European Union developed common political objectives  and instruments to  
implement  a security policy that is including  cooperation policies and instruments  
reaching bejond  a mere military oriented approach to international security and 
covering  a  variety of  political , economic, social , diplomatic and military security 
policies. The common security policies  are implemented by interdependent and 
complementary  cooperation  of  Union level and Member States´ levels : 
 
practicing a combined system of integration and cooperation, thus balancing the needs 
of national sovereignty and common objectives that can better be achieved by the 
Community of Member Countries than by single nation state action and better be 
achieved within a Union created among the peoples of Europe who can identify 
themselves with the democratic, transparent Union that is close to the citizen and 
decisive to guarantee the citizens´ rights to peace, security and freedom.  
 
Whatever the residuals of national sovereignty just in the field of defence policy are: the 
Member State is committed to prove solidarity and to consult within the Council before 
undertaking single nation state action. 
 
 
 
General Conclusion 
 
It is this study´s method  to    apply  the lesson taken from the dynamically gradual 
stages in European integration history  to  the evaluation of current issues challenging 
the  European Union, namely the issue of how to overcome the present deadlock of the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Improving the European Union´s identity 
by making the enlarged Union work, improving the Union´s constitutional essentials - 
democracy, transparency and decisiveness: whether 
 
 through political intervention by  establishing a formal text labelled 
“Constitution” and,by doing so, thus giving the impression to invest a new order, 
a static order similar to the static nature of nation state´s Constitution,  or  
 through improving the existing Founding Treaties on European Union and 
European Community along the traditional line of the dynamic, gradual 
evolvement of the  European integration and cooperation- 
 
that´s the focal issue of the present study.  
 
The study´s method of applying the lesson taken from European integration history is 
exemplified in chapter IX also, applying the findings to the Union´s role played in the 
field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy focussing on the Union´s experience 
made in the years 2001-2003 after the September 11 attacks  and on the current crucial 
issue of international security and cooperation politics of how to overcome the deadlock 
in Iraq and the serious prospect of another deadlock in Afghanistan. 
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This study has undertaken to describe the dynamic nature of the stepwise, gradual 
development of the European integration through further improving the  constitutional 
quality essentials under the Founding Treaties, namely the principles of democracy, 
transparency and decisiveness. The European integration has owed its successes to the 
Monnet method of integration, gradually,dynamically developing the European 
Community and the European Union as an ever closer Union among the peoples of 
Europe,  but intentionally keeping open the exact final design of  the Union, its 
“finalité”, and just  due to this openness facilitating the integration policy. The openness 
about the Union´s final design helped  to avoid the revitalization of, in some Member 
States, still existing misunderstandings concerning the nature of the European Union, 
still believing that any   federal or quasi federal nature of the European Union would be 
synonymous with “central state “ or would lead the Union to become a European 
Superstate.  
The Monnet integration method, therefore,  also experienced its limits, facing a dilemma 
of how to continue  the successful integration process without giving a clear final design 
of the European Union. The more the EU enlarged with now twentyseven members, the 
more the doubts about the Union´s identity,namely its decisiveness, increased ,and thus 
the Union´s need of legitimacy increased requiring  broad democratic approval by the 
European citizens. The European cititens´ broad approval,however, requires the citizens 
to understand the nature of the European Union. This does not necessarily mean to 
present a final design of the Union to the citizens.  
Surely, a European  identity feeling would be difficult  to develop and  maintain if the 
citizens are facing an technocrat´s integration method only. Establishing a constitution 
can be taken as giving an European identity building  political impulse. But establishing 
a Constitution  can also be taken as an act of political intervention, it can be 
misunderstood, in the view of the citizens,  as a final design of  the European Union. 
 
A final design of the European Union,if undertaken at the wrong time, would risk to 
raise misunderstandings about what the European Union is.  The European identity is 
still being shaped, still having to  sharpen a common conviction of  an European Union 
which is balancing liberal economic market policy and social responsibility and 
solidarity policy as well to cope with the globalization challenges. The European identity 
shaping is still ongoing, there does not yet exist a Europeanwide common conviction of 
the constituting common basic objectives and values concerning the basic correlation 
between  economic  liberties and social responsibilities and solidarity. Within the 
Member Countries of the European Union there is still continuing the dynamic process 
of creating an ever closer Union among the peoples, and not of the Member States, 
according to the tradition and to the well established procedures under the Founding 
Treaties. This identity shaping dynamic process should not severely be damaged by a 
political intervention in the way of establishing a “constitution” at the wrong time and in 
the wrong way. Presenting such a legal document formally called “constitution”, would 
give the impression of  establishing a static nature of the European Union, thus 
confusing the dynamic nature of the European identity which is still “under 
construction” and  successful just due to the openness of the Union´s final design.  
 
The European Union,therefore, should leave the formal issue of how to achieve entire 
ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.  and should continue 
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with the still existing essentials of a constitutional quality of the European Union, thus 
avoiding the misunderstanding potential the term “constitution” still does arise as far as 
the nature of the European Union is concerned. Improving the essentials of the Union´s 
constitutional quality and incorporating them in a text should, ín any case, avoid 
labelling any new text with the term “constitution”,and thus following the wisdom of  
the Founding fathers of the European Community/European Union using a legal and 
political framework´s openness necessary to gradually unite the peoples of Europe. 
 
 
The enlargement of the European Union –now the Union of the Twentyseven-  had 
rightly once been conceived that enlargement b e f o r e  being implemented should be 
preceded by a fundamental reform of the way in which the EU institutions operate, 
being democratically accountable, transparent, with a view to both the efficiency and 
decisiveness of the Union in its various policy fields .  A  deepening of the European 
Union, not in the sense of adding new policy powers but of maintaining the Union´s 
capacity to act effectively, both inwardly and outwardly, close to the European citizen: 
that had been considered to be necessary, constituting   the common consent reached 
among the Union´s Member States after the Maastricht Treaty on European Union had 
entered into force and when the Copenhagen summit of the Union´s Heads of State and 
Government had given  perspectives for Central and Eastern European Countries to 
accede  to the Union.  
 
The Member States, however,  did not what they had promised:they did not deepen the 
European Union before enlargement, they were not ready to make the Union more 
efficient. The Member States had lost their  basic   momentum: they did not take the 
chance given by the  IGC which had been supposed to make sufficient progress to 
achieve reforms of the decision-making namely in the Council of the European Union. 
Nor did the Amsterdam Treaty on European Union, nor did the Nice Treaty on 
European Union make comprehensive contributions  to the needs of  the Union´s  
democratic accountability, transparency and both decisiveness and efficiency. 
 
The Member States even failed to let the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
be ratified and thus failing to  take the chance of  deepening the Union first by streng- 
thening  the Union´s democratic accountability and decisiveness before enlarging  when 
the Union became the Union of the Twentyfive on January 1st 2005. Now, the Union 
being a Union of the Twentyseven, since January 1st, 2007,  it is facing the challenge to 
rescue the essentials of the Treaty on Constitution as outlined above. And it is still not 
clear how and when the essentials of the Treaty on Constitution can be rescued, whether 
by a concise amendment to the Treaty on Constitution, but without labelling it 
“constution”   or by amendment to the existing Treaty on EU. Both options have a 
chance of being accepted by the public in the European Union if the text is  concise 
enough and contains  constitutional quality essentials only, by drawing up 
 
 the objectives of the Union (  raison d´Etre): anchor of stability for the peoples in 
the Union: to ensure peace, security, respect for human life and dignity 
 safeguarding fundamental rights and the rule of law 
 basic tasks and instruments 
 guided by basic principles : democracy, transparency and decisiveness 
 institutions, basic tasks 
 procedures subject to implementing European laws(regulations) 
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throughout a newly run procedure of  an Intergovernmental Conference. An 
Intergovernmental Conference will have to ensure the professional political approach 
including the respect for democratic accountability of a European Union close to the 
citizens: ratification procedures will be successful  if a European public will be 
encouraged  to accompany the discussions  of experts and to realize if and why the 
citizens of Europe can identify with the European Union- as democratic, transparent 
and decisive to meet the vital needs of the peoples of Europe. 
 
The following main findings of the study´s method of applying the lesson taken from 
European integration history  to the Union´s role played in the field of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy  in the years 2001-2003 after the September 11 attacks  and 
to  the current crucial issue of international security and cooperation politics of how to 
overcome the deadlock in Iraq and the serious prospect of another deadlock in 
Afghanistan through the European Union´s contributions to multilateral actions 
determined to help winning the peace in Afghanistan and Iraq focussing on civil 
reconstruction bejond merely military actions. 
 
 
The European Union may contribute by using the developed common political 
objectives  and instruments to  implement  a security policy that is including  
cooperation policies and instruments  reaching bejond  a mere military oriented 
approach to international security and covering  a  variety of  political , economic, social, 
diplomatic and military security policies. The common security policies  are 
implemented by interdependent and complementary  cooperation  of  Union level and 
Member States´ levels : 
 
practicing a combined system of integration and cooperation, thus balancing the needs 
of national sovereignty and common objectives that can better be achieved by the 
Community of Member Countries than by single nation state action and better be 
achieved within a Union created among the peoples of Europe who can identify 
themselves with the democratic, transparent Union that is close to the citizen and 
decisive to guarantee the citizens´ rights to peace, security and freedom.  
 
Whatever the residuals of national sovereignty just in the field of defence policy are: the 
Member States are committed to prove solidarity and to consult one another  within the 
Council before undertaking single nation state action, and this legal obligation to consult 
one another should be reaffirmed and incorporated in a Treaty text containing the 
above mentioned other essentials of  the constitutional quality of the European Union. 
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